



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>









SOCIOLOGY

THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN SOCIETY

BY

J. H. W. STUCKENBERG, LL.D.

MEMBER OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF BERLIN

AUTHOR OF "INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY," "INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY," "LIFE OF IMMANUEL KANT," ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

The Knickerbocker Press

1903

HM51
S9
v. 2

SPRECKELS

COPYRIGHT, 1903

BY

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Published, May, 1903

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE THREE GREAT ERAS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION	3
247. Structural Basis for the Division into Three Eras.	
THE FIRST ERA OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION	
XVII.—THE CONSANGUINE ORGANISATION	7
248. Basis of our Knowledge of this Era. 249. The Controlling Factor. 250. Sensation and Mental Reaction. 251. The Emotional Nature. 252. The Will. 253. The Relation of the Consanguinity to the Sociality. 254. Man's Stage at the Beginning. 255. Primitive Man the Roadmaker. 256. Basis of this Era in the Sexual Relation. 257. Solidarity and Distinctions in the Family. 258. Evolution on the Basis of the Family. 259. Early Marital Relations. 260. Promiscuity. 261. Intensity of the Sexual Passion. 262. Monogamy. 263. Spread of the Kinship. 264. Process of Differentiation. 265. Special Callings in Families. 266. Government. 267. The Rulers. 268. Variety in the Governments.	
XVIII.—INADEQUACY OF THE CONSANGUINE ORGANISATION	36
269. Disintegration of the Consanguinity. 270. Unity of Worship. 271. Power of Religion. 272. Causes which Demand a New Organisation. 273. Totemism. 274. What Individualisation Accomplished. 275. Woman's Place in Primitive Culture. 276. Origin of Property. 277. Characteristics of this Era. 278. Fundamental Character. 279. Some Points Reviewed. 280. Effect of Migrations. 281. The New Problem.	
THE SECOND OR POLITICAL ERA OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION.	
XIX.—THE STATE	65
282. Sociological Conception of the State. 283. Origin of the State. 284. Transition from the Consanguine to the Political Era. 285. Localities which Favoured Political Institutions. 286. The Family Relation within the State. 287. Citizenship and	

Territory. 288. Characteristics of the State. 289. The Peculiar Authority of the State. 290. Political Authority and the Freedom of the Citizens. 291. Room for Movement. 292. The State and the Individual. 293. Sovereignty. 294. How the State Expresses itself. 295. Constitution, Laws, and Politics. 296. The State and the Social Organisations within its Borders.

XX.—SOCIAL EVOLUTION WITHIN THE STATE AND PREPARATION FOR THE THIRD ERA

93

297. Culture within the State. 298. Militarism. 299. The State and Economics. 300. The Cultural State. 301. Political Responsibility in a Republic. 302. Evils in Republics. 303. Non-Political Forces within the State. 304. Influence of the State on other Societies. 305. The Constitutional Forces in the State. 306. Value of Writing. 307. Æsthetics Promoted. 308. Political Institutions and Ethics. 309. Religion. 310. Intellect. 311. Review and Summary. 312. A State Compared with Human Life. 313. Is the State the Ultimate Organisation? 314. Sovereignty of the State. 315. This Sovereignty Tested. 316. Absolute Sovereignty Virtually Abandoned.

THE THIRD OR INTERNATIONAL ERA OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION.

XXI.—INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

135

317. Interaction of States. 318. Demand for New Organisation. 319. How Epochs are Evolved. 320. The State and the Organisation of the Larger Relations. 321. Relation between Nationalism and Internationalism. 322. Injustice of States to each other. 323. Limitations of Statesmen. 324. Origin of Modern Wars. 325. Value of the State and Injustice of Statesmen. 326. Movement toward Internationalism. 327. Basis of Internationalism. 328. Anomaly of the Situation. 329. False Training. 330. The Education Needed. 331. International Law. 332. The Sphere of International Control. 333. The Rules for International Intercourse. 334. The Violation of Agreements.

XXII.—THE TREND TOWARD INTERNATIONALISM IN PEACE CONGRESSES AND IN OTHER MOVEMENTS

163

335. Peace Congress at The Hague. 336. Points of Agreement. 337. Court of Arbitration. 338. Sovereignty Jealously Guarded. 339. How States can Aid each other in Disputes. 340. Power of the Press in Questions of War. 341. Economic

Contents

V

PAGE

Questions and National Competition. 342. Spheres of Interests as Basis of Union. 343. Federation and Congress of Nations. 344. Hope Respecting Peace. 345. Supernationalism. 346. Processes Leading to the Organisation of the Society of Nations. 347. How Internationalism is to be Promoted. 348. Educational Demands.

THIRD DIVISION — SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS

XXIII.—NATURE AND AIM OF SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS 197

349. Former Exclusion of Ethics from Sociology. 350. Justification of Sociological Ethics. 351. Present and Increasing Demand for Ethical Considerations. 352. Limit of Sociological Ethics. 353. The Subject Involved in the Nature of Society. 354. The Ethical Conception of Society. 355. The Test of Ethical Judgments. 356. Sociological Ethics and Social Progress.

XXIV.—THE SOCIAL IDEAL 215

357. Basis of the Social Ideal in Society. 358. The Ultimate Aim Social, not Individual. 359. Social Perfection. 360. Two Senses of Social Perfection. 361. Demand on Social Forces and their Organisation. 362. Ethical Relation of Associations. 363. Place of an Association in the Total Social Organism. 364. Importance of the Social Content in Progress. 365. Influence of Rank and Class on the Content. 366. New Organisations. 367. Special Needs. 368. Value of the Social Ideal.

XXV.—THE SOCIAL ACTUALITY 238

369. Conditions of Social Progress. 370. Evolution of the Ethical Spirit. 371. What is Involved in Ethical Progress. 372. Relation of the Social Actuality to Progress. 373. How to Study the Characteristics of the Age. 374. Ethical Adaptation. 375. Crises and Investigation. 376. Critical Construction. 377. Growth of Society and the Individual. 378. What Social Realism Includes. 379. Impediments to Progress. 380. Feeling and Progress. 381. Altruism.

XXVI.—PRINCIPLES FOR CHANGING THE SOCIAL ACTUALITY INTO THE SOCIAL IDEAL 259

382. Difficulties in Progressive Movement. 383. Ethology. 384. Distinction between Self-Interest and What Interests. 385. Reconciliation of Egoism and Altruism. 386. Unconscious Activity. 387. Development of Society and its Conditions. 388. Society Enslaved by the Conditions it Creates. 389. Culture of

	PAGE
Society. 390. Existing Degradation and the Way Out. 391.	
Change in the Spirit of Society. 392. Capitalisation and Promi-	
nent Factors in Social Progress. 393. How Individual Becomes	
Social Culture. 394. Continued Influence of Great Personalities.	
395. Personal Responsibility Increased in Social Action. 396.	
The Progressive Mind. 397. Political Ethics. 398. Social Syn-	
thesis and Perfection. 399. No Finality Possible, but Certain	
Principles Needed. 400. Vital Problems. 401. What has been	
Attained. 402. Conclusion.	
APPENDIX.	297
INDEX.	323

THE THREE GREAT ERAS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION



THE THREE GREAT ERAS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

247. The preceding discussion of the Nature, the Causes, and the General Characteristics of social evolution aimed to present such features as apply more or less to all social development, without taking into account the particular stages through which society passes. After the general characteristics have been considered it is advisable to take up certain dominant stages of evolution in order to obtain their most typical features. Since evolution takes place in time, it is most natural to follow the chronological order in dealing with the various stages of progress attained. Here the question of division confronts us. We might discuss savage, barbarian, semi-civilised, and civilised peoples, thus making four divisions. But, as we have seen, there is no agreement respecting the characteristics of these classes. Who can discriminate closely between the savage and the barbarian, between the semi-civilised and the civilised? Especially for prehistoric times is this division impracticable.

Perhaps we can find some general scheme which includes the above classes, reveals significant successive stages of evolution, and gives a summary view of the entire process of development. The social *structure* establishes the basis for such a scheme. The general structure of an era furnishes the outlines within which all the movements take place. Social development will become clearer if we find a succession of social structures through which society passes in the evolution of its forces.

So far as the course of humanity can be surveyed we find that in primitive times the *Family* was the central idea and nucleus of social life, determining the character and extent of the sociality. The dominance of the family is followed by that of the *State*. But there are indications that the *State* is not the ultimate social structure. There is a tendency toward a union of states for various purposes, offensive and defensive, which can be included under the head of *Internationalism*. These successive phases will be discussed as the *Consanguine*, the *Political*, and the *International Eras*.

While the structural basis is thus adopted for the division, it will be found that each era has characteristics other than structural which mark it as distinct from the rest. The first era lacks the cultural elements of the second, so that its contents are much lower. While all the eras have much in common, each also has peculiarities. The second gives a prominence to the higher forces which the first lacks, and the third transcends the principles and ideas of the second. The discussion will bring out the peculiarities in the social forces and their relative dominance. The first era includes primitive, savage, and barbarian peoples; the second is the era of civilisation or of political institutions; the third is in its beginnings, though it seems to be essentially the era of the future. While the three eras succeed each other historically, they may also be synchronous, as in the present we have the first and second eras and seem to be emerging into the third. So far as influence is concerned, however, this is predominantly the political era.

There are, strictly speaking, no primitive peoples in existence. But we can treat as primitive all those who belong to the first era, thus including savages and barbarians. They are primitive as compared with the eras that follow.

THE FIRST ERA OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER XVII

THE CONSANGUINE ORGANISATION

248. Although it is the prehistoric era on which we now concentrate our attention, we find survivals of it in existing savages and barbarians, who continue to live the life of the remote past. But while studying this era in peoples of our own time we come upon many diversities, and frequently it is impossible to tell which is the older and to what the variations are due. Is the diversity due to influences that affected the development which started from a common origin, or to the fact that the evolution began at different points, the diversity resulting from the difference in the original seeds which have been unfolded?

Invaluable as the relics of the distant past are, they are limited in kind and give but meagre revelations of the social life. Nor can we determine how far they go back, or the age of the human family when the oldest known relics were made. We cannot learn what development preceded the rudest flint implement which has come down to our day.

249. Many of the preceding inquiries have prepared us to understand the infancy and childhood of the human family. Some of the statements made in the first volume are here recalled, because they are essential for a clear apprehension of what follows. Many characteristics of this era are due to the fact that man is so largely under the control of natural conditions. It could not be otherwise with crude man in crude nature. We therefore look for the closest affinity between man and the animal

world, for the reign of natural selection, the prevalence of the biological factors, and the dominance of the constitutional forces. Mental possessions are yet to be acquired and organised. Ideals have not been evolved as the guide of life, reason exists only in embryo, there is no basis in thought and thinking for thoughtfulness, the will has not been disciplined into systematic effort, and therefore instinct takes the place of a conscious and purposive aim. Man's superior endowment differentiates him from the animals to which his mode of life closely relates him; but his physical needs and organic impulses, the solicitations of his natural environment, and his relations to his fellow-men are the main factors which determine his course. Without a rudder, almost without an oar, he moves on the stream of time as directed by his conditions and circumstances.

Physical need and supply are the first considerations in the life of man and the whole animal world. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 98: "Every institution of mankind which attains permanence will be found linked with a perpetual want."

250. We can construct the general scheme according to which the earliest human life was conducted. Primitive man dealt with facts, not with reflection, abstractions, or generalisations. The facts, limited to a small area, appealed to him mainly so far as they pertained to his immediate needs. In his life of sensations the facts were taken, uncritically, for what they appeared to his uncultivated mind. Only generation after generation could the experience be acquired which enabled him to interpret them and put them into their proper relations. Without an accumulation of thought, without reflection, no prominence could be given to the mind in drawing inferences from them. The unorganised mind reflected the objects as presented. But it was more than a mirror. It received lasting impressions, it had a moulding influence

on the facts themselves, and its living powers were exercised in dealing with the sensations. Without writing, with language in its first formative stages, there was little mental communication, and the social life was very meagre. There was hardly anything to transmit to a succeeding generation and the means of transmission were in the most rudimentary stage. The first generations depended for their mental store almost exclusively on personal observation and experience. The small intellectual possession, acquired so laboriously, was clung to tenaciously. It had a monopoly of the mind and became the nucleus around which other material centred. Slowly past impressions were concentrated into general notions, and from these ever larger generalisations were drawn. Observation itself had to be learned. Counting, a kind of elementary thinking, was a slow process. Spatial relations became evident because the objects in space were constantly obtruding themselves on the attention. Time appealed less directly to the senses, required keener mental perception, and its experience was limited, the past having not as yet filled the storehouse of the memory. Hence, the notions of sequence, of cause and effect, and of providence required a mental grasp which could only be developed after long discipline. It was, therefore, natural that the outer sense, which deals with space relations, should be more active than the inner, which deals with time relations.

The figure of Locke, which compares the mind with a blank sheet of paper on which impressions are made by the senses, is inadequate. It fails to give one of the most important factors in evolution—the energy of the mind. We must remember the saying of Leibnitz, in respect to the activity of the mind. To the statement that there is nothing in the mind except that which comes through the senses, he replied, "*Except the mind itself.*" The mind is there, it receives impressions, but not like a blank sheet

of paper; it has an energy of its own, it reacts to the stimuli given according to its inherent laws, and, according to these laws, develops its powers. No greater perversion of evolution can be conceived than that which attributes the psychical processes and development wholly to external influence. As under the natural influences of soil and climate a seed develops its inherent energies, so it is with the mind under the influences which come to it through the senses: they stimulate it, they furnish it with material to work on; but its response to the stimuli and what it makes of the material by mental elaboration depend on the mind itself, just as sight on the eye.

Since society is a psychical product we see the need of emphasising the inherent character and energy of the mind in social evolution. What we call the reason and law of things consists of mental qualities drawn by the mind from the study of objects. Truth is not completely defined by saying that it is a correspondence between a thought and a thing: it is the correspondence between a thought and its object, whether that object be a thing or a mental impression. Truth is harmony of thought. In the statement that every change must have a cause, we deal with thoughts, not directly with things. All the higher forms of thought are ignored by tethering the mind to things without considering the laws of the mind according to which it perceives and thinks and elaborates impressions.

251. The emotional state of primitive man must be inferred from his nearness to nature in general, and the animals in particular, to the predominance of the physiological factors, and to the emptiness and unorganised condition of his mind. Originally such impulses and feelings which sprang directly from his body were uppermost. They might be called the organic feelings. With the development of the intellect the emotions which spring from the cultural forces were gradually manifested. Like

the child, primitive man must have been predominantly a creature of feeling; and his inner contribution to the direction of life was, no doubt, essentially of an instinctive and emotional nature. We have no reason to believe that feeling, unguided by intellectual possessions or mental purpose, was marked either by largeness of range or by intensity. The feeling of man is no less liable to development than his intellect. Among existing savages many tribes are excitable and display violent emotions on trifling occasions, while others, as some of the American Indians, are apathetic. Many feelings require a development of prejudice and ambition, contact with foreigners, competition, and rivalry. The early emotions were strongly affected by the fact that they had the field to themselves.

252. The immediateness of the emotions, their activity being unrestrained by other mental factors, indicates what must have been characteristic of the volitions. Action was direct, reflex, nothing intervening between impulse and will. The feeling thus became a law unto itself. An impression on the senses was immediately followed by volition, so that an act responded directly to the impression. The impulsiveness of many savages explains much which otherwise seems contradictory. The determining factor in conduct is not a fixed purpose, a firm character, or calm deliberation, but the state of the appetite or feeling, the mood, and the surroundings; hence, fidelity and affection at one time, treachery and cruelty at another. Without accumulated experience or other inner directive of life, the earliest man had nothing but the immediate impulse to control action. Hunger, thirst, affection, passion, sport, whatever happens to be uppermost, acts by itself with irresistible force. The moods and impulses of man in the rudimentary stage must have been as absolute and variable as those of a child. What is crime to a man is innocence to a child, and by this

standard the child-man must be judged. The moral qualities were still latent, and therefore no curb to the impulses. Even the social restraints had yet to be developed and organised. Perhaps the cultural distance between the first man and the modern savage is as great as that between the savage and the enlightened man.

Spencer's first volume of *Principles of Sociology* contains much valuable material on primitive man. He discusses the original external and internal factors, the primitive man physical, emotional, and intellectual, likewise the primitive ideas. Many of his inferences are based on his psychology. To whatever criticism some of these may be subjected, his numerous illustrations from savage life are instructive. These and similar ones given by other writers enable the investigator to draw his own inferences. For this first era the works of Spencer on *Descriptive Sociology* and on *Sociology* are specially important. When we come to higher evolution his works are less valuable. He is too much controlled by biological laws to do full justice to society under the control of rational and ethical considerations.

The literature on primitive peoples is very extensive. Modern travel has revealed many valuable characteristics. As an introduction to the subject, such works as those of E. B. Tylor (*Primitive Culture*), Sir John Lubbock (*The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man*), D. Wilson (*Prehistoric Man*), of L. H. Morgan, W. E. Hearn, F. T. Waitz, F. Ratzel, H. Schurtz, J. Lippert, E. Reclus, and others mentioned in these pages, can be recommended.

253. Former discussions have made it evident that special care must be taken in this first era not to confound the consanguinity with the sociality. The social relation during this era is conducted and developed within the kinship, but not identical with it. The general rule prevails: the social life finds its condition, not its cause, in the blood-relationship; the cause is found in the no-

tions, the feelings, and the volitions occasioned by the biological consanguinity. This is the course of the evolution: at first the biological relation, a purely natural factor, is so dominant that the social factor is at a minimum; but, as man develops, the social or psychical factor in human relationship gains such an ascendancy as to become independent of the original consanguine limitations. Psychology gains on biology and becomes increasingly the law in human relationship.

Here we are concerned with the growth of society within and out of the biological or consanguine tie. The process of human socialisation reveals the psychical difference between man and the most closely allied animals, a difference which increases with the social evolution. We have seen that it is chiefly through the social relations that he is humanised. It is by means of intercourse with his fellow-men that his mental powers and social forces are stimulated and freely exercised. The evolution of the social forces is almost wholly limited to the blood-relationship, which accounts for the peculiarities of this era. He learns from his consanguine companions, is restrained by them, adapts himself to them and them to himself, makes signs which become accepted means of communication, develops language, institutes various forms and regulations of social life, and lays the basis for the future development of society. As his humanity is unfolded by association with his equals, so he grows with them during the constant process of giving and taking. The importance of this era thus becomes evident, especially when a period is estimated by the foundation it lays for humanity and the seeds it plants for the growth of the following ages—as we estimate childhood, not by its achievements, but by what it is to the other ages of man, and as we estimate the spring by what it is to the summer's growth and autumn's fruits.

254. Although we have no scientific data to prove that

man began with a degree of human exaltation or rose much above the status of the higher animals, we, on the other hand, have none to establish the contrary. But we have seen that the presumption is in favour of his beginning at the bottom. The fact that no products of culture have come down to us from primitive times is against the presumption that man began his career with an exalted mental state. Had there been at the start any degree of perfection, it seems that some valuable remains must have been permanent enough to resist the ravages of time. Besides, the total loss of the perfection is no less difficult to account for than the gradual evolution from the lowest stage.

On the other hand, that in some instances human remains have been found in a cave with animal remains does not imply that man lodged there with animals, since it cannot be established that the remains were deposited at the same time. He may, at times, have entered into competition with animals for his coarse livelihood. His advantage seems to have consisted chiefly in a superior mental endowment and in an erect posture, which left his hands free to seize objects and use them for defence. Many animals may have been his superiors in physical strength, in swiftness, in keenness of sight, hearing, and smell, but in the making of tools, in foresight and skill, and in combinations for protection and in securing a livelihood, he was incomparably their superior.

The numerous cases of degeneration in the history of humanity do not prove that man started with perfection or an advanced stage of culture. Culture is an achievement, not an endowment. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. i., ch. ii., says of the theory that the lowest peoples have degenerated from a higher stage: "It has practically resolved itself into two assumptions: first, that the history of culture began with the appearance of a semi-civilised race of men, and, second, that from this stage culture has proceeded in two ways, backward to produce savages, and forward to produce civilised men."

Even if we suppose that the lowest peoples have degenerated from a semi-civilised stage, evolution would have to show how those thus degraded rise to a higher degree of culture. Evolution has, as a whole, promoted culture, and the steps in this progress indicate its essential problems. We want to learn how the potential factor with which man starts becomes actual, how the natural state becomes cultural, and how, starting with no acquisitions, he attains the intellectual wealth of modern enlightenment.

E. Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, p. 65, holds that in his crude state man no doubt often learned from his animal environment.

255. Even if the first human beings were better endowed than their savage successors, their evolution was necessarily a process of settling and organising something for themselves and transmitting it to their descendants. For a long time the inheritance of psychical factors cannot have been great. What the early generations manifested must have consisted chiefly of the promptings of uncultivated human nature. Nothing had as yet been invented, and so necessity became the mother of originality and of inventions.

The first man was a road-maker and pathfinder on the way to culture and civilisation. There was not even a track, only an unbroken waste. The first generation made the foot-path in the direction followed more or less definitely afterwards. Some successors remain on the beaten track, others add new roads, and thus, generation after generation, the old tracks remained and new avenues were constructed for humanity to walk in. Every fresh path leads into untrodden fields and prepares the way for new conquests. Eventually, the world becomes so furrowed with paths and highways that men need no longer walk in jungles, unbroken forests, and untraversed deserts.

Take now the paths made at all periods of the past and in the present, as well as the cultured fields through which

they lead, and they will present you with a picture of the growth of evolution. Thorns grow along the route as well as flowers and fruits. In this journey toward culture the individual never goes alone, but always in association with his fellow-men, learning and teaching, co-operating and antagonising; his energies producing abiding results so far as he improves an old road, makes a new one on which future ages will walk, and improves the fields and their products through which the roads lead. He has abiding value in proportion as he becomes a labourer in performing the great social work of humanity.

256. When we look among primitive conditions for the fundamental basis of association, we cannot expect to find it as the result of a synthesis of experience, or of any mental product or artificial arrangement. It must be a basis ready at hand, furnished by nature itself. In the first era we must seek for the regulative principle of society in the order established by the sexual relation, which was discussed in Paragraph 192. This involves the strongest instincts and passions, creates paternity and maternity, founds the family, and institutes the conditions which give to the social forces the sphere for their exercise and to life its supreme value.

No adequate conception of human society is possible unless the overwhelming power of the sexual factor is recognised. Here it concerns us mainly so far as it institutes, organises, directs, and limits society. Its energy was the greater in early times because, as a direct, native force of man, it acted without being interfered with by culture and other modern tendencies. Sex constitutes the most marked division in the natural constitution of humanity; but this division in mankind is not more significant than the union between man and woman of which the sexual relation is the occasion. This union, ordained by nature, is present at the beginning and ineradicable. Art and culture refine without eliminating it.

The family, which it institutes as the determining factor in primitive society, must be regarded as of supreme importance throughout this era. Besides bearing the stamp of nature and therefore being inevitable, this primitive social union is likewise creative and determines the general character of all the relations which men sustain to each other.

The first society was not a compound of individuals, but it was instituted through the sexual relation of individuals. The sexual basis of union is recognised, Genesis i., 27, 28: "Male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." It is significant that this dominion is not given to the individual, but to man and woman, or to society originally based on the sexual relation.

Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, p. 149, discussing the domestic institutions of the Aryans, says: "We can catch a glimpse, therefore, of a long period, during which men knew no other form of society than the family. . . . Every family has its chief, as a nation would have its king. It has its laws, which, doubtless, are unwritten, but which religious faith engraves in the heart of every man. It has its court of justice, above which there is no other that one can appeal to. Whatever man really needs for his material or moral life the family possesses within itself. It needs nothing from without; it is an organised state, a society that suffices for itself."

In the pages following, the author gives an account of the adoption of slaves into Aryan families and their religion, thus making them actual members of the family.

C. N. Starcke, *The Primitive Family*, p. 75: "A comparison between the primitive social life of African peoples, as it is found among the Hottentots, and that of the Brazilian tribes, shows that in both countries the single family, with the father as ruler, must be taken as the fundamental type of social development."

257. We include under the family as the first permanent social union all the persons who constituted the household. Since the family is frequently called the first social unit it must be determined just what this means. Some writers speak of it as if it were a unit in the sense of being indivisible, as if the members lost their individual distinctness by belonging to a family, or as if the collectivity was emphasised, while the individuals were ignored as separate beings. Biologically, the family consists of such persons as are united by the tie of blood, namely, parents and their children. The biological family, in a larger sense, includes all who trace their descent to a common ancestor.

Although the blood-relationship severely dominated social life, it is a mistake to suppose that the biological connection obliterated individual distinctness and responsibility in the family. Each member was ranked and judged according to his family; but, aside from this collective view, each occupied a peculiar place. Where the organisation gave the father supremacy he even decided questions of life and death. The wife and mother also had her particular place and functions. The same is true of the children, sex and age being ruling factors in determining their relative positions.

The truth is, that in some respects the family was viewed as an undiscriminated totality, while in other cases as a unit whose separate factors were distinctly recognised. In the case of blood-revenge, so common among savages, proof is given both of the unity of the family in the responsibility of all for each and each for all, and likewise of the discrimination between the members. If a member killed one of another family in a different tribe, it became the duty of some member of the murdered man's family, probably the nearest male kin, to seek revenge. He first of all, as a rule, sought the murderer himself; if he could not be found some other member of the family

was slain. The solidarity of the family was thus recognised and yet a distinction made between the different members. The family, however, meant more than in modern conditions, and the individual less. The individual went with the family and, perhaps, was inseparable from it; but, in the family itself, he was discriminated from the rest. Later we shall see how the collectivity tended to absorb the individual.

The individual, being so little individualised, could hardly be more than a specimen of the totality. The primitive family comes nearest the type of an organism, every member being, as an organ, a part of the whole. The individuality was more marked in the Middle Ages, but even then there were brotherhoods which made what pertained to the individual member the concern of the entire association.

In the case of blood-feud between two totem clans "the whole clan of the aggressor is responsible for his deed, and the whole clan of the aggrieved is entitled to satisfaction."—J. G. Frazer, *Totemism*, p. 57.

258. Not only was the family the first social unit, but it was also supreme. This supremacy is essential for understanding the position of the family and the evolution to which it gave rise. We know of no other dominant organisation of primitive times, and certainly none existed to which the kinship was subjected. The family was, therefore, a law unto itself and gave the law to those organisations which emerged from it. New families arose in the second generation, each of which was itself a unit, but closely connected with its immediate ancestors and other members of the kinship. The autonomy which belonged to the original family was to some degree conferred on the group of families which sprang from it.

Since the government of the family was indigenous, we can readily see how the social evolution moved along the line of consanguinity. This does not mean that the

consanguine tie was the only consideration. At times economic or religious interests might prevail; but every undertaking was on the basis and in the name of the kinship. Economics, war, religion, and the social relations were family affairs. As the family was itself a relation constituted by nature, so the social life that grew out of it was the result of biological evolution with a minimum of mental determination.

We can thus call the family the root from which were evolved all the social forms, however much they might be differentiated from those prevalent in the family. The traditions were family traditions, and the customs sprang from the intercourse of persons whose ties were those of kin. They were mostly spontaneous growths whose determining factor was in the consanguine relationship. Biological, natural, geographical selection took the place of the later mental and social selection. The reign was that of blood, not of brains, of the senses, not of reason, of natural necessity and constitutional impulse rather than free choice or ethical self-determination.

259. There is no reason for supposing that in the beginning the sexual relations were more definitely settled than other matters of human concern. Time was required to evolve permanent family relations. Great diversity still prevails among savages and barbarians in marital affairs, and in earlier times the regulations were probably still less fixed. The customs and rules which gradually emerged from looseness and disorder no doubt varied in different times and places. The sexual relation is, however, so important, so likely to occasion conflicts, and so deeply affects individual and social life, that it must early have led to some kind of understanding. General disintegration would have resulted from leaving it to whim and passion.

The recognition of a common ancestor and kinship ties among savages seems to be a survival from time imme-

morial and to point to some early marital regulation. Probably men, originally, were not scrupulous as to the means used, but took wives when and where they could get them. Still, with a small relationship and other peoples unknown, the choice would be limited, and determined by connection and circumstances. The voluntary agency was probably not permanent in the matter at a time when things and environment controlled the individual. Force might be resorted to when the relationship became large; or men might purchase their wives if they could not steal them or gain them by conquest. The permanence of the relation formed would depend largely on inclination and expediency. The economic question was a prime consideration. The girl belonged to her family and, as a worker, had economic value; hence, when taken from her home in marriage, compensation for the loss sustained by her relatives might be demanded. Among savages the purchase-money is an important factor for the bride, her parents, and the husband. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that woman is so generally regarded as a piece of property and her husband's slave.

Since she was viewed by her family and clan as an object of economic value, we can understand why, in many instances, the children inherited through the mother, rather than through the father who belonged to another clan, and why the children were often held to belong to the mother's and not the father's clan. Where no compensation was given to her immediate kin for her economic value, the woman and her descendants might, with still greater reason, be claimed to belong to her kindred. The early notion of property in women and children had much to do in shaping the family relation, and may explain forms and customs which are otherwise obscure.

In judging of primitive conditions we must divest

ourselves of modern ideas respecting the intrinsic value and dignity of the personality. The fact that wars were waged in order to obtain human flesh as food shows the prominence of the economic factor in the estimate of the individual. The same economic test was applied to him when reduced to slavery. Although the woman was more generally treated as property than the man, yet he, too, was liable to be put under the same category. Sometimes a savage even in our day lives with his wife and her relatives, in which case her relatives may regard him as their property. He can be freed from this condition only by purchasing his wife and taking her to his home and kin. Otherwise even his children might be regarded as the property of his wife's clan.

Much in the relation of the sexes among savages suggests that marriage can be classed under the economic force almost as much as under the appetitive and affectional forces. See R. W. Frazer, *A Literary History of India*, pp. 13, 14.

Ratzel states that some kind of remuneration which the founder of a family gives to the father-in-law stamps marriage among nearly all nature-people as a matter of purchase. While the parents, or at least the relatives, have the disposal of the bride, this does not imply that her wishes were not consulted. Her influence and that of her lover might be powerful factors in the transaction.

Genesis xxix., where Jacob is said to have served fourteen years for Rachel and Leah, presents a picture of early life in which marriage amounts to purchase. When Rebekah is won for Isaac, Chap. xxiv., the servant gives precious things to her, her brother, and her mother. The prominence of Laban, her brother, above Bethuel, her father, is significant.

Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 75, says that in Sumatra there were formerly three distinct kinds of marriage: one in which the man purchased the wife, the second in which the woman purchased the man, and the third in which they married on equal terms. By the purchase the proprietorship of the wife and the children was determined.

260. There has been much controversy as to whether in the sexual relation promiscuity prevailed in the beginning. The affirmative has been based largely on the theory that the inheritance and total status of the children in so many existing savage peoples depends on the mother, not on the father. This, it has been said, is interpreted by the fact that in promiscuity the paternity was doubtful, but the mother always known. The facts can, however, be otherwise explained. The clan which regarded the woman as their property, or at least as of economic value, might claim her children and possessions for economic reasons. When the husband lives in the woman's home and with her family, this identifies him with her people. Then, she made the home, and often its possessions were regarded as her property; hence the inheritance through her might seem natural. Besides, in case of polygamy, the wives from different clans might still be claimed by these clans and likewise their children and possessions.

It has also been argued that among some of the higher animals promiscuity does not prevail; to postulate it, therefore, for man, there being no direct proof of it, is to degrade him below the level of these animals. Whatever diversity prevailed at first, no fixed rules having been established, the relation of the sexes, as intimated above, most soon have become an object of social regulation. Promiscuity, therefore, is not likely to have been of long duration, if it ever prevailed. (Appendix H. References and Authorities.)

261. While the organising factor of primitive society must be sought in the sexual relation, it is probable that too much influence has been attributed to the sexual passion. It was but one of the forces of human nature; and, while the dominant associative force, it need not always have overshadowed every other consideration. The family it formed had many other concerns than its

gratification, especially when the securing of a livelihood was attended with great difficulty. The passion is susceptible of development, and in early times its more normal stage may have given it less prominence than it attained later, with more leisure and greater luxury. Its status among existing savages is no criterion of its original condition. There can be no question that the adoption of clothing, the development of the imagination and of art, the increase of leisure, and the growth of population had a decided effect on the sexual instinct. The sexual relation among animals would lead to the inference that in primitive man, being near the animal creation, the sexual passion might be brutish, but subject to natural regulation and limitation.

262. The regulation of the sexual relations depended on nature, on experience, on religious views, on social enactments, by means of which tradition and custom were established. But, with all the restraints thus placed on individuals, we must regard the inclination of the man and woman as powerful factors in marriage. If the inclination of the woman was ignored by her family she might have effective means to secure its recognition. Those who had the disposal of her would use her desire for their own purposes. The violation of the rights of an unmarried woman was, at the same time, an infringement on the rights of those to whom she belonged, and they would seek redress. The man who married a woman and claimed her as property wanted the entire disposal of her. Affection and jealousy also played their part. Besides polygamy and polyandry we also find group marriages, the men and women of certain groups regarding themselves as belonging to each other. But if men and women were about equal in number, as is so generally the case now, individual and social selection would tend to make monogamy the rule. Polygamy, polyandry, and group marriage would yield to monogamy in proportion

as individuality was developed and personal preference respected in both the man and woman. The conjugal affections, the love between children and parents, the demands of the home, the accumulation and inheritance of property, and the welfare of society favour monogamy.

Polygamy might prevail because women were regarded as property, and the more property a man had, the better for him. In some cases a man might be better provided for if he had several wives to work for or even support him. But the numerous children to be supported might prove a burden. Perhaps polygamy was the prerogative of chiefs and the wealthy who could afford to buy and keep a number of wives and provide for their descendants. If, however, a few took all the women, the other men would rebel and slay the few. Monogamy may, therefore, be postulated as a social demand.

263. As new families developed from the original stock each was a distinct social unit, but all the families collectively formed a unit of units, in which the kinship, more or less remote, constituted the bond of union. A number of generations might remain together and form a village or community of such consanguineous families. The conditions of life, however, were not such as to enable a large number of persons to exist together; and, since the whole earth was open to them, parties would branch off, invited by fruits or the advantages for hunting and fishing. In this way new centres of population and nuclei for development were established. None were likely to wander far from the ancestral home, though succeeding generations were obliged to push out farther and farther. The first favourable location would tempt them to end their wanderings, and, for the sake of kinship and protection, they desired to remain near each other. The groups which sprang from the new home were naturally most intimately related, but they also kept in contact with the

larger relationship. But the arrangements thus established were broken up whenever scarcity of food or other conditions made further wanderings necessary, when a general migration of the kinship took place, or a hostile tribe took possession of the territory. Sometimes a part of the relationship might be entirely separated from the rest, lose sight of its consanguine ties, and start out on an independent career. There might be innumerable reasons for divisions and subdivisions, for forming new ties and entering new relations; and sometimes those nearest of kin, finding the territory reached already occupied, would be obliged to wander into the distance and associate with comparative or entire strangers. In proportion as a family multiplied throughout the ages would the degrees of relationship become complicated and the difficulty of determining the nearness of kin increase. Those most remote from the centre, or separated by deserts, mountains, and seas, would have peculiar interests and pursue their course wholly independent and distinct from the rest. Thus the conditions were given for new and separate processes of evolution.

Each group naturally gathered around its immediate ancestor, and the various groups were connected by ties close in proportion to the relation of their ancestors. All the related groups were held together by the fact that beyond their immediate ancestors they had one ancestor in common, the founder of the original family, of which the various groups were descendants. As group after group grew in the course of increasing generations new divisions became necessary, enlarging the area occupied by the consanguinity. The relationship between different groups would, in the course of time, become increasingly remote and obscure, and the intimacy of the groups depend on nearness of kinship and nearness of locality, unless special ties were created by some form of agreement.

See Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, Book II., Ch. x., for an

account of the gens. The phratry is described, p. 154; the tribe, p. 157.

264. This development away from the original family, both in time and space, naturally resulted in differentiations in which the simplicity and monotony of the primitive life disappeared. The growth of the number of individuals, families, and groups affected the social relations and conditions. Variety was promoted by heredity; the stimuli to which the individual was subject were multiplied and produced greater fermentation; competition in the struggle for life grew and demanded more energy; larger numbers could enter into combinations and thus augment their strength; diversity was also developed by the division of labour which became necessary. The opportunities, the inspiration, and the demands increased; an impulse was given to undertake and accomplish more. The growing population, scattered over a larger area, required a higher form of organisation than that of a single family, and needed more and different organs for its larger and more intricate undertakings. Each new centre of population, with its peculiar natural and social surroundings, developed differently, in some respects, from all the rest. Thus in the course of time the development which starts with a single family produces manifold diversity and leads society in different directions. An almost imperceptible variation in the beginning eventually produces great divergences. Even if at first each village or group has only slight variations from the rest, these will tend to ever-increasing differentiations. The variations consist in mental views, in feeling, occupation and volition, in social relations and life. Each group with a distinct personality develops peculiarities of language in proportion as it is out of contact with other groups. In this way different dialects arise.

The conditions are thus given for breaking through the

monotony of the inner and outer communism. Within the same general regulations the stimuli differ, various ferments arise, new adjustments are required. Dissension and conflict were inevitable and promoted exertion. Owing to circumstances, evolution would be more vigorous in some places than others and add greater variety. Still, if the consanguinity was limited to internal social influences, stagnation was likely to prevail so soon as the natural and social adjustments were formed which secured a livelihood and maintained peace. Energy might, to some extent, be developed by the ferments, ambitions, and rivalries within the consanguinity, thus giving the spur needed by the savage in order to work; but special value attaches to the greater stimuli which come from without, such as disputes, collisions, and wars with foreign or remotely allied peoples. A study of existing peoples shows that the danger of stagnation is greatest when a consanguineous group is isolated by its geographical position, its limited environment always remaining the same, and the influence from abroad being reduced to a minimum or too much like its own energies to act as a ferment. When the inner resources have borne their legitimate fruit and no valuable stimuli come from without, we have the circumstances which seem to account for the stationary condition of numerous savage peoples for immemorial ages. With like action and reaction there is a perpetual reproduction of the same results. This has, however, been sufficiently emphasised already.

Slight divergences are more significant in the early and formative period of a people's life, when all is fluid, with everything yet to be settled and organised, than in a later stage, when principles, rules, and customs are established. When an order once becomes fixed it is less likely to be seriously affected by small variations.

Before the mingling of different peoples the characteristic

marks of language, as well as those of races, were probably determined. Changes have taken place since; but during that era the roots were developed from which the linguistic trunks have since then grown. Whatever progress occurred in later times, the general types of the human family were developed during the prehistoric period of mankind.

265. It would be interesting if we could trace the specific influences which attached certain characteristics to particular families and made them hereditary. A family or a group of families might be devoted to a calling which became its distinctive mark in the relationship. Even in European countries there are many occupations which have become hereditary in families. So we find that among savages there has been a development of classes which performed various functions in the social organism, such as the governing, the military, the priestly, the medical, and the numerous agricultural and industrial classes. When particular callings became stereotyped a system like the castes of India may have been the result. Often rank was connected with a calling, and those highest in rank would use their influence to keep those below them in a state of subordination. Usually the governing, the priestly, and the military classes were most esteemed, and sometimes the functions of two, or all three, were exercised by the same person, as when the ruler was also priest and warrior.

266. We have seen that from the management of the family more general principles of government were developed. The governmental functions were evolved with the enlargement of the consanguinity. Contiguous groups required some understanding for the regulation of their relations. Each family and each group could order its own affairs; but its rights and duties respecting other families and groups needed regulating through tacit consensus, mutual agreement, or a higher authority. Arrangements which grew up spontaneously, perhaps

unconsciously, naturally preceded formal enactments. An understanding was most necessary respecting territorial limits, economic dealings or barter, marital relations, social intercourse, and mutual protection. The agreement attained led to permanent traditions and fixed rules of conduct. Each family had its head. A group affiliated with others might be subject to a common chief. In its own affairs the counsel of the elders was weighty, and in an emergency a leader could be chosen. One chosen repeatedly over a group or a number of groups was likely to become permanent chief. The position might be elective on his death or become hereditary in his family.

The total consanguinity also needed some kind of government. The union of consanguine families into a larger collectivity may be called a clan, a gens, a tribe, or by some other name; it always means that from a single ancestor many families have sprung, and that by a synthesis of these a larger organisation and a new government are demanded. A tribe might consist of numerous widely scattered groups, all of which recognised a common ancestor as the bond of union. If the ancestor had two or more sons each might become the founder of a family from which a separate tribe sprang. The closest relation naturally existed between members of the same tribe, but a more extensive union would be formed between all the tribes connected by consanguinity. Some of the tribes might form unions for specific purposes (phratries), while the entire kinship constituted a people or nation. There could even be leagues or federations between different peoples, either temporarily or permanently, whether or not united by ties of blood. A people could choose its chief from one of the tribal chiefs; or perhaps the chiefs of tribes, by themselves or with other persons of standing, formed a council for the general government. The rules for the government of the federation would have to be the most general, regulating

only such matters as pertained to the entire collectivity. Peoples thus leagued together required certain stipulations, but not necessarily a common head. The regulations of the federations, nations, tribes, groups, and families descended from generals to particulars, each government being adapted to the special province to which it was confined.

Even in the first era, therefore, we find considerable complexity and also diversity in the social regulations. The actual government of the larger bodies need not have been greatly complicated, however. The life was simple and moved along a common level; the interests were not great, and foreign complications, at least when the land was sparsely settled, not numerous; the head of the family had the functions of an absolute ruler over his household; many things were left to regulate themselves, and others were regulated by tradition and custom. But, whatever measure of self-government existed in a family or group, in the course of time rigid rules were established for the government of the larger collectivity, so that the severest regulation from above prevailed which subjected the smaller to the larger bodies. This was in keeping with the general reign of communism over individuality.

The tribes of Israel afford an illustration of the process by means of which the consanguine relationship is differentiated and its union perpetuated. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are revered as common ancestors. From Jacob twelve tribes sprang, each of which was regarded as distinct. In the course of time each tribe contained numerous families with various degrees of relationship. But each family was classed with its tribe, and all the tribes were classed as Israelites. The sons of Jacob were brothers; then came the relation of cousins, uncles, and aunts, each new generation increasing the remoteness of the relationship one degree. Within the same tribe there was room for many differences in respect to individual and family rank and influence. Groups would be formed by

nearness of kinship, neighbourhood, occupations, interests, and congeniality. With the growth of the tribe numerous organisations may arise within it, and some of its members enter other tribes or become attached to peoples altogether different.

267. The father as the head of the family was, during his life, the natural head, also, of all his descendants. If the inheritance was through the male line, the father's authority descended to his eldest son. The birthright of the first-born son receives great stress among savages. Where there was no son, or where age and experience were regarded as having special claims to recognition, the authority might pass to an uncle on the father's side. In case the descent was reckoned through the mother, the authority might devolve on one of her male relatives rather than on her own children. There were still other possibilities. Before social evolution established a settled order chaos and anarchism probably prevailed, and the dominion, so far as there was any, would sometimes be determined by might, preference, or expediency. Social order, however, required that heredity, age, experience, wisdom in counsel, skill, and prowess should have weight in the selection of a ruler. But the universal reverence for ancestors, even their worship, points to the ancestor, and to those nearest him and of purest blood, as the natural seat of authority. For the choice of tribal or national chiefs no universal rule seems to have prevailed. Ancestry, family connections, popularity, ambition, cunning, ability to command and lead in war, may have had weight in the selection of the various chiefs. In early times, as well as later, force of character, energy of will, and other personal qualities had to be reckoned with in the voluntary choice of rulers. A young and able leader might supplant an aged and inefficient one when war broke out. Perhaps he began war on his own responsibility if he found a sufficient following. Whatever the

form of government and its officials, their authority would be fortified by tradition, custom, and religion. When peoples not under a common rule had need of communications, these were conducted by persons specially delegated for that purpose.

Morgan, p. 18, says of the American Indians: "Intercourse between independent tribes was conducted by delegations of wise men and chiefs."

Starcke, p. 46: "The chief dignity is hereditary among the Guaranis and some of the Carib tribes, but in other cases the strongest and bravest man becomes chief."

Ratzel says that those who lived in hordes had, besides the family rule, that of the strongest, the richest, and the wisest. "The stronger will rule over the weaker and will live by means of his labours, so that he will continually grow stronger while the latter grows weaker."

Sometimes a chief appointed his successor; in other cases he was elected by the people or those of special authority among them. Morgan, p. 66: "The plan of government of the American aborigines commenced with the gens and ended with the confederacy, the latter being the highest point to which their governmental institutions attained. It gave for the organic series: first, the gens, a body of consanguinei having a common gentile name; second, the phratry, an assemblage of related gentes united in a higher association for certain common objects; third, the tribe, an assemblage of gentes, usually organised into phratries, all the members of which spoke the same dialect; and fourth, a confederacy of tribes, the members of which respectively spoke dialects of the same stock language. It resulted in a gentile society (*societas*), as distinguished from a political society or state (*civitas*). The difference between the two is wide and fundamental. There was neither a political society, nor a citizen, nor a state, nor any civilisation in America when it was discovered." The only way to become connected with a confederacy on equal terms was through membership in a gens and tribe, and a common speech. P. 123.

The power of the chiefs varied among different peoples, but as a rule it was not arbitrary. There were advisory councils, either in emergencies or as permanent institutions.

268. The earliest is also the organising stage of humanity. No doubt numerous methods were experimented with before final and permanent culminations were reached. How in that unorganised condition individuals gained influence and organisations were evolved finds better illustration in an unorganised social group of our day than in formal associations whose structural form is the product of ages of experience during civilisation.

We cannot, therefore, affirm that any one kind of arrangement or form of government applied to all peoples and all times. Many circumstances arose which were calculated to produce variations. The nature and degree of government depended on the stage of development and numerous other factors. During long periods the character of the government was probably not definitely fixed. Things were shoved together and along by circumstances rather than settled by custom or choice. In such cases a community or group got along as best it could without a regular government, or, in an emergency, instituted such a rule as the occasion seemed to require. Elders, heads of families, and other persons of influence would naturally exert much power in the direction of affairs.

T. W. Dwight, in the Introduction to H. S. Maine's *Ancient Law*, says that all known societies were originally organised on the model of the patriarchal government found in Scriptural history, such as the Hebrew patriarchs. "The oldest male parent is absolutely supreme in his household. The dominion extends to life and death, and is as unqualified over his children as over his slaves. The flocks and herds of the children are the flocks and herds of the father. These he holds in a representative rather than in a proprietary character."

This is too sweeping. Among primitive peoples the matriarch as well as the patriarch is found, establishing descent and rulership through the mother instead of the father, and making her supreme. But even aside from this, the patriarchal form of government is not universal.

John Matthew, in *Eaglehawk and Crow*, p. 93, says of the Australians: "The cohesion of a community depends entirely upon consanguinity and derives no strength at all from governmental authority. A community is simply an aggregation of families among which the older men have a certain amount of control, derived naturally from age and experience. There is no recognised head, whether king or chief, neither is there any definite ruling body, elective or hereditary. Men of preponderating influence are those who are distinguished for courage, strength, and force of character. These, in conjunction with the elders, generally advise as to the public actions of the community, settle internal disputes, and enforce obedience to traditional law."

CHAPTER XVIII

INADEQUACY OF THE CONSANGUINE ORGANISATION

269. While we are warranted in regarding the family and the consanguine tie as the first great organising force of society, it cannot be proved that, in the course of time, other associative factors did not prevail. As population increased and men travelled, persons would become associated whose kinship could not be traced. Whole communities might be formed of persons whose kinship was doubtful. While the consanguine government to which they were accustomed might be their model, the bond of union did not depend on the tie of blood, but on locality, occupation, interests, and mutual sympathy. Without writing, the relationship would become obscure after many generations, and, amid growing considerations and interests of a different kind, lose its dominance. Some persons not akin were received into a family or clan by the rite of adoption, which gave them the same status as those who were biologically related. Thus from a group or tribe members might somehow be severed, while new members were received from foreigners. This mixture of blood interfered with the purity of the consanguinity; and strangers not adopted into the kinship, when moving into its bounds might be associated with it by economic or other interests. Especially as peoples mingled more with one another would the absoluteness of the consanguine dominion be affected and the disintegration of the kinship promoted.

"Genesis" would be a good heading for this era, the

era of origins. Just as there is a genesis of society from isolated individuals, so there is a genesis of the social from the biological relations, a genesis of government and all kinds of organisations. As mind is increasingly evolved from the natural endowment, so the mental energies, regardless of the blood-tie, grow in dominance and determine human relations. Men move in spheres larger than those fixed by the biological determinations of kinship. This means that other relations than those of blood were formed. Even in the consanguinity the immediate ties of the family ceased to be normative for the government of the larger relationship. This was the case whenever rulers were chosen on account of valour, influence, wisdom, or for any other reason than the consanguine tie. The family itself, with the most intimate consanguine relationship, had to submit to the conditions involved in the larger kinship and became subject to the government established by the tribe or nation. A family that is independent when alone must adapt and correlate itself to the families which spring up around it, an adaptation involving other than kinship ties. Relations, interests, and complications were inevitable which had nothing to do directly with the blood relationship.

Morgan, p. 102, says of the North American Indians: "Each tribe was individualised by a name, by a separate dialect, by a supreme government, and by the possession of a territory which it occupied and defended as its own. The tribes were as numerous as the dialects, for separation did not become complete until dialectical variations had commenced. Indian tribes, therefore, are natural growths through the separation of the same people in the area of their occupation, followed by divergence of speech, segmentation, and independence."

270. No tie, aside from the consanguine relationship, seems to have been stronger than the religious bond. Even with kinship as the original basis of organisation,

religion might eventually be regarded as the supreme consideration. The ties of blood and religion were frequently so closely united that nothing could save from expulsion or death one who did not profess the common faith and take part in the usual religious rites. Where the worship of an ancestor prevailed, whoever refused to participate in it was regarded as excluding himself from participation in the privileges of the descendants. If the ancestor was not thus revered, his god was regarded as the god of the family, and the worship obligatory. The family and its interests were thought to be under the special care of the household divinity. Besides the general deity of the kinship, a family might have a particular god as its exclusive possession.

Since the interests of the kinship were believed to be the exclusive concern of a particular deity, it was evident that all who wanted recognition as belonging to the kinship must have unity of worship. The rite which introduced strangers into the kinship was religious, and the initiation into its worship constituted an introduction into the kinship itself. The gods of foreign peoples were, like the peoples themselves, regarded as hostile. A people's divinity fought for them and thus shared their victories and defeats. The most serious considerations, therefore, bound a consanguineous people to the same religion. If the member of a tribe had the religion of a hostile people he would, in case of war, be obliged to fight on the side of the god he worshipped or else commit sacrilege.

- This, therefore, seems to be the correct view: the religious bond did not, as a rule, supersede the consanguine tie or annul it, but was indissolubly connected therewith. From the same family the kinship and its religion were developed, and the primitive mind could not separate the one from the other. The dominance attained by religion would make it the test even of the validity of the consanguine tie.

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 39

Hearn, *The Aryan Household*, p. 5, says of the Aryans: "In archaic society, the unflinching centripetal force was community of worship. As many as were forms of worship, so many were the associations of men. Where men were associated, there a special worship is found."

See the same, Chap. ii.

P. 27 he says: "Those who worshipped the same gods were relatives, although no drop of common blood flowed in their veins." But the statement of Dr. Hearn that, among the Aryans at least, "the original basis of human associations was religion," conflicts with his own assertion on page 113, where he states that the members of communities "always assumed the fact of their consanguinity." He says: "In every Aryan country, and in every age, we find men living together in communities of considerable size. These communities are generally known as tribes, clans, peoples, or by some similar expression. They were distinct from the other association which is familiar to us as the State. Their members always assumed the fact of their consanguinity. The clan had a common worship and a common tomb; it had common property; its members had mutual reversionary rights in their separate property; they took charge of the person and the property of any clansman that was under any incapacity; they exercised full power of self-government, and maintained for the purpose a suitable organisation; they acted together in avenging wrong done to any of their members; they rendered, in case of need, mutual help and support. . . . They obeyed and honoured a common head, the representative of their founder, and the nearest to him in blood; and in the course of time they branched out into numerous sub-clans, each of which was in its turn subdivided, and tended to become a separate and independent community."

On the nature and power of ancient religion, see Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, Book I., Chap. iv., and Book II., Chap. i.

271. So great was the significance attached to religion that it might, in some cases, be regarded as the chief

concern. Especially would this be the case when the kinship tie was loosened. Religion and the worship it instituted could be recognised when the consanguineous relation could no longer be traced. Religion might become the dominant factor in kinship. The Hebrews recognised as true Israelites none who did not worship Jehovah. When religion became a stronger tie than that of blood we must probably attribute it to the fact that the disintegration of the consanguinity had already begun. In this respect, just as in the case of government and some other affairs, we must not look for uniformity among different peoples and at all times during the first era.

Religion as a bond of union for all who shared in the same worship separated from all whose worship was different. Hearn, p. 19: "Nothing was farther from the minds of archaic men than the notion that all men were of one blood, and were the creatures of one All-Father in Heaven. The universal belief of the early world was, that men were of different bloods; that they each had fathers of their own. . . . They had a strong and practical conviction that they lived under a divine protection; that this protection extended to themselves and all the members of their households; and that its influence not only did not defend, but was usually hostile to others. Those others had in like manner their gods who naturally favoured and protected them, as household gods ought to do." And on p. 143: "With them kinship comprised every social relation, every tie that binds man to life; and with them kinship implied a constant and vivid reference to the founder of their kin, the Eponymous hero of their clan, or of their race." He approvingly quotes the statement of Grote: "In the retrospective faith of the Greeks the ideas of worship and ancestry coalesced."

272. It is, of course, impossible to trace specifically the disintegration of the kinship association and government, and the growing ascendancy of other factors as nuclei of organisation and the basis of government. The processes

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 41

involved must have varied in different places and evolved with different degrees of rapidity. Much would depend on locality. In an isolated, inaccessible region, the consanguine organisation would last longer than where strangers mingled. The disintegration of the biological kinship made other bonds of union necessary and prepared the way for them. Especially was this the case, as seen above, with the religious bond, so that in the community of worship all other ties might be lost sight of. When different peoples united; when outcasts, refugees, or wanderers were thrown together; or where men met in public thoroughfares and centres of trade some kind of organisation would grow out of chaos and anarchy, defensive and offensive, the needs being the immediate occasion of the union whose character would depend on circumstances. What at first consisted of a mere horde would develop into a system of communal authority. As society grew out of the kinship organisation the evolution would tend through the consanguine disintegration toward the principle which dominates the second era, namely, the state. What is pre-political in the first era tends toward and culminates in the political or state form of organisation.

The general course of the evolution can, however, be traced with a considerable degree of certainty. After the kinship tie has developed and become the characteristic feature of the social relations, other interests and associations arise which transcend its limits, with a growing preponderance of other than consanguine considerations. The limited kinship tie becomes inadequate as the larger human interests grow; its dominance is disputed or shared with other bonds; fictions to maintain it are resorted to, as the adoption of strangers into the family; and at last the incongruity and contradictions of the situation become so evident that an irresistible demand is made for a new basis of organisation. This will be sought by the pro-

gressive elements which realise the requirements of the enlarged order of things, while the conservative spirit still clings to the traditional establishments. Even while the kinship organisation remains dominant, foreign factors imperceptibly enter which eventually overturn the old organisation and prepare for a new foundation.

Hearn, Chap. xiii., thinks that when those not akin formed a clan they selected some god or eminent person whom they revered as their ancestor.

Starcke, p. 33, says of some clans found among American Indians and Australians: "Descent is not so much the bond of union as the religious consecration by which a young man is admitted into the group. . . . It is, however, certain that a development of groups occurs which is due to forces independent of the idea of common descent, and this development is found both in communities divided into clans, and in those which are without any clan organisation. When the clan organisation is fully developed, we always meet with usages which must be regarded as tokens of a period in which an individual was assigned to a clan for other reasons than that of his birth. Morgan states that it is no uncommon custom for a mother to enter her child into a clan which she selects at pleasure. Each clan has peculiar names for its members, which no other clan is entitled to use; the possession of a given name, therefore, signifies that its owner is enrolled in a given clan."

273. Often the clans within a tribe were designated by particular names or symbolic signs. They were distinguished among the American Indians by the *totem*, among the Australians by the *kobong*. As both have the same significance, totem and totemism can be used for all such clan designations. The totem is selected from animate or inanimate objects, usually from animals or plants,—something which was supposed to have an intimate relation to the clan which appropriated its name. Those

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 43

designated by the same totem were regarded as bound together by the closest ties and as owing to each other obligations greater than those imposed by the blood tie.

The origin of totemism is in doubt. Some tribes look on the animal whose name was adopted as their ancestor. Perhaps the occurrence of the animal in a particular locality, or its qualities, may have led to the choice. Persons with the same totem could not intermarry. In case war broke out between the totems of the man and wife, he fought on one side, she went with the other, and the children went with him or her, according as descent was traced through the father or mother. The totem had a religious as well as consanguine significance. To ask a stranger after his family meant as much as to inquire after his totem. Sometimes the totem was indicated by the tattooing.

"Totem," from the Ojibwa dialect, means "the symbol or device of a gens, all the members of a particular gens having the same totem." Wake, p. 313. The kobong is the badge of a group which belongs to the same family. Wake, p. 314: "It is evident that the Australian totem is a 'badge of fraternity,' and equivalent to the family name, a name which belongs to all the members of a particular group, who are regarded as of kin, and which cannot be held by any person not belonging by birth or adoption to that group. The possession of a particular totem by any person is proof, therefore, that he is entitled or subject to all the rights, privileges, and obligations of the kindred group with which the totem identifies him, and which answers to the gens."

Other means than the totem might be used to designate the affinity of persons. Reclus says, referring to the Esquimaux, p. 25: "To indicate their tribe the men have a special manner of trimming their hair, the women of tattooing their faces."

Some peoples regarded certain animals as the incarnation of their household deities. Wake, p. 316: "The Fijians supposed every man to be under the protection of a special god,

who resided in, or was symbolised by, some animal or other natural object, such as a rat, a shark, a hawk, a tree, etc."

J. G. Frazer, *Totemism*, p. 1, says: "A totem is a class of material objects which a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that there exists between him and every member of the class an intimate and altogether special relation." It is distinguished from a fetish because always a class of objects, never a mere individual. While the clan totem is the most important, the totem is also used as the badge of a sex or even of an individual. P. 2.

274. Individualisation, freedom from consanguine traditions and customs, were important factors in the movement toward a larger basis of organisation. Progress beyond a certain stage was out of the question so long as the totem and kinship, rather than personal qualities, were the determining factors in social relations. By subjecting the individual to the mass the development which must come through the individual is made impossible. The undeveloped individuality involved an indistinct consciousness of self, a failure to discriminate properly between self and others, between individual and social rights, and robbed the mind of initiative. The life was outer rather than inner, and what was common to all absorbed the attention and directed the course of the individual. The very conditions were lacking for developing the strong intellect and independent will so as to burst the narrow bonds. In the absence of a developed individual consciousness, and in the presence of a dominating communal consciousness on which the individual depended, each one naturally identified himself with his family and gens. It was the dependence of a child in intellect. The individual's life was not determined by what he voluntarily chose and took, but by what took him. Hence he was so largely merged in his family, the family in the gens, the gens in the tribe, so that a one-sided socialism became a striking characteristic of the

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 45

life. Under these conditions whatever loosened these rigid rules and gave strength to the personality tended to sever the enslavement by means of the consanguinity.

This shows how much the problem of that early life was one of individualisation. The independent development of the individual was the condition for the evolution of the best socialisation. A man was socialised before he was individualised; and it was necessary to individualise him before he could have a prominent share in moulding his society.

Hearn, p. 4, says of the early Aryans: "There was, in short, neither individual nor State. The clan, or some association founded upon the model of the clan, and its subdivisions, filled the whole of our fathers' social life."

Reclus, p. 57, says of primitive life: "All felt, thought, and acted in concert. Everything leads us to believe that at the outset collectivism was at its maximum and individualism at its minimum."

There were often marked differentiations in the family, which resulted from slavish adherence to some organisation larger than the family. Starcke speaks, p. 26, thus of the Australians: "The obligation of the blood-feud will sometimes place a father and son in hostile opposition to each other, since they belong to different clans." This was the case when descent was traced through the mother, her children then being reckoned to her clan, not to that of their father.

Of group marriages in Australia, the Rev. Mr. Fison, a missionary, says that the relationship thus entered into is not of individual with individual, but of group with group. "It is the group alone that is regarded; the individual is ignored; he is not looked upon as a perfect entity. He has no existence save as a part of a group, which, in its entirety, is the perfect entity. . . . The idea of marriage under the classificatory system of kinship is founded on the rights neither of the woman nor of the man. It is founded on the rights of the tribe, or, rather, of the classes into which the tribe is divided. Class marriage

is not a contract entered into by two parties. It is a natural state into which both parties are born."—Quoted by Wake, pp. 99-100.

Reclus, p. 93, says of the savage in general—giving Australians as illustrations—that "from his childhood he is shackled with burdensome ordinances inherited from his ancestors, for the observance of which he usually has no intelligent reason to offer. The rules which prescribe the conduct of the Australian aborigines are in every place numerous and strictly obligatory, infraction being followed by penalties which always involve the risk of injury to the person and often the forfeiture of life. The unquestioning obedience which commonly marks submission to these vexatious regulations is very striking."

275. Much interest attaches to the place of woman in the movements of the first era. Her emotional nature would attach her to her clan, while at the same time it would feel its way into larger relationships. In the progressive work of culture she deserves special prominence. The maker and substance of the home, to which she gave the stamp of her character, often she and the children really constituted the family, to which the father was a more or less loosely attached adjunct. Then more than in advanced eras might made right, and therefore, being physically weaker, she was, in general, treated as an inferior being. Even when loaded with an infant on her back and obliged to carry wood and water, gather berries, and cultivate the field, the home and its immediate concerns were her peculiar sphere, while the husband might prefer to play the gentleman, spend his time in indolence and pleasure, go on hunting and fishing excursions, or engage in expeditions for war and booty. Perhaps she was obliged to support him as well as herself and children. With the children she probably formed the first permanent social group, and this gave her unrivalled cultural power. As teacher and trainer of the family she became the chief factor in the establishment and direction of society. Her

part in the creation of language must have been very great, likewise in instituting customs and traditions. If we distinguish between the apparent, showy, external, and noisy forces on the one hand, and the real, quiet, deep, and effective ones on the other, we must assign to woman a place in social evolution which, in many respects, is not second, but superior, to that of man.

That she was the chief factor in the movement toward culture so far as this depended on inner qualities is not negatived by the fact that her social position was generally inferior. Her degradation does not, however, seem to have been universal. Even in a low position her power might be great, particularly in determining the character of the family. While the man thrust himself forward and arrogated lordship unto himself, she was kept in the background, was quiet, wrought in obscurity, but accomplished the most lasting work. In some respects her position has been reversed in modern times. In primitive times she was usually the substantial factor in the family, while the husband was the more ornamental part.

Her rights were, in many instances, as sacred as those of the man. This was especially the case when inheritance was through the mother instead of the father. Often a prophetic gift was ascribed to woman; her counsel might be highly prized even in the supreme concerns of the community, or people: perhaps she rose to the first place of power.

O. T. Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, considers woman as the food-bringer, the weaver, the skin-dresser, the potter, the beast of burden, the Jack-at-all-trades, the artist, the linguist, the founder of society, and the patron of religion.

Perhaps this distinction is warranted: the work of culture was more that of woman, the work of civilisation more that of man, she being the chief factor in the inner, he in the external, development of society.

Reclus, p. 57, gives man too little credit, perhaps, but what

he says has much truth: "It is to woman, I think, that mankind owes all that has made us men. Burdened with the children and the baggage, she erected a permanent cover to shelter the little family; the nest for her brood was, perhaps, a ditch carpeted with moss; by the side of it she set up a pole, with large leaves laid across; and, when she thought of fastening three or four of these poles together by their tops, the hut was invented,—the hut, the first interior. She laid the firebrand, with which she never parts, and the hut became illuminated, the hut was warmed, the hut sheltered a hearth. . . . Notwithstanding the doctrine which holds sway at present, I maintain that woman was the creator of the primordial elements of civilisation."

276. The cultural grades in the first era were very great, extending from man near the highest animal, through the savage and barbarian as known to us, to the border of civilisation. The length of time required testifies to the difficulty and greatness of the task performed. The economic interests were considerably developed, although extensive commerce became possible only when the narrow limits of the consanguinity were broken through. The stage in which man depended on the immediate products of nature yields to one in which human labour became an important or the chief factor, as in hunting and fishing, in pastoral and agricultural life, in manufacture and exchange. The period of wooden implements was followed by the bone, stone, bronze, and iron periods. The chief metals became known and were worked. The introduction of iron from the ore was one of the greatest achievements of all ages. All modern machinery and its results depend on this initiative. Barter gave place to exchange and commerce by introducing general standards of value. Travel increased, means of conveyance were developed, and peoples became acquainted with each other and with the world whose resources they learned to exploit.

The notion of property was established and gradually applied to all objects of commercial value. While the people were scarce and the land was abundant, all the ground needed could be had for the taking. The act of occupation was the seal of ownership. Land, therefore, was not the first object claimed as property, though the possessors would resist the encroachment of others. If advantageous to do so, however, a location was abandoned and another site selected for hunting, fishing, pastoral or agricultural purposes. The question of property in land would only arise when there were rival claims for the same territory. A people would demand whatever was necessary for a livelihood. Where conflicts arose respecting the possession of land, the fact of occupancy might be appealed to, but there were not likely to be contracts. When population became more dense some agreement would, however, become necessary respecting the territory claimed or the acquisition of new land. In case of dispute between strange peoples the appeal was probably made to force, though in case of old neighbours conferences might be resorted to. Peoples of the same blood had a tribunal in the kinship. Aside from land, the fact of possession or of labour bestowed on an object seemed to give the right of ownership, though where force reigned rights were but little regarded. In the kinship, however, a standard of rights was necessarily evolved. The man who slew an animal had the strongest claim to it, though the communistic custom might require him to share the object with his chief and his fellows. Implements for the chase and war, clothing and personal ornaments, were perhaps the first things recognised as property. Sheep and cattle in the pastoral age, and the land and its products during the agricultural period, probably belonged to a family or community rather than a person. The manufacturer had the first claim on his products,—the arrow, spear, and canoe he made; and such specialisa-

tion or division of labour probably first led to trade. To this era also belongs property in human beings; and the man who owned slaves claimed the product of their labour. With the kinship as the limit of the recognised rights and the notion of property vague, strangers were apt to regard as theirs whatever they could seize from each other and hold. Savage tribes not bound by consanguine ties are inclined to respect each other's property only so far as it can be maintained by force.

The notion of property was a product of evolution and eventually of social regulation. In the first men it could hardly exist any more than it does now in children. Piracy and robbery are often regarded as proper among savages who are strangers to each other. McLennan, p. 133: "Whatever is foreign to a group is hostile to it." The recognition of rights was limited to those within the kinship.

Progress depended essentially on thrift, foresight, and economy. Little could be expected so long as the savage lived from hand to mouth, now feasted, then starved, with no resources to fall back on so as to obtain leisure for higher concerns. Reclus, p. 33: "It has not been often enough said, often enough repeated: civilisation augments with food, and food with civilisation. The human race is a question of provision. The more bread the more men, and the better the bread is distributed the better will the men become."

Hearn, chap. xviii., discusses the law and custom of property.

277. The gravitation of the first era being so largely toward the essentials for the existence and perpetuation of the species, we find, at least in the beginning, the reason for the almost undisputed reign of the animal nature, the economic force, and such social regulations as are required by society on a low level. The exercise of the economic and martial forces was chiefly in the interest of the appetite and its affinities. But, while the organic

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 51

impulses governed society, the evolution of the cultural energies began and made progress in the approach toward the second era. Especially was this the case with æsthetics and the religious force. Ethics depended largely on social expediency and religious teaching, while the neglect of the direct culture of the intellectual force was most marked. All the cultural forces evolved slowly, amid difficulties almost insuperable, and usually in subordination to the constitutional energies.

The marvel is, that amid the conditions in which they lived, primitive peoples could be evolved to a higher plane. They were not in the situation of savages existing under the influences of a superior culture introduced among them, for these influences had yet to be created. Taking a survey of what has been stated in preceding pages, we must conclude that the dominion of nature, the absorbing character of the lower interests, the indolence, the slavery of tradition and rigid adherence to ancestral customs and degrading superstitions, and the lack of intellectual appreciation and effort, were likely to be overcome only by the force of circumstances which aroused energy, by the superior power of strong individuals, and by the ferment occasioned by contact and mixture with foreign peoples. Labour, the great civiliser, was, like the intellect when at all exerted, concentrated too exclusively on physical objects to promote voluntarily the higher culture. Religion likewise ministered to selfish ends. The peoples were like their gods, or rather they made their gods a reflection of themselves. The personal and tribal selfishness involved in their superstitions, together with their ignorance, prevented large conceptions respecting mankind and altruistic sympathies. The regulations necessary for the existence and welfare of the consanguinity were developed, but confined to the kinship. Striking illustration is afforded by this era that an organisation is apt to separate its members from other

associations in proportion as it binds them together in a compact but narrow or bigoted union. The conscience being developed within, and tethered to, the consanguinity, ethics could not rise above the kinship to embrace humanity.

Great progress is evinced by the fact that permanent methods of government were established with governmental organs of various kinds, which were further developed in the following era. It is impossible to tell how far in this period of origins the cultural forces were evolved; but that the advance was considerable is proved by the remains of antiquity and by existing savages and barbarians. Whatever the lack of initiative and the trend to reproduction, the results attained show that the creative energy was not lacking. Behind the forward movements of society there must have been persons of marked power who gave impulses to progress. But the only record left by primitive genius is the work done. Within the limits of the kinship there were competition, rivalry, ambition; and personal ability, skill, industry, and achievements would tell on society and exalt the doer. In point of initiative the pre-eminence no doubt belonged to a powerful chief or warrior, a wise counsellor, a religious prophet and reformer.

Characteristic of this whole era, especially at its beginning, was the fact that the intellect was not the guide and interpreter, but the servant of the impulses and the will. It did not teach man what he needed, but aided him to get what he wanted. The growth of the intellect from subordination to supremacy is among the most striking facts in social development.

Perhaps instead of saying that primitive man and the child act out their nature, we might say that they are guided by instinct. The instinctive action of an animal is action according to its native impulses, without reflection, perhaps un-

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 53

consciously. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., p. 453, holds that there is no essential difference between instinct and reason, the latter being distinguished from the former only in degree. Reason, he claims, is but instinct which has lost its automatic character. What we do consciously as a result of reasoning becomes, in the course of time, automatic—an important fact in accounting for habit, custom, imitation, tradition, and conservatism.

When the emphasis is placed on blood it is vain to look for any special inspiration to the development of the cultural forces. When nature determines whether men shall be equal or unequal, why make an effort to gain distinction in any other way? A totally different spirit enters society when personal achievement instead of birth, is made the arbiter of human affairs. Then, and then only, do intellect, labour, and sacrifice gain the deserved prominence. There are parents and children, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts and cousins, ancestors and descendants, relatives and foreigners; but no stress is placed on rank dependent on mental factors, and therefore no impulse is given to cultivate these factors.

278. We can sum up the importance of the first era in the statement that it is fundamental, the basis on which the subsequent eras build. Taking into account the task it performed amid the greatest difficulties, with no other age on which to build or from which to receive guidance and support, its achievements must be placed among the most wonderful of any made by mankind. Not only did it plant the seeds and develop the germs ever since then cultivated, but it also tilled the soil in which they have since grown. With all its conservatism, it is the original era; the one which followed was its heir, appropriating and enjoying its contributions to the wealth of the human family. Placing the direct products of that era beside those of enlightenment, they appear like the undeveloped germ compared with the tree and its fruit; but when we turn from this abstract view to the conception of the first

era as a living, energising factor in the great process of social evolution, our estimate of it is exalted. The latter view brings out the magnitude and peculiar grandeur of the springtime of humanity.

Perhaps the alphabet and writing also belong to this period, thus equipping society for the advanced progress it was destined to evolve. While it was the seed-time of the human race it also had harvests for its own use and for transmission to its successors.

A summary view of this era among the Aryans is given by Hearn in the introduction to *The Aryan Household*. Among other peoples some of the conditions would, of course, vary considerably from the description here given. The archaic Aryan society had no central government and no central organs, no parliaments, no courts of justice, no executive officers. Property belonged to households, not to individuals. Custom ruled in place of law, and protection was secured with the help of kinsmen. Those who were descended from the same ancestors and worshipped the same spirits or ancestors formed what Dr. Hearn calls a household. By the union of different households, all claiming descent from the same forefathers, the clan was formed. The clan, the expansion of the household, "marked the boundary line of human sympathy in the archaic world. Within the clan there were the truest loyalty and devotion. Beyond the clan there was, at best, indifference and usually active hostility. The clan was settled upon land of which it, in its corporate character, had the exclusive ownership, and which it shared among its members, according to certain customary rules. It possessed an organisation sufficient for its ordinary wants, and was essentially autonomous. It had, too, its gradations of rank. Every clan contained nobles—that is, men of pure blood and of long descent, and free men whose blood, though good, was not maintained through the necessary number of generations. But it contained others besides the men of pure blood. These were dependents, varying in degree from the honoured guest to the mere slave. . . . The old customs were inflexible. They

admitted of no deviation, and of no extension." There were two institutions side by side: the village community, and the enlarged, independent household under the absolute control of the head. As in the course of time the clans multiplied they formed different kinds of unions—unions of which the clans were the social units, just as the households were the units of which the clans were formed. The union constituted by different clans became territorial. "The tie that held the society together was not the fact of a common descent, nor even the fact of a common worship, but the fact of its occupation of a common country. Early political history consists mainly of the narrative of the relations between the clans and the new body to which they had given rise. The great example of this process is found in the history of Roman law, both because Rome was the earliest example on a large scale of a true state, and because the results of that process directly and largely influenced the history of modern Europe." He holds that law belongs to the state, while in the clan custom takes its place. In archaic society it was characteristic to make the kinship the limit of vision and affection. "The theory of the moral sense would have been intelligible, provided that its operation was limited to a man's own kin. The recognition of the brotherhood of the human race has been a slow and painful lesson, and perhaps even yet some portions of it remain to be learned." The altruism involved in this lesson could never have been learned within the narrow limits of the consanguine organisation.

279. The consanguine era was naturally limited to the period in which the kinship organisation sufficed to meet the demands made by the conditions and relations of men. In point of time it, no doubt, occupied by far the largest portion of human existence; and before it ended the world was peopled. For evident reasons it must have ended soonest along a line running east and west in the same latitude as the Mediterranean or in the temperate zone. The main agencies which wrought disintegration in the consanguine organisation and prepared the way for

a new order of things have already been mentioned, so that here only a review is necessary.

Probably there were long periods, in some places longer than in others, when the kinship organisation no longer sufficed, but a new one had not yet been found. This was the transition era, a kind of middle age. The social evolution broke through the consanguine rule and tentatively moved toward the establishment of a different, but as yet unknown, foundation. The purity of blood became a fiction whenever strangers were adopted into a family. Slaves taken from other peoples also required other than kinship regulations. After many generations, with no written records, it became difficult, or even impossible, to trace the relationship, especially if a people was scattered over an extensive territory. Those most remote from the centre might enter into more intimate relations with foreigners than with their own kin. So soon as social reasons gained the ascendancy over the biological reasons, the psychical tie became stronger than blood. Thus sociological conditions, which had no ground in kinship, became dominant, so that men associated, not because they were of the same blood, but because they were drawn together and united by social interests. This does not imply that the community of blood was ignored. The immediate family tie continued, but it was not the sole consideration; the more remote relationship was apt to lose its significance. The religious power might overshadow the value of the consanguine tie. Men with the same religion would treat each other as brothers, and those with a different religion as enemies, whatever their biological relation. When economic considerations became supreme, men might, for industrial reasons, leave their kin to reside with foreigners. As the world became populated, kinship evolution would be superseded by a wider social evolution. Different peoples would intermingle, intermarry, form

colonies, establish trade and commerce, regardless of the blood tie. The old organisation became effete as soon as the intellectual horizon and the sympathies and conscience were enlarged beyond the kinship; when a stranger ceased to be an enemy and was recognised as having human claims; when different peoples entered upon an interchange of thought and established commercial relations or made some kind of contract.

An institution is tested by its adaptation to the new conditions that arise in the course of evolution. If, in its highest development, it fails to meet the demands, events themselves will pass out of its domain, prove it antiquated, and require a different principle of organisation. This was the case with the consanguine system. The more strictly it was adhered to the more evident its inadequacy became. In the very nature of the case, therefore, the inauguration of another era with a basis for an enlarged social system became a necessity and could be prevented only by checking the social evolution.

The movement was from status to contract, which Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 183, defines as meaning that the development passed from a condition determined by the rules of the consanguinity to one in which each individual determines things for himself by means of a contract with other individuals. As soon as man associates with his fellows for the sake of all the reasons of human sociality he, of course, transcends the consanguine reasons for association.

280. Great effects were produced by the migrations made necessary by the increase of population. Those on the circumference might push farther out and find suitable lands, but those nearer the centre who outgrew their territory would either have to displace others of their own kin or else move to new territory at a distance. Driven by economic necessity, individuals, families, and hordes migrated, carrying with them relatives more or

less akin, and perhaps picking up strangers in their journey. When they finally settled, removed from their kin and receiving stimuli from other peoples, the traditional basis was loosened or eventually superseded. The new bonds of union were on a totally different basis. Weaker peoples with whom the wanderers came in contact might flee, leaving their homes and taking possession of what lands they could get, perhaps in inhospitable climes. Ever driven farther and farther by stronger peoples, they would at last find an abiding-place in a country which no one else wanted, such as the sandy desert or the barren polar regions. During such migrations and the mingling of different peoples dialects in languages would arise and races be modified.

The energy developed and the experience gathered during such migrations overcame the usual stagnation of savages. Movement and change might mean or prepare for progress. So long as the migrations lasted the accumulations required for continuous development were out of the question. Stability combined with inner movement is more favourable. A cumulative process of culture was possible only when life became more settled.

Much was gained by early man when he learned that the world contained other peoples than his kin; that they asserted their rights; and that it was necessary to recognise these rights, and to establish with these peoples other relations than those based on consanguine ties. The ancestors differed, and therefore reverence for the same forefather could not be the bond of union. Neither could the worship founded on blood-relationship be the same. The kinship organisation into families, clans, tribes, likewise became impossible. It was clear that if amicable relations were to exist between foreign peoples an entirely new social system was necessary.

The evolution of the kinship era terminated in a condition making the State a necessity. Mr. Morgan, page

62, says that two plans of social organisation have prevailed: "The first and most ancient was a *social organisation*, founded upon gentes, phratries, and tribes. The second and latest in time was a *political organisation*, founded upon territory and property. Under the first a gentile society was created, in which the government dealt with persons through their relations to a gens and tribe. These relations were purely personal. Under the second a political society was instituted, in which government dealt with persons through their relations to territory, *e. g.*—the township, the county, and the state. The relations were purely territorial. The two plans were fundamentally different. One belongs to ancient society and the other to modern. . . . The Grecian gens, phratry, and tribe, the Roman gens, *curia*, and tribe, find their analogues in the gens, phratry, and tribe of the American aborigines. In like manner, the Irish *sept*, the Scottish *clan*, the *phrara* of the Albanians, and the Sanskrit *ganas*, without extending the comparison farther, are the same as the American Indian gens, which has usually been called a clan. As far as our knowledge extends, this organisation runs through the entire ancient world upon all the continents, and it was brought down to the historical period by such tribes as attained to civilisation. Nor is this all. Gentile society, wherever found, is the same in structural organisation and in principle of action, but changing from lower to higher forms with the progressive advancement of the people. These changes give the history of development of the same original conceptions."

He states that among the Greeks the organisation based on the gens, phratry, tribe, and nation existed till the time of Lycurgus and Solon. The gentile organisation continued until superseded by the political. (P. 242.) On p. 213 he says: "Ancient society rested upon an organisation of persons, and was governed through the relations of persons to a gens or

tribe; but the Grecian tribes were outgrowing this old plan of government, and began to feel the necessity of a political system."

The beginnings of the history of the Germanic peoples point to divisions made in prehistoric times into tribes and peoples which were not held together by territorial union. The people is "*eine Volksgemeinde, aber keine Landesgemeinde.*" Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. i., p. 29. At the same time the people had transcended the narrow consanguine limits before they formed a State in the modern sense. Other demands than those of the blood tie entered into the bonds of union. They regarded themselves as descended from a common ancestor, so that the kinship tie continued, without being the sole bond—a condition which seems to have been quite common at the time the state arose.

281. In closing the consideration of the first era of social evolution we are struck with the magnitude of the problems it involved. An association developed beyond itself breaks its historic continuity without at once finding the principle for the construction of the new social order needed. The discussion has made clear what the supreme problem which needed solution at the inauguration of the second era was: How the peace and order of the first era could be extended to all the relations of peoples who were humanly and socially connected without being biologically akin. How to meet the new and enlarged conditions so as to promote the deepest needs and highest interests of society was the problem.

When we speak of the State as natural we cannot mean that it is natural in the same sense as the kinship organisation, whose basis is given by nature itself. The State is a product of evolution, of experience, of rational development and contemplation, however little men have been aware of what they did. The situation was the occasion of the action taken. Society overflowed the old bounds, and the State met the new demands made thereby.

Inadequacy of Consanguine Organisation 61

The State was the supply of the need, the adaptation to the actual requirement, and this makes it natural in distinction from all mere speculative or artificial adjustments.

Lippert, *l. c.*, vol. ii., pp. 555-602, gives an account of the conditions which led to the origin of the State among the Greeks, Romans, Scandinavians, Germans, and other peoples. So long as the kinship organisation prevailed the foreigner had no rights, except such as were freely accorded him by the tribes. He had not, like the members of the kinship, redress in case his person or property was injured. This was, of course, an intolerable condition where strangers were numerous. Whether all the inhabitants of a place agreed to a different order of things by enacting laws including foreigners, or a ruler was appointed to adjust any differences that might arise between the members of tribes and strangers,—in either case the consanguine rule had become inadequate and was superseded. The author discusses numerous forms of organisation which evidently marked the transition to the State as we now know it.

**THE SECOND OR POLITICAL ERA OF
SOCIAL EVOLUTION**

CHAPTER XIX

THE STATE

282. The genesis of the State until it stands out distinctly as a peculiar institution must be distinguished from the evolution of the State itself after being fully established. The genesis concerns us chiefly, for the reason that the origin of the State presents most difficulty, belonging to a period of much obscurity. The second, or political era, which we now enter, introduces us to our own times and to movements with which we are more familiar than those of the first era.

The sociological student finds within easy reach a knowledge of the State and of its wealth of social content. The history of the State is not included in our investigation; were it written our task would be more easy. We must leave it to political science to discuss elaborately the nature, the forms, and the functions of the State. The culture which has taken place within its borders is a rich and important theme; but that can be learned from the numerous scholarly works which have been developed under the protection and inspiration of political institutions, at least within the historical period. The sociological view, which is the only one which here concerns us, considers the place of the State in social evolution and the general influence of the State on human association.

283. We cannot tell when, where, and how the political superseded the kinship organisation; but we have learned what conditions had outgrown the consanguine govern-

ment and prepared the way for the political constitution of society. Primitive man grew slowly into those large interests which were difficult for him to appreciate, but are familiar to us, and which made the State a necessity. The determining factor in the genesis of political institutions consisted of the new conditions which were evolved, or rather the demands made by man amid these conditions.

The contract theory to account for the origin of the State is generally abandoned now. It attributes to earlier stages such knowledge, reflection, and purposive action as arise only at a later period of development. Certain circumstances arose which pointed beyond the existing organisation, and the indications they gave need only be followed to lead naturally, spontaneously, perhaps semi-consciously to the new order of things. These circumstances, as seen above, involved the development of industries, the growth of trade, the mingling, through commerce and otherwise, of peoples of different blood, the establishment of cities where strangers located and formed a community, and the increase of human and social relationship which physiological connection does not account for. The political organisation began when the individual became more independent of natural ties and followed his mental affinity and intellectual requirements. The childhood of humanity is tethered to the family; when manhood is reached citizenship takes the place of the kinship.

Hearn, p. 10, says: "That society was based upon a contract few persons would now care to maintain. There is no evidence that such contract was in fact made. It is in effect inconceivable that it should have been formed."

After States have existed for some time, others can, of course, be modelled after them, so that modern states may be the product of convention, and in that sense artificial. But that has

nothing to do with the question of the first origin of the State. See J. W. Burgess, *Political Science*, p. 62.

Schurtz, p. 175, shows that in recent times political organisations have been constituted by adventurers and others, who, for various reasons, left their tribes.

284. The very fact of consanguinity settled much in the first era without formal organisation. The position in the relationship often conferred authority. The natural head of the tribe or the elders could manage the internal affairs. The people under the control of rules which had grown up among themselves, and under natural consanguine regulations, required government by chiefs and councils only in general affairs. Except so far as tradition needed interpretation and application it was a personal government. In a State, however, the government becomes a constant and more essential function. The law is required to regulate by specific enactment what the mere fact of relationship formerly determined. Government is not an incidental function of the State, but its essence. Political regulation required experience and time in order to permeate and regulate all the affairs of the State.

This makes it probable that a long time was required for the transition from the first to the second era, from the purely consanguine to the purely political organisation. There must have been numerous intermediate stages in which the consanguine rule became less rigid and foreign elements began to assert their claims. The kinship regulation was naturally stretched to the utmost to meet the new demands before yielding to another bond of union. The transition, though gradual and imperceptible, involved one of the greatest principiant changes in history, a change during which men passed from what nature had instituted biologically to what their developed minds, enlarged personal interests, and the totality of

their social relations required. The tenacity with which the masses clung to an established order made a radical change in that era more difficult than afterwards. Perhaps, however, the change of principle involved was so gradual as to be imperceptible. The inauguration of the new era was, no doubt, largely due to a few leaders or men in authority, who recognised the new needs and made provision to meet them.

"The people, as a whole, is always conservative, those favouring progress are always a few individuals only, and therefore even the smallest and most innocent change must reckon with a degree of opposition which grows in proportion to the departure of the change from what is customary, or so far as it requires an unusual amount of understanding." —Schurtz, *Urgeschichte der Kultur*, p. 57.

Following Wundt, the author holds that the people are much more inclined to transform the old and adapt it to the new demands than to create or adopt something that is new and directly meets the new requirements. P. 58.

Tentative movements, new experiments, conflicts between the old and new, confusion and uncertainty, were inevitable. It is to such a period that Curtius refers, *History of Greece*, vol. i., p. 92: "The Theban myths comprehended in brief and clear lines the main movements of historical development which really occupied centuries. Such epochs as that which the arrival of Cadmus represented fix the conclusion of a patriarchal condition of innocence and tranquillity; craft and force accompany the blessings of a higher life, and bring with them into the land evil manners and unheard-of misdeeds, war, and trouble. The wrath of the gods and the guilt of men, sin and its curse, follow one another in a close and terrible succession." The adherents to a conservative tradition naturally attributed such evils to the wrath of the gods for abandoning the old landmarks.

285. Cities with their great concentration of force and interest, their competition, friction, and stimuli, have

been the centres of empire and given the mightiest impulses to progress. The evolution which led to their origin also created the conditions which made the State a necessity. The cities may have been the first States, or at least the nuclei of States. An organised city easily subdued the surrounding unorganised country districts and governed them. Old centres of civilisation, at least, make it probable that political organisation began where the natural and geographical conditions favoured traffic and the concourse of peoples. Perhaps they were neutral places on some highway where different peoples mingled freely and on equal terms; or they might belong to a particular people, but attractive to others who settled there and eventually gained recognition. The Ganges and Indus, the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile seem to have been such highways. India and China, Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and other points on the Mediterranean were adapted to a confluence of different peoples.

Where the sea offered no invincible obstacles to early mariners, but favoured navigation along the coast and among islands, it afforded many advantages for civilisation. The Mediterranean early became a highway for nations and promoted intercourse between peoples. Curtius says that the empire of the Dardanides grew up on the soil of a peninsula, "on which Phrygians and Pelasgians, Assyrians, Phœnicians, and Hellenic mariners met."

In some places a kind of theocracy may have intervened between the consanguine and the political era. The religious rule was in that case superinduced upon the kinship regulation and may even have continued its authority in the State. With the Israelites the consanguinity existed as before, but the theocracy was dominant when they demanded a king. The people had long outgrown the direct kinship rule, though in the tribal arrangements the consanguine organisation was adhered to. The appointment of judges and rulers by divine authority was

deemed by the people a failure when they were about to be subjected to the rule of the wicked sons of Samuel; 1 Samuel viii. The fact that the demand for a king was interpreted as the rejection of God's reign over the people shows that God had been regarded as directly choosing the rulers. That the kinship organisation had not been entirely superseded by the theocracy is made evident by the coming of the elders of Israel to Samuel with the demand that a king be appointed. Samuel, recognised as God's prophet, heeds the elders, who represent the consanguine tie. Among other peoples priests, prophets, and sorcerers were also looked upon as divine agents who governed the peoples as directed by dreams, visions, necromancy, by direct inspiration, or other means. When this failed, as in the case of Samuel, a new organisation became necessary.

The functions of the king are described by the elders who came to Samuel—"that we also may be like all the nations, and that our king may judge us, and go before us, and fight our battles"; viii., 20. The old form of government by specially appointed judges seemed too haphazard, too uncertain; they wanted something more authoritative. The description of what is to be expected of a king, viii., 10-18, is significant. The choice of Saul was determined by other characteristics than blood-relationship, ix., 21, and x., 23-24.

Certain persons might claim to reign by divine power; but if their rule was disagreeable the claim was liable to rejection. When different persons claimed divine appointment the decision might be left to war. So far as we know, the reign of priests, prophets, and judges by divine authority has everywhere been superseded, in the higher stages of evolution, by the political era. Kings who claimed to reign "by the grace of God," and transmitted their authority to their descendants, took the place of judges and rulers appointed in some extraordinary way.

We have no idea how far the first State antedates history. It is claimed that Egyptian civilisation dates from 5000 to 7000 years before Christ. A more complete deciphering of the hieroglyphics may change these dates. We have, however, no evidence that the first State was formed in Egypt.

As "politics" points to the city for its origin, so "civilisation" points to citizenship, *civis*, or the State as the condition for civilised life. *Civilis*, *civitas*, and the derivatives from *civis* in general, imply that civilisation and the State go together. The origin of "politics" from *polis* (city) is significant.

E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. i., chap. iii., gives an account of the beginning of Greek States. Piracy prevailed on the Greek coast and the islands of the archipelago. In the midst of the confusion and chaos resulting therefrom, political order arose under Minos, the first king, in Crete, a place admirably adapted to shipping and the mingling of persons from various peoples. To this first king is ascribed the initiation of that epoch of civilisation which established "order and law, the foundation of states." Religion, the worship of Zeus, was the basis of this organisation. "Here (in Crete) the Greek genius first manifested itself as strong enough, not only to give admission to the varied impulses offered by the crafty and inventive Semitic race, but also to transmute by its own creative agency everything it had admitted, and to produce developments of religious and political life, which are the clear reflection of its own nature." The Greek civilisation on the mainland of Asia Minor may, however, have preceded the founding of the State in Crete.

286. The territory and the social relations within the territorial limits are the supreme factors considered by the State. We can almost say that the territory is substituted for blood. Prominent among the subjects for political regulation are property, economic affairs generally, internal peace and welfare, and relations with other States. These concerns need not interfere with the biological relationship; indeed, this usually receives distinct recognition and is made the basis of many legal

enactments, but it has ceased to be the dominating influence. The State makes a specialty of the rights of the family and the relation of the members to each other, to property, and inheritance. Being relieved of the domination of the clan and tribe, and subject only to the laws of the State, the family may have a better chance for the independent development of its peculiar functions than in the first era. The family in the State becomes a more complete concentration of the idea and affection of the kinship, the home can be better protected against intrusion, and the individual members are freed from slavish consanguine bonds. It meant much for the family to be relieved of the mechanism of the enlarged kinship and thrown more on its own resources. The establishment of the kingdom in Israel did not destroy the authority of the family, nor the internal arrangements of the tribes; but these were subordinate, the sovereignty having passed to the king. This is implied in the tyranny which it is foretold the king will exercise. Among the Greeks the gentes, after the State was formed, continued their separate existence and enjoyed peculiar privileges. Rome also recognised division into families. In modern times Scotland has held the clan responsible for the deeds of its members. Similar conditions have prevailed in other States. But the State considers its people as composed of citizens who constitute a nation with varied interests, of which the kinship relation is but one of many factors.

The clans or tribes might select a king; the selection, however, as in the case of Saul, did not depend on family or ancestors, but on qualities which were supposed to fit him for the government. When the citizenship supersedes kinship the State determines who the citizens shall be, and what their rights and functions. Race, language, religion, might be made conditions of citizenship; but as the State developed, the bonds involved in the old blood tie would lose in significance, while increasing importance

would be attached to the land, the general social relations and interests, and the foreign affairs of the State.

The succession of authority in the State from the father to his eldest son might be regarded as the adoption of a kinship rule, according to which the prerogatives of the ancestor are conferred on the oldest son. But this rule was not without exception during the first era. Besides, it is so natural for the ruler to transmit his authority to the oldest son that its adoption does not require the example of the kinship organisation.

Treitschke, *Politik*, vol. i., p. 113, thinks it probable that the first States depended on blood relationship. No doubt the political organisation grew out of the consanguine; but we have seen that in places where different peoples congregated for commercial purposes a State might arise which did not depend on the kinship of its members. He thinks that the State resulted from the seizing of authority by the stronger tribe, and that war and the desire for conquest were the most important factors in the creation of political organisations. We have found abundant room for other factors, and it is impossible to determine how far those mentioned by him prevailed. War undoubtedly made a strong organisation like that of the State a necessity. A State is a political unit including in its borders numerous social units with various interests and aims; and it determines the relation of these units in the interest of national peace and welfare.

Hearn, p. 460: "So late as the year 1581, the Scottish legislature, in dealing with certain troublesome Highlanders, made a whole clan answerable for the misdeeds of its individual members; and in another statute, shortly afterward, the chief of each tribe was made responsible for all the offences of the surname."

The transition from a gens or consanguine government to a State, in which the dominance of the blood tie ended, is said to have taken place among the Franks at the time of Chlodovic. See Georg Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, vol. iii., Part I., p. 136 and foll. Sohm is quoted as advocating the

same view since he declares that the Frank constitution freed the theory of the State from the idea of the gens.

287. The fact that the State occupies a definite territory and that great stress is laid on this territorial basis has led to an undue emphasis on the land, as if it were the most essential of the political factors. The State deals, first of all, with its people or citizens, and the territory is valued for the sake of the inhabitants. The soil, the climate, the geographical situation are important factors for the State; but they have no significance of their own, as in the case of natural science, for instance. The essence of the State is the citizenship, the relation and functions of the inhabitants. The State can be understood only as a truly human and social institution, with man in his varied relations, not property, as the central idea. Therefore the territory, as stated above, must be regarded as the physical basis of the State, much as in the previous era the biological relation was regarded as the basis of all association. But in both cases the social essence is distinct from the basis on which it rests.

So important is the question whether civil government makes persons or property most fundamental that it should be settled beyond dispute. Even if it were in some cases true that civil government is based on territory or property, it would not establish that as containing the correct idea of the State. Property, whether personal or communal, has value only as a personal or social possession. It ceases to be property so soon as abstracted from persons.

While no one questions the importance of a territorial basis for the State, it is the one-sided emphasis on territory and property, to the ignoring of the citizens, which is here opposed. On the other hand it has been questioned whether a definite territory is a necessary condition for the State. Without such territory the idea of the

State cannot be fully realised. But the occupation and control of a definite territory does not differentiate the State from the consanguine organisation, since a tribe might sustain to its land the same relation that the State does. The difference between the consanguine and the political era is not in the relation to the land, but in the *form of the organisation*. The land may be increased or diminished without affecting the essence of the State.

It is evident that a State which makes its citizens the most essential feature must be radically different from one which places the first emphasis on land and property.

Mr. Morgan repeatedly states that civil society is based on the idea of property. He says, p. 264, that under the old system the idea of persons was predominant, being founded on relations purely personal; but, he continues, "the idea of property, as the basis of a system of government, was now incorporated by Solon in the new plan of property classes." But "property classes" are persons with property, so that the government Solon attempted was still personal; persons were, however, taken according to their actuality, that is, as holding property. The confusion is due to the common failure to distinguish between what is truly social and its merely physical adjuncts.

He says, p. 272, in referring to the change from society based on kinship to civil society: "Thus the Athenians founded the second great plan of government upon territory and upon property. They substituted a series of territorial aggregates in the place of an ascending series of aggregates of persons. As a plan of government it rested upon territory which was necessarily permanent, and upon property which was more or less localised; and it dealt with its citizens, now localised in demes through their territorial relations." The last clause shows what is meant. Territory and property are conditions of government, not its end. The people are the basis of government, but the people in particular localities and with their possessions. This emphasis on "the people" is con-

firmed by what follows the above quotation. "To be a citizen of the state it was necessary to be a citizen of the deme. The person voted and was taxed in his deme, and he was called into the military service from his deme. In like manner he was called by election into the senate, and to the command of the division of the army or navy from the larger district of his local tribe. His relation to a gens or phratry ceased to govern his duties as a citizen. The contrast between the two systems is as marked as their difference was fundamental. A coalescence of the people into bodies politic in territorial areas now became complete." All of which makes it evident that the government was based on the people, the citizens, but according to their new relations.

288. So numerous and varied are its functions that it is difficult to give a sharp and concise definition of the State. It can be considered from many points of view without making its essence the nucleus from which everything radiates. It is especially important to discriminate between the State and all other organisations, by seizing its distinctive peculiarity. The fact that it possesses regulative authority it shares with other organisations. But its peculiarity consists in the fact that its authority is political, which means that within the limits of its authority the State is supreme in all public interests. There has been much dispute respecting the exact domain of the political, but when this is once settled there can be no question of the supremacy of the political over all other organisations. The political and religious forces have, at times, been closely allied, or even identified; at others, militarism was regarded as the most essential factor in politics; often economic pursuits have been treated as the chief consideration. In the same State different forces have successively gained the ascendancy. Thus, the State itself has been subject to change according to the stage of evolution attained, the circumstances of people, the dominance of certain factors, and the relation sustained

to other peoples. But in whatever sphere its chief functions were supposed to lie, the State is always the dominant force in what is recognised as the political realm.

While authority is the essence of the State, it is an authority amid numerous other authorities. The aim must then be to get the exact nature of this authority, that which differentiates it from all other rule. The family, the kinship, the Church,—every association, is a centre of authority. Nor is it definite enough to call the State a commonwealth, a body politic, a political, civil, self-governing community. The definition of the Standard Dictionary is better: "A political community organised under a distinct government recognised and conformed to by the people as supreme." We define a political community as an association of persons on a given territory for the purpose of regulating their public affairs. This differentiates the State from a consanguine community which is intent on the kinship relation, not on public affairs generally. In politics we find the general social relations dominant. The Government recognises no appeal beyond itself in the exercise of its internal functions, while for every other organisation in the State the decision of the State in political affairs is final. The associations within a State have specific interests and distinct spheres; and it would be a usurpation of the functions of the State for any particular organisation to claim general functions which subjected other organisations to its decrees. The function of the State pertains to the general or public interests of its citizens; and the fact that the State confines itself to what pertains in general to all the inhabitants, and is supreme in the regulation of these public affairs, differentiates it from every other authority and organisation.

The State protects all, whether akin or not; its laws are for all, citizens and strangers, though their privileges differ; it

levies taxes in order to perform its functions; it demands and enforces obedience; it engages in war with foreign powers and with insurgents, to protect itself and its citizens and to further its interests. Its functions are both external and internal; and so far as its citizens are concerned, its external and internal policy is ultimate. See Sidgwick, *The Elements of Politics*, p. 212.

While public welfare is the purpose of the State, every association within its bounds has only a part of the public within its organisation and usually has some specific aim far less inclusive than the aim of the State. The inhabitants within the state, particularly its citizens, are the public; and their welfare involves all that pertains to them. The basis of this welfare is a right relation between all the persons in the State. Citizenship thus involves a vast range of relations and interests which could not be provided for in the preceding era. Law substitutes a rule of general application for individual whim, caprice, and passion; it sets up an impartial, impersonal, and universal standard in place of personal prejudice and malice. The State puts a judicial tribunal where formerly the blood-feud prevailed. Tradition and custom no longer suffice, because new relations have been entered and new cases for adjudication arise. The State as a law-making and law-executing sovereignty applies rational tests to human relations and actions, instead of letting them be determined by biology. Its laws reveal the State as a higher (psychical) stage of evolution.

289. The State is, therefore, an authority of a particular kind. The exact nature of its authority is essential in order to avoid confusion. An isolated family may be supreme in managing its limited affairs, yet we do not call it a State. The State involves large general interests, the might to maintain them, and a relation to external organisations which secures its independence within its particular sphere. Sometimes a tribe is called a "state," and we read of the "patriarchal state"; but these do not make the general social, as distinguished

from the kinship, interests supreme, as the modern idea of the State implies. Loose expressions like these occur: "The family is at first the State"; "the very first State which ever existed was a human family consisting of a mother and her offspring." The next States were supposed to be the clan, the tribe, the patriarchate, the confederacy, all consanguine organisations. But this wipes out well-established distinctions and robs the State of the characteristics attributed to it in modern times. The State, in modern usage, has a stability, and size, and organisation which the family cannot attain, and it has social interests and relations which far transcend those which spring from the tie of blood.

We have seen that the State must be regarded as an evolution from the family; but that is different from identifying it with the family. All that can be claimed is that in authority it has an analogy with the family. This indicates how far we can adopt the language of Woodrow Wilson in *The State*, p. 3: "The original State was a family. Historically the State of to-day may be regarded as in an important sense only an enlarged Family: 'State' is 'Family' writ large." The qualification, "*in an important sense*," must not be overlooked. In *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, by J. W. Burgess, vol. i., p. 51, we read: "The State is a particular portion of mankind viewed as an organised unit." But how many organised units exist which are not States! The State is a particular portion of mankind organised as a *political* unit, having the ultimate authority to correlate the relations of its citizens and regulate all civil affairs within its own boundaries.

The mere organisation of government is, of course, not a guarantee of ethical institutions. There may be government, peace, and order among thieves and thugs. Proof might even be furnished that the State has at times been "a band of thieves and robbers," as has been charged.

Ratzel calls the primitive organisations "family states"; but

this fails to distinguish sufficiently between the consanguine and the political organisation.

290. Although the jurisdiction of the State extends to its territory, and to all the persons and interests within the limits of the State, yet it may decide to leave many things to particular relations and organisations. This decision must, however, emanate from the State, and is no infringement on its supremacy. It belongs to its function to determine what is essential for the harmonious working and movement of the individuals and societies within its borders. The kinship within the State is limited by its consanguine functions; the priesthood by the priestly functions; every profession, every caste, every economic association, every class, and group is limited by its specific calling and interests, by its traditions and customs. The State can assign to each its particular sphere, and in that let it be supreme. Not one of them can, however, claim the right to determine its own sphere and the relation of each to each or the government of all. The State, larger than each, includes all of them. It can, therefore, lay down general rules for the relation of these societies; but within these rules it leaves room for independent individual and social movement. Thus, it determines the limits of its dominion.

One of the most important differences in States is found in what they subject to rule and what they leave to voluntary action. The sphere of political action consequently varies in different ages and States. Each particular society is individual, and in its specific limits may have autonomy; but its individual character forbids its interference with the functions of other similar societies. What, then, shall determine the relation of such societies and be the final appeal? Here we come to the function of the State. If it fails to attend to the interests which lie beyond the function of a particular society yet

are common to all the societies and necessary for their welfare, it abdicates its authority. On the other hand, it leaves its special sphere and becomes a usurper if it assumes the functions of the particular societies and dictates terms which belong to the freedom of these societies.

People who came from various kinships to centres of traffic and formed cities might regulate their individual and kinship affairs. But in order to maintain peace and promote the welfare of the community it was necessary to make general internal regulations and to ward off foes. Whatever had no political bearing, that is, did not pertain to the public welfare, was no concern of the State. When, however, affairs which were entrusted to particular societies led to disturbance or conflict, then the State was the arbiter. No association was ultimate for the State, but the State was ultimate for all associations within its borders.

The omnipotence of the State within its specific sphere has frequently been interpreted to mean its omnipotence in every sphere. Repeatedly an effort has been made by the State to control thought as well as action. That the State exists for the sake of the people has often been overlooked. This is the case with a paternalism which keeps the people in the condition of children by thinking and believing for them. Only by self-government can the people be trained for self-government. But degrees may be necessary in the self-government which trains the people, so that complete political independence is the culmination of a long process of evolution.

The State as the authority of and for the totality has been the occasion of much dispute respecting the nature and extent of that authority. All the way from a despotism to a republic or democracy differences prevail respecting what is to be left to the freedom of the citizens—one phase of the problem of the rights of the individual and the rights of society, or of

the relation between the private and the social forces. The answers which have been and are still given depend on the kind and degree of civilisation attained by the people and the Government. What can be committed to the choice of the citizens at one stage may not be safe at another, and sometimes the Government may lag behind the people. Even if a people must be governed, that fact may make it a prominent function of the State to train them for self-government. Where the government is mainly by force to which the people are subjected, the question of force may be settled by the people in resorting to force in order to secure their rights.

A twofold development may have taken place respecting what was regarded as political. Some factors, at first left to voluntary choice, might later be deemed political, while others, such as religion, might at first be settled by the State and afterwards left to individual and social choice.

When the supreme need was a political union for the sake of peace and order (civilisation), neither the nature of the union nor the means of promoting its ultimate ends seems to have been thoroughly scrutinised. The immediate necessities of the case were met and other things left for determination as they arose. It is too much to expect that a distinct idea of the State, of its functions, and of its peculiar place in the social organism occupied the thoughts of the rulers or the ruled. A government solely intent on ruling was limited by its might, but not likely to be much concerned about the rights and relations of individuals.

Probably, at first, the ruler of a State was similar to a chief of the preceding era, uniting in himself legislative, judiciary, and executive functions. A division of labour and functions was the result of evolution. Even in early England the king "was at once ruler, lawgiver, general, and judge, all those functions being as yet enfolded in the same germ." But he exercised his functions with the consent of an assembly of the magnates. See Goldwin Smith, *The United Kingdom*, vol. i., p. 8.

291. Important inferences are drawn from the fact that the State has more general functions than the societies

within its bounds. The consanguine organisation, the caste, the profession or occupation, the Church, severely limits its members if made ultimate forms of government. Each draws the lines within which the members can move. The smaller the content of a society, therefore, the smaller the sphere of its activity. A State affords more room for movement than an association of shoemakers. What is common to shoemakers is not so general as what is common to all the citizens. The shoemakers' association, accordingly, has a much more limited sphere than the State. The State never becomes a particular society, but it determines the relation of each to the general interest. This very fact cultivates a larger conception than a particular society and has a cultural influence. To be a citizen means more than to be a member of a kinship or caste. To belong to a State as well as to a family or profession enlarges the individual himself and presents favourable conditions for the individual evolution. In proportion as a State develops freedom it gives room for individuality. The evolution of the State, however, sometimes tends to the development of individualism, sometimes to that of socialism or communism.

292. The Greek ideal, that the individual is to be free to develop his powers to the utmost, subject only to such restraints as the public weal requires, can hope for realisation only in the State. The individual must be freed from the dominion of the blood-relationship before he can appreciate the larger interests of society or shape his own course. The State deals more directly with the individual *per se* than primitive society; it even defends him against the unjust demands of his family and tribe. Hence the room for, and culture of, individualisation in the State. The person is thrown more on his own resources and his responsibility is increased. The true State aids him in his independence and in the lawful

exercise of his energies. At first the political institutions, modelled on the kinship plan or greatly influenced thereby, could not deal so directly with the individual; but in modern times the State makes individual responsibility the basis of dealing with persons. It is, in fact, a question whether the individual's dependence on his family and kin for his training and character is not too much ignored. That "society makes criminals" has a special application to the influence of the family.

Peculiar social complications might arise when factors of the consanguine government continued after the State had been established. In Rome, for instance, a father was supreme in his family so long as he lived, and could decide questions of life and death respecting the members; yet the son might become a magistrate and pronounce sentence of death on his father.

Hearn, p. 335: "It was only by the complete subordination of the clan, and the direct communication of the state with each individual citizen, that true political society was established."

In Chapter xx. he emphasises the individualistic factor of the State in distinction from archaic society: "Modern society is emphatically political society. It implies great aggregates of individuals living together under a central government, whatever may be its origin and its form. Of this government they recognise the authority and they obey the commands. Their common bond of union is that they are fellow-subjects of the same sovereign. Each man is accountable for his conduct to the law, and to the law only. Within the limits of the law, he may act, or forbear to act, as he pleases; may gain and may spend; may accumulate property, and may alienate it for such interest as the law allows, either during his life or upon his death, without any regard to any kinsmen or other persons, and merely at his own will and pleasure. He has to answer for his own conduct only, or for the conduct of those persons who are under his direct control; and he is under no legal

obligation for any misdoings of his brother, or of his uncle. No such powers or immunities existed, or could exist, in the clan system." The State promotes individual rights and removes impediments in the way of their free exercise. "The freedom of individual action is found in the State, and is not found elsewhere." Such stress on the individual, if introduced into the consanguinity, would have disintegrated it.

293. The State is sovereign. Sovereignty means supreme power from which there is no appeal. The extent and exercise of the sovereignty have been subjects of dispute, and much evolution of political thought will be required before the problems involved are solved and agreement is reached. When a despot seizes the throne by force his sovereignty rests solely on might, and on might its maintenance will depend. When Louis XIV. declares himself the State, he becomes a usurper of authority and inaugurates a course of development which ends with the overthrow of the monarchy. In the monarchies of Europe it has become common to divide the sovereignty between the ruler and the people. The growing recognition of the people as part of the sovereignty, not merely as its subjects, is significant of the trend. The European constitutions grant to the king certain sovereign rights, perhaps on the ground of dynasty, of historic development, or of divine sanction; while other sovereign functions are assigned to the people and find expression in Parliament. The king of England is called sovereign, but in many respects the sovereignty is lodged in the Parliament elected by the people. The State is sometimes treated as a kind of abstraction which hovers over the people. The Government is not the State, but only its directive or executive function, the organ through which the State expresses itself. Governments change while the State continues to exist. The State is the concentrated political force of the totality,

which force is expressed by the legislative, judicial, and executive powers.

While the extent of the sovereignty of the State has varied greatly, it has generally been admitted that the decision of the matter rests with the State itself. If it has not the power to determine its own sovereignty it is a State only in a limited sense. Some ethical questions involved will be considered later. States are not equally independent; hence they are not equally sovereign. Greece, for instance, is not as independent as Germany or Russia, since it requires the protection of other States. But the quasi-dependence or limitation of its sovereignty must be assumed by the State itself, otherwise it is forced into subjection to another State. Where a number of States form a nation, as in the case of the United States or Germany, no individual State has the sovereignty in the same sense as the nation itself. The rights of each State must be settled between it and the totality. There need be no conflict, for the functions of the one are specifically limited; those of the other are more general. Shall the nation itself be called a State? In that case it is a State of States. In its own sphere each State of the nation has the final authority; but its functions depend on the condition made by the nation of which it is a part.

There may be a conflict between the State and a society within its borders. The "Culturkampf" in Prussia was a conflict between the sovereignty of the State and the sovereignty claimed by the Catholic Church in the management of ecclesiastical affairs. It is especially in respect to religion and economics that conflicts are apt to arise between the authority of the State and the rights of the people.

Anarchism sets the supremacy of the State at naught, and insists on a government from below (absolute individual freedom), instead of from above (the State). The

quiet, theoretical anarchists agree in this respect with the destructive anarchists of deed. Men who defy the law of the State or take it into their own hands, as in the case of lynching, are anarchists. This kind of anarchism must be distinguished from the anarchy which takes place when chaos reigns, as in a revolution. Anarchism is the fruit of despotism, but also of lax or unjust class-government, when the law is not enforced or is used for the aggrandisement of a party. The citizens may, in that case, take the making and enforcement of the law into their own hands for self-protection.

The word "sovereignty" is recent. Bluntschli, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, p. 563, says that the idea of sovereignty and the word itself, originated in France.

Since the perfect agreement of all citizens cannot be expected, the rule is that of the majority or of what is called the majority. The majority is a part of the whole; therefore, since it rules the totality, we find in politics a part greater than the whole. Where there are three or more candidates for a place, the successful one may represent a minority of the voters. In the United States the president, the members of both houses of Congress, and of the State legislatures, can be elected by a minority. In the election for the German Parliament, if a number of candidates oppose each other, a new election becomes necessary whenever one of them fails to secure the majority of all the votes cast. In the second election only the two candidates who received the largest number of votes are pitted against each other.

In the United States a president may be elected without having a majority of the votes of a single State. If there are three candidates, he need but have more votes than either of the others, though he may have less than the two together.

294. The State reveals its sovereignty by putting its will into laws which it makes absolute. It treats its authority as final in enacting, interpreting, and executing the laws. Other societies may advise and persuade; but

they are subject to the State, which demands implicit obedience. In its laws, its courts, its executive, its institutions, and its politics a State objectifies itself and speaks its mind to its citizens and the world.

Whatever the ideal of the State, it has manifested itself as essentially a concentration of force. This force as will embodies its mind and heart. No other organisation has the right to exercise force of the same kind and to the same degree. When at the time of the Inquisition the ecclesiastical authorities committed the functions of deciding questions of liberty and life to the State, they recognised its supremacy. Usually in resorting to force for self-preservation the State identifies this with the preservation of the citizens and their interests. The real aim may, however, be the retention of the government by those in power. State necessity, State policy, the welfare of the people may be mere pretexts which cannot hide the hypocrisy, injustice, and oppression actually existing in States.

In the exercise of its functions the State is, of course, not limited to force. The evolution of the State consists largely in modifying its force and introducing other factors. When legislative bodies appear the views and needs of the people can be considered by their representatives, freedom of discussion promoted, and the laws and their execution adapted to the requirements of the occasion. As will be seen later, a State advances in proportion as it puts educational, preventive, and ethical forces in place of punitive legal enactments.

In idea the State and its government are distinct; but the Government, including the legislative and judicial, as well as the executive, functions, is the political actuality which makes itself visible and felt. The State realises itself in its laws, politics, and executive function. The actual legislative and executive powers may be at variance with the constitution and laws, a conflict between the

expressed ideal and the actuality. The law may be disobeyed and unexecuted, a variance between theory and practice. We can say that the State is the sovereign power in the form of a political organisation. The Government is the organ of the State for the realisation in actual life of the inherent sovereignty. Every mistake made by the organ in the interpretation and execution of the law makes clear the distinction between the State and its government.

Machiavelli said: "The State is might." Treitschke, vol. i., p. 13: "The State consists of the independent might of a people lawfully united." P. 32: "The State is public might for defence and offence." P. 35: "The sovereignty in a judicial sense, the perfect independence of the State with respect to every other force on earth, is so completely the essence of the State that one can pronounce it the criterion of the nature of the State." P. 37: "Gustavus Adolphus said: 'I recognise no one as over me except God and the sword of the victor.'"

295. The distinction between the laws and politics of the State illustrates statements in a previous chapter respecting what is settled and organised, and what is still fluid and unsettled. A constitution is the basis for law and politics, giving the limits within which they are to move. The principles it involves are a concentration of the political ideas which are supposed to be final. Evolution may, of course, create new demands for which the fundamental law makes no provision, thus requiring a change in the constitution itself. The laws enacted on the basis of the constitution are specific applications of its general principles. If the constitution declares what ought to be, the laws are more specific, and state what must be. Politics, distinct from both, deals with questions of expediency within the limits of the constitution and laws;

in other words, it is concerned with what is not yet settled, but ought to be. Every law enacted takes something from the sphere of the undetermined and gives it a fixed form. Perhaps a law is not required or cannot yet be made; the general application it involves cannot be determined for all time. Then a resolution applying to a particular case can be adopted. The constitution of a land is justly regarded as of first importance, because it contains a summary of what is deemed fundamental. While it can be changed and may have a provision to that effect, just as the laws and politics can be changed: a change in the constitution involves a change in the foundation on which the whole superstructure rests and may mean a revolution in fundamentals.

Politics, as the sphere of expediency, does not imply the absence of principles. The statesman is perhaps distinguished because he makes principle the law of policy. The highest ethical and religious considerations enter politics. In the open questions with which politics deals, the problem may be whether some great principle shall be made an integral part of the organism of the State or an expedient adopted. Expediency can, itself, be made the principle, as when, in respect to slavery, compromise is resorted to for the sake of peace.

The State, the culmination, according to its general principles, of a long process of evolution, is a permanent type whose essential qualities remain, but whose minor factors are liable to change. Similarly constitutions and laws must be viewed.

Much of the evolution of the State consists in organising and settling what before was unorganised and unsettled. A State must be judged by what it has settled and what it leaves to the freedom of its citizens; how it executes what it has fixed by law; and what its political attitude toward unsettled problems. What has been permanently organised is an epitome of the culminations and

crystallisations of the past, the fruit of the total evolution.

296. What is unsettled and yet within the realm of constitutional and legal possibility pertains both to internal and external affairs, and leaves much room for politics. Here we are, however, especially concerned with what is left to individuals and the social relations within the State. The State is not a unit of the social units within its borders, but a unit solely of their political relations. These relations are regarded in different lights by States, and this affects the societies within them. The State, as a concentration of the political force, does not concern itself about the other forces, except so far as they are thought to sustain a relation to political institutions. The political status of the individuals and the societies is fixed; but, aside from this, they exercise freedom. Thus, all the human forces have spheres for free play and development. This explains the fact that the political force and the other social forces within the State do not always develop in parallel lines. The societies can make progress while the political institutions remain stationary, or there may be political progress while the societies change but little. The reason is that the two spheres have independent factors which develop separately. When, however, the two spheres clash, the development of the one will also affect the other. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russian Government, affected by the French Revolution, cherished liberal principles in advance of the people, and the same was in part true at the time of the emancipation of the serfs; since then, however, the intelligent classes have outstripped the Government in the march toward freedom. These classes want a share in the management of the State; their political consciousness and demands have grown. In all States similar processes may take place, as when the disfranchised male classes demand greater privileges or women ask for the ballot. In the societies within

the State great differences prevail, some being stationary or even reactionary, others progressive.

Russia and the United States need but be compared to show what an important bearing the determinations of the State have on the social relations. The people are not apt to concern themselves about functions which the State assumes for them. This is especially true in a low stage of development. On the other hand, popular energy will be developed in respect to the interests pertaining to the people and left to their management. While, therefore, the political and other forces do not always develop together, they greatly affect, and may even determine, one another. Transfer the society of England or the United States to Russia, and the Government must be changed; and, under the Government of Russia, the present development of the society in these countries would have been impossible. The State sustains a direct relation, by its laws or its influence, to economics, education, and ethics. It may promote the liberty of its people in proportion as it passes from anarchism to organisation, on account of the protection it affords. What it leaves unorganised may be used by the unscrupulous to oppress the honest; by the strong to crush the weak. There is some truth in the statement that in a republic each one is lord, and therefore each lords it over his fellow-men to his heart's content. Anarchism, libertinism, and the most degrading tyranny may sail under the banner of liberty. The State as an embodiment of the political force of the totality ought to organise and control whatever pertains to the public welfare of the community.

CHAPTER XX

SOCIAL EVOLUTION WITHIN THE STATE AND PREPARATION FOR THE THIRD ERA

297. Besides the effects wrought by the laws of the State, other processes are at work to settle social affairs, particularly in the large spheres not under political control. Tradition and custom prevail, though they have less power than in the first era. Public opinion, churches, schools, voluntary associations, often determine the course of the people and may affect the State and its laws. Society changes much or little, according as the social (non-political) institutions are mobile or fixed. A fickle society may be too mobile to settle what needs settling—reflection is lacking, a fair trial not given, and permanent deposits are out of the question. History is not made by fits and starts. Where too much is settled progressive movement is likewise out of the question.

It has been shown that civilisation cannot be identified with culture. Civil society, or civilisation, may indicate only that political institutions have been established, without implying that the society within the State has attained a high degree of culture. History and the present status of nations prove that civil institutions often affect the external relations rather than the heart of society. The peace and order in which the people live may afford them opportunity to cultivate selfish cunning and brutal passion. Its very means furnish civilisation with such savages as savagery could not develop. Hence, the horrors of civilised life run parallel with its advant-

ages. Wars have become more methodical, and, in spite of the growth of mercy, are more destructive than formerly. Great cities create slums with a concentration of brutality and corruption the like of which cannot be found among savages of the forest. The development of culture within the pale of civilisation thus remains a problem by itself. How significant that, when France deemed itself the first of nations and boasted of its civilisation, Rousseau proclaimed the advantages of the life of nature-peoples and found enthusiastic adherents of his doctrine!

The foremost countries abound with illustrations of the brutalisation possible within the pale of so-called civilisation. Sensuality is intensified by concentrating on it the advantages gained by intellectual development and material progress. From this point of view a study of France during the century before the Revolution is instructive. The most revolting vices prevailed in circles which were regarded as most refined. Such was the depravity of the relation of the sexes under Louis XV., that "art and literature were infected by it, and the refined civilisation, the elegance, the perfection of manners, the luxury and extravagance are but the veneer of a moral corruption which bids fair to lead to the destruction of the social and political order, whose core is full of rotteness."—Mac-kinnon, *The Growth and Decline of the French Monarchy*, p. 811.

298. The progress directly attributable to political institutions may be small compared with the social development for which they afford the conditions. The protection of individuals and societies enables them to develop their resources and make the most of their opportunities. This protection was the means of developing the martial force which often became a dominant factor. Bagehot says: "The progress of the military art is the most conspicuous, I was about to say the most

showy, fact in human history." The same writer discusses the value of conflict in promoting progress. War seemed to be the only method for settling disputes before diplomatic relations were established and agreements entered into. Even afterwards, and in all ages, war has been the serious occupation, if not the sport, of nations. This enables us to understand why warriors have been so prominent in national affairs and rulers esteemed for military prowess. Where war was the chief political aim, as so often in Rome, all the arrangements were subordinated to militarism and the martial spirit. The Government, the taxes, the industries, patriotism, rank, the chief training and occupations, were determined by militarism. When a people lives for martial purposes the military virtues may be cultivated, but the higher interests of culture are likely to suffer. A nation absorbed by war cannot concentrate its attention and strength on the cultural forces. Perhaps the military habit and traditions become so great as to seem to involve the only glory worth seeking.

Warlike preparations may become a necessity. They are perhaps the means of preventing war, a State not being liable to attack if protected by a powerful army and navy; but, on the other hand, the existence of a strong defensive force can become a temptation to use it for offensive purposes. An ambitious ruler, tempted to make conquests, or gain glory, or humble a rival, easily finds a pretext for war on the plea that another power is a menace to his State. The evils of a standing army, the expense involved, the appropriation of men in their best years for the barracks and the camp, taking them from their studies and life-occupations, are well known. Much as the army as a school of vice has been commented on, it has not been equally considered as a school of training and discipline, of self-denial and devotion, and for the development of character. There are parents who hail

with joy the day when their sons enter the army and are subjected to its severe schooling.

Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, is quoted above, p. 44. The volume contains valuable discussions on "The Use of Conflict," "Nation-making," and other subjects pertaining to the state.

299. With its enormous expense war has become largely a pecuniary problem. But even in time of peace the State requires revenues to maintain the Government. Thus, for its own preservation, if for no other reason, it must take an interest in economics. Probably economic reasons had a large share in the movement from the consanguine to the political organisation, for the sake of promoting industrial co-operation between different peoples. Then, the fundamental character of production and exchange, for the individual and society as well as for the State, assigns a place of first importance to economic interests. This was the case whether a State had sufficient resources within itself or depended on other States, whether its life rested on agriculture or on manufacture and commerce. The growth of the industries tends to make militarism subordinate to them. This is a characteristic of our own age. Where the population is dense the employment and provisioning of the people becomes an absorbing political problem. The situation of the advanced nations explains the prominence of economics in legislation, politics, diplomacy, and war. The control of the world's market is a dominant aim of States. Colonies are established as an outlet for the surplus population and to obtain new spheres of industry and commerce. The leading nations are economic competitors and rivals, each striving to gain the advantage by home and foreign regulations, by cunning or force. The materialistic spirit thus engendered pervades the whole people and seems to

be on the increase. The age is consequently designated by industrialism, commercialism, capitalism, materialism, mammonism. The reign of economics has become a mania, encourages greed, and idolises means instead of considering the end which gives the means value. In many respects the spirit promoted is inferior to that created by militarism. It occasions internal war as well as conflict with foreign nations. Not only is its degrading influence felt in politics, where men have their price for the meanest ends, but also in the family, the school, the Church, and every social relation. Capitalism begets socialism, communism, anarchism, and revolution. Under the guise of outward prosperity lurk misery and crime; under a brilliant exterior are hidden ignorance and hypocrisy, brutality, and corruption. It does not seem a vain prophecy, "that a State given to materialism will be ground to powder by the wheels of progress."

The State unfettered and marvellously developed the industrial forces. Indeed, much warrants us in affirming that in the second era the economic interests have taken the place of the dominance of the kinship interests of the first era, with politics as the chief promoter of industrial and commercial affairs.

300. Perhaps we are only in the initiatory stages of political evolution. Certainly commercialism as the high-water mark of political achievements does not indicate great progress. It cannot continue to dominate where the true elements of culture have entered. These elements, fostered by education, create ideals which are cherished by a few, then permeate the people, and are finally accepted by the State. Industrialism was at first, perhaps, a necessity; or the agricultural, mineral, industrial, and geographical advantages may have promoted it and made it dominant, the people being unconsciously controlled by its influence. There is reason for its absorbing power in a new country whose resources are to

be developed. But so soon as a people of education comes to itself it subordinates industrialism to worthy ends. If a State advances with a society of real culture it will recognise its cultural mission as supreme. A cultured State cannot be true to itself without a cultural aim. Industrialism furnishes the accumulations and leisure for culture. Its blessing would be still greater if it also furnished superior intellect and the cultural spirit. The line of evolution seems to be from militarism and commercialism to the cultural functions of the State. No State can as yet claim that these functions are made the supreme concern, though great cultural progress is manifest. This progress is, however, less characteristic of the State than of limited portions of the society within its borders. Thus far political institutions have been chiefly restraining, coercive, and punitive forces; their sovereignty has been exercised in punishing rather than in preventing crime. History records that their most conspicuous representatives among the people have been tax-gatherers, soldiers, the police, judges, and prisons. Only recently has the evolution of the freedom, rights, and education of the people been seized as a prominent function. This beginning will be followed logically by more institutions for the exaltation of the people.

Reformatory institutions are already taking the place of penitentiaries; in prisons the reformation of criminals receives more attention, and the relation of food, employment, sanitation, alcoholism, and education to crime are investigated. It has been discovered that the State itself may be a criminal in proportion to its omnipotence. A glaring incongruity is recognised in the punishment of criminals by the State which the State has itself been instrumental in making, either by tempting to crime (by licensing dens of iniquity), or by failing to institute proper preventive measures. The educated classes know that public welfare is more effectively promoted by pre-

venting than by punishing crime. The cultural State need not abolish militarism and commercialism; but it puts them in the right place, as means instead of ends, culture being the all-absorbing aim. Charity is embodied in true culture, so that hospitals, asylums, and other benevolent institutions are provided for the helpless. But it is to be the rule to furnish the best means for self-help; in other words, government aids the people to govern themselves and thus lessens the need of governing them. The ultimate aim of coercion is to render coercion unnecessary.

This can best be accomplished by converting the police State into an educating State. That is done by establishing schools, libraries, museums, official bureaus for all kinds of information to enlighten the public. An age truly enlightened will find means to give protection before courts to its poorest as well as its richest citizens, to make church buildings of constant value to the community instead of only a few hours a week, and to turn its schoolhouses over to the public for meetings and entertainments when not required for the pupils. The Government is a function of the people, not something abstracted from them, and with its citizens the State is exalted, just as with the State the citizen is exalted. There is little glory in ruling a people hardly exalted above brutes, unless it is the aim to exalt them. The enlightenment is for the benefit of the State as well as of the people, to develop the best citizens and most efficient officials, to adopt the wisest laws and secure their most perfect execution, and, in general, to establish the most favourable social conditions and relations.

How significant that heretofore diplomatic relations have pertained chiefly to war and economics! Now, however, educational matters, sanitation, and the higher interests of nations receive attention. The international congresses and

expositions are significant; even if the aim is chiefly industrial, they promote various departments of culture. Commissions are also appointed to investigate schools, prisons, and reformatory institutions, in different nations. Numerous documents bearing on learned subjects are exchanged by States.

In the United States the economic force dominates the nation. In England, the industrial interests have been supreme, the naval force being largely for their protection and promotion. In Germany, the military and cultural forces have been in the ascendancy; but, since the era of Bismarck, a marvellous industrial development has taken place. This is not a comparison of these peoples in respect to culture, but of what their governments do for culture. The intellectual life in ancient Greece by no means always found expression in the political institutions; and the same is true of other States.

The effect of the Government on the social life within the State is not only felt in the direct acts of the Government, but also in the influence of its host of officials. They are everywhere, they affect the life of the nation and may determine its general character. The importance of education has in recent times been specially emphasised. At the time of the greatest loss of territory and money, and at the period of the deepest humiliation through Napoleon, Prussia proceeded to establish the university of Berlin. When the proposition for its establishment was made, Frederick William III. said: "It is right, it is excellent to compensate the State by means of intellectual forces for what it has lost in physical forces."

The late victories of Germany have been attributed to the schoolmaster. This fact has told on other States. In Austria after the defeat of 1866, and in France after the defeat of 1870-71, an effort was at once made to improve the schools. It is astonishing to notice the amount of time and money spent by Germany for the establishment and improvement of the common and technical schools, the gymnasia, and the universities.

301. Political history can be profitably studied with this problem before the mind: Is society subject to poli-

tics or is politics a function of society? Not only are tyranny and freedom involved, but also the question of the dominance of a party or of the entire social organism. Party politics differs from social politics in making party interests superior to those of a whole people. The government by the people is a social government; a factional government is the rule of a faction. Where freedom prevails the ultimate responsibility for the political condition rests with the citizens. They constitute the body or organism, of which the officials are only the organs. In a republic, when we inquire into sources and causes, we always come to the people. They elect the officials; these govern in their name and by their might; and the people who appoint bad men as their own organs can substitute good men for them. Nothing is clearer than that the guilt of political mismanagement rests ultimately with the citizens, not with the politicians, who are nothing but their chosen representatives. There is but one logical inference from the failure of government in a republic: it is the direct failure of government by the people. The Government is the expressed will of the people, and its approval or condemnation is the approval or condemnation of the people. A free city badly governed but reveals the corrupt society dwelling there. Perhaps the greatest mistake made consists in the theory that self-government is natural, whereas it is to be learned and is an achievement as the result of great progress.

In a despotic State the people are robbed in proportion as the functions of the Government are increased. But in a republic, the people themselves possessing the sovereignty, the authority of the people is in exact proportion to the function of the government of the people by the people. In a despotism the contrast is between the people and the despot; in a government by the people the contrast is between the people as a whole and individuals or factions, particular societies, organisations, and

corporations. The government of the people by the people prevents the encroachment of private greed on public interests. To speak of the excessive power of a republican government means to speak of the excessive power of the people. The logic of self-government requires that all public interests must eventually be in some degree under the control of the people. Equity demands that private affairs be committed to private management, as much as public affairs are committed to public management. There are three kinds of relation of the State to public affairs: public supervision; public control; public ownership. Perhaps a fourth ought to be added: criminal apathy, which leaves to individuals and associations the exploitation of the public in order to enrich themselves.

302. The theory that the people ought to govern themselves because they understand their own interests best is a fallacy. The wisest among them may be better judges and better rulers than the masses. Popular government rests on the claim that the people have a right to determine their own affairs. The other theory is that the people cannot govern themselves, but must be governed. But who has the right to govern them? Between these opposite views are found all the possible forms of political institutions. The tendency toward political freedom has been pronounced dominant in Europe. Everywhere in the world's most advanced nations the evolution of citizenship in the fullest and best sense is still in an imperfect beginning. To govern a people of millions is a very different problem from the government of the individual by himself. It is impossible to rule a nation on the basis of individual self-interest. This art of governing a whole people must be learned by the study of human relationship on the basis of altruistic principles. The fickleness, misgovernment, and corruption prevalent in republics have produced a reaction against republicanism. Partisan rule has been unfavour-

ably contrasted with a monarch who stands above parties and can impartially consider the interests of all. The people are believed to be most likely to choose as representatives such as are on their own level, having no consideration for specialists, men of superior talents, and scholars who outrank their appreciation; while a monarch is supposed to make his court the centre of the best talent. How far this is mere theory and how far realised in actual governments depends much on circumstances.

The reaction which has begun against parliamentary government has little practical effect, because it is admitted that no better system has yet been found. Evolution will, no doubt, overcome many of the evils which now degrade leading republics, and prepare them to cope with municipal, State, and national problems. The securing of specialists for departments requiring specialisation, and the meeting of serious emergencies which require a strong government and vigorous, united action, are among the present difficulties of republics. Even in republics there are those who fear the levelling tendency of democracy, and think a monarchy has advantages for the efficiency of the Government and for promoting impartially the best interests of the people. Certain it is that while in a monarchy the wisdom and integrity of the monarch deserve special emphasis, in a republic the emphasis must be placed on the education—especially political—and uprightness of the people. Where the sovereignty has been seized by the people they are not likely to relinquish their advantages. As republics are evolved in righteousness they will commend themselves and promote the freedom of enlightened peoples generally. Only when government becomes democratic will that which pertains to all the people find expression in the political institutions, just as in the preceding era the kinship organisation was based on the blood tie common to all.

303. Just as the analysis of the individual showed that

he is not wholly absorbed by society, but is something besides,—having private as well as social forces,—so, when we take the individual and consider his relation to the State, we find that he is more than a citizen. In other words, his entire personality is not absorbed by his political force. Much is left to him as a private individual with which the State does not interfere. There are likewise numerous social relations he can enter about which the State does not concern itself. This explains former statements, according to which the political evolution need not involve a parallel evolution of all the societies within the State. In this way we get the important distinction between the State as a society and the social groups and social organisations within its borders. The religious force of the individual may be so completely severed from his political force that his relation to the State does not determine his ecclesiastical relation. On a certain territory, therefore, the State is but one among many societies, and there may be numerous independent, parallel, harmonious, or conflicting developments. The compact basis of unity formed by consanguinity may be wholly lacking in a State. Only a territorial or local union is formed by the fact that the State and all societies within its borders are within the same territory. The common bond for all societies is political, and this at times is hardly recognised by individuals and societies; aside from this the utmost diversity is possible, which sometimes so absorbs the attention that disintegration seems to prevail. No other nation presents a social diversity equal to that of the United States. Here a compact political unity, binding firmly together all the distracting and conflicting tendencies, is one of the most momentous and most difficult problems.

The content and aim of the State are political; the content and aim of the other societies, unless political organisations,

are economic, religious, ethical, æsthetical, intellectual. They have political relations and through these touch the State; but they are not political in essence, as is the State. On the other hand, the State has relations to intellect, ethics, religion, and art, without making any one a substitute for its political force. Respecting legitimate, non-political forces the State is only protective, without attempting to determine their nature or to direct their course. Under this protection they are allowed to work out their own non-political destiny. The State and the societies within its borders thus present problems of independence and of interaction and co-operation. The utmost room is given for the division of labour. There is no proper social interest for which a place cannot be found inside of the political sphere.

304. It is evident, therefore, that for individuals and social groups and voluntary associations the State is only a part of the social environment. Perhaps its influence is regarded as remote and abstract, while other societies have a more direct and more powerful effect. The relative position of the State and its institutions is among the most important subjects in respect to the social system. Sometimes the influence of the State on other societies is overestimated, at others depreciated. Those who underestimate its power are inclined to neglect their political duties, while those who overestimate this power expect it to confer benefits which they must achieve for themselves. In its proper sphere, a unique one, its power is supreme and not easily overestimated. The best illustrations of the beneficence of political institutions seem to belong to the distant future. Nihilism, anarchism, the Marx social democracy, and numerous economic agitations have thrust into prominence the question of increasing or diminishing the power and functions of the State. Political science ought to be the favourite study of the public where the people are the political autocrats. How a free State can establish schools without making

training for citizenship one of the chief aims is unaccountable.

The blood tie has often been a more firm cement than the political bond. The former depended on nature and the gods, and united all; the latter seemed more like a voluntary arrangement, a human invention, an artificial production as a matter of expediency. Hence Salvianus declared that the barbarians who invaded the Roman Empire—the Franks, Goths, and Vandals—were united, and to this their superiority was attributed. “All the barbarians, if they belong to the same tribe and king, love one another, while nearly all the Romans persecute one another.”—A. Dove, address on “*Der Wiedereintritt des nationalen Princips in die Weltgeschichte.*”

These invading tribes, Dove says, had their tribal chiefs and were on the way to become States. Their chiefs were of their own flesh and blood, and this made them bonds of union. Athaulf, brother-in-law of Alaric, wanted to take the place of the Roman emperors; but he said experience had taught him that the unrestrained barbarity of the Goths would not submit to the discipline of a State governed by laws. Theodoric the Great distinguishes between civil society, the law-abiding citizens, and the barbarians, the wild, lawless tribes, or such as are a law unto themselves. This gives some idea of the gulf between the consanguine tie and the State which governs by political law.

305. All the constitutional forces, so far as they do not interfere with the rights of others, have opportunity for free exercise in the State. Nothing hinders the development and display of ardent family affection. The malevolent affections are more restrained, the law assuming the control of many things formerly left to individual passion. The beneficial effects of the State become evident by comparing the lawless life of the first settlers of a new country with the regulations which prevail after the establishment of political institutions. Both North and South

America furnish illustrations, from the time of their discovery till the present. The contrast is between self and society, self-will and law.

We cannot judge fairly the capacities of a people if seen only in a transition period. At such a time it is natural for the fundamental and constitutional forces to receive special prominence. Only when the foundations of life have been established and economic and political affairs have been settled can we look for a development of the cultural energies. When the Roman Empire was broken up it was impossible to tell what would be accomplished by the people who were destined to inherit its culture. No one could see for a century after the Thirty Years' War to what industrial and intellectual power the Germans would attain. So it is hazardous to predict from the present transition era of the Negro in the United States what his future status will be. The Middle Ages teach us to make haste slowly in estimating the inherent power of peoples if known only in an unsettled condition. Many ages of civilisation may be required before a people or race can do justice to itself.

Law means restraint, order, system; it gives the conditions for the development of culture. Those who live within a fully developed legal system can have no conception of the time and labour required to obtain a basis for law and to make the law itself. The condition which the law establishes is in striking contrast with savages who are a law unto themselves. Savages are at times impelled by a power which seems demoniac to give expression to their pent-up feelings. An accumulation and concentration of passion breaks forth in the form of fierce explosion, the fury discharging itself in destruction and murder. This species of temporary madness can easily be taken by the spectators for demoniacal possession. Sometimes this passionate outbreak leads to fearful self-mutilation. For illustrations of this mania, see Schurtz, *Urgeschichte der Kultur*, pp. 67-73.

306. More interest attaches to the development of the cultural forces within the State. This development reveals the greatest advantages of political institutions. In two respects these forces can be considered: so far as they produced permanent results in science, literature, art, and institutions, such as schools and churches; and so far as they are embodied in the life of society, in the wisdom, the education, the refinement, and the exalted character of associations. That the State did not at once make these results its conscious aim is proved by history; but it established conditions whose evolution promoted the development of the cultural forces in actual society and their crystallisation in a permanent form. A broader outlook was given by the political relationship, security and stability rendered the accumulation of wealth possible, ferment was caused by contact with different peoples, and the struggle for political existence involved an evolution of social strength. The weak nations were crushed or swallowed up by the stronger ones. The larger life, the energy aroused by the variety of interests, and the possibility of continuous development were important factors. Indeed, with the State the conditions were given for evolving the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic progress of historic times. The State required men of ability, and to secure them it had to promote and reward culture. It needed culture to sustain itself, and the influence of other States gave impulses toward the exercise of the higher social forces. Ability in general statesmanship, in finance, and in war was in constant demand. A State could try to isolate itself, a survival of the spirit of the preceding era, as in the case of Japan, Corea, and China, and thus prevent the larger culture produced by contact with foreign peoples; but such a State would fall to the rear, and by its relation to other States eventually be obliged or forced to enter into international relations. Culture was involved and promoted

by commerce, travel, wars, national ambition and competition, and diplomacy. An ambitious and powerful ruler affected other States as well as his own people, and the achievements of one State inspired the rest.

What the introduction of writing had to do with all these things has already been intimated. Without writing it would have been impossible to give permanence to enactments and exceedingly difficult to promulgate them. With no written documents the continuity of the State would have to depend, as the preceding era, on tradition and custom. A record of the decrees, acts, and laws of the State took from haphazard and from the whim of the ruler the most important affairs of the government which statecraft before him had settled. Written decisions were an application and recognised interpretation of the law. Writing made a definite and cumulative growth of politics and culture possible. We need but consider a people with a history and one without such a record in order to appreciate the cultural effect of writing.

The first records probably pertained to religion, politics, and medicine, because these were regarded as specially valuable. Rulers had their scribes to keep a record of the decrees and laws, state actions, war and diplomacy, and of the lives of monarchs and prominent personages.

An invention so important as writing would soon pass from one nation to another and become a repository of all that was deemed most valuable. Becoming the memory of the nations, it made possible the comparison of the political, religious, and intellectual status of an age with the conditions which prevailed in the past. Political institutions multiplied and perpetuated the humanising influence of spoken language by writing.

Gibbon, in the ninth chapter of his *History*, thinks that the use of letters being unknown to the Germans at the time of Tacitus marks them as in a low state of culture. "The use

of letters is the principal circumstance which distinguishes a civilised people from a herd of savages incapable of knowledge or reflection. Without that artificial help, the human memory soon dissipates or corrupts the ideas entrusted to her charge; and the nobler faculties of the mind, no longer supplied with models or with materials, gradually forget their powers; the judgment becomes feeble and lethargic, the imagination languid or irregular. . . . We may safely pronounce, that without some species of writing, no people has ever preserved the faithful annals of their history, ever made any considerable progress in the abstract sciences, or ever possessed, in any tolerable degree of perfection, the useful and agreeable arts of life."

Feodor Sigel, in *Lectures on Slavonic Law*, gives a number of instances of the transfer of unwritten customs to written law. A Croatian code of laws was written in 1288, in order to avoid the mistakes incident to the application of an unwritten law. Persons were selected, on account of their knowledge of ancient legal customs, to put into writing all the good, old, and proved laws. This assembly put into written form what they had from their elders in order "to preserve in their entirety the ancient good laws of their forefathers." (Pp. 138, 139.) On another occasion the judges and other functionaries of the commune and old persons deliberated and had put into writing what had heretofore been customary. Pp. 142-143.

307. What the State has done directly for the promotion of art is much, but only a fraction of its æsthetic influence. The establishment of cities developed architecture; the accumulation of wealth and a settled life promoted display, likewise a taste for embellishments which indicated superiority of rank or pecuniary advantages; particularly kings strove to surpass their subjects in splendour and made their courts brilliant. There was lavish expenditure to adorn the residences of monarchs and to give an imposing effect to their persons by means of gorgeous apparel and magnificent surroundings. State

Social Evolution within the State III

officials and the wealthier classes imitated their example. Music and dancing, both recreative and æsthetic, were common at court, at festivals, feasts, and on memorable occasions. Literary art was developed with writing, especially in the form of poetry. Sculpture and painting had their origin in the preceding era; but they were developed by the conditions, interests, and culture which the State promoted. From the ancient records, as well as from the ruins and excavations in Egypt, India, Babylon, Greece, and Rome, we learn that great prominence was given to æsthetics.

The command: "Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image" etc, no doubt refers to the common representations of divinities among the heathen.

In an article by Flanders Petrie, *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, October, 1901, interesting accounts are given of the perfection attained by some of the arts in Egypt from five to four thousand years B.C.

Much of the culture of a people leaves its impress on their art. The same author said in an address before the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1895: "Art is one of the most important records of a race. Each group of mankind has its own style and favourite manner, more particularly in the decorative arts. A stray fragment or carving without date or locality can be surely fixed in its place if there is any sufficient knowledge of the art from which it springs. This study of the art of a people is one of the highest branches of anthropology and one of the most important, owing to its persistent connection with each race. No physical characteristics have been more persistent than the style of decoration. . . . We must recognise, therefore, a principle of 'racial taste,' which belongs to each people as much as their language, which may be borrowed, like language, from one race by another, but which survives changes and long eclipses even more than language." He says that in the Orient "the long-persistent type of Egypt, of Babylonia, of India, of China,

which outlived all changes of government and history," prove the vitality of art.

308. Social ethics, co-extensive with the relations and interests of the State, superseded kinship ethics. The political institutions can be permanent only when they have a regard for the ethical concerns in human relations. Might without morality must eventually be doomed. The most significant advance in government consisted in its growth from mere expediency, selfishness, tyranny, and might to a great ethical institution. Its approach toward perfection is seen in the State so far as it views the classes and all human relations, economics, war, essentially from the moral standpoint. Here principle is the highest expediency. Morality is the true foundation of the State; law strikes its roots in ethics; jurisprudence is an ethical science. That right is the essence of the true State must be maintained in spite of the perversions of the fundamental principles of politics in ancient and modern times. Friction within the State and between States can cease only with the elimination of wrong. Reason and conscience are developed by the very demands made by political institutions. Tyranny undermines its own power; class-rule is against humanity and must end as humanity rises to assert itself; iniquitous laws not only excite the opposition of those whom they oppress, but they also awaken sympathy for the oppressed as true culture advances. Every consideration thus points to the fact that the evolution of the State means the evolution of its ethical character and functions.

As is usual in transition eras, there must have been a loosening of ethical ties when the kinship bonds were severed and the political ties not yet formed. But in the very foundation of political institutions the conditions were given for a new and vigorous ethical development. In every advanced State the severest test of politics is

the ethical standard; and the demand for progress is along ethical lines. To moral principles is due the strongest impulse for governments to grow beyond their former status. Less, perhaps, is the stress to be placed on what has been evolved by politics than what of morality is involved in politics and must be unfolded by the progress of political institutions. No party, no State, no government fails to claim right as the basis of its policy, well knowing that no other claim can stand before the bar of the modern conscience. Governments must justify their course to the people and to each other, and their strongest justification is in ethics. In free States, and even in others, the non-political societies can make moral progress in principle and practice, and become a leaven of the entire citizenship, and eventually determine the political course.

The moral problems increase in difficulty during this second era because great masses, large cities, and vast interests must be dealt with. The ethical bond is less palpable and more easily perverted than the consanguine tie. The biological relations established by nature must now be superseded by rules and laws which can only be wrought out by reason and conscience during long processes of experiment. A natural brotherhood is more easily recognised than a moral and spiritual brotherhood. Much development was required to distinguish between legality and ethics, between formal obedience and inner or moral conformity, between custom and right, a distinction which is not universal even now in enlightened nations.

With the State itself runs parallel the evolution of its laws. At first the State could hardly rise in respect to law above the customs prevalent in the era immediately preceding. Written law probably came late so far as a regular code was concerned. Custom, or repeated judgments of kings, the elders, or others in authority, would

gradually settle certain points. The legal decisions were, in many cases, left to some individual, chiefly the king, or whoever the ruler might be. Thus in legal matters, as in political institutions in general, the evolution from anarchism or arbitrariness to system was gradual. Indeed, every law finally fixed seems to have had a slow, and often devious, process of development, of which it is the outcome.

What but ethics could take the place of the kinship customs and be lasting? The second era need but develop logically the ideas involved in the political relations, the ideas of justice and public welfare, in order to secure the dominance for ethics. As the Roman Empire embodied its ethical notions in the Pandects, so every country puts its morality into its laws.

309. Much importance is naturally attached to the character and place of religion in the State. The early States made it very prominent, and even the monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, have been identified with States and regarded as an integral part of political institutions. Hence the religion of the State is important in considering the whole society of this second era. Often the theocratic idea affected all the political relations. Monarchs professed to reign and to conduct wars in the name of the national divinity. The complete separation between politics and religion belongs to modern times.

Sociology is most interested in the new relations into which religion was placed in the State and what evolution was thereby promoted. Only gradually, with the growth of political institutions, could the religious limitations of the kinship era be overcome. The State, with its larger views and higher social conceptions, opened the way for a religion with ideas and interests which extended beyond the tribe to humanity. What the kinship requires was exchanged for what the human family and an enlarged

personality demand and sanction. The frequent contact of peoples with different divinities promoted polytheism, but also created doubt and incited to inquiry. The way was thus opened to break through a narrow traditionalism and an effete conservatism. The general culture promoted by political institutions deeply affected the religious faith. The inquiring mind, especially in Greece, subjected the myths and mysteries and symbols to severe criticism. National deities, which were probably a survival of tribal gods, were exchanged for a Deity whose realm is mankind and the universe, an illustration of the tendency of men to put their highest conceptions into their faith.

We need but point to the great ethnic religions of today to show to what development religion was subject in this era. All of them, with the possible exception of Judaism, seem to have had their origin, or at least their most complete development, within the State. In proportion as political institutions and the citizens progressed the superstitions and religious stagnation of the former era became impossible. The larger realm in which religion moved prepared it for the great evolution to which it has been subject.

As a rule, the most direct influence of religion is on the ethical conceptions. The faith determines questions of right and duty. Laws and customs were enforced because they were believed to rest on divine decree or sanction. For the second era the ethical evolution of religious faith is especially important. Sometimes the spiritual factor seems to be divorced from the moral element, while at others it determines the character of the morality. Human sacrifices, prostitution in temples, wars of subjection and extermination, the worst forms of tyranny, and many other abominations were possible because believed to be divine requirements. We must remember that governments and peoples are dominated

by their subjective notions, whatever the objective reality may be. Hence, their religions, however superstitious, were their guides. Religion has been one of the most conservative factors in the State, and often a serious barrier to progress, while at others it has inspired progress and been the leader in forward movements. The curse or blessing involved in the religion of a people enables us to understand why religious reformers have been regarded as the greatest benefactors. The people were moulded by the adopted faith and worship. With gods delighting in human blood and revelling in vice, the people were naturally brutalised.

The ethical influence of religion is illustrated by the Hebrew faith. The State and life were dominated by the religious idea, in which the law was very prominent. Whatever cruelties and iniquities prevailed in politics and society, the idea of God as righteous, as seeking justice and punishing iniquity, as demanding purity and holiness, as full of mercy and compassion to His children, could not but be of great power in moulding the thought and life of the people. Hebraism, as consisting of the *law*, and of prophets expounding, applying, and expanding the law, is significant.

Burgess, *Political Science*, discusses the relation of religion to the State, p. 60. This relation is held by many to be still an open question. Shall the constitution explicitly recognise religion, say Christianity, and shall religious teaching be promoted by the State, or shall the theory of the social democracy prevail, that religion is strictly a private affair and therefore no concern whatever of political institutions? Even where the freedom of the Church is recognised, a question as to the extent of this freedom may arise. In education and other matters a church may claim rights which the State claims for itself.

310. The government of the State required wisdom, though the demand of the Greek philosophers that wise

men should occupy the throne has by no means been the rule. Yet a series of intellectual weaklings was ever in danger of being ended by a usurper or conqueror with superior mental power. The great problems of government were calculated to develop intellect. Not only did courts attract men of eminent ability, but intellectual development was also promoted by the settled condition of law and order; by the extended view; through the friction of thought by means of city life, and commerce and wars with other States; and through the increased social diversity and interests. The State became the centre of the cumulative process developed by writing. Scribes gathered about the courts, kept the records and wrote the histories, thus becoming the teachers of future generations. The State made history a necessity; and before the State a connected history, in place of tradition, was hardly possible. All the history known to us, at least, belongs to the political era. Schools were established at courts to train princes and the children of the aristocracy, largely for political functions; sometimes in connection with religious institutions, now for education in special branches, then for more general culture. Libraries date back thousands of years. Probably at first the intellectual factors collected at court became leaders for the enlightenment of the people; the impulse toward scholarship from the public being left to the distant future. Intellectual superiority gave a people so decided an advantage in the struggle for existence and power as to make them conspicuous. They inspired, taught, and led the inferior States or perhaps subjected them. National intellect was so essential a factor in political affairs that it soon proved itself indispensable for national prosperity.

The State, itself a rational product, inaugurated a condition which promoted the marvellous development of intellect which

has taken place since the introduction of political institutions. How vast the progress since the first records, which date back some ten thousand years! In art and literature (Greece), in politics (Rome), in ethics and religion (Christianity), much became a model two thousand or more years ago; but in intellect, in historical and inductive investigations and scientific results, especially within a few centuries, the progress has been without a parallel. Indeed, in its highest achievements intellect requires the opportunities and order afforded by the State. It was evidently in the State that reason was so developed and organised as to attain the power exerted in Greece, Rome, and modern times.

311. From this epitome of the operation of the social forces in the State we can now, as a summary and review of the preceding chapters, indicate some of the differences between the first and second eras. What the first era accomplished without the State is, in many respects, worthy of especial study. Its movements introduce to us elementary factors which are still at work and from which our modern civilisation has been evolved. With all its disadvantages, that first era has the honour of being the pioneer of the entire course of humanity. The mind we call, probably contemptuously, savage or barbarian, furnished mankind with spoken, and perhaps written language, certainly among the most marvellous achievements of the race. That first era also evolved racial characteristics which were permanent, but not necessarily final; it developed hunters and fishers; taught men the use of nature and how to make tools; developed pastoral and agricultural life and learned the value of metals; it established important relations between men, founded the family, instituted tribal government and still larger governmental institutions, and was rich in associations from which higher organisations could be evolved; it began art, formulated ethical rules, made religion of some kind universal, and laid a basis for intellectual development.

Besides laying a foundation, it left to the second era a vast amount of material with which to build a suitable structure for the growing needs. The long evolution which culminated in the State was not a continuous progress; but there was no break between the first and second era, though there were intermediate stages. So gradual does the unfolding process seem to be that we cannot draw a line showing where the first era ended and the second began. If we look at the humanity of to-day we still find different stages of the first as well as of the second era, which aids us materially in the investigation of the conditions of evolution in both stages.

What the social forces are and effect within the State depends much on the degree of the political evolution attained. For the answer we can point to the great repositories made in history. At the founding of political institutions these forces could hardly be more favourably situated than in the most advanced kinship organisation. A new process of development began, new adaptations were required, and the forces had to be organised in order to achieve the victories made possible by the political epoch. The consanguine tie is not destroyed, but limited. Its supremacy ceased as soon as man was esteemed as man, regardless of his kin. That none of the kinship is foreign was superseded by the dictum that nothing of humanity is foreign. Put social for biological, psychical for physical, political for tribal, national and human for consanguine, the large range of the interests of mankind for the limited concerns of the family, and you obtain the essentials of the second era. What the State did directly for individuals and associations was probably less significant for social development than what it committed to them and gave them the opportunity to accomplish. It unfettered the powers of the mind, threw man more on his own resources, made favourable conditions for progress, and created fresh stimuli

for development. Not that all these were at once accomplished or are even yet realised; but the principle of the State involves them and they result from the progressive political evolution. Probably the political superstructure is less elevated above the foundation laid by the first era than we imagine. The State still finds unsolved the problem, what the limits of its functions are and what it must leave to the freedom of its citizens. The relation between the two is evidently one of dependence, of mutuality, of reciprocity, of co-operation. The State will be discriminated from individuals and associations within its borders in proportion as their self-consciousness is developed. As the citizens grow in the ability of self-government, the State will increasingly confine its attention to the general interests of the public. The largeness of the political interests, being commensurate with the extent of human concerns, makes it impossible to forecast the future functions of the State. While it affords room for all that pertains to man, it confines its dominion to what is political or pertains to public welfare, leaving other matters to the wisdom and freedom of the citizens. Much of the grandeur of the State is concentrated in the possibilities it opens up to its people and the opportunities it affords for the realisation of the highest aims.

The State affords opportunity; but can it be indifferent to the use made thereof by its citizens? Equality of opportunity, so far as possible, is a reasonable demand. The State can grant political freedom; but real, inner freedom lies beyond its power. Political equality is very limited in extent. The State cannot make men equal in endowment, in industry, in providence, in character, and achievement. Thus with the utmost political freedom and the most perfect equality of opportunity great differences must be expected among the citizens of the same State. Hence we must look for differences of rank. Even if the State does not create them, as when it institutes slavery and a nobility, the people will create them by their

own estimates. Purity of blood, connection with a distinguished family, political position, wealth, the social status, and personal qualities, such as character, intellect, and persuasive power, are the chief factors in determining rank. Where culture is low the people are inclined to estimate rank by external qualities. Probably at first the ranks of the kinship era were projected into the political institutions, and to these new ones were added. Where a State confers hereditary rank it makes permanent distinctions between its citizens which become a source of danger when the blood nobility loses inherent distinction. It is a survival of the kinship era, when rank pertained to ancestors and families, or depended on biological factors. If those regarded as most eminent are made so by birth, what inspiration is there to the greatest personal achievement?

312. Sometimes a State is compared with the life of a human being, the periods of childhood, youth, manhood, old age and decay. To this analogy many exceptions are, however, possible. A State old in years may be rejuvenated and again pass through the same periods as before. In most cases it would be difficult, or even impossible, to indicate the boundary and length of the periods. Nothing in the idea of a State makes decay and disappearance necessary. The conditions which promote decay may be within or without, or both. It was the inner decay of the Roman Empire which made the assaults of the barbarians the more effective. Many States have been overthrown by conquerors or absorbed by other States. By the exhaustion of the soil or a change in the climate or by unfavourable relations to other peoples a State loses the conditions for the struggle for existence. The people, the substance of the State, may be enervated by vice; but they do not grow old. They would become old if one generation endured age after age; but a fresh generation constantly takes the place of the old one, keeping the people ever young. The present generation

in Egypt is no older than that which lived when the first king reigned. Institutions grow old; but if the people mould them instead of being moulded by them, they can be changed and kept as young as the people are. The danger lies in the mass of traditions and institutions which become antiquated and lose their adaptability, and then so dominate the people as to make the citizens, like themselves, effete. There is no reason why China should not enter on a fresh career of development and become a new State, except in the enslavement of the people by a mechanical routine.

"A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favourite and detested types of character."—Bagehot, p. 206.

313. A survey of the present condition of political institutions would be as profitable for the problems it presents as for the actual achievements it reveals. We cannot consider the many vital questions respecting the nature, the structure, the functions, the laws, and the government of the State which remain undecided. They must be left to political science. One problem, however, deeply concerns us: Is the State the ultimate and most comprehensive form of association, or must we look forward to a third era for which it is the preparation? The fact that the State is given, that it is politically omnipotent, that it is now the chief factor in making history, absorbs the attention too much to give proper consideration to the question just proposed. We are confined to facts and their legitimate inferences, and therefore cannot indulge in speculation. But it is the facts themselves which force us to question whether the State is the ultimate and the most comprehensive association.

A careful study of the political situation and of social evolution indicates that the State is passing through a process similar to the one through which the consanguine organisation passed when it proved itself inadequate to the demands made, and prepared the way for the second era. Social relations have been formed and interests have arisen which need regulation, but with which the State sovereignty can as little deal as could the kinship sovereignty with the mingling of strange peoples which broke the consanguine tie. A State may be as intolerant, exclusive, and selfish as a clan, and thus unfit itself for the larger social relationship of modern times. Every society organised for a particular interest limits itself to the specific purpose of its organisation. Its inclusiveness, as we know, is the measure of its exclusiveness. To this the State is no exception. Organised for the peace, order, and welfare of a particular community, its very purpose limits it to these objects. The absorbing intensity with which internal political affairs have been promoted prevented the due consideration of foreign claims. The patriotism formerly deemed a peculiar glory is now recognised as often standing for an ignorant, narrow, and bigoted nationalism which unduly exalts home affairs and treats other nations with gross injustice. The unethical theory, "my country, right or wrong," is often made a general principle and controls whole nations, particularly in time of war. Worse than this: the citizens do not care to inquire whether their cause is right or wrong. They go with a political faction or government as irrationally and brutally as the savage goes with his clan. The evil is the greater because the State is regarded as omnipotent; the people absolutely identify themselves with its course and make its action their own, and are blind and deaf to the interests of humanity beyond its limits. The glaring iniquities of States in dealing with each other, of which criminal war is but a single

instance, forces on us the inquiry whether there is not some serious error in the theory adopted respecting the State. Every step in evolution makes it clear that the radical error consists in treating the State as ultimate where it is not ultimate.

Social evolution is extending the vision beyond the State, just as it broke through the narrow limits of the kinship. The early peoples could not get far beyond their habitat, not even if they lived on the border of the sea, on account of imperfect modes of travel. The ancient maps prove how limited a knowledge of the world the most enlightened possessed, in fact, even of their immediate neighbourhoods. Until the time of Alexander the peoples seem to have had contact and dealings with each other only if contiguous or easily accessible. Egypt, India, Assyria, Phœnicia, Israel, and other Asiatic peoples entered upon commerce and war; but their world evidently did not extend far beyond their own borders into Africa and Europe, and left even a large part of Asia an unknown region. When Rome became a world-power it knew the coasts of the Mediterranean, the borders of India, and England; but that is far from being the world as now known. There could be no interest in people not known; and foreigners which were known were apt to be despised or regarded as hostile rivals. The State, under these circumstances, became the object of ultimate concern in the estimation of the people, and neither ethical nor religious scruples prevented the heathen nations from absorbing other peoples, and seizing all the land and power within their reach.

314. The sovereignty of the State received an application in former times which must be abandoned now. The State was regarded as in all respects the final appeal, in external as well as internal affairs. This inevitably led to numerous conflicts between States. Each had its own standpoint, was intent solely on conserving its own interests, and ready to defend them at any cost. War has frequently been engaged in for the very purpose of main-

taining the sovereignty. An insult, real or supposed, is resented with all the force of the State, because deemed a defiance of the sovereignty, in which the very essence of the State was thought to inhere. This kind of sovereignty has proved itself untenable; it is illogical. If ten States are equally sovereign, then none of them is sovereign; just as it is evident that if ten men equally own a house, no one of them owns it absolutely. If one State can determine its relation to other States, then all with an equal sovereignty must have the same right. International affairs are, therefore, in a state of chaos. That primitive condition returns in which disputes must be settled by an appeal to force. The plea of sovereignty gives no State the right of way more than another. Each sovereignty pits itself against other sovereignties, and no higher authority is recognised. Hence the common appeal to the arbitrament of war in case of international disputes.

Nations know and influence each other as never before. With the opening of China and Japan to the world the closing of a State to foreign influence ended. It is indicative of the general trend that no nation can close its ports in time of peace without the consent of the other nations. Each State looms up as an integral part of the world, in whose relations the world has a voice. But the increased intercourse of States has promoted competition and rivalry and also the spirit of nationalism, perhaps likewise of selfishness. The great States are rivals in power and in the effort to gain a dominant place in the world's politics.

The impossibility of shutting out foreign influence, so long as the present means of communication exist, is illustrated by Russia. Russian statesmen have long tried in vain to keep the principles and doctrines of Western Europe out of the Empire. The Pan-Slavistic culture of nationalism could not prevent the leaven of the ideas of

freedom from entering, either peaceably or in the name of anarchism and nihilism.

Maine, *International Law*, p. 54, accepts the following definition of a sovereign State by Mr. Montagu Bernard: "By a sovereign State we mean a community or number of persons permanently organised under a sovereign government of their own, and by a sovereign government we mean a government, however constituted, which exercises the power of making and enforcing law within a community, and is not itself subject to any superior government."

On sovereignty see Woodrow Wilson, *The State*, §§ 1209-1211. Mohl, *Encyklopaedie der Staatswissenschaften*, § 60. Bluntschli, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, Book VII. As an instance of the claim of absolute sovereignty on the part of a State see Burgess, *Political Science*, Book II., Chap. i.

315. Whatever theories political science advocates, it has been common for States practically to treat their foreign as well as their home affairs as subject to their own control. Politicians speak of their State as the only arbiter in such matters; and it is notorious that they seek to exercise the sovereignty in foreign affairs in the same spirit as in internal ones. Respect for foreign might is apt to be the most effective check to their claims. The State considers the actual situation, perhaps hears the argument of the other side, and weighs the question of expediency; then it exercises its sovereign power by adopting its own course of action. The State makes itself the judge and final appeal respecting what it shall be to other States, and even what other States shall be to it. The States thus confront each other with an equal claim to sovereignty and with no appeal beyond. The Monroe Doctrine, whatever its inherent merits may be, is a striking illustration how a government can claim, not only to dictate what foreign powers shall be to it, but also what their course shall be toward other States. Who

gave a government the right to dictate to European powers or to determine the course of other American States? If any sovereignty inheres in the Monroe Doctrine, then the European States and the South American States have none in the matter. This is but one of many instances to show that State sovereignty in external affairs is untenable. The State that exercises it sets at nought the sovereignty of other States. When supposed sovereignties conflict, the question of supremacy is settled by war. That is, the claimed sovereignty does not exist, but an effort is made to establish the sovereignty by physical might, with armies and navies, and bloodshed and devastation—a sad commentary on the political progress of the times! Often the sovereignty is lodged in brutality and crime, from which even savages might shrink in horror. Sovereignty in foreign affairs is a myth with which fools try to deceive each other.

Even in internal affairs a State's sovereignty may be questioned, as in the case of the massacre of Armenians by Turks or the treatment of Cubans by Spain. In external relations it is still more disputed. England, France, Germany, and Russia are sovereign States and recognise each other as such; yet the sovereignty is respected only while they agree. In case of conflict, each tries to become dictator, and when war breaks out one sovereign tries to crush the other. It is thus patent that while each of two States may be sovereign in a particular sphere, say in internal relations, they cannot both be sovereign in the same sphere. If there is a dispute between Great Britain, Venezuela, and the United States respecting the ownership of a piece of land, which sovereign State is sovereign in the matter? In all conflicts between States the boasted sovereignties effectively nullify each other.

316. Since the State cannot be as sovereign in its external as it is in its internal relations, we find a vast sphere with stupendous interests left to the settlement of

haphazard and might. If the State is the ultimate form of organisation, the whole realm of internationalism is given over to anarchism. So long as States had few interests in common and but little contact with each other, compact or permanent bonds of union were hardly to be expected. In case of conflict the survival of the fittest usually meant the survival of the most mighty. Peoples knew and cared too little for each other to be shocked at the carnage wrought by their armies. When the feeling of humanity enlarged the horizon beyond petty nationalism, chiefly through the influence of Christianity, the sentiments underwent a change. War is beheld in its real horrors when the prejudices of nationality and race yield to sympathy and good-will for man as a human being and brother. Sociology, with its conception of mankind as an associated totality, also puts human altruism in place of national selfishness. Then, the modern contact of nations, commerce, travel, the press, the post, and the community of interests serve to make humanity more of a concrete reality. The nations move along the same lines, act in the same spheres, have constantly increasing mutual interests, and therefore are more liable to clash and to need some understanding than heretofore. With the growth of correlation, interaction, and co-operation, there has also been an increase of antagonism, disputes, and conflicts. Every leading nation has world-wide interests, and, in their promotion, constantly comes in contact with other nations. This makes a new *modus vivendi* necessary. The old idea of absolute sovereignty is already abandoned. Each State is learning to recognise and consider the rights of other States. This is evident from the diplomatic relations, from international commissions and congresses, from the co-operation of States in promoting common interests, such as conduct during war, from compacts, leagues, federations, and alliances. Were one State now to claim a sovereignty

which dictates to others, it would array against itself all the other States and be forced to recognise their equal rights.

Therefore we affirm that just as, in the first era, evolution led beyond the family organisation as final, so now evolution is leading beyond the State as final. Practically, in the intercourse of States, the second era has already been superseded. The State is not the ultimate form of organisation, but a step that leads to something beyond. Statesmen as well as sociologists and other investigators seize the idea of the family of nations and seek to determine what relations and actions are involved in this idea. Not at once can the idea be realised; but every deeper view of the political trend points to a more comprehensive organisation than the State as ultimate.

Besides the actual intercourse between different peoples, there are numerous evidences that they are coming nearer each other. Scholars, thinkers, inventors, reformers, work for the world. Important books are translated and their thoughts become the possession of the enlightened of all lands. A nation can no more have a monopoly of its profound thought and eminent writers than Greece can of Homer and Aristotle. National classics become world-classics; and what is universal to humanity supersedes what is peculiar to a sect, a faction, or a nationality.

This intellectual cosmopolitanism is seen in the influence exerted by peoples formerly regarded as too degraded for consideration, such as were contemptuously spoken of even by Greeks as barbarians. Now the enlightened eagerly study them, and thus valuable contributions are made to the knowledge of the beginnings of the human family. The old-world peoples also, such as the inhabitants of India and China, are coming nearer the Western peoples and making valuable literary contributions. There is an intellectual revival in India which

produces a literature that is telling on European and American thought. Other Oriental peoples may also be stimulated to new mental activity and add to the world's intellectual treasures. Many hopes are centred on Japan. Modern peoples heretofore in the background in mental productions, such as the Russians, are also coming to the front—strong proof that the world is growing together. Humanity is rapidly becoming the enlightened man's nationality.

This movement of the State itself beyond the State is among the most significant signs of the times. If it is true, as Treitschke says, *Politik*, vol. i., p. 64, that the State is the essence of all historical processes, then in this movement of States we see the most important historic event of the day, a movement upward, growth in comprehensiveness, and promising a permanent result. Statesmen are embarrassed because they feel obliged to promote the welfare of their State and yet must respect other States when conflicts of interests arise. The growing sentiment against war justifies war only as a last resort and as absolutely necessary. Peace conferences and the efforts to substitute arbitration for war prove that a new era is dawning. In the conduct of war, in the treatment of property, non-combatants, the wounded, and prisoners, every civilised nation is bound to conform to the consensus of nations. The powers of Europe have arrived at a basis of co-operation; and the Concert of the Powers, the Triple Alliance, and all agreements between States, whether public or secret, reveal a tendency toward internationalism.

Among modern statesmen Bismarck is conspicuous for insisting on the autonomy of the State in internal affairs. In external affairs, however, he recognised the necessity of concession and compromise as the condition of concord. He promoted congresses, and in a dispute with Spain submitted the question to arbitration. He was eminent as a diplomat and laid great stress on the power of diplomacy. He saw that conferences and agreements between States were necessary if these were not to destroy each other through perpetual war.

This attitude is evident from his whole policy and from many of his speeches, particularly that of February 19, 1878.

The Peace Conference at The Hague, 1899, is a striking evidence of the trend. The hopes concentrated in it and the eagerness with which its proceedings were watched by the nations indicate the general desire for a new era. Particulars respecting the Conference will be found in the following chapters.

This unifying tendency is likewise attested by the increasing sympathy of peoples for one another. The press daily tells the world the world's story, makes the nations better acquainted with each other, and creates an interest in their condition. Who can now be indifferent to a famine in Ireland, Russia, or India? The feeling that we are denizens of the same world and citizens of a common humanity creates a universal family relationship. Whether or not the world ever becomes one in language or religion, already the ties are such between the members of the human family as to make the limits of the largest State seem narrow and to increase the unity of the world's thought, and feeling, and movement. Every age decreases the number of the dwarfs who cannot look over the hedge of their nationality and see the great world beyond.

**THE THIRD OR INTERNATIONAL ERA
OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION**

CHAPTER XXI

INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

317. The process which takes place in the development of political institutions is similar to what we have found to prevail in societies generally: movement from the simple to the compound and complex, differentiation, and then unification of the differentiated parts. As States develop in different places they assume various forms with different functions and organs, and acquire an endless variety of social content. An interesting study is afforded by a comparison of States, wherein they agree and differ; how they attract and repel each other; how each goes its own way and yet in doing so crosses the paths of others; how they co-operate and yet antagonise one another. What unifying bonds underlie the fifty-four independent States which now exist in the world? Much in their relations remains unsettled if not chaotic. The sphere in which a State professes to move somehow and somewhere cuts the spheres of other States, perhaps the spheres of all. Suppose we regard mankind as the one sphere which includes the fifty-four spheres of the States. What unites these States within humanity? Has humanity only these fifty-four spheres, or are there human beings which are not included in them? There are great movements which are not political, so that the consideration of the State leaves unanswered some of the weightiest problems of social evolution.

The problems thus presented, owing to their great complexity, naturally come last. They involve larger gen-

eralisations than those heretofore considered, and required the past evolution in order to be themselves evolved. The different States had to be developed into contact, co-operation, and conflict before the problem of their relation appeared. The present status of the political world makes the problem inevitable and urgently demands its solution. The question is that of the interrelation and interaction of States, the reduction to unity and harmony of the conflicting political diversities, and the comprehension of humanity as a totality.

318. That the mind cannot rest with the State as the ultimate and most comprehensive social organisation is established by the fact that this has already been superseded by thought. Relations which really exist between States long remain undiscovered; but eventually they reveal themselves and receive recognition. A new epoch is inaugurated when new principles in the interrelation of States are found and create new rules for interstate conduct. This epoch has already been inaugurated, and now demands recognition. It becomes patent as soon as the profound and dangerous political reality is mastered. But at the dawn of a new era in social evolution the development and its results can only be obscurely surmised.

The way to meet an evident need often requires long experiments and leads through devious processes. No one could have foretold at the beginning of the consanguine and political eras what direction evolution would take. Nor can any one now prophesy how the society of nations will be formed and through what development it will pass. The solution of the problems will depend on circumstances, on individuals, on the enlarged conceptions and altruistic sentiments of societies, and especially on the nations themselves. Changes may suddenly occur which make actual what now seems impossible. In an age of electricity evolution moves more rapidly than at a time when men did not even have fire. The pro-

found study of the States, the cumulative results of past political experience, the crises arising from the increasing intercourse of States, the enlarged and enlightened sentiment of humanity, and the investigation of international problems by statesmen, philosophers, and sociologists, are evolving new principles and practices in the organism of nations. Even in the present initiatory stages the problems are becoming more definite and the hopes of their solution brighter. The need felt is the precursor of the supply; and the need of solution is becoming an overwhelming conviction. To subject to law what is now left to the prejudice, passion, cupidity, and self-will of a State or ruler, is, owing to the stupendous interests involved, a greater necessity for international peace than to make law the arbiter in the case of individual disputants.

The international relations are farthest removed from immediate determination by natural processes. The senses are limited in perceiving even the effects of these relations. Internationalism is a theme for thought, for thought in its largest generalisations, and involving the highest processes of reason. One need but comprehend what the subject involves to understand why it has not been more fully evolved. Where are the international thinkers?

We come upon the trend toward internationalism when we inquire not merely what the ages have evolved into definite and explicit form, but also what is involved in the present and is in process of being evolved.

319. With all the uncertainty respecting the method of solving the problems evolved with the new era, the process through which humanity passes in the transition from epoch to epoch grows in clearness. Man is an artist who seeks to embody in a visible and tangible form his mental conceptions. His progressive mind outgrows stationary institutions and tries to supplant them. It creates, though all the rest of the world only re-creates. New

conditions are evolved for which the old organisation has no room; events occur which snap the threads of tradition, wash away the banks in which custom has moved, and thus make a new channel for the deeper and broader current. A small organisation yields to a larger one which has space for new adjustments and adaptations. By means of a logic inherent in human nature society is thus pushed from era to era. As a time comes when the kinship ceases to be the centre and limit of thought, feeling, and action, so the development of politics and the enlargement of the mental horizon so as to include the world reveal the limits of the State. Through the biological and political eras evolution passes to the recognition of the whole human family and to an association based on this recognition. The citizen of the State learns to know himself as still greater, as a human being and a citizen of the world.

In its proper relation to other States the State loses none of its prerogatives, but is itself enlarged by overcoming its false exclusiveness and entering into the most fruitful correlations. The earth must lose its old position to put the sun in the centre of our system; but the earth loses absolutely nothing by the change, while the whole system is put into harmonious relations, and truth becomes the basis of solid and permanent progress. Only in its right place can the State be right and sustain right relations.

Students of internationalism realise the necessity of taking a step forward which involves a new principle. Professor Westlake said at the Social Science Meeting, Birmingham, 1884: "Believing that complete national independence is little more compatible with the great society of the world than complete personal independence would be compatible with the smaller society of every-day life, that in whatever form men exist on this earth some government is essential to their welfare, I must believe also that the necessities which have drawn individuals

together under governments will certainly continue to work until nations, in their turn, have been drawn together under a government."

320. Since the new era is created by an adaptation of social theories and structures to the existing actuality, we recognise a substantial movement toward internationalism which differs fundamentally from that vague and sentimental cosmopolitanism which is the Utopia of dreamers. There have been apostles of humanity whose fascinating ideals of the brotherhood and co-operation of man inspired poetry, romance, and oratory rather than practical efforts at realisation. Perhaps this idealism embodies an aspiration which is prophetic of an approaching realism. But sociology is intent on discovering that solid reality in which States move and which impels or even forces them beyond the outgrown limits of the past. The realistic trend of the times turns away from that mystical universalism which seeks somehow to grasp and correlate the world without considering the State. For the present, at least, the State is the most weighty factor in instituting the larger relations and organisations required. Europe, for instance, might, through an ideal arrangement, be put under one central government if the States did not exist. But what becomes of this ideal when it strikes political facts undergoing crystallisation for long periods of history? We must take things as they are; and as they are, the citizen is now correlated with the world chiefly through the State. The problem of internationalism thus becomes definite: the States must be brought to an appreciation of the situation, in order to establish such relations and construct such organisations as the welfare of nations requires.

Although numerous tentative movements indicate that the third era has passed beyond the stage of wishes and prophecies to actualities, and is really here in embryo,

still the full consciousness of the revolution involved in these movements has not been attained by the public. It takes time for the masses to realise that the deepest religious conviction of the day, the ethical principles and precepts, and the teachings of sociology involve the whole of humanity and regard the State as but a fraction of the totality. It is not surprising that such as cannot grasp even the comprehensiveness of the State should fail to seize the interrelation of States and the demands of mankind as a whole. But the larger vision is constantly affecting greater numbers.

321. The social relation of nations involves problems similar to those in the social relation of individuals. It is clear that the society of nations does not involve a compounding of the nations, but it means the establishment of specific and equitable relations between them. Compound the nations into one nation of humanity, and the nations themselves cease to exist, just as the individual ceases to exist if society absorbs him. Then, a nation, like a person, has private and social forces, or national and international ones. Some things solely concern the State itself, and for other States to interfere with these is like the interference of society with the private forces of an individual. But besides the things which pertain exclusively to a nation, there are others which belong to the society of nations. The international relations lie beyond the national boundaries, just as what is social lies beyond the private sphere of an individual. What is national, what international, has become as fundamental for the third era as what is private and what is social in the individual is fundamental for all society. It is no more evident that what belongs to the individual should be left to individual management and what belongs to society to social management than that what belongs to a nation should be under national control, while what belongs to a number of nations should be subject to international

control. The problem of nationalism and internationalism is involved throughout this era; but in the beginning already it is evident that in the international sphere the society of nations is as supreme as is a nation in the national sphere.

If a State has a right to ignore other States in the settlement of international affairs, why should not an individual or a particular society have the same right to ignore other individuals or societies, even the State, and settle arbitrarily the affairs which pertain equally to all? Individual and social anarchism is cursed, while in a larger realm and with worse results international anarchism is fostered. Political anarchism finds its strongest encouragement from the examples set by international anarchism. An unprejudiced reading of history establishes one thing beyond all controversy: their power and magnitude and selfishness have often made the States, in their treatment of each other, the worst pirates, the most unscrupulous robbers, the most cruel oppressors, and the most brutal assassins. For verification, let but the history of the last century, the ripe fruit of the total evolution of the past, be read. If some draw from these awful crimes the inference that the only hope is in the annihilation of the State, a different logic establishes the necessity of a radical reform in the international relation of States.

L. von Stein, Schmoller's *Fahrbuch*, 1882, p. 399, thinks that the recent international inquiries are due to "the origin of the community in the life of Europe, which has supplanted the old rigid individuality of the States." This community of interests, he thinks, characterises our times and is destined to dominate the future. Present knowledge makes it impossible to limit the attention to any particular European country. He claims that the time has come when the educated will contemplate the total life, and thought, and conditions, and problems, and movements of the whole of Europe. Everywhere the consciousness is beginning to prevail that he who works for a part

works for the great totality. This inclusiveness of the totality in one's labour enormously enhances the value of the individual's task. No State, amid present conditions, can make its peculiarity the law for other States. "We ought now to search for the *jus naturæ* and establish it as the *jus gentium*."

322. Modern as well as ancient history proves that on the old basis of absolute sovereignty it is impossible for States to be just to one another. They are organised for the sake of their citizens and internal affairs, and all else is foreign to them. The specific sphere of their activity is also their limitation. Countries have been governed much as war has been waged—those not in the same army are enemies. More exalted theories have prevailed, but the practice has generally been Machiavellian. Between a despotism, a constitutional monarchy, and a republic the difference in regard to self-aggrandisement has not been striking. The respect inspired by States has been due less to nobility of character than to the power of armies and navies—a respect of fear rather than affection. When a people whose loudest boast is freedom strike down others who contend for freedom; and when a nation, denouncing the sale of individuals to individuals, by its own act sanctions the buying and selling of a whole people consisting of millions, this trampling on liberty furnishes a sample of the perfidy and consequent infamy to which a false and pernicious conception of sovereignty may lead. Conduct which justly excites the contempt of an individual becomes the law of some States in their foreign relations. Such a course can, unfortunately, find in tradition and custom hosts of examples in its favour. Just as no association within the State can understand all the other associations and determine independently its relation to them; so a State cannot, of its own accord, determine its relation to the other States and their relations to one another. As the associations require a State larger than they are to correlate them, so the State needs a

larger association to determine the relation of all the States.

The egoism of States can only escape reprobation because it is so difficult to locate the responsibility. Then, the pretended good of the citizens serves as an apology for all manner of injustice. States are often designated as personalities; but it is notorious that the ordinary ethical considerations demanded of every respectable personality are little regarded in the interrelation of States. The humanity of nations in behalf of suffering peoples is usually aroused in proportion as they have no selfish interest in the suffering. But apologies are readily found for sufferings they themselves inflict for the sake of exploiting the sufferers. States bitterly denounce one another for crimes which they themselves do not hesitate to commit when an advantage is to be gained. Even wars are begun for selfish ends, and afterwards reasons sought to justify them. Such political conduct usually finds the merited condemnation of some persons and they seem to be on the increase; but the general current commonly called patriotism sweeps past them, if it does not carry them along.

323. How far selfishness and a disregard of others enter political motives can be learned from political discussions of foreign relations, from diplomatic correspondence, and the lives of statesmen and rulers. How significant that so often a statesman is idolised at home and from the international standpoint abhorred as a brute and monster! The end, the supposed welfare of the State, is lauded at home, and any means to this end seem justifiable. Napoleon, who spoke of the sacrifice of a million lives as an insignificant affair, is a conspicuous illustration. The Nemesis of history is likely to receive more consideration henceforth, since the true international standpoint is gaining on the selfishly national one. The citizen who condones or even praises the selfish crimes of his own politicians will censure those of other nations.

The memoirs of three statesmen of last century furnish rich material for reflection—Talleyrand, Metternich, and Bismarck. Their characters and degrees of merit differ greatly, but each makes the State he serves supreme,—the one France, the other Austria, the third Germany. Sometimes they speak in the name of Europe and advocate theories which profess to embrace the greatest interests of humanity; but practically each identifies himself with the greatness of his State. That they were thus tethered seemed a necessity, for every one else was doing the same thing and each had to be fought with his own tactics. Even in international conferences each representative stands for the peculiar views and interests of his own State. With the present political status the international standpoint seems almost impossible. (Appendix I.)

324. The origin of modern wars reveals our pitiable international anarchism. The condition is a survival of savages in a state of nature, where each attacks when he sees fit and defends himself as best he can, there being neither law nor sovereign to which an appeal can be made. Some slight affair, whose effects no one can foresee, arouses the jealousy, prejudice, passion, fear, or cupidity of a nation, and nothing but bloodshed can allay the frenzy. A whole nation is in that state of furious insanity which sometimes overtakes the savage and finds an outlet in murder and destruction. Rulers and people become sensitive, irritable, and are on the scent for grievances. Then all is ready for an explosion. Facts are perverted, statements misinterpreted, and reason loses its sway; perhaps a misunderstanding or an imagined act of discourtesy becomes the match to the powder. It is horrible that at this stage in the world's history States are made the sport of chance, which places in jeopardy the lives of thousands and the fortunes of millions. It would be some relief if in this reign of international barbarism

the responsible and guilty parties were placed in the front rank of battle; but they are at a safe distance, while innocent soldiers are slaughtered in the carnage, nations are overwhelmed with grief, and the fruits of honest toil and ages of culture are ruthlessly destroyed. The people who furnish the victims for the slaughter and the money to wage war have no voice in the matter; but those who pretend to act for them go about like silly boys with chips on their shoulders. When those who have to obey, pay, and die once learn what accidents, and trifles, and crimes may deluge their fairest fields with blood, ruin their families, and lay waste their cities they will overthrow a system intolerable to all who understand its full meaning.

I learned on the battle-fields of Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg that no language can describe the horrors of a battle. Every battle-field made the conviction indestructible that nothing but the utmost necessity can justify war.

The danger to which the present system exposes nations can be learned from any recent war, such as the Crimean, the Franco-German, the Spanish-American, and the South African. The broad and placid lake becomes a narrow current in which all is concentrated; there are slight agitations, then rapids appear and increase in violence, and at last the awful Niagara. Wars are often crimes of the first magnitude. This, of course, does not imply that they may not also be the holiest enterprises in which, with the present situation, a people can engage.

Instructive accounts of the beginning of the Franco-German war are contained in Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, and Benedetti's *Studies in Diplomacy*.

325. The value of the State, the great interests concentrated in it for conservation, and its significant functions for society at large must, of course, be weighed in order to appreciate the jealousy for its honour and welfare. To treat its vast concerns with neglect is in the highest

degree criminal. But the value and dignity of the State should be the measure of wisdom in the conduct of its affairs. No evidence of greatness can be found in a policy which makes supersensitiveness the test of honour, which belittles the State itself by ignoring the claims of other States, and which treats brute force as the basis and measure of its dignity. But base and selfish motives do not always explain the failure of statesmen to be just to other States. Every statesman is the organ of his country, whose interests he is appointed to promote, and the conditions under which he labours require a concentration of energies in behalf of his own State. His specialty is his tether. The French diplomat remains a Frenchman in Washington, London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg; and only as such is he deemed fit to retain his position. Within the national horizon all international objects are beheld with a national vision. The results are seen everywhere in the diplomatic relations of States. The gigantic problem at which the nations have been labouring is this: how to evolve a healthy internationalism while each State, with its representatives, remains self-centred. It would be as easy for astronomers to construct a science of the solar system while each astronomer directs his telescope and limits his inquiries to the single planet of which he makes a specialty.

Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron" has often been pronounced brutal. Yet his course simply meant the supremacy of his State at all hazards—German unity and power, under the leadership of Prussia. The principles he adopted had prevailed from time immemorial and were sanctioned by the statecraft of all ages. Not his principles so much as their practical operation differentiated him from other statesmen. Perhaps the bitterest denunciations came from those who would not have scrupled, under similar circumstances, to do as he did if they had had his definite aim, his resolute will, his venturesome spirit,

backed by his army and inspired by his hope. He frankly avowed his principles and was consistent enough to maintain them at the risk of three wars with an enormous cost of men and money. It was worth while to let the world see the ripe fruit of the common statecraft, which so often means political craftiness. Bismarck is a striking illustration of that efficiency which gives a statesman glory at home and loads him with curses abroad.

Essentially the same principles are revealed by statesmen of other countries. The wars they inaugurated had the same spirit. Did Napoleon III. have motives better than those of Bismarck in entering on the war with Germany? In the Crimean War England and France did not have even Bismarck's cogent State reasons. They did not unite for love of each other, but rather because they feared and hated a third party. These are the studies which give a picture of the times and reveal the character of the prevalent policy of States. If with Napoleon III. and Bismarck the old political principles ended, the nations are to be congratulated.

Lord Palmerston takes his place among the ordinary statesmen and gains his popularity in England by adopting the rule he is said to have followed, that "a great and powerful nation should always be at liberty to enforce respect and compliance from a weaker one." Gladstone is conspicuous among modern statesmen for his exalted principles respecting international relations. In opposing the selfish and arrogant State policy of Palmerston, he advocated the higher law which recognises a duty to other States similar to that exacted from them. "There is," he said, "a law of nations which we must observe and respect—a great and noble monument of human wisdom, founded on the combined dictates of reason and experience, a precious inheritance bequeathed to us by the generations that have gone before us, and a firm foundation on which we must take care to build." (Summary of speech delivered in 1850, given in his *Life*, by L. Apjohn, p. 72.) Yet

Gladstone, in spite of these principles, which were no doubt sincere, was too much controlled by State reasons, by party considerations, and by cabinet affiliations, to say nothing of the impossibility of understanding fully other States and doing justice to their interests, to be a fair judge and safe guide in all international affairs. But even if he could have risen above his national limitations, it is by no means certain that he could have carried the nation with him. In fact, he was liable to sacrifice his popularity at home in proportion as he became international. He is an illustration of the noble statesmen who want to be just in all their relations but meet insurmountable obstacles. In the present situation a statesman with an international spirit can hardly be understood at home or believed abroad. The force that gives the diplomat his efficiency is not always his ethics. "Diplomacy is best conducted with bayonets gleaming at the door," Gladstone said, and the Earl of Beaconsfield, in a novel, puts these words in the mouth of one of his characters: "All diplomacy since the Treaty of Utrecht seems to me to be fiddle-faddle, and the country rewarded the great man who made that treaty by an attainder."

Modern diplomacy has, however, become more honourable. It is conducted more in the presence of the public and promises to be based on more exalted principles. Even the shrewdness of a Talleyrand would not now save him from the contempt of diplomats. His very character would defeat his aims.

326. Internationalism is involved in the idea of the State, and for this reason must be evolved with the State. The political view of the State is not the only one possible; the sociological beholds in it a society amid societies. The only organisation that can be erected on the biological basis is that of the kinship; but when the existing sociality becomes the basis, as when political institutions are founded, why stop with the State? The State is an association which has imperative reasons for recognising other associations beyond its bounds. The sociological aspect is larger than the political, and in respect to inter-

national relations more correct. The politician makes the State ultimate; the sociologist makes humanity ultimate. In proportion as the social relations of humanity became more evident there was also a growth in internationalism. The nations have increased in sociality, and politics has yielded more and more to sociology. The social relation of States as distinct from the political relation is a new but important subject. The tendency now is to find a place in politics for what is recognised as having social existence, to find the law for what has already become a social actuality. Embassies, treaties, leagues, are old in history; but with the growth of internationalism they have also grown. Great international movements are a symptom of modern times. Even now, however, alliances are limited to contiguous States and such as have immediate common interests. They have a political rather than a social basis, and for that reason, interest, not sociality, being the bond, there is no universal or world-alliance.

A history of the leagues formed by nations shows how in all the historic ages there have been more or less tentative movements toward internationalism. Culminations of these great movements are found in the present. For the study of this history until his own day the work of Grotius on *The Rights of Peace and War* is indispensable.

That "political" applies to what pertains to a State as distinguished from what is international is determined by usage. Count Mouravieff, in a circular respecting the Peace Conference at The Hague, wants "the political relations of States" excluded from the deliberations; and the English Government willingly agreed "that questions concerning the political relations of States" should be excluded. "Political reasons" also led to the choice of The Hague instead of "the capital of one of the Great Powers, where so many political interests are centred." Here "political" is distinctly separated from the international interests which formed the subjects

of the deliberations. The Count said that the Emperor of Austria feared the political interests of the capital of a Great Power might "impede the progress of a work in which all the countries of the universe are equally interested."

327. From the sociological point of view the nations now confront the problem of rising out of the present untenable position by developing the era which will meet the new requirements. Natural evolution moves on resistlessly, whatever efforts men may make to direct its course; in international affairs, however, not blind nature, but seeing reason is the guide. States having grown in likeness and toward each other, the result attained requires rational comprehension and arrangement. The chaos in the relation of States is now to be submitted to the organisation of reason. We are not discussing sociological ethics or what ought to be, but what is involved in the existing relation of States, in order that reason may take the place of chance and fate in internationalism. On the basis of what exists, reason is to form an international organisation in which the parts which belong together are actually and consciously correlated. In order that this may be accomplished it will be necessary to overthrow traditional political prejudices and fathom the true meaning of the State, of the relation of States as parts of the same humanity, what their rights and duties, how they now regulate international affairs, and what the inherent requirements are which these affairs make. A great problem is presented by the determination of what nations have settled between themselves and in what spheres anarchism and haphazard reign. An age that boasts of its enlightenment would add to that enlightenment by realising that the States are still largely at that stage of evolution when savages settled their disputes by whim, passion and greed, the final appeal being brute force.

328. This is the anomaly of the situation: we have outgrown the old political status, and yet in practice are enslaved by the effete system. The expediency or necessity of a State, as isolated or abstracted from the totality, is really an inferior motive and requires wisdom inferior to that which involves the larger field of internationalism. There is no isolated State; a nation abstracted from the rest is a myth. Just as humanity, which includes all the States, outnumbers and transcends in value any particular State, so broader and higher considerations are now required than those which make the State ultimate and endow it with a universal supremacy. Everywhere the narrow political limits are being burst. In that great trend toward enlarged combinations only the States are behind, each preferring to nourish its own interests and in the larger affairs engage in destructive rivalry and conflict. Capitalism has international organisations in the form of syndicates and trusts. Labour is forming leagues regardless of nationalities; and both socialism and anarchism have international affinities and unions. Religion transcends State bounds and makes the world its kingdom. Learning is rapidly becoming cosmopolitan, the boundlessness of truth being its only limit. A university or academy of science fails in its calling if its influence is not international. Ethics, like religion, makes humanity its sphere. The same largeness pertains to sociology, whose researches are commensurate with human society, which aims to fathom the meaning of every social relation, force, structure, and content, and which seeks to put in its right place and properly correlate every human association.

When it is affirmed that politics as State exclusiveness, limited by State reason, has lost its supremacy, the meaning is that genuine humanism has taken the place of a false nationalism as ultimate. The political force has evolved the ethical and intellectual forces, and cannot henceforth be severed from them. The contracted and

vulgar politics is giving way to a deeper and greater truth, to a larger conscience, and a higher and broader religious conception. Sociology in its grasp of humanity locates and properly estimates the limb, and therefore refuses to treat it as if it were the whole body. The evolution in thought involves a revolution of the old and selfish notions of the State, which, instead of posing before the world as an irresponsible autocrat, will be obliged to justify its claims on rational grounds, and shape its policy according to the total intellectual and moral requirements of the age. These requirements prove the old State, with its fictitious, self-constituted, world-wide sovereignty, out of date. The glory of the State is not in isolation, self-concentration, and foreign despotism, but in a wise dominion within its own bounds, and in taking its true place in the society of nations which it helps to constitute and govern, to which it gives and from which it takes.

Sociology, so efficient in promoting this enlargement, has not always made the social totality the limit of its interpretations. So long as it rested on a biological basis it could only by means of some grand inconsistency rise above its biological conditions into an actual sociality. On such a basis it was natural that what was called sociology should concentrate its investigations chiefly on primitive conditions of the race, and look to bees and ants as examples of social organisations. This helps us to understand why a certain kind of sociology does not rise to a consideration of the society of nations. Some animals furnish something analogous to specific human associations, but nothing international. The reason is the lack of reason. Sociology reduced to mechanical processes of course has no room for the reflection and reason required to establish international adjustments. Likewise when social evolution is treated as pertaining merely to domestic, ecclesiastical, political, and other particular institutions, it is not apparent how the interrelation and interaction of these institutions is to be

determined, how a comprehensive and connected view of society as a totality is to be grasped, and how from the isolated particulars internationalism is to be evolved. We have seen that the evolution of the social forces along particular lines, such as the political, religious, and economic, each taken by itself for specialisation, is valuable as a method of social analysis and interpretation; but a correct conception of society is possible only when a synthesis of all the social forces takes place. Such a synthesis is now required. It is the ethical, the religious, the intellectual, the economic, and the political forces which are now, under the synthesis made by sociology, pushing toward an international organisation.

329. Nations suffer from the dominance of men who have been trained in the old political traditionalism, while they remain strangers to the deeper and broader conceptions and demands of the age. To this training must, in large measure, be due the astounding fact that they do not see that the same logic which gives the State the supremacy in State affairs insures the supremacy to the international management of international affairs. There are schools of politics and diplomacy which unfit men for the largest statesmanship. These schools cater to the greed of the nation, and this insures their popularity. An anarchist has proclaimed that one has a right to all he can get and hold, and this rule is followed by many representatives of States.

From these political schools we must turn to the training given by sociology for the preparation for the highest and largest sphere of social action, such as that of the society of nations. This is only saying that a knowledge of society is required in order to deal intelligently with society. There is good reason for calling the third the *sociological* era. The same intellectual evolution which has evolved sociology is also pushing toward the superseding of the narrow political system by the larger social or international system demanded by sociological thought.

Progress is seen in the fact that greater demands are made on statesmen than formerly. It is beginning to be questioned whether the training and traditions of diplomats do not unfit them for the promotion of international relations. When the Czar of Russia proposed the Peace Conference held at The Hague, Mr. H. H. D. Pierce, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States to Russia, reported to his Government the reception given to the proposal in the Czar's dominions. Special interest attaches to the diplomats at St. Petersburg.

"The general consensus of opinion among the members of the diplomatic corps now present appears to be that the proposition is visionary and Utopian, if not partaking of Quixotism. Little of value is expected to result from the Conference, and indeed every diplomatic officer with whom I have talked seems to regard the proposition with that scepticism which great measures of reform usually encounter. This is perhaps an argument in support of an opinion which has been advanced in certain journals, that, diplomatic training and traditions being wholly opposed to the objects in view, diplomatic officers would be unsuitable representatives for such a conference." (*The Peace Conference at the Hague*, F. W. Holls, chap. i., p. 18.) The ordinary statesman and diplomat finds his education defective and his occupation gone when international relations are settled on international principles. Even political science contains survivals of the dark ages. In *Politik*, vol. i., p. 40, Treitschke says that the State has two chief functions, namely, might in external relations and law in internal affairs. Why not let law and righteousness reign in both realms and banish brute force altogether?

330. Let us understand correctly the statement made above, that it is chiefly through the State that the new era is to be developed. More and more the State is coming to mean the people in their associated capacity. The hope of the needed reform, therefore, consists chiefly in the instruction of the people, especially the leaders, in political and sociological affairs. The rulers and voters

must learn to view politics in the light of modern actualities, instead of the antiquated notion of the State as the universal and ultimate sovereign. With an ethical, a humane political, and a sociological education the people will eventually see to it that the State enlarges itself to their enlarged conceptions. This popular education is important in proportion as the people possess or gain control of the government. Yet Russia has a professor of international law in every university, while very few are found in the whole United States. Especially essential is it to create an intelligent popular interest in international affairs. Only with the growth of altruism in place of egoism, whether personal or national, can relief be expected. In international conflicts the appeal is less to reason than to popular fanaticism, so that popular feeling is of fundamental importance. Whatever cultivates the friendship of nations and promotes an understanding and sympathy between them is valuable. With the present neglect of international affairs, even on the part of the educated, neither public interest nor intelligent action can be expected.

Direct inquiry has revealed astonishing ignorance respecting international law, and internationalism in general. Even law students usually get but a smattering of the subject, perhaps not even that. Judges are expected to be familiar with the subject only if, in the higher courts, their calling demands it. As a rule, the theme is too remote from the interests of law students and lawyers to appeal to them. The minds of other students and professional men are mostly a blank on the subject. There are exceptions; but generally our institutions of learning do not even excite an interest in internationalism. This gives to the few professors and specialists almost a monopoly of the whole field. Hence the most selfish State policy finds enthusiastic support at the ballot-box, on the platform, in the pulpit, in the press, and in political

life, while the plea for international justice, to do unto others as we would be done by, strikes deaf ears.

The countless affinities of nations are not studied; what wonder, then, that they are ignored so soon as a single element of antagonism absorbs the attention? What a vast common content in the Christian nations, for instance, backed by the profession of obedience to the command to love one another! In the department of science the same nations form but a single commonwealth. In the study of nature and mind, in medicine and theology, in history and literature and art, these nations have become a grand university in which all thinkers and scholars are pupils. Even in war these peoples go to school together. Whatever their external differences, there is within them a great communistic realm whose social content minimises the conflicting elements. With increasing differentiation the external contrasts and conflicts may also increase, while the inner bonds, the deep intellectual and moral possessions of the nations likewise constantly grow and constitute indissoluble interstate ties.

331. There are numerous and valuable works on international law; and yet it is claimed that "international law" is a misnomer. Certain it is that an international law enacted by an authorised legislative body, sanctioned by a legitimate government, enforced by an authority from which there is no appeal, and actually controlling all within the society of nations does not exist. A sovereign body above the nations has not been established. A nation may adopt certain regulations respecting foreign affairs; but this adoption applies only to itself, not to other nations. Instead of "laws," it might be better to say international rules and customs. Certain rules exist respecting the rights of diplomats and the manner of conducting their negotiations. The incessant activity in recent times, particularly since the appearance of the great work of Grotius, in the efforts to regulate the relations of

nations in peace and war, has resulted in an understanding on certain points which has produced customs that have essentially the effect of laws. Whether or not by legal enactments nations have sanctioned these customs, they are recognised as obligatory on all civilised peoples. Greater force is given to them when adopted by an international convention. Even the less advanced peoples in the range of enlightened international influence are expected to conform to these regulations. When the rules of civilised warfare are violated by a State respecting the implements of war, the treatment of non-combatants, the prisoners, the wounded, and the dead, the other nations censure the violation through the press and public opinion, if not formally. The civilised world has, in fact, become a tribunal from which there is no appeal. A State persistently ignoring existing international regulations loses caste among the enlightened nations, puts itself outside of the recognised pale of civilisation, and perhaps its course becomes a *casus belli*. The precedents established and the usual customs have become powerful factors in international life. They are educational as well as restraining and directive in their influence. Whether, therefore, called laws or not, a body of international rules exists as a valuable achievement of evolution, and constitutes a basis for conducting the affairs of the society of nations and for future progress in internationalism.

Nations have effective means of showing their disapproval of one another without going to war. This can be done by an unfriendly attitude toward the offending State, by taking sides with its opponents, and by enacting laws against the State, particularly such as are of an economic character.

There is thus a practical internationalism which does not depend on law, in the strict sense of the term. Just because the relation of States has become more intimate each is anxious

to secure for its policy the favourable opinion of the enlightened world. This it forfeits by violating rules which are regarded as exponents of civilisation, by trampling on the ethical code of the advanced nations. Besides the disgrace incurred, its very existence might be endangered. The growth of this ethical demand on the nations is among the best evidences of international evolution.

Suppose a State passes as law an international code, would not that be international law? Only for itself unless other nations join it. Many difficulties would, however, be overcome if the leading States agreed on such a code and made it the law of their action. Even in that case each nation would make itself the ultimate appeal respecting the law, thus giving room for different interpretations.

332. The discussion leaves no doubt that, according to the very nature of the case, certain rights and responsibilities belong to the society of nations and to no other society. They involve all the affairs of which no State has a monopoly, but which concern all alike. Each nation in the society has immunities and duties somewhat like those existing between individuals. Respecting this proposition agreement in the abstract is perhaps easy. The difficulty consists in determining the exact sphere of internationalism and making it subject to international control. The rule has generally been followed that a State's place in the family of nations is made by its ability to enforce its demands, which has resulted in subjecting the weaker to the stronger. The modern advance in international relations is seen in the persistent demand for a higher principle in the intercourse of peoples. The problem now presented is: How can that which is recognised as right be embodied in international law and made effective in the intercourse of nations? It cannot be questioned that what is called international law does not yet include all the international rights and duties.

333. It is important to determine on what the rules for

international conduct are based. 1. The right of force, might being made the arbiter, the dominion in the relation of States belonging to the most powerful State or combination of States. 2. Existing treaties and agreements between States, or what is practically international law. 3. Some ethical notion of right or some ideal to which it is thought States ought to conform in their interrelations. 4. The standard of right actually accepted by enlightened peoples, whatever agreement or disagreement there may be respecting the absolute ideal. 5. In determining the rules of international conduct, the fundamental question may be: What does the situation demand in the light of the achievements of modern progress?

Each of these five points presents a different object as the essential thing in an inquiry into the foundation of international conduct. The first presents as the determining factor the greatest might, the power of a nation to execute its will, a principle whose prevalence in history and at the present time is well known. Brute force, perhaps under the guidance of wisdom and skill, is the arbiter in the affairs of States. How to supersede this by a higher principle is now one of the chief problems.

The second basis concentrates the attention on the agreements already made, the obligations entered into by States, without regard to questions of abstract right. In this case the existing legal regulations are treated as final.

The third theory enters the region of abstract right, an ethical ideal as the basis of conduct. The difficulty, however, consists in determining the absolute right, different standards prevailing in nations as well as in schools of ethics. The adoption of this theory would, therefore, be impracticable until an agreement is attained in regard to the absolute or ideal right.

The fourth adopts the standard of right actually accepted by different States without inquiring into the ultimate basis of right. Certain ethical principles prevail in

the enlightened States, those of humanity, of liberty, of reciprocity, and the like, and these are made the basis of the intercourse. This might be called the subjective basis.

The fifth concentrates the attention on what actually exists in the relation of States—what binds them together and makes of them a solidarity, a real association of nations. The achievement in the evolution of internationalism is seized; it is interpreted in the light of the enlightenment and conscience of the day, for the purpose of finding what its requirements are. This reality is studied with the view of discovering what organisation is needed in order to meet the demands of the situation. From the existing actuality the new social forms are to emerge under the guidance of all the attainments made. This is evidently the true basis. It subjects force to the light of reason; it regards existing international agreements as part of the reality to be studied, but tests their value by the actual demands that are to be met; it has respect for the ideal of ethics, but can make it the test of what exists only so far as the ideal itself has found recognition; the standard of right really prevalent is also a test by which the existing rules can be tried, and so far as they fall below it they are to be exalted to its level.

Tested by these principles, it will be found that the existing international rules fail to meet the demands; the situation itself, the requirements of nations, the thought and conscience of the age, have outgrown the existing international organisation. On the totality of the international situation the total enlightenment of the age must be concentrated in order to construct an internal organisation and an international code of laws.

334. The preceding paragraph shows that the existing international regulations are inadequate. Nevertheless their study is important because they indicate where the beginning is to be made for further progress and for the

establishment of what the situation requires. Especial importance attaches to the congresses which were called to settle points of dispute between nations, to fix principles of international law, and to give directions for the future relations and actions of States. Of the congresses held in the nineteenth century those of Vienna, 1815, Paris, 1856, and Berlin, 1878, are of great historical significance. Some burning question of the day was the occasion of the meeting, such as peace and war, the possession of certain territory, and the rights of States in disputed cases; but their decisions were regarded as precedents and therefore had a general significance. These and similar congresses, particularly the one at The Hague, which will be more fully considered, have been valuable in making the nations better acquainted, in giving definiteness to the points that needed settling, and in promoting a mutual understanding respecting controverted topics; but they neither established peace nor laid a secure basis for the settlement of national disputes. Each nation bound itself to the stipulations so far as it saw fit; each interpreted them in its own way and made of them what application it pleased; and in emergencies when there were strained relations for which the rules adopted by the congresses were specially intended, each nation became a law unto itself.

It is a common charge that statesmen and States violate agreements into which they have entered. Consequently the conventions often fail to direct the course of nations in their international affairs. State reasons are apt to be regarded as superior to such conventions. Weak States may be bound by them out of regard for their safety; but strong ones are apt to ignore them when in their way. No one considers these conventions a guarantee of peace or a necessary basis for future negotiations. With all its conventions and the solemn pledges of nations to each other, Europe has for a long time been, at short

intervals, on the verge of war, and its peace has been an armed one. How could it be otherwise so long as there was no authority or power to execute the decisions of the conventions?

The steps which led to the Crimean War illustrate the dangers to which States are exposed under present conditions. In the relations between Russia and Turkey old treaties and promises amounted to nothing. The war itself was, in part, an evidence of reckless ambition and hatred, and for the sake of these, countless innocent victims were slaughtered. Emperor Napoleon could use the war to strengthen the place he had usurped in France; and to pose as an arbiter in the affairs of Europe appealed to his ambition. The Turk was but a tool in the hands of his Western allies. England had no superfluity of affection either for Russia or Turkey; but its weak Cabinet lacked the decision which might have prevented the war. Popular passion was inflamed by speeches and the press, and, as is usual in such cases, the Government was easily carried along by the tide. When peace was concluded, a treaty was forced on Russia which that country found it convenient to repudiate at the first opportune moment, namely the outbreak of the Franco-German War.

When the Concert of European Powers, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, fixed the disputed boundary between Turkey and Greece, Turkey refused to accept the decision.

It is on facts like these, which can be indefinitely multiplied, that Hall, in the introduction to his work on *International Law*, bases the following statement: "It may safely be said that it is rarely that the treaty policy of any country is consistent with itself over any long period of time. . . . Treaties are only permanently obeyed when they represent the continued wishes of the contracting parties."

CHAPTER XXII

THE TREND TOWARD INTERNATIONALISM IN PEACE CONGRESSES AND OTHER MOVEMENTS

335. Reference has already been made to one of the most important of recent international conventions, the Peace Congress at The Hague, in 1899. It was convened at the suggestion of the Czar of Russia with the view of establishing an international code for the prevention of war, or at least for the mitigation of its horrors. On some points there was agreement, though it had to be left to the individual States to determine how far, in their case, the agreement should be binding. It did not augur well for the success of the Congress that the two of the nations represented which were thought to be most favourable to peace, the United States of America and Great Britain, soon engaged in war. The enthusiasm with which many welcomed the Congress was disappointed both by the proceedings and the results. Nevertheless, valuable results were obtained. To students of international law the views presented were not new, but it was important to have them discussed by the nations and made known to the public.

The calling of the convention is significant of the trend. It was a recognition of the advanced sentiment of the age respecting war, the burden of standing armies, and the increased demand for the regulation of international affairs. Probably the most valuable results are those which show what is needed in the way of international organisation, and how great, almost insuperable, the

difficulties are. A new impulse was given to the study of international questions, and students now know better what requirements are made on them.

The importance of such conventions is great. They are, however, somewhat unwieldy and hampered by the fact that a representative has an authoritative voice so far only as his State dictates or approves his sentiments. What is recognised as international law may find expression, but new theories are apt to be regarded with suspicion. Now, as heretofore, progress in international law is likely to depend on individual specialists and voluntary associations, and on the adoption of their conclusions by separate States, after which international congresses may accept them and render them effective. It should be remembered, however, that these congresses are not theoretical, but practical. This practical aim was made prominent at The Hague. The possibility of this Congress, the readiness with which the nations entered it, the conciliatory spirit which prevailed in its proceedings, and the actual points on which agreement was reached are proofs of the desire of nations to overcome the difficulties under which they labour. Its direct and positive results may be less valuable than its revelations of the international situation, the foundation it laid for future work, and the impulse it gave toward new development.

Those who expected the Congress to end war did not appreciate the difficulties in the way; those who pronounced it a failure seem to lack an appreciation of the value of the tentative efforts which start a new development and whose fruits can be gathered only after long seasons of growth. From the Congress itself had to be learned for what the nations are prepared. No doubt the Czar and his advisers expected greater results, though they had misgivings, and spoke of the Congress as an initiative for further efforts in the interest of peace and the mitigation of the evils of war.

In his opening address the President, M. de Staal, said: "We perceive between nations an amount of material and moral interests which is constantly increasing. The ties which unite all parts of the human family are ever becoming closer. A nation could not remain isolated if it wished. It finds itself surrounded, as it were, by a living organism fruitful in blessings for all, and it is, and should be, a part of this same organism. Without doubt rivalries exist; but does it not seem that they generally appertain to the domain of economics, to that of commercial expansion which originates in the necessity of utilising abroad the surplus of activity which cannot find sufficient employment in the mother country? Such rivalry may do good, provided that, above it all, there shall remain the idea of justice and the lofty sentiment of human brotherhood. If, therefore, the nations are united by ties so multifarious, is there no room for seeking the consequences arising from this fact?"

336. The two points presented to the Conference for action were: "1. To check the progressive increase of military and naval armaments, and study any possible means of effecting their eventual reduction. 2. To devise means for averting armed conflicts between States by the employment of pacific methods of international diplomacy." The first point was soon dropped, the nations not being prepared for its adoption. The abandonment of the hope that the armies and navies might, for a while at least, be kept at their present strength and the budgets for their support not increased, was a great disappointment to some who had favoured with enthusiasm the convening of the Conference. It was agreed to submit for signature to the States represented the following conventions or agreements and declarations:

- I. Convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences.
- II. Convention regarding the laws and customs of war by land.

III. Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of the 22nd August, 1864.

IV. Three Declarations:

1. To prohibit the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other similar new methods.
2. To prohibit the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.
3. To prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.

Although no agreement respecting the maintenance of the present armaments could be reached, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

"The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind."

Mr. Holls gives the proceedings of the Conference and also explanations and discussions of the articles adopted. See also the "*Official British Report of the Correspondence respecting the Peace Conference held at The Hague in 1899.*"

The following States were represented: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, China, Denmark, Spain, United States of America, United States of Mexico, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Siam, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Bulgaria—twenty-six States, from Europe, Asia, and North America.

The delegates could not act finally for their Governments, and all action taken was referred for adoption to the governments they represented. The following wishes were added to the above conventions and declarations:

1. The Conference, taking into consideration the preliminary steps taken by the Swiss Federal Government for the revision of the Geneva Convention, expresses the wish that steps may be shortly taken for the assembly of a Special Conference having for its object the revision of that Convention.

2. The Conference expresses the wish that the question of the rights and duties of neutrals may be inserted in the programme of a Conference in the near future.

3. The Conference expresses the wish that the questions with regard to rifles and naval guns, as considered by it, may be studied by the Governments with the object of coming to an agreement respecting the employment of new types and calibres.

4. The Conference expresses the wish that the Governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the Conference, may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets.

5. The Conference expresses the wish that the proposal which contemplates the declaration of the inviolability of private property in naval warfare may be referred to a subsequent Conference for consideration.

6. The Conference expresses the wish that the proposal to settle the question of the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force may be referred to a subsequent Conference for consideration.

The first of these wishes was adopted unanimously; the other five were adopted unanimously, saving some abstentions.

337. By far the most valuable work of the Congress consists in the arrangements for a permanent court of arbitration and its method of procedure when nations appeal to it. The provisions thus made have now received the signatures of all the Powers represented and this court may be regarded as an established fact. Whether the nations will appeal to it, and what questions shall be submitted, must, of course, be left entirely to them. Of what benefit it will be and what effect it will have in preventing war, can be determined only by the

future. Its establishment by the action of all the Powers is, however, significant. Its seat is to be at The Hague. Each signatory Power can appoint four persons as arbitrators, and from the entire membership of the court the nations can select such persons as shall act as arbitrators in any given case. Elaborate provisions were adopted regulating the appeals of nations to this court, the presentation of documents, the argument of the case, the decision of the judges, and the offering of any new evidence, within three months after the decision, for a revision of the judgment. At this court the best talent of the world on international law is likely to be concentrated in the argument and decision of cases submitted to arbitration.

The existence of the court removes the excuse that there is no tribunal for States to appeal to in disputes. Such a tribunal, besides the peace it may establish, will be a most efficient agent for promoting the study, the advance, and the interpretation of international law. Its moral effect may be of incalculable benefit. The fact that this court can be assembled whenever an emergency arises will lead the people to expect, or even demand, that to it an appeal be made for the settlement of difficulties between nations; and a refusal to do so may prejudice the cause of the nation in the eyes of the world. It will appear as if the State refusing arbitration, especially on causes not affecting its vital interests, has a case or motives which cannot bear the light of day. At the Conference, as among statesmen generally, it was admitted that cases may arise which are deemed of such vital importance that a State will refuse all attempts at arbitration.

In conflicts between nations, just as between capital and labour, it is important not to let the issue continue until passion is aroused and reason silenced. As soon as difficulties arise there ought to be means of conciliation. Later an agreement

and settlement are more difficult, if not out of the question. Hence boards of conciliation are perhaps more necessary than boards of arbitration.

In various respects such a court as that established by The Hague Congress is valuable. It can hear cases and give an impartial judicial decision. Besides actually deciding disputes between nations, it can establish points of law and a body of precedents which will be a guide for States and become a substantial part of international law.

338. The jealousy with which the sovereignty of the State was guarded is an ominous sign of the times. So diverse are the States represented in respect to authority and government that there was no hope of agreement regarding State sovereignty. Yet, a frank and full definition of this sovereignty is indispensable for future progress. An insistence on the notion that a State is as sovereign in its external as in its internal relations puts aside all hope of arbitrating international affairs. Consistency requires the admission that the Conference was based on the theory that in international relations an international decision is required; that these relations lie in a sphere outside of the realm of national sovereignty. Beyond the boundaries of the State, great, even vital, interests exist; but these affect others, and are, therefore, in their sphere likewise. For a State to claim the sovereignty where others have an equal or even greater claim to sovereignty, as shown above, is absurd. A State is sovereign in deciding to take part in an international congress; but it yields its sovereignty as soon as it decides to submit unconditionally to the acts of the convention. For this reason, in order to maintain its sovereignty, a State accepts or rejects the resolutions passed by the congress. It is thus clear that the Conference at The Hague guarded the sovereignty of the States by submitting everything to them for final decision. But the logic thus followed makes a court of arbitration, with the power of a final

decision, impossible. A State is sovereign in appealing to such a court; but the appeal ends its sovereignty—it has no voice in the decision made for it. The free choice of arbitration by the State is a surrender of its sovereignty in the points to be arbitrated.

There is no hope that arbitration will become general for the settlement of international disputes so long as the old fiction of the sovereignty of a State in foreign affairs is adhered to. The principle involved in arbitration must be recognised in order to make arbitration effective, namely, that there are spheres in which no State is sovereign, but that in these the sovereignty resides in several States, or is international. In sociology this principle is perfectly clear, and equally so wherever false politics is superseded by reason, and bigoted nationalism by a true internationalism.

How did the State obtain international sovereignty? The people who organise the State can give it authority only respecting themselves and internal affairs. Whatever political course may be pursued, sociology can recognise the sovereignty of the State as commensurate only with the authority of those who confer the sovereignty. Outside of this all sovereignty is a usurpation which is perpetuated by traditionalism, by fictions, and by might.

If the United States is sovereign in respect to the Alabama Claims, then it is the business of the United States to exercise its sovereignty in settling the claims in its own way. If England is sovereign respecting those claims, then England is in duty bound to exercise its sovereignty in settling those claims. But it is absurd for both to be equally sovereign respecting the same thing. When both Powers submit the question to a third party for settlement, say to a court of arbitration, each admits that it has not the sovereignty in the matter.

The Conference consisted of representatives of States,

and there was no danger that it would interfere with the sovereignty of States in the management of their internal, or what were termed their political, affairs. The statements made so often and emphatically respecting the duty of guarding the sovereignty of the State must therefore refer to their external relations. The question is, whether the State is sovereign in determining its relations and conduct within the society of nations. For the present, as well as for the future, a definite and positive answer is required. Numerous utterances at The Hague imply that even in international affairs the State is the ultimate appeal. In that case, what rights has the society of nations? Does not the State usurp these rights? The society of nations, which really exists but lacks formal organisation and recognition, is the true sovereign in international affairs.

The independence of States, so vitally connected with their sovereignty, is equally in need of definition. If in a society of nations a State is independent in the sense of not being bound by other States, then the society of nations is a misnomer. In this society, just as in the case of an individual in society, each State is free and yet bound, independent in some respects and dependent in others; and it is necessary to determine definitely the spheres of dependence and independence. (Appendix K, Sovereignty of the State at The Hague Congress.)

339. The Conference took into account the fact that, aside from arbitration, nations can, in various ways, aid each other in the settlement of disputes. A State friendly to the disputants may offer its services to both for the purpose of finding a solution of the problems involved; or each of the disputants may select another Power to act as its agent, just as individuals who are about to challenge each other, or have already challenged, can refer the whole case to seconds. The seconds, after investigation, can determine whether the honour of the parties

involved requires a duel or whether some way of reconciliation can be found. National disputants can also submit to a third party those questions which disinterested and impartial judges can settle better than the parties immediately involved. In numerous ways nations may help one another by offering their friendly services. They can investigate questions of dispute and give advice concerning them; they can mediate or arbitrate between States in which conflicts have actually arisen or are imminent.

340. Without overestimating the immediate and positive results of the Conference, we are warranted in regarding it as marking a real advance of the nations in their efforts for peace. The public being the open forum which will increasingly discuss national and international questions, much may be expected from the growing aversion to war among the people. The power of education in this respect has already been considered. The time has come when the most advanced States will hesitate to rush into a war which the people oppose.

An advantage has been gained by the fact that the cumulative processes which culminate in war are understood better than formerly. An irreconcilable conflict and the ignorance or baseness of politicians who advocate war and inflame the passions of the people are known not to be the only causes which lead to hostilities. The Governments, no less than the citizens, are greatly influenced by the marvellous power of the press. In questions of peace and war the sovereignty of the press may be more potent than that of a monarch. When ruled by base motives it may practically force the Government into war through the popular clamour aroused by appeals to the prejudice, hatred, and passion of a multitude controlled as little by reason as by conscience. This dangerous incentive to war is now recognised, and one of the strongest peace movements of Europe lays special stress

on the importance of the tone of the press in respect to foreign affairs. Especially does the sensational press require attention, which promotes the war fever for the sake of popularity and the increase of its circulation. Instead of a calm, judicial investigation of all the facts for the sake of discovering the truth, falsehoods and garbled statements are spread to excite the people to frenzy. Popular fury outruns the slow processes of diplomacy and the calm deliberations of government. The press and a misguided public opinion thus declare war before the authorities have time to act. It sometimes happens that the fiercest denunciations of war are followed by a frantic insistence on revenge, bloodshed, and conquest. The results are inevitable when the men in power are ignorant or disregardful of international relations and laws, and when, instead of directing public opinion, they are the puppets with which the popular fancy plays.

During a residence of seventeen years in Europe I had abundant opportunity of learning the ignorance of Europeans respecting America. The American people and their institutions were judged according to one-sided reports, often caricatures, in the press. This is true both of conservatives and liberals on the Continent and in England. The English are thought to know America better than other Europeans; but their ignorance respecting the United States during the Civil War became as notorious as it was astounding. On the other hand, the American press and American politicians have frequently returned with interest both the ignorance and the prejudice. European politics, religions, and general social conditions are often grossly misrepresented. Even the European nations misrepresent and malign each other. The relations between England, France, Germany, and Russia may be such that they cannot understand one another or do each other justice. This situation is a reproach to civilisation as well as a constant danger to peace.

Mr. Hodgson Pratt, one of the most efficient leaders in

European peace movements, travelled extensively for the purpose of discovering the modern causes of war and the means for their removal. He concluded that peace can best be promoted by a change in the character and tone of the press. So long as it treats jingoism as patriotism, insists on the supremacy of the country or a party, whether right or wrong, and systematically maligns foreign peoples and governments there is no hope of permanent peace. All the facts respecting foreign nations are required in order to form a correct estimate of them; but how can the public obtain the facts about a distant nation whose language, religion, history, traditions, and government are all foreign?

341. From the prominence of economic questions it is natural to expect them to be fundamental in many of the international considerations. Race and religion still exert an influence in uniting and dividing peoples, but they have lost much of their former power. The Anglo-Saxon nations are drawn together by the blood tie; similarity of interests seems, however, to be stronger; and when interests clash the blood tie does not prevent intense animosity. In spite of Pan-Slavism with its plea for the union of all Slavs, and in spite of the tie between the Latin peoples, and between those of Teutonic origin, we find that Teutons and Latins, the Slavs and the French, form alliances regardless of race. A religious war does not seem probable, though reports are sometimes spread about the combination of Mohammedans against Christianity. There has been racial as well as national evolution—a united Germany and Italy, and the racial feeling in Ireland, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia bear witness to the fact. This can be regarded as a survival of the consanguine era; but it has a basis in reason as well as in nature. Other interests have, however, increased in dominance, so that geographical position, agricultural and industrial relations, culture, and a community of aims are becoming the controlling factors.

Now, and for some time to come, the questions of feeding and housing the people, of rewarding capital, and giving a competent wage to labourers, of meeting the interest on the debt and enormous expenses of States, must give unusual prominence to material considerations as the basis of international agreement. The great struggle for life and economic welfare easily takes on the semblance of political necessity. There is thus a reason for the earth-hunger of nations, aside from inordinate greed and lust for power. Colonisation, now so important a factor in international relations, may be an outlet for surplus population, as well as providing a market for home products. Economic pursuits are complicated by the fact that peoples with a lower standard of life compete with those of a higher for the control of the world-market; and it is impossible to foresee what consequences to the Western nations will follow when the Chinese and similar peoples attain greater industrial advantages and a better commerce.

The diplomatic and martial influence of the enlightened nations aims to secure the control of less advanced peoples chiefly for economic reasons. The dominant power is now with the Western States, Europe and America, especially the United States, England, Germany, Russia, and France. For self-protection some of the States of Europe may think it expedient to combine against Russia. National power is constantly shifting, and the present centres of strength are by no means assured for the future. But now the responsibility of determining the character of the international relations depends mainly on six or seven nations. An understanding among them means the control of the world, and therefore is naturally one of the first aims of diplomacy. The smaller States of Europe and America are overshadowed by the greater nations, perhaps are dependent on them. The destinies of Asia and Africa are largely in the hands of the Anglo-

Saxon, Slavic, and Latin peoples. The main problem respecting Asia and Africa seems to be which State, or combination of States, shall gain the ascendancy over them or over particular parts.

Whether they have held their own or not, whether temporarily or permanently, the *relative* power of Austria, Spain, and France has waned, while that of the United States, Germany, Russia, and Italy has grown. To increase the power gained, to regain lost prestige, to extend dominion over weaker States, are among the prevailing national ambitions. Strong as are the grounds for co-operation in certain great movements, numerous elements of conflict also exist. Causes for jealousy, rivalry, and hostility abound in foreign as well as in home fields. It is significant that nations are especially intent on developing their navies. Great conflicts are expected in remote parts. Concentration may henceforth mean strength, while the necessity of defending extensive remote possessions may prove an element of weakness.

The less enlightened nations are not without influence on those which dominate them. Whatever influence the Western nations gain over India and China, these seven hundred millions or more will remain Asiatic and Oriental. As they become enlightened and add to their existing advantages, the lessons learned from the West in respect to the industries, military equipment, diplomacy, education, and organisation will teach them to become their own masters and take their place as independent States in the society of nations. It is probable that the most vigorous evolution is to be expected from the peoples left in the rear, but in contact with the most advanced civilisations. No imagination can picture the future; no prophet can foretell that the greatest American nation will always be in the north, and that Europe will continue to be superior to Asia, Africa, and Australia. Not in the developed, and perhaps exhausted, but in the unde-

veloped resources lies the condition for future greatness. These considerations heighten the importance of the international relations, but at the same time reveal their difficulties and uncertainties.

Here is a maze in which the wisest statesman is at times sure to be lost. Insight and foresight are equally in demand, and both extremely liable to err. States are international for State reasons, but State reasons clash; and subordinate peoples may come to the front with State reasons which they can back with force. These facts argue for the assertion and prevalence of interstate reasons in interstate affairs.

Why are nations so intent on opposing a State which makes unusual gains in power? The equilibrium is endangered. They realise that the growth of national strength may mean growth in selfishness, arrogance, and oppression. States seem to trust each other only so far as they can manage or cope with one another. It would be different if in international relations organisation prevailed instead of anarchism. Then the strength of each State would give strength to the international concert and be hailed with joy.

342. Evolution has not proceeded far enough to render a world-organisation possible at present. Nor can an organisation be looked for at once which will cover all the elements of international relationship. But a union of some States in respect to certain common interests is actually taking place, and will, no doubt, increase. Such agreement in order to be lasting must be on the basis of respect for each other's rights and of the abandonment of false claims. Union on a few points will strengthen the conviction that what is common to the nations is greater than was expected, and that in this common realm the sovereignty is shared by all. This collective sovereignty makes impossible the unconditional sovereignty claimed by ancient Assyria, Persia, Macedonia, and Rome, involving an outer as well as an inner *imperium*.

Certain spheres of interest exist which form a natural bond of union between nations and point to practical international groupings. There is a cultural sphere which embraces a large part of Europe, America, and Australia. The strongest reasons for union would be discovered if the cultural forces were made dominant. Ties which ought to be indissoluble exist between the Christian nations. Many economic interests require international co-operation. Is it not strange that war, the greatest waster and destroyer, should be resorted to for the promotion of material interests? State reason itself points to the spheres of mutual interest as the basis of union. What can more concern a State than peace, with the development of the industries and commerce and culture? In proportion to the nature and number of the common interests may we expect a growth in the union of States, the basis of the union always being the factors held in common by the States. Sometimes two or three States, sometimes a group of States, will be united, as France and Russia, Germany, Austria, and Italy, or the Holy Alliance, or the Concert of European Powers. In Oriental questions the leading Christian nations may unite, as lately respecting the Chinese rebellion.

Some points involve the welfare of nations without affecting their political interests or raising questions which are liable to lead to conflict. Sanitation is of this character, such as preventing the spread of contagious diseases. Medical discoveries have a universal significance. The same is true of inventions, education, and moral reform. Here is a large sphere of prime importance in which co-operation is not only possible but in a measure already realised. In respect to statistics, industrial advancement, the enactment of laws for the protection and insurance of labourers, nations can be helpful to each other and at the same time promote the cause of humanity. Material objects are subject to the limitation that

their possession by one means the exclusion of others from their possession; but truth, knowledge, all that pertains to intellect can be communicated, and shared by others, without loss to the original possessor.

Some questions which present serious international problems deserve special study for the purpose of understanding the situation. The equilibrium of the European Powers is an object of so much concern because it is feared that the balance of power may be disturbed if any State receives much addition to its strength. Turkey is a perpetual source of danger. Its Asiatic civilisation, its Mohammedanism, and its treatment of Christian subjects, especially the Armenians, seem to unfit it for Europe and cause much irritation. But how to get rid of the Turkish dominion is a problem which has thus far proved unsolvable. What is called "The Testament of Peter the Great," the inheritance from that monarch to his country, means that Russia is to gain possession of Constantinople. But this would increase still more the already dreaded power of the Muscovite and, allied with France, give to Russia the preponderating influence on the Mediterranean and new Oriental might through the control of the Suez Canal. While the Powers are not prepared to submit to this, Russia, on the other hand, would not permit any other State to control Turkey. This country is, accordingly, eagerly watched by the whole of Europe, and yet at times defies all the Powers, because its preservation seems necessary in order to maintain peace. The jealousy of the nations is such that the outbreak of hostilities between any two States might occasion a general European war. No doubt secret understandings exist between nations which will become public when war breaks out. Then, also, new combinations will be made as demanded by interest and safety.

The map of Europe is, in all probability, not settled, perhaps not even for the near future. It is doubtful whether Austria-Hungary can be held together. Were Austria, which is German, to become a part of Germany, the German Empire would stretch from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. A new

empire might then be formed from the States between Germany and Russia. Were Germany itself to become a Mediterranean power it might consent to let Russia have Constantinople. Then the continent of Europe and the Mediterranean, with the Suez Canal, might be dominated by these two countries. Other combinations are, however, possible which might frustrate this plan. A union of Latin peoples in the west and southwest, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, may some day be feasible. Any of these combinations, with the aid of England and the smaller States, might gain the ascendancy in European politics.

The Teutonic, the Slavic, and the Latin peoples of Europe are nearly equal, the first being the most and the last the least numerous. This presents an interesting problem respecting combinations on a racial or consanguine basis. These peoples also represent the three great Christian religions, the Protestant, the Greek, and the Catholic, as well as three great families of language.

343. Leaving future combinations to the future, it is evident that for the present the dominion of the world belongs to the Christian nations. They are in the van in intellectual, moral, and material progress, have the most powerful armies and navies, and control most of the world's commerce; their prestige is unrivalled; they make the international law and preside in the councils of states. Their dominion is felt in Africa, Asia, and Australia, and no heathen land or savage tribe is beyond the reach of their aggressive power. It is, therefore, to the principles and course of these nations that we must look for indications of what the next move in internationalism will be. With the materialistic trend of the age, we are prepared to find that in the nominally Christian nations the religious and ethical principles are largely subordinated to national greed, selfishness, and rapacity. Not a nation exists in whose ethical and humane principles other States have confidence if these principles clash with national

egoism. But it is being gradually recognised that in the sphere of interest ethical considerations are eventually the best policy. Even through the evolution effected by enmity and bloodshed the international interests will more and more gain the ascendancy over the selfish dominance of national affairs.

Federations of Christian nations are most demanded by States connected geographically, by mutual interests, and by culture. With the sovereignty in internal affairs guaranteed, a sphere for co-operation in international relations might be agreed upon. The federation would not be a new state or an empire of states, but could be a union for discussion, counsel, and co-operation, so far as required by their mutual interests.

To some degree models for such a combination can be found in the United States and the German Empire. In these countries each State is sovereign in the management of its internal affairs, has its own ruler, legislature, and courts, and is guarded by the Constitution in the exercise of its rights. To the union of these States belong all the matters of a general character, such as pertain to all the States. The particular and general spheres are so definitely marked that conflicts are not likely to occur, or, if they do occur, they can be settled by the properly constituted authorities. Unions like these, of course, imply a friendly feeling, a disposition to co-operate, and a proper regard alike for the peculiarities of each and the welfare of the totality. A federation of nations on a similar basis would need no permanent president; a temporary presiding officer, taken in succession from the nations represented, would suffice. A permanent congress, to meet at stated times, or when occasion demands, could be established, with delegates from the respective Powers. The sphere of the deliberations would have to be clearly defined. The delegates, acting strictly under the instructions of their Governments, could propose the questions

submitted to them by their States. Even if the power of the congress were only deliberative, without adopting resolutions, or if the resolutions adopted were submitted to the States for final action, the results in promoting understanding and conciliation might be invaluable. False impressions could be removed by a frank interchange of views, also prejudices and mistaken grounds of irritation. If on certain points immediate agreement is out of the question, each nation could formulate its own views and present them for consideration to the others. Laying no claim to final authority, unless endowed with it by the nations, the congress would have an educational and moral, instead of a legal, influence. In this way it would accomplish the very thing now most needed, and prepare the way for a more effective form of organisation. In this as in other spheres, the process of evolution will lead from initiatory to more perfect forms.

The possibilities of such a federation can, of course, be tested only by experiment; but they seem to be great. The congresses now called meet after too great intervals, and only for special purposes. When they close there is no guarantee that their decrees will be enforced. With a permanent congress established, the previous agreements would be more likely to be retained, they would, at least, be kept before the nations and their violation become more difficult and more dangerous than at present. Another fact is to be considered. In the ordinary diplomatic relations one nation deals with another nation. But how is it with international affairs which equally concern a number of nations? They are not submitted to an international body to which they belong, but are left to be settled as best they can by ambassadors sent from one nation to another. Two powerful States may now settle through their ambassadors affairs which belong to a number of States. This difficulty would be overcome by the federal congress suggested above.

This seems to be the natural course of evolution: first, a federation of nations having most in common; then, a federation of all the nations which have relations which require regulation; finally, a federation of all the States of the world. With Mohammedan and heathen nations, being on a different and lower plane of culture, the Christian peoples cannot sustain the same relations as those which exist between European and American States.

A federation of nations on a truly international basis presupposes the educational work mentioned in a previous paragraph. Every consideration leads to the conclusion that international education is the way to right relations between nations. The education of the people in this respect is essential on account of the power actually lodged in them and the appeals made to them. From them impulses must come which shall prove to States that a disregard for each other on account of selfishness is despicable. History in proportion as it becomes general will condemn a statesmanship which is limited by national considerations, and therefore unjust in foreign relations. The knowledge, the sentiments, the spirit, and the purpose of States must be changed. Diplomacy now expresses the will of States; and a change in diplomacy involves a change in this will. This reveals the enormous difficulty of the task. No federation or congress can rise above its source. With selfishness as its basis, a federation of a few States can be as unjust and cruel to States not in the federation as States are when not federated.

Heretofore alliances between States have been formed by rulers without sufficient regard to the wishes of the people. International agreements made by republics of course take more account of the people, in whom the sovereignty resides. In Europe, however, the people have been too much ignored in the making of international agreements. The Holy Alliance, formed in Paris, September, 1815, by the rulers of Russia, Austria, and

Prussia, was intended to check the effects of the French Revolution in the emancipation of the people. Its articles were presented to all the Powers of Europe, except Turkey and the Pope. The former could not enter into a Christian agreement; and the latter was supposed to claim a dominion in religious affairs similar to that of the Middle Ages, and so some States objected to presenting the articles to him for signature. Every other European power, England excepted, signed the agreement. The aim was an offensive and defensive alliance on the general basis of Christianity, the Greek, Catholic, and Protestant peoples of Europe being regarded as one family with sufficient harmony of religious principles to form a compact and effective union. With all that was grand in the conception, the defects were too glaring to make it a success. The people were opposed to it because it was aimed at their freedom, and the time had come when the people had to be reckoned with. The so-called Holy Alliance was in conflict with their aspirations. Besides, each monarch sought to prevent religious manifestations in his State as he saw fit. The Alliance died, as it deserved, a natural death.

An account of the Holy Alliance is given in Bluntschli's *Staatswoerterbuch*, article "Allianz, heilige."

Valuable lessons respecting the formation of a union of States are taught by the origin of the United States. When the thirteen colonies formed the United States, the sovereignty in federal matters had to be consigned by the separate States to the Union. This was a difficult point, and the framers of the Constitution had to take it into account. As it was, there were serious fears that their work would be rejected by the people. Some wanted to make still further claims for the Union; but Edmund Randolph said: "Perhaps nothing better could be obtained, from the jealousy of the States with regard to their sovereignty." The States had to make sacrifices for the sake of the Union. Rhode Island wanted to make its fiat

money equal to gold and silver; New York had the most lucrative custom-house; but the Constitution gave the revenues and the making of the money standard to the Federation. "Virginia owned a vast territory which she must cede that it might become the public lands of the United States." (Chief-Justice Nott, in *The Nineteenth Century*, p. 6.) The privilege of entering the Union meant that the States must surrender to it a part of their sovereignty. But each thus shared the benefit conferred on the whole.

Sir Travers Twiss thinks that the Congress of Vienna, 1815, may "be regarded as the keystone of the arch, upon which the political branch of the modern international jurisprudence rested for nearly half a century without the disturbance of its equilibrium, that branch of international jurisprudence which has been defined by the great Austrian statesman who presided over the Congress, as the science which is conversant with the vital interests of States, for, inasmuch as an isolated State no longer exists except in the abstractions of a miscalled philosophy, we must always keep in view the society of nations as the essential condition of the present world. It results, accordingly, that each State, besides its special interests, has also interests which are common to it with other States, either collectively or in particular groups. The great axioms of political science proceed upon the knowledge of the true political interests of the general body of States, and history teaches us that whenever the special interests of a State come in conflict with its general interests, and the latter are neglected or made subordinate to selfish considerations, this fact gives rise to an abnormal and unhealthy condition of political life, the unchecked development of which leads to the decline of the State, and may ultimately cause it to lose its place in the family of nations. . . . A characteristic feature of the modern world, which distinguishes it from the ancient world, is the tendency of nations to draw near to one another, and, after a certain manner, to enter into a social league, which rests upon the same basis with the great human society developed in the bosom of Christianity."—In an address before the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1879.

344. The trend is unmistakable. Our investigation fully justifies the claim that a new epoch, the international, has been inaugurated. Perpetual peace is likely to remain a dream for a long time. Wars are apt to be continued in proportion as their horrors receive the gloss of civilisation. No apology can make the slaughter of a battle-field humane. War is always "hell" and develops the devil in man. The best way to make war detestable and intolerable is to expose its brutality to the utmost publicity. The prevention of the use of certain explosives and of other means of speedy and cruel destruction is of doubtful value. When the utmost certainty and horribleness of the messengers of death are attained, the time may come when no mortal will be ready to face them. War may yet become so terrible that to enter it will be as rational as to fight an earthquake or a volcano.

There is not much hope from peace societies which occupy a false position. With present conditions wars are the logic of the situation and therefore inevitable. The strongest hope is in the change of States, in an increase of international power, and in the removal of the conditions and causes of war. So long as States remain unchanged a peace may be rotten and war the most sacred duty. Nor is it consistent to denounce Governments for engaging in war when the impulse to do so comes from the sovereign people. Equally absurd is it to denounce tyrants for imposing heavy taxes on the people in order to maintain a standing army, when the real tyrant, if the army is not a necessity, is the people who vote and pay the taxes. (Appendix L.)

345. It is not our province here to inquire whether the international era will be the last in social evolution. We adhere too closely to reality to indulge in prophecies, and leave to sociological ethics the consideration of what ought to be. But sociology seeks to apprehend, as we have seen, humanity in its associated capacity. It has a

concern for peoples not included in states, as well as for those who are controlled by political institutions. The sociologist cannot regard as final any organisation which fails to include the whole human family. What shall be done with savage tribes which have no State, but are still on the kinship basis? Alliances may not be possible with them or even deemed necessary or desirable. The States are apportioning the world among themselves, without troubling the uncivilised peoples to express their preferences. The time is past when a savage people can be isolated or determine its course of evolution. All the savages are rapidly being absorbed by the States, and long before the international era has completed its course there are not likely to be any people left who are not included in, or subjected to, some State. The only benevolence exercised may consist in appropriating the lands of the savages and in subjecting the native owners of the soil. By ignoring the principles of ethics and of humanity in such forcible appropriation or robbery, a State may be true to its character, but not to the most advanced thought of the day.

The State as a human institution with a cultural mission will recognise the rights of helpless savages no less than those of a State which has the might to defend its rights.

Some years ago I coined *supernational* and *supernationalism*, in order to obtain a designation for such factors as transcend both the State and internationalism. These words have found their way into dictionaries and contain a valuable idea. Certain interests are not confined to the State and therefore not involved in the idea of internationalism. They existed before States arose, are found among savages without political institutions, and therefore do not depend on the recognition given by the State. The old Roman law tried to comprehend them under the terms *jus naturæ* and *jus gentium*, that is, a law which

inheres in nature itself and belongs to all persons, whether or not it is embraced in a legal code. There are human ideals that no State embodies, and which, therefore, can have no international being; so there are ethical principles which transcend the character of the State. Frequently the term "higher law" is used for principles beyond those which the State adopts. All rational, sociological, humane, and ethical principles or ideals which pertain to man as man, but still fail of political recognition, are designated by the term "supernational." The idea of supernationalism thus rises far above the ordinary views of States and the poverty of the existing internationalism. Men owe each other duties as men, duties imperfectly expressed by laws. Hence, what is legal is not the measure of the ethical. Political and international forces may mean mendacity, baseness, using diabolical means for the destruction of inferior peoples, such as alcohol, opium, war; supernationalism is altruistic. Internationalism is confined to peoples within States; supernationalism includes every human being. Owing to the low character and exclusiveness so common to nationalism and even internationalism, a term is needed which includes the highest objects and most exalted aims of humanity. Supernationalism stands for the supreme sociological, ethical, and altruistic problems of the human mind.

Political theories are sometimes advanced respecting the rights of savages which, in practice, are generally ignored, perhaps even by the nation professing to hold them. At the African Conference in Berlin, Mr. Kasson, the plenipotentiary of the United States, while agreeing in general with the action taken in reference to the African peoples, proposed at the meeting held on January 31, 1885, that the following declaration be added to the protocol: "Modern international law follows closely a line which leads to the recognition of the right of

native tribes to dispose freely of themselves and their hereditary territory. In conformity with this principle my government would gladly adhere to a more extended rule, to be based on a principle which should aim at the voluntary consent of the natives whose country is taken possession of in all cases where they had not provoked the aggression." The principle might have hope of practical recognition did not civilised people appropriate the lands and inhabitants of uncivilised peoples for selfish ends instead of the good of the natives. If a civilised people, it being the judge of the propriety of the act, has a right to make such appropriation, why should not any other people, following this example, it being the judge, make the same claim?

346. In closing our account of social evolution we are struck with certain factors running through the entire process and constituting the law of the movement. Conditions are given amid which the generations are placed; to these conditions each generation adapts itself as best it can. The conditions change, and with them the adaptations. At first the natural conditions so prevail as to make them the determining factors; in them rather than in human reason is found the logic of the evolution. Later, as reflection gains, social considerations rise above the biological conditions and institute a new order of evolution. Man himself now, by apprehending the meaning and requirement of things, by learning what they demand and by meeting those demands, more and more determines his relation to things, instead of being determined by things. He emancipates himself, masters his situation, and thus becomes master of his course. The change wrought is a mighty one. Formerly he was adapted to things, now he adapts things to himself. Nature, which was once his master, now becomes his servant.

The State involves so many difficulties, not only because its relations are so complex, but also because nature does not determine its course. This is done by rational

insight, by apprehending the situation and meeting its requirements. More difficult still are the international relations. They are larger, more remote from the usual considerations of statesmen, and involve more comprehensive interests. The immediate environment of the citizens is the State, which therefore is more constantly thrust on their attention. What an enlargement of conception is involved in rising from the State to the society of nations! Much in this society is not only foreign, but also exceedingly difficult of apprehension. To master it requires a great effort of thought. The foreign relations are not only larger than those of the State, more complex and more remote, but also less palpable. Only by a gradual process does one pass from the consideration of the family to the State and then to the society of nations and humanity. Only as reason develops and enlarges its grasp can the international relations and requirements receive due attention. The reality is not transcended and the realm of the ideal entered; but thought grasps the larger reality and fathoms its social demands.

It is thus evident what kind of mind must be looked to for the development of the third era. In it things will regulate themselves less than in the first era or even the second. It is a problem whether even rulers and statesmen can be exalted to this enlarged conception and meet its requirements. Can it be expected of the people as a body? The demand being clearly before us, we at least know what end is to be sought. An international organisation must be preceded by the dominance of reason and ethics. That society is not seen, but thought, becomes especially striking when we consider the society of nations. The international relations do not appeal to the senses, but a conception of them is possible.

Not only is organisation required that international order may emerge from chaos, but the largest and highest organisation. Just as in politics we have an art from

which political science has been developed, so we need an evolution of international art from which to develop the international science. From the time of Aristotle many of the highest intellectual efforts have been concentrated on the State. Political history and political science prove that the achievements of able men in noble causes have been great. Perhaps the fear of endangering the welfare of millions sometimes kept them from reaching the ethical principles of morality prevalent in their own age. They may have failed from no fault of their own, but from the lack of existing international organisation. The time has come when the soul of nations is being organised into unity, and it will form a body through which to give an adequate expression of itself. The State cannot remain self-centred while its societies—religious, ethical, educational, philosophical, scientific, medical, æsthetic, and economic—receive and exert international influences.

347. The persons who are expected to be leaders in the development of a healthy internationalism are, besides rulers and diplomats and statesmen, specialists, professors, and students in international law, sociology, and ethics. The subject will be promoted by all considerations which take into account the interrelation and interaction of States, the basis of peace and the causes of war, and the general interest and progress of humanity. Much hope is centred on the individuals and societies which make an effort to codify, develop, and spread a knowledge of international law. The times are so eloquent in their demand of a more complete federation of nations and fuller development of their relations, that every deeper study of the larger interests and tendencies of the age will help the cause. Indeed, whoever reads aright the signs of the times and attempts to meet their demands will work for the realisation of the federation of States on the basis of the independence and sover-

eignty of each in its own affairs, and its correlation to all other States on the principles of justice and humanity. A narrow patriotism is, in many cases, yielding to a passion for humanity which involves the highest interest of each State and, by concentrating the attention on its legitimate affairs, will enable it to promote the best welfare of its citizens and the righteousness of the nations.

348. The character of the work to be accomplished explains why this chapter lays so much stress on education in international affairs and ethics and sociology as the precursor and principal preparation for the development of the third era. A knowledge of the consanguine, the political, the international, and the human relations should constitute a part of every liberal education. What is social should be comprehended in its remote as well as nearer bearings. A special work devolves on the higher schools of learning in removing the lamentable ignorance respecting the character, the contents, and the interrelation of States. The actual condition of States and an analysis of their contents are required for an intelligent theory of their synthesis into a federation. Such an epitome of the nations, giving their general and most important characteristics, is possible. It would give the substance of the present status of the human family, than which hardly any knowledge could be more valuable. A strict adherence to reality requires that the attainments already made by evolution be taken as the basis for further advance. The history of international relations, as contained in the diplomacy of the individual States, and in conventions of States, and, in fact, in all the dealings of States with one another, is of first importance. This history shows what advances have been made, while a study of the present condition reveals what is still needed. Specialists recognise the great importance of the codification of international law. The development of this law has not, by any means, been systematic, but

the results are cumulative. The material is vast, difficult to master, and will rapidly increase in amount and complexity.

Codification means classification and simplification. Without this it will be impossible to make clear to nations and students what international agreements have been entered into and what obligations rest on States. A system of international ethics has long been in process of evolution, but the details are in too chaotic a form to present a consistent totality. This system is a mirror of the true greatness of States and statesmen, but its application also reveals the perfidy of nations in disregarding and violating treaties. With the international law, so far as evolved, clearly before them, the nations will find many problems, which now perplex them, settled, and may learn to be less ready to make an appeal to arms the first resort in conflicts. We have reason to expect from present studies and movements that the State, as a commonwealth of the citizens, will lose none of its prerogatives by accepting its proper place in the world as the commonwealth of humanity.

The international, as stated above, is not to supersede the political era, except so far as the political usurps international functions. With both spheres properly correlated, we expect the political and international factors to co-operate, so that the evolution of each will promote that of the other. The State is no more superseded by internationalism than the family was superseded by the State when the political era was inaugurated. From the kinship organisation social evolution passes to the State as involving a larger sphere of interests, and from the State it passes to internationalism as involving greater interests and a larger association.

The preceding discussion does not imply a depreciation of national characteristics and achievements. Many of the peculiarities of peoples are among the greatest

products of culture. Each great nation of our day has evolved types which are valuable and ought to be conserved. This kind of national evolution will not be interfered with by a healthy internationalism. By properly correlating the States this national development will be rendered more effective by diffusing its typical advantages so as to make them a leaven to other peoples. Heretofore the imparting of national achievements to other States has been too much delayed till the decay of States. Greece and Rome had to be destroyed before their streams of culture fertilised to any great extent other nations. Has not the time come when the life of a people can be made a greater boon to humanity than its death?

THIRD DIVISION
SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS

CHAPTER XXIII

NATURE AND AIM OF SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS

349. A significant revelation of the present status of sociology is found in the fact that a justification of sociological ethics is required. The basis on which the social science has usually rested excluded ethical considerations. By reducing sociology to physical or cosmical law, or regarding it as an integral part of biology, the social processes must be treated as the product of blind and irresistible forces of nature. Society, robbed of everything distinctively human, has no room for ethics. The wonder is, that under these circumstances sociology should be viewed as a human science. Our subject has likewise been dominated by the theory that the inquiry must be limited to what exists or has existed, to facts, namely, and that this rules out the great and difficult problems of what ought to be. Comte had a place for social prevision, but made no provision for sociological ethics. As if what must be has meaning for science, while what ought to be lies outside of its sphere! His theory of prevision is now abandoned and likely to be superseded by sociological ethics, for which he had no room. Throughout his works, however, we find many discussions of what ought to be, an inconsistency quite common with those who reject ethics from their sociology and yet cannot do without ethics. Mr. Herbert Spencer furnishes interesting illustrations how indispensable ethics is for sociology, in his discussion of such subjects as individualism and socialism, militarism and industrialism. If desultory remarks on

ethics can be scattered through a treatise purporting to be scientific, a more systematic attempt may be justifiable.

The conception of the social science underlying that method which excludes ethical inquiries is itself false. We are dealing with a human and not a natural science, or with natural science only so far as it enters into social relations; and the objects discussed must be treated according to their relation to humanity and from a human standpoint. There is the more hope for sociological ethics now, since a deeper and broader, and therefore more rational, conception of human affairs is taking the place of a social mechanism which is dogmatic in proportion as it is irrational.

Until my *Introduction* appeared sociological ethics had never been treated as an integral part of sociology. The reasons for its inclusion are there given at length in Chapter vii.

The materialistic interpretation of the universe is a species of metaphysics which never had a claim to science and now is losing also the faith of scientists. "To-day, at least, the view that the whole universe is in its essence a physical universe and all psychical life but a special manifestation of physical transformation, receives scarcely any recognition in circles paying serious attention to philosophical problems." (*H. Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, p. 4.) The author continues, that the peculiarity of the psychical life is admitted; "the total incomparability of the psychical processes with the physical is regarded as self-evident." At the same time, the author shows that, in spite of this, the claims for the universal application of the method of natural science have not been abandoned. Thus an effort is still made to establish a natural science of the psychical life; and a natural science of psychology is held to be the only scientific psychology. That is, the materialistic theory is pronounced unscientific, but the habits and prejudices engendered by that theory still continue, and from them sociology suffers. Human society cannot be treated as a natural science and yet is to be subjected to the method of natural science.

Numerous authors have shown that science is not limited to natural science. The author just mentioned gives a summary of his views on the subject in an address: "Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft." In the volume quoted above he discusses the limits of natural science.

The materialistic conception tended to minimise the psychical factors, particularly the highest, such as reason and conscience. Theories of evolution have even attempted to eliminate the peculiarly human element from ethics, religion, and history. It has been denied that human purpose has anything to do with these. "Something thinks in man" it has been said; and so man's thinking in society has likewise been made impersonal. The highest social products have consequently been pronounced physical products, *productum naturæ*. But one example, which might be indefinitely multiplied: "When Darwin announced his theory of the struggle for existence, Professor Schleicher, of Prague, the eminent philologist, declared that language lives quite independently in us, that we can exert no influence upon it, and that languages struggle for existence the same as men and other organic beings." (S. Bodnar, *Mikrokosmos*, vol. i., p. 28.) Numerous proofs are given by the Hungarian professor just quoted of the trend from a narrow naturalism to idealism. If what is to be will be, whatever human conduct may be, then, of course, there is no room for sociological ethics.

350. What ought to be is as legitimate an inquiry of the human mind as the investigation of what actually exists. Violence must be done that mind by emphasising what the senses reveal of the actuality, while the reason is forbidden to apply its demands to that actuality. Indeed, every deeper investigation shows that an inquiry into what society ought to be is but an earnest search after the truth. From the dawn of history, and no doubt from the beginning of human society, ethical considerations have prevailed, moral problems have arisen, and some chosen end has been among the most potent factors

in founding and developing institutions, particularly after the cultural stage was reached. Evolution itself, so far as the embodiment of an intelligent purpose, moves from what is to what is believed to be the *ought*. The bibles of Oriental peoples, the classics of Greece and Rome, and all the literatures of the ages teem with ethical problems. The changes in law, in customs, in religions, are due chiefly to changes in moral perception and moral feeling. Without ethical interpretation it will be impossible to understand either the society of the present or of the past. Such questions as the following have repeatedly agitated society: What should be the relation between the individual and society? What is the function of the family, the State, and the Church? Is slavery justifiable? Is it ever right to tell a lie, to deceive an enemy in war, to violate a civil law? Is a State amenable to the same standard as an individual? So prominent, in fact, are such ethical questions that to dismiss them without inquiry is to abandon the effort to interpret society. And we are warranted in affirming that not until the ethical factor is eliminated from human nature and human society can it properly be eliminated from sociology.

What D. G. Brinton says respecting the historian applies likewise to the sociologist: "The facts of ethnology and the study of racial psychology justify me in formulating this maxim for the guide of the historian: *The conscious and deliberate pursuit of ideal aims is the highest causality in human history.*" Ethical considerations are unquestionably among the most potent causes in social evolution. The same author says: "My assertion is that the chief impulses of nations and peoples are abstract ideas and ideals, unreal and unrealisable; and that it is in pursuit of these that the great as well as the small movements on the arena of national life and on the stage of history have taken place." He quotes William von Humboldt: "The last and highest duty of the historian is to portray the

effort of the idea to attain realisation in fact''; and Lord Acton: "Ideas which in religion and politics are truths, in history are living forces." Brinton writes as an ethnologist, and as such he insists on recognising the great forces at work in society, such as wit, ideas, and ideals. "These are the primary impulses of conscious human endeavour, and it is vain to attempt to understand ethnology or to write history without assigning their consideration the first place in the narration." Society cannot be understood without "the principles of reason, truth, justice, and love," which he emphasises as of supreme importance in ethnology and history.

The quotations are from Brinton's address on "An Ethnologist's View of History."

"No rational being will question that it is the highest duty of science to be a guide to human society on the way of its development."—H. Maier, *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, C. Sigwart gewidmet, p. 222.

The prominence of the ethical factor in society makes the attempt to exclude its special consideration from sociology the more surprising. "It is the moral forces which reign in history. . . . Therefore in the progress of the ethical views the kernel of historical progress in general is found."—D. Schaefer, *Das eigentliche Arbeitsgebiet der Geschichte*, p. 24.

The most inconsistent in excluding ethics are those who regard it as a natural product. They ought to be, if there is an *ought to be* for them, the first to reduce it to scientific treatment, of course making of it, if possible, a natural science.

Dilthey recognises three departments of science: history, natural science, and sciences which express values or what ought to be, which furnish imperatives. The last includes ethics. (*Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, vol. i., p. 33.) He regards the imperatives and ideals which are to guide society as constituting a basis for science as truly as such a basis is furnished by the existing reality. P. 481.

351. Rational inquiries and rational directives, more

prominent now than in former ages, grow with the development of the mind itself. We come to the social evolution of the past with the query, whether there is reason in it; whether some idea is not to be evolved to give meaning and value to the whole process; whether a great moral purpose is not to be attained. An unmeaning process has no interest for reason; in a meaningful one reason wants to discover the meaning. That humanity works its latent forces into actuality is evident; it becomes itself, and in so doing becomes conscious of itself. In this self-elaboration of humanity the ethical factors are of special interest on account of their supreme value. How, now, are these factors to be understood? Sociology must appropriate the results attained by ethics; perhaps it will itself have to specialise on social ethics, in order to accomplish its task. Everywhere the history of man reveals him as moral and as owing to this fact many of his most characteristic qualities. Whatever theories prevail respecting the origin of man and of his morality, it is not possible to be just to his distinctive peculiarities if he is treated as subject only to the same forces as the lower animals. Biological ethics has no more been shown to be human ethics than psychology has been reduced to physiology or genius to mechanical processes.

But besides the demand made for the interpretation of the past, the status attained by reason makes purposive action more prominent than formerly. Ideas impel the will to seek definite ends, and social problems give rise to theories whose realisation is the inspiration of mighty mass-movements. Sociality is becoming more fully conscious of itself and of its ability to shape its own destiny. Besides the revolutionary movements of the masses, thinkers are inquiring into the logic of the situation,—what is desirable, what possible, and how the possible can be realised. What is to be the law of these tendencies? Partisan or class whim and prejudice and pas-

sion, or ethical principles? Sociology rises above party and faction and makes the social totality its object. Its investigation of the social forces leaves no doubt that in society the supremacy belongs to the ethical force. Thus, for past and present interpretation, as well as for future movement, we find sociological ethics a necessity.

Material evolution makes actual whatever is given potentially. Blindly the forces at work push each other on, so that what comes to pass is not due to intelligent human direction or design. Nor can it be questioned that in the past, particularly in lower stages of culture, society has generally been the subject rather than the director of its evolution. Still, human purpose and volition have at no time been wholly absent, though generally more clearly manifested by particular individuals than the masses. In primitive times distinguished individuals may have been more powerful than when the general social level had been elevated. History shows that eminent personalities, profound thinkers, astute statesmen, moral and religious reformers, have worked for definite ends, have enlisted the energies of others for their accomplishment, and given to social evolution a direction such as it would not have taken without their initiative. The recent awakening of intellect and the uprising of the masses are making definite purposive action far more general. So great have the ethical interests of society become that many students regard sociology valuable in proportion as it gives a firm basis for social progress.

352. Many ethical questions lie outside of our sphere. We are obliged to leave to ethics its own great problems and to use its valid results for social study. Unfortunately, heretofore ethics has been considered too exclusively from the individualistic standpoint, so that sociologists may be obliged to develop the sociological side of ethics. We do not propose to consider the moral order of the

universe, the destiny of society, the design inherent in society or somehow imposed upon it, and the *summum bonum* in an absolute sense. Here, as throughout our inquiry, the metaphysical questions do not concern us. It is enough for our purpose that history and experience testify that ethical demands are made by society and act with the force of an unconditional imperative; but their origin must be left to the general science of ethics. Nor is it our province to discuss practical measures for social reformation. We deal with sociological ethics as a science. The principles we discuss are not superinduced on society from without, but, as we shall see immediately, have their origin in society. We are, in fact, warranted in saying that sociological ethics grows directly from the study of society and is a prominent factor in that study.

The theory that ethics depends on a separate and distinct faculty has already been discussed. The conditions for conscience being given, just as for reason, the conscience itself, with the notions of right and wrong, is produced by education and training; it is a synthesis from observation, experience, tradition, and conduct. Character can be viewed both as its source and product; and, like character, whatever the original endowment, conscience is an achievement through the choices and processes of life. Some theories of evolution threaten to obliterate conscience by reducing it to heredity. So much stress is laid on what the ancestors do for a man that what he does for himself, his own responsibility, is overlooked. There are notions of heredity which seem to restore the "innate ideas" which Locke thought he had forever banished from the human mind and in whose actual existence no psychologist believes. We are not born with ideas, whether moral or otherwise, but with the ability to form ideas; they are not a biological, but a psychical, product.

Nature and Aim of Sociological Ethics 205

In *The Social Problem*, Social Problem Publishing Co., York, Pa., I have discussed many of the practical social questions of the day.

353. Ethics as an integral part of sociology cannot be severed from the nature and evolution of society. It is not an artificial product, but springs directly from these two divisions of sociology. In the nature of society certain truths are involved which are the chief source of sociological ethics. We mean this when we affirm that society ought to be true to itself; that truth should prevail in the relation existing between the individual and society, and in the conduct of associations toward one another. Social truth is the highest demand; and, as an ethical demand, it antagonises, as false to truth and duty, the reign of mere whim, caprice, and haphazard. Evolution, in developing what society involves, furnishes the means of testing the social actuality by the principles found to be inherent in the nature of society. If there are private as well as social forces, then an association which absorbs an individual's private as well as social forces enslaves him, and is false to society itself. If the economic force has a particular social function, it becomes a usurper when it leaves this and takes the place of ethics or religion.

The very nature of society thus furnishes criteria for social judgments, because this nature involves ethical principles. So old a thinker as Aristotle throws light on this subject. According to his *Politics*, Book I., the ideal of an object is inherent in the thing itself. In distinction from Plato, with his supermundane sphere as the abode of ideas and ideals, Aristotle finds these in the perfection of objects themselves. In the end of a thing its ideal is realised. This perfection is the true nature of an object, which is only imperfectly foreshadowed in the embryonic stage and all the lower forms. What society is (in idea, according to its true nature) that it is to become. In

Jowett's translation we read: "If the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the State, for it is the end of them, and the (completed) nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family." The perfect State is the only true State. He pronounces the State "the creation of nature," not artificial; in it man, "by nature a political animal," attains the end of his being. Applying this to society in general, we conclude that the ideal or perfection of society is simply the perfect development of its inherent nature. A society not true to its nature would not be perfect, but artificial. So much emphasis is now placed on the interpretation of a thing by its evolution or history, that it is overlooked that the end or ideal may be a valuable aid in interpreting a thing itself and its evolution.

What right has a writer to form an ideal of sociology and work for its realisation if he has no right to form an ideal of the society whose science he constructs? Why need the ideal of society be less scientific than the ideal on which the whole construction of his science depends? Indeed, in proportion as a man's science of society is true will he be able to give the ideal of society.

The problem presented in sociological ethics has analogies in other departments. To be true to its nature, according to the circumstances in which it is placed, is all that can be required of any object. This seems to be the essence of the saying of Democritus: "I have sought myself"; I have sought to become what I am, to be true to myself. He who fully realises his nature attains perfection so far as within reach—*his* perfection. This is the marrow of education—reason is to become truly rational, conscience to be made true conscience. Society is to be normal; that is the social norm. If the idea of the State involves law, order, the welfare of its citizens, then these are the ethical requirements or the ideal. He who limits

his knowledge of the State to mere facts gets only a history of the State; a science of the State involves more—to get at its essence.

“It will be noticed that to idealise a thing is not to falsify it; it is rather to give a vivid impression of what is most essential and true in a thing. We are to remember that the ideal is never properly contrasted with the true, or even with the real, but with the actual.”—C. T. Winchester, *Some Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 134.

Usually the true, the beautiful, and the good are treated as three distinct departments, yet they are in reality but one. The second and third can be reduced to the first, namely, the true. In intellectual apprehension we pronounce true whatever is consistent with itself and harmonises with its idea. A statement which admits of no contradiction is true. Thus, truth pertains to all that admits of the most rigorous intellectual or rational test. Beauty, on the other hand, appeals to the emotions; that is, it is true to the demands of the æsthetic nature. A mathematical problem appeals, perhaps, only to our logical faculty, and then has no æsthetic value, though its value as truth may be absolute. A picture, a drama, a book appeals to the æsthetic faculty in proportion as it meets the demands of taste or is true to these demands. So far as it falls short of this truth it fails to be æsthetic. Goodness is nothing but ethical truth or harmony with the demands of conscience. We can thus consider truth purely intellectual, truth æsthetic or corresponding with the taste, and truth ethical or harmonising with conscience. Hence we can speak of the social ideal as the realisation of the ethical idea involved in the very nature of society, or as a condition in which society is simply true to itself. An ethical society is the only true society.

354. It has been said: “Practical and ethical demands impel us to make the aim or end of things the most prominent, while the scientific point of view places the emphasis on the causes of things.” This would put a marked contrast between the general conceptions which

dominate ethics and science. The quotation, however, overlooks an important factor, namely, that in human affairs the end or aim is itself one of the most powerful of causes. The end which men set themselves, whatever its character, becomes so potent as to determine the whole course of life. When we treat sociological ethics as a constituent part of the social science, we do not propose to go outside of society and what it involves, but to consider what the mind in its social investigation requires of society. What ought to be, according to the inherent nature of society, is the problem. The rational consideration of society cannot but conclude that certain things belong to society as such if true to itself; and the mind that enters upon ethical investigations simply concludes that what is thus discovered as due to society, or what society ought to be, should be made the end in social progress. In the past there have been such social ends and society has worked for their realisation; and when, now, similar ends are chosen, they also become causative factors in promoting the progress of society. Serious misapprehension may be avoided if it is remembered that we are not discussing the *design* of society, but what the ethical conception of society reveals as the end toward which social effort ought to be directed.

The quotation is from Vierkandt, *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker*, p. 454.

The result of the aim of progress is, of course, beyond our power. "From all that has been produced we can subsequently select that which is to be described as progress, but we cannot calculate what will follow; for all progress is of the nature of invention."—Sigwart, *Logic*, vol. ii., p. 459.

355. If we test the social actuality by the nature of society we pass an ethical judgment. Men are continually passing such judgments, and our science should furnish the principles by which they can be tried. The

Jacobins, for instance, during the Reign of Terror, attempted to realise their theory of society. They were in power and constituted themselves the judges of what the State should be and do. They declared the State absolute and its function to force men to be free. Has sociology, in determining that there are both private and social forces, nothing to say respecting such demands? The social democracy has its theory of society, which determines its social ideal and the efforts for its realisation. Plato and Aristotle, with their conception of society as essentially a political organisation of freemen with leisure to devote themselves to the affairs of State, cannot but favour the institution of slavery. Those who, with Augustine and Bossuet, regard society as created to accomplish the divine purpose must behold in the kingdom of God its ideal. Bentham and his followers see only individual ends in the purpose of social organisation, and, therefore, make its ideal the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The conception of what ought to be thus always depends on the conception of the nature of society; it is but an inference from this.

The result of adopting an ideal of society also shows the importance of sociological ethics, since that ideal determines the course of social action. The nature of society, as given in the first division, helps us to get rid of many errors heretofore common, because it enables us to go directly to the causative forces. Perhaps the forces of which society is a concentration are imperfect, or their correlation and relative dominance wrong, and therefore the society they constitute must be faulty. To all sociality this applies, to every social group, to voluntary organisations, to the Church, the State, and the society of nations. In this last division our inquiry pertains to social structure, content, relation, order, and function; it investigates what pertains to the truthfulness and value of society. The question of value cannot arise if society

exists for things; but if it exists for man, and reason is the arbiter, the question becomes inevitable. Unless science has some value, say for the reason, the reason for scientific investigation vanishes. The standard for testing being found in the nature of society, it is to this nature that the ideal must correspond. We therefore regard sociological ethics as intent on showing what society must become in order to be true to itself and to meet the demands of rational inquiry.

This brings out the scientific factor in our inquiry. Sociological ethics comes to society with a demand similar to that made by logic on thought, by grammar on speech, and by aesthetics on art—a demand, in each instance, for the highest truth and for the most perfect reality of which the object is capable. The theory that science has a right to inquire into the imperfect stages of society which actually exist, but not into the perfection which the very nature of society demands, is equal to a medical science which exists for the sake of diseases which are common, but not for the sake of that perfect health which is nowhere found.

We therefore claim that sociological ethics, instead of substituting ideals for empirical investigation, impels to the deepest investigation of the actuality in order to banish the ideals which are foreign to society, and to substitute for them those which are involved in the very idea of society.

The more profoundly we investigate our subject the more evident it becomes that those who do not rise to the science of ethics fail to get the true science of man. So those who exclude sociological ethics cannot get the true science of society.

Have we not in the three divisions of sociology the three great divisions of human science—the first inquiring into the nature of society, and corresponding most fully with the investigations of nature; the second, the evolu-

Nature and Aim of Sociological Ethics 211

tion of society, corresponding with the historical sciences; and the third, sociological ethics, corresponding with the sciences which treat of values?

In his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, p. 122, Dilthey states that we must learn from history what is valuable. "For what is of value to man and what the rules of conduct should be for society can be learned, with any hope of success, only from historical investigation." Evolution brings out the values and imprints on them the stamp of their worth. Thus, history and the total social actuality are the laboratory to which the sociologist resorts for his ethical interpretations.

G. Ruemelin, *Reden und Aufsätze*, discusses the idea of social law in his first address. He holds that a law in the true sense gives the constant forces which invariably produce the same effects. In this sense we have natural laws, but no social laws which furnish invariable causes for the movements of the masses. But while denying the application of the term "law" to inferences of social students from social phenomena, even from statistics, he claims that in another sense there are real laws, namely, in ethics. "The moral law, too, is a law of nature; it is no ideal phantom, no empty creation of thought, but the expression of a real, living force." He pronounces moral law altogether a law in the sense in which he defines law, as the expression of a real force; he in fact pronounces it a law in the absolute sense. The force which constantly has an ideal as an aim is "thoroughly real in its nature. In that it works in the masses we find the law of progress. . . . The moral law is a true natural law, the law of our true nature; it only seems to be ineffective while working in the masses; in the long run it is the mightiest and the highest of all social laws." See also vol. ii. (or Neue Folge), p. 138.

Eleven years after delivering the above address he stated that he had constantly been on the search for social laws which give the real forces or causes of series of social phenomena, but had found none. *Reden und Aufsätze* (Neue Folge), p. 119. In this address he shows that psychical and social phenomena cannot be reduced to law in the same sense as natural

phenomena. On pp. 147-148 he again speaks of the ethical laws as inexplicable as mere imagination or postulates. "They are the expression and creation of our own moral and religious faculties and impulses, and as such they are, at the same time, active and impelling forces. . . . We might call natural laws the laws of our true ideal nature. The ethical laws which alone give a definite aim to the individual life are also the peculiar and true laws in the life of the race and the only guiding star in the dark night of the destiny of nations. That which was and is, the past and the future, can be understood only by means of what ought to be."

It is thus evident that those who do not rise to the science of ethics fail to get the true nature and the true science of man.

356. It is not strange that we have a special division for sociological ethics, but not for sociological religion or sociological æsthetics. What society ought to be involves all the social forces, religion so far as it pertains to human relations and æsthetics included; that is, sociological ethics applies its principles of truth and right to every phase of society. It is, therefore, not proposed to isolate the ethical force from the other social forces and treat it as an abstraction for independent development. The ethical factor is, however, regarded as sovereign in social matters. Being intent on what is highest and for the good of all involved, it is entitled to the dominance in its interaction with the other forces. Let us call it the *regulative* force. Thus what society ought to be pertains to the economic, political, egotic, appetitive, affectional, recreative, æsthetic, religious, and intellectual forces, showing what is required of each, how they should interact, and what kind of society they should produce. The aim is to subject society in all its parts, relations, and combinations to the ethical aspect. This comprehensive view shows that sociological ethics includes all the principles of social *progress*. Indeed, the conditions of the true and permanent progress of society constitute an essential ele-

ment of this third division. The ideal involved in the nature of society is to be made the inspiration, the guide, and the end of social effort and movement.

Ethics is not always regarded as the universal leaven of an individual and society. Morality is often viewed as affecting a part rather than the whole, so that to call a man moral is not the same as saying that he ought to make the most of himself under the guidance of moral principles. Morality generally means the absence of vice and the cultivation of virtue; that is, morality is regarded as something which can be cultivated by itself. Ethics is not taken in this sense here. Sociological ethics does not deal with the morality of society as if a peculiar quality besides many other qualities. A society that has virtue, but is intellectually indolent, is not ethical. So far as society is in any way defective it is not what it ought to be, and therefore is unethical. An ethical character is truthful and seeks the greatest truth; it aims at the highest political righteousness; it insists on the best development in art. Ethically, a man fails in proportion as he comes short of the highest possible development in any sphere or relation in life. This enlarged view must also be applied to society. It thus becomes clear how every phase of true social progress is involved. Correlated with the other social forces, the ethical force affects them and is affected by them. To make it supreme means that to all the forces the ethical test must be applied.

The highest ethical aim or the ultimate purpose of progress is not palpable and involves so many factors as to make the investigation extremely difficult. Perfect agreement respecting the highest social standard cannot be expected now, but the strongest reasons must finally prevail and increase the consensus. The discussion of the ethical demands will produce valuable results in regard to fundamental principles. Whatever differences

may prevail respecting the ultimate social aim, there may be agreement on the general purpose and immediate demands of society, and we may also expect a progressive elimination of errors.

Schaeffle, *Zeitschrift fuer die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, 1880, p. 649, says: "The social science cannot possibly avoid the teleological conception, for the reason that at all times there prevail in society ends which are made objects of future realisation. Such ends cannot be ignored by sociological thought."

Ihering, whose *Zweck im Recht* has been very influential, held that the will is purely egotistic in the individual, but in society it becomes moral. "The knowledge of morality and the moral purpose are the products of *history*, namely, of the historical life of society." He regards the development of man from egotism to morality as the greatest achievement of history and society, as, in fact, the only qualitative change, all other changes being only quantitative. "Egotism has been changed to its very *opposite*, it has *negated* itself. . . . The egotist is the product of nature, the moral man the product of history." Society is pronounced the source of moral principles, moral rules, moral sentiments, and moral will. "What is the source of moral rules? Society. What is the purpose of moral rules? Society. What creates the moral will? Society." Hence, society being the source of ethics, he regards ethics as a department of the social science. Pp. 12-16.

In *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, by J. S. Mackenzie, chapters iv., v., and vi. discuss "The Social Aim," "The Social Ideal," and "The Elements of Social Progress."

CHAPTER XXIV

THE SOCIAL IDEAL

357. The various theories of the universe can be included under the conceptions of fate, chance, and purpose. The first is the realm of necessity, such as that found in nature and dealt with by mathematics; the second involves accident, the fortuitous, the incalculable, and usually means that what comes to pass was neither intended nor foreseen; the third implies mind, a definite end, choice, action aiming at a specific result. Whether design or teleology rules in nature, directing its processes toward an end intelligently chosen, is not a sociological problem. Wherever there is, however, a rational mind it has a purpose for whose realisation it works. This, in fact, is meant by rationality. The end chosen by the mind becomes the directive power of life—the plan which the builder follows in erecting a structure, the model according to which the artist works, the ideal whose realisation is sought by the student, the scientist, and the reformer. The model may be faulty and the execution imperfect, but both must be taken into account in estimating the result. A statue that represents beauty is imperfect in proportion as it is true to the ugly factors in its model. We speak of an ideal as a creation; it is fully as correct to call the ideal itself creative, since it determines the course of the whole life devoted to its attainment. The correct ideal is, therefore, of utmost importance to the student and politician, as well as to the artist, and to all purposive action in social affairs. An

ideal as a guide is unmeaning where fate rules or chance is the arbiter; but for a rational end and a systematic purpose for its attainment the ideal is indispensable. Into the ideals and the movement toward them an individual and an association concentrate their ethical character. Much of their progress consists in the growth of their ideals to an ever higher stage of perfection.

The ethical ideal of society is not created by instinct or intuition, but is the product of scientific inquiry. This inquiry finds that we must look to man himself for the basis of ethics, whatever evolution may be required to make evident and to establish the ethical principles. These principles have been differently apprehended by societies and ages, which does not, however, argue that their basis does not exist in human nature. Man may travel long and far before the development is reached which makes conscience and duty the ruling factors. But if human nature is the same in all persons we must conclude that, whatever wanderings and conflicts may be required, a substantial agreement regarding ethical ideals and principles will eventually be attained. Truth has conflicts similar to those of right; yet, with the ages, the truth grows. Sculpture, painting, music, have a similar history. Every age that reaches the level of Greek culture will prefer its art to that of Assyria. With the general advance of culture, particularly of ethics, the social ideal will grow in definiteness and general acceptance.

"There is no question that morality is natural to man in the same way that language is; that is, if you give man time, he will undoubtedly develop an ethical creed."—W. L. Courtney, *Constructive Ethics*, p. 11.

A. Vierkandt, *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker*, p. 28, 29, directs attention to the dangers connected with the emphasis on the social ideal to the neglect of social causality. By an exclusive or predominant attention to the end to be attained

the actuality may be overlooked, the causes at work neglected, the moral forces exalted at the expense of the material conditions, and too much power attributed to human initiative and voluntary agency. But these are abuses. The ethical conception which makes real progress its aim must take into account all the factors of this progress. At the same time, the social ideal fully apprehended becomes itself a prominent causative factor in shaping the course of society.

The social ideal is that which is truly normal. Sigwart, *Logic*, vol. ii., p. 14, makes the ethical ideal the basis even of "our scientific investigations of the perceptible world. That comprehensive knowledge for which we seek is no gratuitous gift of a self-developing nature, nor is its acquisition merely incidental to the necessary process of satisfying our wants. It is a freely willed *end*, for which we work with conscious and voluntary activity, and our justification in pursuing this end is ultimately derived from the validity of the moral ideal as including the conception of the most comprehensive knowledge." The search for truth involved in logic "is contained in the universal duty of mankind, and is a necessary aim of human activity." In logic, exactly as in ethics, we seek to gain our end by means of "an ideally perfect process."

358. For determining the social ideal it is essential to answer the question, whether the aim pertains to society itself or to something only connected with it or perhaps external to it. The individual is so much in evidence to the senses, while society can only be thought, that even in considering the aim of society he is apt to receive special prominence. In an age of strong individualism, with an insistence on facts and a depreciation of philosophy with its general ideas, we ought, perhaps, to expect that the aim of society should be bent in the interest of the claims of the individual. This is the reverse of the Greek tendency to treat the individual as existing for the State, and of some creeds to subordinate him to the Church. The individual is made the ultimate object of

social effort. Most frequently it is affirmed that the happiness of the individual is the social aim. The practical inference from this is sometimes drawn by using the State for personal aggrandisement—for money, position, honour. This individualistic theory may also be promoted by the fact that society is so often used for the promotion of personal welfare. But there are weighty considerations on the other side. This individualism may strike its roots in the false theory that individuals literally compose society, and as its substance deserve supreme consideration. With a correct view of society, however, it seems strange that its end should not be in itself, but in those who can give only a part of themselves to society. Much of the significance of society is lost by reducing it to means for something else, instead of finding its end in itself. Besides, the happiness of the individual is not within its power; that depends too much on the subjective state to be under social control. It is, in fact, a private, not a social, affair, and depends on so many personal conditions that it is impossible for society to adapt itself to all of them. The utmost that society can do for the individual is to establish the best social conditions, and leave it to each one to make what use he can or will of them. That in this way the greatest happiness of the greatest number will be promoted is, no doubt, true; but the result must be left to the individual himself, while the social aim is concentrated on the character and conditions of society.

Since the relation existing between the individual and society is one of reciprocity, that which affects the one must likewise affect the other. Society cannot ignore its individual members on which it depends; nor can the individuals ignore society, from which so much of good and ill flows to them. Owing to this reciprocity, mutuality, we are warranted in affirming that the best state of society is most conducive to the best state of the individual. Its

exalted condition, however, may make him unhappy; a corrupt state might be more congenial to him. But the very fact that he is made unhappy may be promotive of his real welfare. Society can no more insure the happiness than the culture of the individual. Even if it institutes the best schools, libraries, museums, and social conditions, it cannot determine the use to be made of them by the individual.

Why concentrate the social aim on the *happiness* of the individual and leave other sides of him untouched? Are his personal culture, the enlargement of self, and his social relation and influence of no concern? In the best state of society all that pertains to the welfare and efficiency of the individual is touched and stimulated.

If the social aim is individual are not its effects in danger of being made temporary, passing away with the individuals whom it is to prosper? By making the aim social the effects are likely to endure as long as society, and to be cumulative in their development.

Mr. Herbert Spencer makes happiness the ethical aim, and therefore the adaptation of conduct to this end the test of goodness. It is surprising respecting this whole utilitarian school of ethics that a *feeling* is made the test of the entire mental life. Why not make the intellect the test, or the will? Some of Mr. Spencer's reasoning is, to say the least, extraordinary. His whole theory seems to rest on the assumption that good conduct will eventuate in happiness, which will generally be accepted as correct; but then he infers that happiness is the aim of good conduct, which is not true. Frequently the question of happiness is not involved in the motive, not being thought of, even. An object is called good, he argues, which is adapted to meet its end; but is the end sought always happiness? The philosopher seeks truth without regard to the question of happiness in the end: that end may sadden him. An object is valued in proportion as it corresponds to the idea or ideal of the mind. If the scientists made happiness the end

of their inquiries they would no doubt often be deflected from the course they now follow. The mind has an inevitable bent in certain directions,—mental laws let us call them. Pleasure as the law of ethical conduct is not one of them. The man who follows the highest demands of his nature or the most exalted laws of his being does so because they are imperative demands and final laws, without considering the question of happiness or any other result.

359. The social ideal, then, can only be *Social Perfection* or the perfection of society. On this as the general aim investigators are more apt to agree than on the definition of social perfection. Some may even claim that the perfection of society must be measured by its value to the individual in his search for happiness. Yet, the fact that we can determine only the general character of the aim is no more an objection than it is to make correct speaking the aim of grammar, and correct reasoning the aim of logic, without indicating just what in every case the speech and reasoning must be. Even grammar and logic have had their evolution, and the same must be expected respecting sociological ethics and its theory of social perfection.

It is impossible to give a final definition of social perfection, just as it is impossible to describe the most perfect beauty or the most perfect truth. Outlines, certain conditions, and general rules, perhaps in a negative form, are all that can now be expected. The study of the society of a particular period may, however, reveal imperfections when compared with the ideal so far as already attained, and thus lead to their removal. The ideal does not lose its value even if its realisation is beyond reach. Its very existence in the mind may inaugurate an endless process of social amelioration, just what ought to be expected in evolution and in all efforts to realise an ideal. Every science, every department of knowledge, is only tentatively a realisation of its ideal.

Only in individual minds does the social ideal exist. In these it is the product of evolution, constructed in each according to experience and knowledge, and therefore liable to vary. But this does not imply that no such ideal with objective validity can be discovered. Like many other truths it has not yet been formulated so as to command general assent.

No one is required to construct the social ideal *de novo*. He is born into a community with existing ideals and with some efforts at their realisation. Means for criticising, correcting, and developing them are usually given in the schools and systems of thought. Progress consists largely in the criticism, synthesis, and development of the prevailing ideals.

What a thing is good for is made by Mr. Spencer the central point of view in discussing perfection. He thinks perfection "can be framed only in relation to ends," and affirms that "conduciveness to happiness is the ultimate test of perfection in a man's nature." (*Ethics*, vol. i., pp. 33, 34.) He overlooks the fact that if perfection has its end in happiness, it cannot itself be the ultimate end. Social perfection, however, is the end because in it, aside from any other consideration, society is completed. If it can be shown that any theory of perfection does not make society complete, it proves that particular theory of perfection false, but does not overthrow perfection as the social aim. Happiness as the ultimate aim of social progress and as the social ideal reduces the perfection of society to means—means for happiness. But happiness can exist only in the individual, and therefore the highest aim of society is made individualistic.

Janet, *The Theory of Morals*, discusses "the Principle of Excellence or of Perfection, in the third chapter. He considers wherein this perfection consists and says: "Whether consciously or unconsciously, the moralists always have before their eyes the conception of perfection. What, indeed, would be the aim of morals if not to make us perfect?"

S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, discusses Perfection in Book II., chap. v.

360. The social ideal can be taken in two senses: as absolute perfection, or as that degree of perfection of which a society *under existing circumstances* is capable. All societies are subject to severe limitations; and absolute perfection becomes a false measure of what societies ought to be when their very conditions make the attainment impossible. No society ought to be what it cannot be. The same standard is not applicable to savage and enlightened communities. An absolute standard can give only the ultimate aim of all social movement; but in its application to particular societies their natural limitations must be considered. The perfection of a society in one line, say science or art, may determine its limitations regarding other lines. Here, of course, we cannot investigate the possibilities and requirements of particular societies; but the general considerations on social perfection can be applied to all societies, in order to determine their place relative to the ideal.

W. Sombart, *Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, 1897, holds that science can view the ideal in two aspects: according to its genesis or the causes which produce it, and, according to its value, its significance,—when applied to actual social conditions. He thinks that science has before it a great and fruitful task in exposing false conceptions of the ideal and in making the ideal a causative factor in social progress.

361. It is a primary condition of the perfection of society that the social forces of individuals be fully developed and so combined as to co-operate harmoniously. Imperfect individuals cannot constitute a perfect society. We have seen, however, that special stress is placed by sociology on the social personality or that part of the individual which belongs to society. The undeveloped

social forces of primitive society made the sociality correspondingly low. Evolution developed the higher energies, with superior motives and tendencies, and thus inaugurated the cultural reign. But the correlation and co-operation of these forces has also been promoted, and in this way society advanced. Social organisation has grown in perfection. In an army, for instance, the soldiers no longer fight at random or with only slight bonds to unite them; but with the efficiency of each soldier vastly increased by education, drill, and improved weapons, we have also an organisation of marvellous compactness under the control of a single mind. The fact that the army is a multiplicity in unity, the vast strength of a great multitude acting with the concentrated energy of one man, makes its stroke so effective. Likewise the perfection of every society must be sought in the efficiency of the social forces and in their most compact organisation. A perfect society is a perfect unit of perfect units, or forces.

Social perfection would be more simple if it were necessary to consider only one social force; but all must be taken into account. Whatever force is dominant in a society is influenced and modified by other forces. An economic association must take account of affectional, political, and ethical factors. Now, a society is perfect in proportion as each force is in its proper place, rightly related to the others, and with due prominence. An economic society, perfect if considered for its own sake solely and for the accumulation of wealth, may be extremely imperfect as a part of the total social organism. It would not be economic if it made æsthetics or intellectual pursuits the chief aim; but to pursue wealth at any cost, regardless of its purpose and relations, degrades a society. To treat the segment of a circle as the circle is to act a lie—an error almost universal in social affairs. An association of capitalists which exploits labour, buys

legislatures, corrupts public officials, and debauches the community by its practices is antisocial. The Greek idea of proportion, right relation, due emphasis, the golden mean, applies to the social forces and all truth, not merely to art. The tones of an orchestra must not only be beautiful themselves, but they must also harmonise. A recreative society may attain recreation and in doing so sink to the depths of degradation. What a society is good for is perhaps proof of its badness; for it may be good only for evil. The sphere of an association is necessarily limited, and its end would be defeated if the sphere were made too comprehensive. How eventually to form a synthesis of specific and narrow lines of progress so as to include all that pertains to progress becomes a weighty problem. Owing to severe mental limitations, an association is apt to identify its own development with the progress of society.

362. Perfection of organisation is not the measure of social perfection. A despotic government, which crushes the liberty of the people and exploits them to maintain itself, is socially deplorable in proportion to its structural perfection and strength. The quality of the organised power is its ethical test. With the savage and brute, might is ultimate. In ethical questions we again see the fundamental character of relations. Only in its particular sphere is an association sovereign, and the ethical requirement is made that it recognise the proper sovereignty in every other sphere. Supremacy at the cost of the rights of others is wrong. The individuality of an association demands respect no less than that of a person. A society degrades itself in proportion as it suppresses freedom of legitimate development, speech, and movement. Rights and duties are co-ordinate, reciprocal; and one of the best evidences of the perfection of a society is seen in the fact that it is as intent on giving others their due as in insisting on its own. An ethical society has a share in the

ethics and welfare of other associations, and favours their individuality and freedom no less than those of its own members. The ethics in the relation of associations is a deep and neglected problem, and on its solution much of future social progress depends.

363. The mind demands in respect to the social relations the same unity which it requires of its separate thoughts, of the sciences, and of the universe. Societies may move along particular lines, but these lines must be inclosed in a sphere, not running their own way into endless space, regardless of how they cut and destroy one another. The agreement that societies shall not interfere with each other gives only negative results. The recognition and realisation of the positive relations sustained present an equally important phase of sociality. Unless interest binds associations together, social disintegration and atomism prevail. An unethical limit characterises an association which pursues its specific aim without regard to the claims of other societies. Hence, organisations so often become individual selfishness intensified, which results in destructive rivalry and conflict. The common bonds of humanity and the still closer social ties are ignored; each association acts as if it were the whole of society and perhaps arrogates to itself the right to domineer over others to the extent of its ability. It is the false sovereignty of States introduced into the general social relations. Among economic organisations this seems to be the normal condition; it is common also in the relation of churches and all voluntary associations. A valuable lesson is taught by the imperfection involved in the fact that the perfection of the Greeks was made so exclusively Greek that other peoples worthy of profound study were so much despised as barbarians that their origin and condition excited no interest.

Specialisation, which means limitation, is frequently required in order to attain a high degree of development.

Still, a society is out of its place in the total social organism unless somehow related to neighbouring societies, to the community, the State, and humanity. Specialisation may be a necessity, but the claim of specialisation to social sovereignty is objectionable. Sociology, with its comprehensive view of the articulations of society, sees that the health of the total organism depends on the health and co-operation of the parts. A self-centred society not only curtails its influence but also loses the stimuli which other societies can give. As the world must be known in order to understand the relation of the Himalaya Mountains to it, so the social totality must be known in order to assign to each society its right place in the complex social interrelations. Confusion and anarchy result when each association makes itself the centre from which it draws the circumference of its authority. The State prevents positive encroachments only within legal limits. The remedy for the existing social disintegration may, in large part, be expected from the preparation given by the social science for a larger vision of society, for the more perfect organisation of particular associations, and for such a correlation of societies as will form the perfect social organism.

The world's malefactors are persons out of place. They do not sustain the right relation to their fellow-men and to things. They enter a domain which does not belong to them and they appropriate foreign possessions; they usurp authority and interfere with personal or social rights; following only their inclinations, they arrogate to themselves what belongs equally to others. A society draws a circle and claims all it includes, when in reality it is only a point in the circle. Thus men commit wrong in thought, feeling, and act, because, instead of limiting themselves to what belongs to them, they rob their fellows.

Organised selfishness is social error reduced to a system, and the worst because the most powerful. So common is it that it

poses as normal and seems to be expected. The fact that selfishness is associated, and so far social, is deemed a sufficient apology. On the same principle a pack of howling and destructive wolves is more noble than a single wolf. The evolutionary stage for the association of individuals has been reached; the higher stage in which associations themselves are associated seems far off yet, to say nothing of the ethical association of associations.

No association is asked to neglect its specific aim, to abandon its freedom, or to sacrifice a single right, but only to be true to its proper relations, to respect the rights of others, and to supplement its own rights by its duties. The special calling and the limitations of organisations present almost insurmountable obstacles to the realisation of this ideal conception of society; but in many cases the greatest barriers are presented by the selfishness and carelessness of organisations.

364. The structure is to the social content what the binding of a book is to its substance. This content cannot, like the social structure and relations, become an integral part of the permanent social constitution and thus be transmitted from generation to generation; but, like the social forces, the social content depends on the individuals and may disappear with them. The psychological possessions of an organisation are an index of the social culture, and constitute the substance of the character and life of an association. The actual mental content can, of course, exist only in individual minds; but all the members may be possessors of the same content. Indeed, there must be some degree of similarity to make associated action possible. The member of an association who has the poorest social content is the measure of what all share. The speed common to ten horses can never be greater than that of the slowest. The average speed of the ten is a different matter. No two men in an organisation have the same mental content; but discussion reveals or constitutes agreement so as to make united action

possible. The resolutions adopted express the will of the society or of the majority. Action is will; and often there is agreement in respect to a definite policy amid great diversity of thought and feeling. The variety of thought, faith, feeling, and purpose brought out in discussion makes what is individual social, a ferment is produced, and in this consists much of the value of social intercourse. The agreement respecting the social content is the point of social action. Social action, say in the form of a resolution, may express but a fraction of the social content; perhaps it is the result of a compromise and really presents the complete desire of no individual or party.

The mental average or the common level by no means always decides the course of action. A superior mind often lifts others to its standard and thus determines the social course. We generally look to an extraordinary personality for an extraordinary movement. Deliberative assemblies are saved from stagnation by new interests, exciting problems, fresh members, and new parties. Conflict, antagonism, and revolution may at times deliver society from inanity and death.

The existing social content presents important problems. Those who understand it best have the most favourable conditions for controlling their fellow-men and shaping the future. But it is difficult to discover, its manifestations often being meagre and fugitive; much is held in reserve, ready for action, but never able fully to body itself forth. In the case of a nation we call this content its nationality, generally a vague notion. The content of a particular church is not its professed, but its actual, faith. The content of one labour association pertains to mechanics, of another to textiles, of a third to mining. The content makes one association scientific and another economic, while their form of organisation may be essentially the same. Social progress requires

especial concentration on the content of society, on the total psychology, the intellect, the feeling, and the will.

It has been made evident that the social content does not consist of the sum of the content of the individual members. The combined wisdom of one hundred men consists only of what is collective and characterises their associated action. It probably falls below the wisdom of the wisest. Both the wisest and most stupid men are liable to be outvoted in an assembly. What guarantee is there that in an association the best men, the wisest counsel, and the most progressive principles will prevail?

Socrates has no hope if votes are counted, not weighed. An assembly may have exalted and able men, and yet be on a low plane as a collectivity.

But the statement often made, that social action cannot rise above the level of the lowest elements of society, is a mistake. It may be true where a decision requires unanimity; but even where the majority who decide questions are inferior, they may be dominated by a superior mind. Free societies also have kings and emperors.

An individual, an organisation, or humanity always has at disposal only a definite amount of energy. This is not subject to statistics, but as truly limited as the forces of nature. When an association, therefore, concentrates its energy in a specific direction none will be left for any other purpose. An association absorbed by economics has neither time nor strength for literature and art; and if wholly intent on self-aggrandisement it cannot consider its duties to others. Hence the common phenomena of self-centred, self-absorbed, egotistical associations, not denying the existence of other organisations, but simply ignoring them. Therefore the correlation or federation of associations is so urgent a problem. Is not social anarchism likely to increase with the multiplication of organisations?

In the social content, with its life, variety, fermentation, we have a counterpart of the monotonous unity of an organisation. The constitution and structure of a society may be rigid, despotic, perhaps necessarily so, as in the case of all legality; but in the social content, in which each person has a share and which each can seek to influence and modify, the freedom and right of the individual are recognised. If in the organisation we have the permanent factor of society, in the social content we have the more fluid and more progressive factor. Even the changes in the social constitution must be effected by means of changes in the social content. What must be subjected to social law and what left to social freedom is, as we have seen, among the greatest problems of associations, of ages, and of history.

In sociological ethics we naturally place the greatest stress on the ethical content. To the increase of this content and to its leadership we look for the best conditions of social progress. As already shown, this ethical leadership means that every social force is to be cultivated to the utmost and made most effective in its correlations. Society is ever to become more fully conscious and master of itself; to grow in the subjection of nature so as to make the material forces serve the interests of humanity; to establish freedom in the realm of freedom and law in the realm of law; and to secure, within the social bonds, the right place to intellect, feeling, and volition.

Social action is often wrong on account of false specialisation. A particular part of the social content is made the basis of action when other factors are likewise involved in the act. A statesman may be so controlled by what he regards as required by the politics of his country that he ignores ethics and other matters which affect his country. War may be declared for political reasons which would have been avoided if all the factors involved had been considered. So on a narrow economic basis associations are guilty of conduct which a regard for ethics would have made impossible. Society is often led

astray as much by its limited vision as by evil intention. The little that is seen is not seen correctly, because not viewed in the light of the totality of which it forms but a part. The *nature* of many a society is good, but its *geography* is wrong.

In scientific induction the whole process is vitiated if a single factor involved is omitted; so all the social relations are perverted if a single essential factor is ignored.

365. Rank is inevitable in society, being a creation of social differentiations. But it differs in origin and kind and the estimate in which it is held. Even in republics the constitutional equality in politics and law is merely nominal. Perhaps all social degrees, from the highest to the lowest, are found in a society which most loudly asserts the freedom and equality of its members. Slowly the centuries are teaching that men can be alike free only in proportion to their equality. The ranks in a republic differ from those in a monarchy; but that does not prevent the actual social distinctions from being equally marked.

The division into ranks deeply affects the social content. Each class has its peculiar sphere of thoughts, feelings, interests, and activities. That which determines social rank frequently reveals the dominant social trend. We see Greece in the honour conferred on its statesmen, philosophers, poets, and artists. The Middle Ages objectify themselves in their estimate of the popes, theologians, the clergy, and ascetics. An age puts itself on record by treating its teachers as menials, and its snobs and dudes and Philistines as social leaders. The ethical test is seen in what men are and what they are used for. A change of social grading, say from material attachments to intellect, art, ethics, religion, involves a total change in the character of society.

Class attractions, class limitations, and class movements have much social significance. The relation of the classes, the place of each in culture, what is right and what

wrong in them, are worthy of profound inquiry. The readjustment of classes, especially when rank and privilege are involved, presents problems of peculiar difficulty. The class spirit has been fostered by history, tradition, custom, political privileges, and the laws. A favour originally intended for the existing generation is apt to be claimed later as hereditary right. It is natural that what is made an endowment through ancestors, through legal enactments and the very conditions of life, should not be regarded as an object of voluntary exertion. Nobility by birth takes the place of nobility by achievement. It is not surprising that those who attain their privileges without effort gradually fall below those in character, in strength, who depend on personal exertion for all they ever hope to attain.

The class war would be less dangerous if the classes did not make themselves ultimate, but agreed in making religion, the State, language, race, or some other tie the bond of union. Perhaps the class war would cease in that case. A class which makes itself sovereign and its demands absolute, regardless of the claims of others, is the most dangerous. It becomes dogmatic, ceases investigation of principles, since it regards them as for ever settled, and is ready to resort to any means to attain its chosen aim. It is these sovereign centres, with their absolute demands, with no higher bond of union, no law above them, which now cause the threatening aspect in so many of the enlightened States. Unless a change takes place in the vision and spirit of the classes, a war between them, the worst of all wars, is inevitable.

How far is social equality possible? In what respects is it now within reach? The ablest ought to aid the weakest without being dragged down by them. In the growth of humanity respecting the humbler classes evidences of progress are seen since the time of the Greeks, even since the time of Louis

XIV., and in fact since the close of the eighteenth century. The popular outbreak at the time of the French Revolution was the culmination of the entire process of the preceding evolution, just as it was the inauguration of a new era.

Schmoller, *Fahrbuch*, ch. xiv., p. 99, says that "the war of classes is not the natural condition of society, as the blind struggle for existence is the natural condition of plants and animals. The culture of society consists in peace established by morality and law, a peace whose basis is found in an intellectual and ethical sociality."

366. The test of existing associations and the development of their forces, their structures, their relations, and their psychological contents, are not the only considerations in discussing the perfection of society. The process of passing from an unorganised to an organised state is constantly going on. It may go too far, congealing what ought to be left to free movement. Organisation is often the culmination of a process which means finality and an end of progress. While it is the function of organisation to enforce, by its concentrated might, what has already been attained, it often fails to do this, while it effectually stops further development. With the true purpose of society in mind, new associations can be formed to meet existing needs. As new ideas are evolved and new interests created, progressive organisations for their embodiment will be required. There may be overorganisation, which is followed by disintegration; but there are likewise unorganised forces which require organisation in order to exert their full power. Energetic evolution makes some old organisations useless, develops others, and creates a demand for new ones. Often an urgency for the last exists in the requirements of the times. Instead of leaving the matter to unconscious processes, it can be taken up for rational purposive action, the aim being to give expression to the growth of ideas and needs in organised action. Associations are not altogether new creations;

they rather rise out of the conditions given. With the emerging interests the occasion for these associations arises, and this is seized by the interpreting and foreseeing mind. That the organising genius need not be selfish is proved by such guilds of former ages as put honour and integrity, or religion and patriotism, first, and made their own particular interests secondary. There is special demand for associations of an ethical and sociological character, viewing society as a whole and advocating its welfare, in distinction from the ordinary selfishness in social organisation. This involves a new social mind and requires the elevation of the general tone and purpose of social action. Society needs freedom from narrow and enslaving organisations. In many instances it requires the destruction of society for the sake of society.

•

That social "mind" is used in a figurative sense has become evident from previous discussions.

367. The greatness of the social ideal increases with its study. We have not now the data for its full appreciation, much less for its realisation. Social progress involves an evolution of the social consciousness and social requirements. Hardly more can be expected than to make this perfection of society the aim, to give some general ideas respecting the perfection, and to leave it to social development to make these ideas more definite. So long as both society and sociology remain in their present stage of development we can treat it only as a theory that the social ideal must be a product of the nature of society, being only a realisation of the perfection of society itself. Still, the perfection of society as the great aim, general though the idea is, may be of much value. It presents this perfection as a problem for solution. This perfection must be analysed, the factors involved in it determined, and then, with the ultimate aim

distinctly apprehended, each association can take its part in working toward the realisation.

At present the relation existing between the individual and society is so urgent and of such fundamental importance that future progress will depend much on its solution. It is easy to say that what belongs to society should be given to society, and what belongs to the individual should be given to him; but the point of dispute is, what belongs to each. Particular societies, often individualistic, are to be treated like individuals. The problem of individualism and socialism hinges on what belongs to public control and what to individuals or individualistic organisations. The term "social" is so indefinite as to be confusing. The least social life may be the most social—least social in that it moves little in society, and most social because wholly consecrated to society. The solitary student can lead the most altruistic life, making his fellow-men the beneficiaries of his researches. By no one standard can all be judged, just because every one cannot be everything. One can do the best social service in solitude, another in the family, a third in business, and a fourth in a profession or some public career. Every legitimate calling can tend to the same end, social perfection. The peculiarity of one's individuality may be his best contribution to society. But it must be contributed to become a social factor. The man whose subjectivity does not become an objective reality gives nothing to society and has no social existence. It is a social axiom: he who does nothing to society does not exist for society.

368. This bare outline of the social ideal will at least serve to call attention to the subject and to remove some errors respecting its nature. It has not its birth in the idealistic philosophy which characterised German metaphysics at the beginning of the nineteenth century, nor is it introduced as an element foreign to society from any other source. This ideal simply means that society

realises itself. It is, therefore, not in conflict with the realistic tendency of the age, but calls attention to a neglected phase of reality. The value of the ideal is not diminished because progress toward it involves an endless movement. A guiding star does not lose its value as a guide because it is never reached. The ideal is a guide as well as a goal. We cannot even claim that society is an organism which steadily grows toward the goal, each stage attained by evolution making the next a higher one, society thus pushing on ceaselessly and cumulatively toward perfection. In the social process every age laboriously forges its own link in the chain, and the last wrought out in any period may not be the best. Perhaps the new recruits which a society receives are inferior to the ones they replace, and thus society sinks to a lower level. A kind of heredity may be claimed for social structure, the future progressively developing the past; but this is possible only in form; the real life must come from the generation itself. All that the age of Pericles could leave is not able to make the Athens of to-day the Athens of his day. The symbolism of the past must be interpreted into a living reality. Even were all social possibilities of the present attainable, new conditions would arise which require fresh adaptations. The highest attainable perfection at any period ought, in its very attainments, to find impulses to something higher. Perhaps the aspiration aroused is the best measure of the perfection already realised.

We cannot look back on the ideal considered without receiving an impression of the sublimity it involves. It lifts us into the true sphere of humanity and presents the highest aim for the realisation of our humanity. Thou *must* savours of the fate which rules nature; thou *shalt* savours of a command from without, perhaps from a tyrant; thou *canst* gives a revelation of ability and is instinct with possibility and power; but you *ought* appeals

to our inmost being, reveals an imperative in the personality itself, and is a fountain of inspiration and aspiration. The emotion is still more exalted when the individual recognises the ethical bond as uniting him with all his fellow-men in respect to what is highest in thought, most valuable in feeling, and most worthy of effort. Every ethical personality lacks some essential ethical factors if he does not include humanity in his ethical considerations and purposes.

CHAPTER XXV

THE SOCIAL ACTUALITY

369. In considering the principles of progress I do not forget that society is not made by rules. It is life, must live its own life, and only what it makes its own becomes a vital directive force. So many factors enter social movement over which society has no control that it cannot definitely foresee or predetermine results. The ideal will not enable it to move in a straight line toward the goal, but it will help to get rid of legality and mechanism as substitutes for the spirit or mind as the social essence. The best soul in the best body is the rule in social progress, but the soul is the life and guide of the body. It has been said that nothing is surer in history than that the lessons of history remain unheeded. Perhaps history is not old enough to warrant a final conclusion on the subject. For those who want to learn, evolutionary history offers a fruitful field for social harvests. In its data we have forecasts of what may be expected of the working of the forces as the causative factors in progress. Not only do we lack in sociological ethics the exactness of natural science, because quality reigns instead of quantity, but interest and prejudice are also more liable to vitiate the results. Still, with all the difficulties encountered, even at this stage of sociological development, certain principles of social progress toward the ideal are within reach.

No scientific or philosophical standard exists to which an appeal can be made for the principles of progress and

their application. When the Sophists made the individual the measure of all things, which is a denial of absolute principles, Socrates insisted on going beyond the notions of the individual to the ultimate reason, the last thought, as the standard, believing that reason is one and that rational inquiry will eventually result in agreement respecting principles. That the pre-Socratic attitude is still common cannot be denied. But great development has taken place since Socrates. We have important historic results, the workings of Christianity, and the treasures of modern thought. The field of research thus presented offers vast opportunities beyond the appeal to a class, a school, a sect, a party, or an aristocracy of any kind. All the means within reach when used co-operatively by the scholars of the day will further the advance of the principles of progress.

If society is to become the heir of the past it will have to appreciate both itself and its history better than heretofore. Each age has been too much treated as if ending with itself, instead of being part of an endless movement. Society has also been too little aware of itself to realise its share in the succession and wealth of the ages.

370. One of the values of a definite ethical end consists in the fact that it involves an imperative. With the ethical purposes of men the impulse to attain them likewise grows. An age with a new ideal has an urgency of which ages without that ideal know nothing. Men who question the growth of morality seem to overlook the fact that an advanced ideal and the impulse and effort for its attainment involve moral growth. It is thus clear that much is already gained if society seizes a definite end, such as perfection, as its goal. This puts a sublime ethical purpose in place of haphazard, and not only reduces the other forces, such as economics, the appetite, and recreation, to their proper place, but

actually makes them minister to the chosen purpose. It cannot be claimed that the ethical aim has ever dominated society. Its introduction as the directive of all the social forces means unity in the tendency toward perfection. For blind impulses are substituted a rational purpose, a study of possibilities, a choice of means toward the chosen goal, and the supremacy of the social conscience. Society thus takes its destiny into its own hands, instead of being irresistibly pushed forward by a necessity like that of natural force. It is by the reign of reason, of conscience, of choice, that society attains the highest summit in its ascent from nature and animal propensities to humanity.

The evolution of the ethical spirit will overcome many difficulties which are still met with in social movement. The aim will grow in definiteness and in exercising a controlling influence; the social problems will become clearer; defects of society still hidden will be revealed; the comparison of societies with one another and with the past will make evident excellences and possibilities before unrecognised; by testing the efficacy of means the value of their application will be enhanced; and ethical appreciation, now usually low, will increase in comparison with other motives. Perhaps an evolution of social agencies similar to the development of appliances for the use of natural science may be looked for. The subject of social dynamics seems to be about as much advanced as were the appliances for natural science in the Middle Ages. Not only the possibility and means of social progress require investigation, but likewise the very nature of this progress. We have seen that progress is often taken to mean the diffusion of something already attained, as is so often the case in education or religion; while the other sense, the development of something new out of the old, is overlooked. The progress to something beyond the present social status involves every factor of society, the

social forces, their interrelation and interaction, the social structure, the social content, and the social will under the direction of this content.

Sigwart states that "reflection upon what man ought to do reveals itself as the highest and most urgent problem of thought," and that the "ought" gives unity to purpose and life. An end of unconditional validity is thus given on which all the energies are concentrated. The same applies to society. Not that it is perpetually to be goaded to the pursuit of this end, but this purpose as the expression of its real character is to become the directive power in its movements, an imperative which works both consciously and unconsciously.

That the spirit of progress, the first step in the purposive movement toward perfection, is yet to be created in society is patent. When it is created it must be concentrated in that unity of social action which implies unity of social aim. Without this co-operative concentration there will be atomism, disintegration, antagonism, and destructive movements.

371. Only with the most general principles can we deal here. Ethical problems involve so many contingencies, so many possibilities and conditions, that individuals and societies must determine for themselves the course of conduct amid specific circumstances. The school may train the best physician, without being able to give him the prescription for every particular case. The "best" physician can prepare this himself. Ethics prepares men to be self-directive, to consider all the facts and then act accordingly. There is no objective standard for every subjective ethical decision; this decision depends on the will backed by intellect and feeling. Ethical action, like scientific investigation, has general rules whose application must be left to the individual. The entire character of the individuality is involved, and in face of the same practical problem the solutions will differ according to the persons giving them. Who can trace to their causes all

the factors entering into an important moral judgment? The uncertainty connected with the conduct of persons equally sincere is no fault of ethics, but due to the difficulty involved in particular cases, to the limited knowledge pertaining to all the facts, and to the impossibility of determining the working of the causes set in motion. After the best principles have been inculcated there is not only room, but also demand, in ethical conduct for wisdom, invention, art, and, in fact, all the highest elements of genius.

372. Social progress does not begin with the ideal, but moves toward it. The actuality is to be transformed into the likeness of the ideal, and on that actuality the creative work must be performed. This emphasis on the reality in distinction from what is visionary characterises ethics as a part of the science of society. Viewed in the light of the ideal, the social condition is beheld both in its inadequacy and its possibilities. To work on an imaginary social basis means not to work on the social basis at all. Every teacher and artist knows that the object to be shaped is no less important a problem than into what it is to be shaped. A statue will not emerge from a block of marble by treating the marble like a piece of wood. It is, in fact, axiomatic, that in its application sociological ethics is as much confined directly to the social actuality as the farmer is to the soil he cultivates.

The diagnosis of the case first, then the remedy. This realism is specially marked in politics, the wise statesmen never losing sight of the end in view, carefully considering the state of the country, its needs, relations, and possibilities, and the efficacy of the means within reach. Its adaptation to specific cases is the measure of the wisdom in an ideal standard of education. Why so much that seems in itself good is good for nothing when applied, presents an important problem. We know that all influence depends on the response of the recipient no less than

on the agency of the actor. Especially men of intellect and scholarship eagerly seek a kind of abstract excellence in every department of thought and life without regard to its application, and then seek to apply it without studying the conditions required. In this way the failure of many really able men can be explained, as well as the fact that students preparing for the professions are taught and disciplined in knowledge, but do not learn how to apply it and fail to study the men to whom it is to be applied. We need not only a social psychology, but also special emphasis on the psychology of adaptation.

The *Zeitgeist* must be mastered in order to promote, counteract, or modify its tendency. Subtle as it is, it depends on causes of which many can be determined. Certain general ideas which characterise ages can be discovered, such as the ruling religious, political, intellectual, or æsthetic trend. The world is too large and humanity too varied to make the movements in any particular part characteristic of the whole. But there are large circles in which essentially the same principles prevail, so that some degree of unity can be discovered in societies on a similar religious, political, or cultural level. The European-American group of highest culture is most important, since chiefly on it future progress seems to depend. Usually a nation embodies particular ideas or gives them particular forms. These ideas change with the ages. Hence, with all the existing unity, the impossibility of characterising all the ages alike, or all the peoples of the same age, or even the organisations within the same nation. Differences in kind and degree occur. There is necessity for studying each by itself. The same force which would make a man a hero in the United States might in Russia send him to Siberia.

The prevalent realism has given a strong impulse to the study of the age; but it is usually an inquiry into isolated

phenomena, rather than into their causes and the philosophy they involve. The interpreting genesis is overlooked. A sensational, superficial, and uncritical or even false press does not reveal the actual forces, but by means of its undigested and undigestible contents cultivates superficiality, distraction, chaotic heterogeneity, and a vain conceit of knowledge, which form striking characteristics of the time and prevent a profound study of the social actuality. This study requires a special training, such as institutions of learning, even, fail to give. Careful inquiry among students from different countries proved that they had not been prepared for a scientific study of their own times. Even those pursuing a post-graduate course could not answer these questions: What are the dominant forces and tendencies of the age? What general ideas underlie the intellectual movements and shape science, philosophy, literature, and art? What method should be adopted in investigating the causes of social movements? They declared that their colleges and universities had not even taught them how to get the answers. Here chaos reigns in thought and necessarily, also, in action. Superficial signs are recognised, perhaps, but the roots whence they spring are missed.

Whoever wants to understand the present age must know what it means by reality—that which is palpable, can be seen and touched, weighed and measured, while the highest demands of reason are regarded with suspicion. The age of naturalism wants to sit only at the feet of empirical investigation, and in distinction from ideas and ideals, faith, and all subjective notions, insists on *objective* realism. But those who go still deeper will discover that the reaction has begun and that human nature is emphasising its peculiarities and highest claims.

A group, a community, or a people is best judged by its usual conduct, its most common factors. What is exceptional may show what a society is capable of, but the other reveals the dominant forces. Often what rises as exceptional above the ordinary level is a hint of what may be cultivated to advantage for progress.

Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, p. 2: "On any theory,

our view of what ought to be must be largely derived, in details, from our apprehension of what is; the means of realising our ideal can only be thoroughly learnt by a careful study of actual phenomena."

373. Certain discoverable general characteristics are apt to prevail throughout the culture of an age. From Russia westward as far as to Japan there is a community of intellectual interests, a consensus respecting scientific method, and a high degree of unity in the results attained. Certain great principles can consequently be regarded as typical of the culture of a period, particularly when the world is as much united as at present. These prevalent characteristics, found in all who are on the same cultural level, whether near or remote, furnish the key to great movements of the times. Many differentiations necessarily occur, which can be studied in nations and other associations. The method to be pursued in these investigations is as follows: Get the chief manifestations of the social forces, and from these proceed to the investigation of the forces themselves. This is essential, since it is the forces which must be directly affected in promoting social progress. Thus, the inquiry leads to the consideration whether economics, politics, religion, or science is dominant, and what the relations and relative prominence of the forces are. At first, it may seem as if the vast material to be taken account of in the inquiry is unmanageable. In the great and complex network of society it is, however, possible to discover central and dominant factors which are indicative of the general characteristics of the times.

In a volume on *The Age and the Church* I have given a full account of the method to be followed in investigating the age in the first chapter and the Appendix.

A class of students in sociology thoroughly investigated an American city with twelve thousand inhabitants for the purpose

of determining the four most dominant social forces. For months the causative factors in the society of the city had been objects of special inquiry, and as a result of the whole research the dominant forces became the problem. The inquiry was altogether new to the citizens. They had never thought of the subject, not even the professional men. When asked about the dominant forces at work, the most conflicting answers were given. The investigators were nearly unanimous as to the most dominant force, namely, economic pursuits. But diversity prevailed in respect to the other three forces of greatest dominance; the weight of the testimony was, however, in favour of the pursuit of pleasure as second in dominance, while education (it was a college city) came third, and religion fourth. The result astonished the most thoughtful citizens, but many who dissented at first, after reflection, admitted the correctness of the conclusions. Having attained this result, it at once became evident what was needed in order to insure the best social progress. The investigation showed that æsthetics and politics were so completely neglected as not even to deserve mention among the dominant forces. Only at election time was there any political interest, and then the forty-five saloons were the centres of influence.

Essentially the same results were obtained by investigating two other cities of larger size in a different part of the country, of which one was also a college town. The economic force was dominant, the recreative came second, and æsthetics last.

374. From the preceding discussions we conclude that from the ethical standpoint the adaptation of man to his environment is one of those half-truths which are liable to perversion. Ethical adaptation implies that in ethics a standard is presented to which persons and things are to be adapted. Instead of conformity to an age, therefore, it is required that, however prevalent principles and practices may be, they must be tested by their conformity to truth and right. Measured by the ethical ideal, the standard adopted by an age may be found very low.

The very possibility of the adaptation of the age to the

ethical ideal implies that this ideal is involved potentially in the reality, just as a statue in a rough block of marble. The truth is not to be adapted to the times so as to conform it to the age, but the age is to be adapted to the truth. An age may need least what it wants most. There is in real adaptation something which reaches far below the usual acceptance of what is called "practical." The most profound truth is usually also the most practical truth. True adaptation is so comprehensive that it is possible only when all of the factors it involves are considered. It is absolutely realistic; and one ought to know thoroughly the total actuality in order to apply to the totality the means of progress. The social present is a mass of possibilities; the ethical thinker selects from the actual potentialities whatever is most available for progress toward the ethical ideal of society.

Huxley, in *The Romanes Lecture*, clearly distinguishes between the ethical and cosmical process, thus making the cosmical, as the law for man, inferior to the ethical. This confirms what was stated above, that adaptation to the physical environment cannot be the supreme law. He says: "Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of another which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect to the whole of the conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best." He then shows how the practice of what is ethically best "involves a course of conduct which in all respects is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial age of existence. . . . Laws and moral precepts are

directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process and reminding the individual of his duty to the community, to the protection and influence of which he owes, if not existence itself, at least the life of something better than a brutal savage."

375. In crises and transition eras, when the social actuality requires most careful study, the situation itself is apt to be too absorbing for profound investigation. So urgent are the immediate necessities thought to be that expedients to meet pressing needs are resorted to, while the causes and a permanent cure by their removal are not considered. Those agitated by great social problems become impatient when asked to turn from their real or imagined grievances to investigate similar problems in the past and apply the lessons to the present. Sometimes a theory, like that of Marx, fascinates them and ends all inquiry. In crises events move so rapidly, and so many new conditions are created, that the past seems out of date and no longer applicable. Even scholars come to look on the situation as so unique as to be judged only by itself. It is overlooked that the causes run back into the past, though they be hidden. Thus crises have an overwhelming and paralysing effect. Things seem to move of themselves, the impelling forces are said to be in the air, secret, acting with a kind of demoniac power, and beyond human control. Yet it is then that purposive action is most needed; and a strong will, an illuminating thought, a creative word, may evolve order out of anarchy, symmetry out of chaos. Then a formative principle, an overmastering idea, and a hopeful aim may bring salvation to society. The very rapidity and force of the movement make a guiding truth the more important. Had the actors understood their time, the French Revolution would have been different. The present is too much treated as if a creation out of nothing and to be guided by spontaneous impulses. Such crises can be understood only by tracing them to their historic sources. They are

culminations of evolutionary processes, when great interests are thought to be at stake, when deep feeling is excited, when something ought to be done, and yet the course is uncertain—times when the mind is frenzied and psychological interpretations are required. The actors, too, are involved in the historic processes and moulded by them. It is thus clear that by the actuality to be studied is meant the present in the light of all the forces which have created it.

Shallow efforts at reform are apt to be characterised by a denunciation of existing social conditions without regard to their origin, and by efforts at relief without considering the removal of the causes. Were the efforts spent in relieving poverty, in curing intemperance, and in reforming criminals directed to the removal of the causes, on the principle that prevention is better than cure, much more might be accomplished for social progress. Individuals may indeed be saved; but evil causes and systems are transmitted unimpaired from age to age and continue their destructive work. The eggs are handed down from which a fresh brood springs.

In the study of the social causes three factors deserve special inquiry: the character and spirit of society; the dominant and subordinate social movements; and the social environment which promotes or opposes the existing character and tendencies. All three interact and influence each other and must be studied together.

“One thing the dominance of natural science has impressed on all departments of thought: the value of reality and the importance of facts as its interpreter. The actuality is the source of all laws, the ground of speculation, and the basis of valid systems. . . . Like the solution of a proposition in geometry, the next step in ethics can be taken only if all on which it depends has preceded. All improvement, therefore, like education, depends on systematic progress. . . . The social actuality must be known in order that there may be

economy of effort, no attempt being made to do again what has already been done; in order that what is yet required may be learned; in order that the social factors to be moulded and developed may be understood; and in order that the next social step which logically follows may be taken. These considerations indicate the importance of considering thoroughly the social actuality as the substance to be shaped into the social ideal."—*Introduction*, p. 220.

376. After mastering the character of society, always including the causes of the existing actuality, three problems are presented: some things are to be destroyed, others retained and developed, and new factors added. This means that the work is partly destructive, partly positive, but throughout critical. The positive work can be called constructive, and involves the retention of the old of value and the addition of new truth. The social work is not like a natural evolution, dependent on the thing to be evolved and its immediate environment. The worker in social ethics has not only a definite end toward which to move, but also all the resources of mind and history from which to draw means. He creates his mental surroundings out of the realm of human experience and human thought. His environment consists of the social actuality, the ideal, and the means for its attainment. The destructive work, comparatively easy, is usually undertaken first. This destruction, unless followed by construction, may itself be an evil. A defective government is often better than none. Criticism and destruction have value in so far as they prepare for construction. The limitations of the human mind are strikingly illustrated by the fact that usually either criticism or construction, each to the exclusion of the other, holds the field. Hence, we have critical, destructive, and radical ages; and then constructive, conservative, traditional ages. Often errors are so enormous that to get rid of them seems to be the only calling; then, so much of new

material is offered, which appears to be well established that its construction into system seems the supreme demand. Each effort requires all the energy. Taking the period of more than a century which followed Kant's great critical processes, this is unquestionably the lesson: for the most fruitful work, the most thorough criticism of the mind and its methods and of the subjects it discusses must be connected with, or followed by, synthesis and construction. The way to social progress thus lies through construction by means of criticism.

Positive work can, perhaps, afford to let negation take care of itself. A truth ends error, just as light does darkness. Virtue makes impossible the vice which the law can only punish. Schools end ignorance. The wrath over error and iniquity seems too mighty to let the love of truth and goodness take their place. The soil that bears thorns may also bear figs; and to plant a fig tree where the thorn grows makes the thorn impossible.

A new truth is positive; so is a new principle of conduct; likewise a new method of investigation, a new organisation, a new institution. All the most fruitful results of scientific investigation and scholarly research are positive; and, being popularised, can be made the content of society and means for social construction.

377. The nature of society has proved that while we discuss social progress we at the same time consider that of the individual. Hence, whatever hinders the full development of the personality and a proper expression of individuality also hinders social development. Schleiermacher gave deep insight into the true nature of education when he declared that he did not regard it his mission to teach men anything new, but to make them aware of what was in them and help them to unfold this. In the development of each one's individuality to the utmost, eliminating, of course, all that is false or wrong, he saw

the condition for the best results both to the individual and society.

The question asked with serious apprehensions, whether the growing prominence of society will minimise the individual, must be answered in the negative, if the social growth is normal. With the true society the individual will grow, just as society will grow with the individual. Society will be increasingly personalised; the mechanical factor more and more subordinated to the personality. We can at present have no conception what society will be when it attains a full consciousness of itself and its relation to individuals. Sociology values the individual with his freedom in proportion as it values society with its solidarity, both being necessary factors for social progress.

378. The psychical status as the essence of society deserves special inquiry in estimating the existing actuality. Nature, with its powerful influence, has already been considered in its relation to social influence through the effects produced on thought, feeling, and volition. As in its psychical factors society itself is seen, so it is through these that the course of society will be directed in the future. The existing social thought thus becomes the problem, the feeling associated with it, and the impulses it creates. Let us call this the essence of social realism, including all the mental factors, in distinction from naturalism, which eliminates the distinction. This realism involves the study of the science, philosophy, religion, literature, art, the press, and all the revelations and agencies of society. Usually these are studied for their own sake, abstracted from their source; but it is a different thing to see society in and through them, and learning from them how they can be used to further social progress. It is in this light they are here considered.

An enormous task is involved in this study—schools, churches, governments, associations, all that is typical of

the social character and trend. The problem is, in a large measure, solvable by concentrating the attention on characteristics, principles, the dominant spirit. Much of the mind of the times can be found by inquiring whether the dominance belongs to empiricism or rationalism, to naturalism or idealism, to individualism or socialism, to things or the personality, to appetite or ethics, to wealth or culture. It is important to know to which side the pendulum swings at a particular time while society moves amid contrasts. The dominant is apt to be the lasting trend, growing with the ages, and controlling, for some time, at least, the future. Does thought impress itself on matter, the soul forming its body, or do things absorb thought and transform the mind into their likeness? Evidently, many of the most powerful modern tendencies have culminated in mental materialisation,—matter ruling mind. The mind is made a tool and does not even know it.

The change in principle and spirit is necessarily slow, but it has begun to affect large classes. Such a change in the guiding principle, involving the inauguration of a new era, is designated an epoch. The reformation, revolution, or whatever it is called, is a marked factor in the growth of the self-consciousness of society. Unless the signs of the times are misread, society is manifesting its inherent nature and energy as distinct from the things it uses. The advance indicates a cultural triumph of the first magnitude.

In order to get at the deeper social actuality, it is necessary to study the political and economic institutions and how they work; the daily press and journalistic literature generally, as the expression and moulder of public opinion; the popular works, the prominence and character of entertainments and amusements; the schools, churches, and voluntary organisations; the interest in science and philosophy, the place of æsthetics, and the estimate in which culture is held; the

position given to ethics in the schools and life. The study can be made especially valuable if everything is viewed in the light of its relation to tradition, to present necessities, and to future progress.

379. Unexpected revelations will be given to every one who passes from the surface to the depth in the investigation of the existing social forces so far as related to progress. Few studies promise to be more fruitful. In spite of the prominence of theories of evolution, so absorbing has the present become that its sources in the past are neglected, and still less attention is given to the relation of the present to the future by people of average intelligence. Classifying all the social forces under the heads of "work" and "play," the latter, unless for needed healthful recreation, must be regarded as consumptive, not productive. Much of the working forces is exerted for immediate use, merely to meet the necessities of life. Enormous effort is required simply to maintain a stationary condition. Large masses, the vast majority, consume without contributing anything of abiding value. Not only is there consumption by means of pleasure, but vain formalities also consume valuable time. Endless repetition of commonplaces produces no progress. Hence, much social life is so unmeaning, cultivates mere conformity, deadens intellect, does not even help to conserve values transmitted by the past. So far as progressive culture is concerned, the classes called highest may be dead or actually retrogressive.

The hope of progress is centred in persons and institutions which embody æsthetics, ethics, religion, and intellect, such as professional men and specialists, æsthetic and ethical associations, churches and schools. The family, as the great nursery of humanity, is the most powerful institution for determining what kind of forces shall control life. The social forces have been too little studied to appreciate their relation to social progress.

Nothing better can be expected so long as men regard themselves as separate atoms or, at best, but molecules, not as integral parts of the social universe whose past they inherit, whose present they help to constitute, and in whose future they have a share.

Social show and social substance, brilliant nonentities and humble energies, are the striking contrasts. Our period or one like that of Louis XIV., invites to the study of its wasted, destructive, and progressive forces. An age overflowing with energy may abound in each kind of forces and be both worse and better than other ages. Actual progress may take place because the cultural outweigh the destructive and retrogressive forces.

We can apply to the society of our day the sage remark of Ernst Curtius, referred to in § 149, that a man's culture is estimated by the way he spends his leisure. His business or profession probably indicates only what he is obliged to do; but into his leisure he puts his inclination and tastes, and therefore this leisure reveals his heart and character. Important views are obtained by the study of our age in this light.

380. Were society composed of philosophers and scientists there would be more reason for estimating it by a theory which considers only the intellect. But the philosophers and scientists are the exception. As in ethics a juiceless moralism results from neglect of the emotional element, and in education, owing to the same neglect, the personality is not completely developed, so every estimate of society is false which ignores the powerful influence of the feelings and the practical tendencies. Perhaps it is due to cold reflection that in the school, before the law, and in shaping social conditions the impulsive nature with its imperative demands does not receive due weight. Comparatively few subject their feelings to the guidance of cold calculation. Perhaps unconsciously impulse pushes most men irresistibly forward. Social interpretations and arrangements from the view of

reason may be wholly inadequate in the light of the emotions.

The systematic training of the feeling, a subject of first importance, is hardly deemed possible, so little advance has been made in this branch of education. Either the impulses must be suppressed, or they must be gratified in a legal way, else they will break forth and seek satisfaction lawlessly. Native impulses cannot be suppressed; they are constituent factors of humanity. But they can be trained into subserviency to higher interests. Respecting them the principle of sacrifice is demanded, curbing whatever is excessive and abnormal. Society is bound to protect itself against them when false and destructive. In their proper exercise, however, the means of their satisfaction ought to be within reach. This demand is so fundamental that arrangements to meet it are among the most urgent duties of society. The failure to do so prepares for debauchery, anarchy, and revolution. The appetite, with its important function of supporting life and perpetuating the race, is censurable only when made the end instead of the means, when brutalised, and when improperly gratified. The home is the place to meet the demands of, and to regulate, the appetitive and affectional forces. The recreative impulse, especially on the part of toilers, is also justified. The opportunity for the proper use of the powers for profitable labour and for play is a deep need and the occasion of socialistic agitations. Other impulses become general with the progress of enlightenment. We hear of "culture-hunger," and the sphere of culture should be open to every human being. All cannot be equal here; but in some measure every sane person ought to share the highest cultural advantages of the age.

The failure so to model the arrangements of society as to meet the imperative demands of human nature proves how little the social actuality is really understood. Peo-

ple are not taken as they are, but as torsos or measured by false intellectual standards, and society suffers the consequences. Many persons remain children, creatures of impulse and environment, and must be treated as children. If they are not trained out of this state the forces at work in society are chiefly to blame. Social progress will depend much on taking into account man in his totality, and meeting his just requirements as fully as suppressing his false demands.

The sad fate of men, the pathos of their lives, the tragedies of history, are largely due to the fact that men cannot realise themselves by a proper exercise and expression of what they are. Modern studies have fortunately made it clear that man's physical nature, the basis of his feelings and his total physical activity, ought to receive the wisest consideration and best treatment.

Valuable hints on the subject of the paragraph are given by Rümelin, *Reden und Aufsätze*, vol. ii., first address.

381. Among the ideas and impulses which dominate the ages selfishness and altruism are among the most important. We have found a large and important class of impulses which lie between these two and demand recognition, such as were put as justifiable under the head of the egotistic force, namely, self-regard, self-protection, and all involved in a proper expression of self. A neglect of one's own personality may prevent the exercise of the highest altruism.

Under selfishness we include much that is social, not merely individual egotism. Social selfishness is a common phenomenon, such as the egotistic family which is only self-regarding; self-centred associations which promote self-interest at the expense of others; clannish cliques and communities; sects which vaunt themselves heaven's favourites, and pronounce all others accursed; and States whose sovereignty is interpreted to justify the robbery or subjection of other peoples.

Altruism, on the other hand, rises into the domain of ethics, takes an enlarged view of individual and social relationship, and considers the claims of others as well as personal rights. It does not involve the abandonment of any legitimate right of the individual or association, or a vague and sentimental conception of the human totality to which every act is to have reference; but it does imply that the individual and society are to recognise social duties, that to others be accorded what is demanded for self, and that in promoting personal and social interests the claims of others be respected. Perhaps this altruism is most difficult in national affairs. Frequently associated egotism is beheld in its most despicable character in the form of a false nationalism. How meaningful the complaint that you find Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, and Englishmen, but fail to find *men*! It is by means of this false nationalistic specialisation that men are unhumanised. We have seen that the growing unity of the world's thought and life is stamping this selfish nationalism as debased bigotry. With all that is valuable in worthy national characteristics, in the world's great literatures the universal human element is the most attractive feature, a feature that will charm as long as society lasts, while narrow local and national interests change and pass away. The advanced minds are passing from a false social individualism to an enlarged sociality, to such an inclusiveness of humanity in social considerations as sociological ethics requires.

CHAPTER XXVI

PRINCIPLES FOR CHANGING THE SOCIAL ACTUALITY INTO THE SOCIAL IDEAL

382. Difficulties almost insuperable confront us in taking up the principles for passing from the social actuality toward the ideal. There is no lack of ethical rules. They are found in works on moral philosophy, embodied in proverbs as the wisdom of the ages, and proclaimed from pulpit and platform. But they are largely individual or for social application only to a limited degree. Society, sociological ethics in particular, has been too little mastered for a compact system of principles of social progress. To the difficulty of a mere statement of the principles must be added that of vitalising and energising them so as to become a dynamic force for the actual transforming of society.

In treating of personal and associated forces we deal with the most subtle factors, whose influence it is impossible to determine mathematically. Two persons are not like two simple chemical elements which, when brought together, can act or combine in only one way; but for each person the possibilities are innumerable. The same applies to all social action. It is impossible to tell what part of a man's nature will respond to given stimuli, from what fund of experience and knowledge an answer will be made to a question, and what course of action his intellect and feeling will impel him to take. A human being is a compound, and it cannot be foreseen what factors of the compound will be brought into exercise. A general clue

of what may be expected is, indeed, offered by the character of an individual or society. With a knowledge of a man's conscience, his past experience, his intellect, his maxims, his party affiliations, the probable action may be foretold. So if the general characteristics of an association or nation are known the effect of certain influences can be estimated with considerable certainty. Yet we know that the shrewdest statesmen err in this respect. The uncertainty of the stock exchange has its counterpart in politics and social life. Intimate friends misjudge each other.

To this general uncertainty respecting social influence must be added the peculiar difficulties attending efforts at social progress. It does not merely present the problem how men will act in a given situation, but also how to get them out of that situation. The importance of the subject must, however, create a desire to obtain all the light and establish all the certainty within reach.

I take it for granted that it is not necessary here to discuss the question, repeatedly debated in modern times, whether ethical progress is possible. That it has actually taken place is as clearly proved by history as the fact that it be made an aim of life is demanded by reason and conscience. Moral progress must, however, be taken according to its full depth and breadth, as involving the whole man and not merely some feeling, as that of responsibility, or some particular virtue, as that of struggling against adverse circumstances. The removal of obstacles, making the struggle more easy, may be the result of progress. Moral ideas become clearer; perplexing ethical problems are solved, thus making the moral course more plain; the feelings attending this intellectual development are strengthened, as when lying, theft, and murder, once common, are abhorred; and the will is aided in the performance of duty because the ethical principles have been impressed on and embodied in education, customs, laws, and institutions. Janet, *The Theory of Morals*, discusses moral progress in Book

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 261

III., Chap. ix. The same subject is discussed by S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, Book III.

383. The term *Ethology* was proposed by J. Stuart Mill for what he calls "the science of character," which pertains to education in the widest sense, "including the formation of national or collective character, as well as individual." It affords knowledge of much practical value, though no actual predictions. He says: "There may be great power of influencing phenomena, with a very imperfect knowledge of the causes by which they are in any given instance determined. It is enough that we know that certain means have a *tendency* to produce a given effect, and that others have a tendency to frustrate it. When the circumstances of an individual or of a nation are in any considerable degree under our control, we may, by our knowledge of tendencies, be enabled to shape those circumstances in a manner much more favourable to the ends we desire than the shape which they would of themselves assume. This is the limit of our power; but within this limit the power is a most important one."

The tendency of certain forces is unmistakable; but there may be counteracting influences, so that the results cannot be foretold. The more the forces in a movement are understood the greater the probability of a correct estimate of the course of the movement. Apprehending our study as an inquiry into the tendencies of forces, with no undue claim respecting effects, action purposing social progress may attain the greatest available efficiency. This is, in fact, the only rational method for attaining the ethical end, and is the one constantly pursued. We resort to training in the classics, in philosophy, in science, in art, in religion, in economics, because we believe this training will produce a particular result. Such stress is placed on the exercise of certain social forces, as the

cultural ones, because, like seeds, under favourable circumstances, they will produce the intended harvests. For the unforeseeable counteracting influences we cannot be responsible. This study of social causes is closely allied to the study of many natural causes. We may know how certain elements act when brought into contact, but when the contact will occur is not known.

The subject of Ethology is discussed in J. Stuart Mill's *Logic*, vol. ii., book vi., chap. v.

Social agencies, unless force is resorted to, are naturally tentative. Training in the family, the school, the Church, in penal institutions, in every department of life, is of the nature of an experiment. Society is a great experimental laboratory; and the very uncertainty involved in its processes emphasises the importance of the utmost care and greatest wisdom in the use of methods and means.

384. The control of the social forces is a fundamental question in social progress. What creates public opinion and directs social action? In every case we have human nature trying to realise itself amid the peculiar influences in which it is placed. But what part of human nature, and under what directive force? Individual self-interest is mighty but not omnipotent. Men are, as we have seen, controlled by what *interests* them; but what interests them need not have its motive in self-interest. Nothing is better established than that men can and do pursue many objects in which this motive plays no part. An idea has universal validity regardless of self, and ideas are dominant factors in the world's history. Only a monstrous perversion can make self-interest the source of the pursuit of truth and ethical principles, or devotion to scientific investigation of nature or any rational inquiry. The religious devotee, the æsthetic genius, and the martyr to social reform can be so absorbed in their pursuits as to lose sight of personal considerations. That men are con-

trolled by what interests them, and that self need not be the absorbing theme of this interest is attested by literature, science, art, religion, and personal experience. Psychology proves that the human mind has a capacity for various exercises and that such as spring from self-interest are very powerful and often dominant, but that such as do not pertain to self-interest may also be dominant.

Here, then, is a law of universal application : *men are not necessarily controlled by self-interest, but always by what interests them.* Hence, in order to direct and control public opinion and social action, determine that which interests people, give them subjects which command attention and enlist their hearts, some absorbing theme, religious, ethical, literary, æsthetic, scientific, political,—capital and labour, individualism and socialism, anarchism and nihilism. Any discussion which gains the attention for a long time will affect the public; it may, in fact, give a kind of instinctive or intuitional force to ideas continually advocated. Hence the power of fiction, of the drama, of sentiment manufactured by newspaper reports, and of political parties. Thus idealism may become more potent than realism, altruism the guide of life instead of egotism, and reason or faith more effective than the senses. Hence the power of schools in shaping the course of men by determining what shall interest them. That which interests may be for good or for ill, for self or others, or both, for destruction or for construction. The value of education is not confined to the information it imparts, but consists rather in the ideas it makes absorbing, in the spirit it develops, so as to become the rule of life. The basis is thus removed from the theory of utilitarianism, which has so long been an incubus to ethics and a barrier to social progress.

Since ages and nations are at various times controlled by different interests, it is important to determine the

causes of the changes which occur. By developing a subject its hidden forces are made manifest, concealed errors are exposed, and its one-sidedness becomes evident. Its inadequacy is recognised when neglected objects come within the range of the mental vision and attest their value. Progress itself creates new interests which are united with the old ones or which supersede them. The discovery of America enlarged men's conception of the world, gave them new interests and purposes, and changed the thought and pursuit of mankind. The new world made humanity new.

From what is partial the world moves, by contrasts, to supplement the partiality and attain completeness or the totality. A study of modern times reveals the movements from extreme to extreme in a marked degree. The reign of empiricism is followed by speculation, and speculation by empiricism. So general, in fact, has this become that it is characteristic of recent philosophical movements even. Thought in empirical England passed to speculative Hegelianism, and in Germany, Scandinavia, and other Continental countries from metaphysics to empirical investigation. Comprehensive philosophical systems which ignore details are followed by the investigation of details; and this absorption by details, ignoring rational comprehension as much as facts were during the reign of speculation, is followed by vast, all-inclusive systems. Aristotle follows Plato, the reign of natural science follows Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. Signs appear of a new era of synthesis and idealism. The course lies through specialisation to a comprehensive theory of the universe. Whatever the way to it, the mind can rest finally only in completeness, unity. Extremes meet and complement each other. Thus the movement of history from extreme to extreme may be progressive through the following synthesis. Then, during a continuous process of evolution an extreme once proved inadequate never reap-

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 265

appears in its original form. Ideas dominant for awhile and then proved one-sided, or to rest on an inadequate basis, lose their dominance (Plato, Hegel). Evolution, as a grand synthesis of the past, takes possession of the thinking mind; but analysis and criticism come and the demand is made that it give an account of itself and justify its claims. Thus, with the ages, with thoughts and systems, the interest changes.

As food is the basis of the physical life, so what interests men is the basis of their mental life. Self-interest has a legitimate sphere; but the individual and social sphere is larger than self-interest. Much of the difficulty respecting this subject vanishes by sharply distinguishing between self-interest and what interests. What interests a man is a revelation of his character, and that character can be cultivated in many directions besides self-concern.

Self-interest of course controls life so long as the feeling for self is dominant. But when one rises into the realm of reason, which deals with general ideas and principles, it requires a monstrous perversion of the rational faculty to make self-interest the controlling factor. Why the pursuit of truth, beauty, goodness, should be a pursuit of self-interest does not appear. Kant regarded it an essential element of beauty that it is free from self-interest. In proportion as a man rises from what is individual to what is general—as from self to society, from self-interest to truth and right—he becomes absorbed by principles which apply to others equally with self. And humanity uplifts itself as it passes from what is merely local and individual to what is universal.

By mastering the greatest interest on which the social mind is peculiarly concentrated we may find the key to social progress. Some things are to be promoted, others hindered, while there may be special need for the creation of new interests. The dominant interests are usually organised or at least control organisations. The world-wide organisation of economic interests is a proof of their dominance. Natural selection has heretofore, no doubt, played a prominent part in

determining the dominant interests of history. This fact, however, is no argument against intellectual and ethical selection with the growth of culture.

385. It is an old and still prevalent theory that egotism and altruism equally belong to human nature, but that they are irreconcilable. So far as they really belong to man they are reconcilable, and only as excessive or perverted are they antagonistic. Both have their root, as shown before, in the egotic force. The prevalent theory, that what pertains to the individual and to society cannot be harmonised, is a mistake. Suppose that the individual apprehends himself according to the actuality, as related to society and having interests identical with it, can he not then, at the same time, pursue the interests of self and of society? Self need but be properly socialised in order to recognise the identity.

If egotism means an undue exaltation of self it is, of course, in antagonism with altruism. But take it in the sense of self-manifestation, attention to self-interest, self-assertion, and no reason appears why it should not, so far as proper, be a social as well as individual demand. We again encounter here the old and pernicious error, that what is individual cannot, at the same time, be social. To banish this error means the removal of one of the greatest barriers to healthy individual and social progress.

386. The importance of the feelings in social progress has already been considered. The fact that the historic process is so largely dependent on impulsive, non-purposive action, has an important bearing on our subject. Since pure intellect and rational aim are so often subordinate, it is necessary to emphasise the control of the emotional nature and that large sphere, the subconscious source of action. The feelings and instincts may not, when they act, be subject to choice; but they are the product of heredity, character, habits, and customs, and deposits of energy from existing social views and con-

ditions, which exert a subtle but powerful influence. Even the intellectual conceptions require emotion to back them in order to obtain practical efficacy.

Every consideration thus brings out the breadth of view required. All things human must be considered in order to make social progress possible, healthy, and permanent. It involves the total humanity of the world and the total humanity of the individual and society. Perhaps special emphasis should be placed on the emotional nature because most liable to neglect. Much of man that cannot yet be intellectually formulated may find expression in feeling. What is best in the personality and the spirit and heart may body itself forth immediately, spontaneously. Especially is this the case in religion, ethics, and æsthetics, which contain much which cannot be confined to mathematical definitions. Hence, a kind of anticipation or forefeeling, rather than definite aim, is the inspiration to much action.

Cities are usually the centres of powerful movements, the progressive ones included; but the ordinary efforts required to meet the demands of city life are too absorbing and exhaustive to permit of careful criticism of existing views. The profoundest intellectual work is therefore relegated to the few. In order to turn the movement of the masses in the right direction it is essential that the native impulses be properly trained. The greatest stress belongs to the family, the education of the children, the reading, the songs, the recreations of the people, and the general impressions to which the public is subject.

Valuable discussions of the psychological factors in a high stage of civilisation are given by Vierkandt, *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker*, chap. v.

It is a favourable sign that the subconscious influence in the individual, society, and history receives greater attention than formerly from investigators. The subconscious impulses, while the direct result of the character and action of the per-

sonality, are at the same time largely due to the society which affects the individual. All the social influences tend to form character and to make subconscious deposits and energies, acting on persons long before their self-consciousness is fully developed. In but few persons is the formation of character due in a prominent degree to a well-defined ethical purpose. The character of most persons, even in advanced communities, is determined mainly by the secret but effective influence of their environment. Very generally the social surroundings are more powerful than the natural in all that pertains to the distinctively human impulses, the ethical included.

The reason is thus given for our emphasis on the emotions as well as of the intellect, such, namely, as affection, sympathy, and the altruistic passion for humanity. The importance of the will in ethical considerations is well known; indeed, the value of the feelings depends largely on their influence on the will. By the healthy interaction of intellect, emotion, and will each is strengthened and helps to strengthen the other two.

387. Society and its enveloping conditions are too closely interwoven to be easily distinguished, yet the distinction is important, just as between the thought of a volume and its letters, pages, and binding. The tenants change, but the farm remains. The principles of a state continue, but the governing bodies come and go. Generations succeed each other, while the Constitution, the laws, and their execution may remain unchanged. Judges differ in their interpretation of the same law, even give opposite judgments in the same case. Untold diversities are possible with different societies amid the same conditions.

These facts and many others indicate that social progress involves two distinct aims: the development of the best social conditions and the development of the most perfect society within those conditions. The preceding investigations have shown that all is related to the social conditions which in any way affects society or is used by

it for its purposes, such as the nature of the soil, climate, and geography; the political machinery transmitted from age to age; the economic system which perdures however the managers change; and the total mechanism in which society moves, involving religious and moral ideas, notions of etiquette, maxims of conduct, and social institutions—conditions in which society finds its sphere of action, into which the children are born, in and through which they are trained. All social creations—schools, churches, organisations—are means through which society expresses itself. Many things, as we have seen, exist in which society objectifies itself, such as the law and political institutions, which have a kind of independent existence or which are the same with different societies, but which cannot be identified with society. Distinct from these is society as a psychical force, as thinking, feeling, willing. Society is, so to say, the mind, which uses all these conditions and agencies as the individual uses his body. When labourers fight individualism, capitalism, competition, they attack the social system in which they live; and when they advocate socialism they show that they want to live in a different social system. They thus distinguish between themselves, say as a socialistic association, and the social condition in which they live.

These two, the existing conditions and the society moving in these conditions, can be abstracted, the one from the other, for specialisation; but so closely connected are they that each affects the other—the social mind and body sympathise and co-operate.

Socialists of the Marx school fight the individualistic and competitive system in which they live, just as anarchists fight the state to which they belong. They thus distinguish between themselves and the conditions of their existence.

Perhaps a more complete analysis of society and all its affairs might favour the following division: 1. Society itself. 2. The conditions in which it lives. 3. The movements of society

within these conditions. 4. The products of society. But the products of society immediately become a part of the conditions in which it lives, and the movements of society within its conditions can be considered as merely a manifestation of society itself.

388. Such an ascendancy has been gained by psychical factors and by society itself that culture and civilisation are now possible in regions where primitive man would have starved and frozen to death. Society is created by, and yet creates, its conditions. All through the process of evolution from nature-people to culture-people society and its conditions have been co-operative, have reacted on each other and developed together. As we have seen, however, a change has taken place in the relative dominance. Machinery has become the instrument of the mind, the hand to do its bidding. It supplants such natural implements as sticks, bones, and stones. The growth of the mental dominance has not ceased; there are, in fact, indications that the subjection of physical to psychical forces has only begun.

But, with his victory over nature, man has unawares been brought under subjection of a peculiar kind. He has passed from the dominion of raw, crude nature under the dominion of things of his own creation; that is, he is enslaved by the very conditions which he has made. Society itself has not kept pace with the evolution of its institutions. It is hard to tell whether capitalists or labourers are the greater slaves of the existing social system. The grand economic evolution which all the world admires has constructed a palace for the sake of the palace, and makes the occupant, perhaps ignorant, lean, and despicable, merely the guardian and slave of the palace. His worth is found in the value of the things which absorb him. Constructing things instead of self, he can neither come to himself nor be himself. Everything is said when you call him a capitalist or a labourer.

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 271

Here, then, is a supreme consideration—how society, lost in its conditions, can free itself from the net in which it has entangled itself, and use its material creations for truly human aims.

389. These considerations make it evident that for the supremacy of ethics and the progress demanded, the culture of society itself is the first need. A greater humanity and a more perfect ethical organisation of humanity are supreme requirements. All else is but means for the culture of society and to give effectiveness to this culture. Some socialists insist on a change in social conditions as the means for the salvation of society. In this respect they represent a striking characteristic of the age, an emphasis on externals, regardless of the changes required in men themselves. To counteract this materialistic tendency requires the affirmation of the unconditional supremacy of the human personality, and that society be made conscious of itself and its worth as distinguished from its means, accessories, and instrumentalities. The energy which accomplishes this will effect one of the most radical revolutions in history. When a man is said to represent millions, the degradation to the personality is infinite. The millions do not represent him,—perhaps there is nothing in him to represent. All classes suffer from this burden of things and many are crushed by the weight. Men vaunt themselves enlightened, when the reign of things actually establishes a condition essentially similar to the primitive reign of nature over savages. The problem of first urgency is too often lost sight of: how society can be cultivated in all the elements of humanity and into humanity.

390. Amid the varieties of culture the possibility of the culture of the personality has with many ceased to be an article of faith. The mind is treated as a cistern to collect water, as soil in which things can be cultivated, not as a seed which itself expands. Students are surprised when

told that they are not barns, but life, which is to grow into greater intellect, larger heart, stronger will. Yet the hope is in the culture of the personality, and of society through its members. Conditions apply to all, they are the atmosphere in which men live; but true culture is always personal. A social culture isolated from individual culture is an abstraction. Perhaps the individual looks in vain for schools and churches and communities in which conditions are not more than the men! Then the inspiration to self-culture cannot come from them, but must have its source in himself. Institutions of learning are not expected to train *men*, but economists, politicians, doctors, and lawyers. Not only would Diogenes's search be in vain, but a Diogenes cannot be found. How can a man exploited by business, place, and things be expected to realise himself? What is left to be realised? "Brains for business!" is the cry; culture changes it to the cry: "Business for the sake of brains, and brains for thought, for truth, for the ideals of beauty and goodness!" Perhaps in solitude the individual can work out for himself the value of the personality and society, and then introduce this value into schools, churches, and communities. Education is the chief agent in evolving society out of things. Now society drifts too much on the current of its conditions. True education, always personal, will develop the social consciousness and promote genuine social culture.

This is optimism—the conviction that the present social degradation is not the permanent doom of mankind; that society can yet become itself; and that its vast possibilities, now so often ignored or perverted, are prophetic of grand realisations in the future. Hope is centred also in such persons as realise the fearful degradation, aspire to truly human conditions, and labour for the supremacy of the personality and society. But it is an optimism based rather on the study of evolution than on present dominant tendencies.

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 273

The above contains the essence—the aim of all true education in the family, the school, the Church, in every society—to exalt man and society above things. With the change of spirit the condition for other radical changes will be given. The means are abundant; all the studies can be directed toward this valuable end. The impulse to this revolution can, perhaps, be most effectively created by a thorough study of existing society in the light indicated. Men work to live; but what do they live for? They slave for wealth; but what do they get wealth for? Many have pronounced freedom the aim of progress; but how many are free, and what is the content of the freedom attained? The full development of personal power is a high ideal; but where is this the supreme aim in order that men may become the most perfect personalities? How many persons could be swept away from our churches and States without a loss to what really makes for a true humanity? So soon as society becomes truly aware of itself and exalts culture so as to become the dominant trend, it will find the existing condition intolerable.

In spite of the advances made by statistics, we have no definite means for ascertaining what cultural interests prevail and what progress society is making. The number of students and graduates reported would be valuable if their character and after-life were known. How many build scholarship on the foundation laid in college? The statistics of books published is of use only when the solid works are classified in a separate department. Often stress is placed on mass rather than quality. The use of books in public libraries might be a valuable index of intellect if their character as well as number were given. Solid books are dear, and for that reason students depend so largely on public libraries for their use. Probably they are consulted in the library, while the lighter ones circulate more freely. Oettingen, *Moralstatistik*, calls attention to the impossibility of getting trustworthy data respecting the

actual interest in solid literature. "It is a sad evidence of the materialistic trend of the times that the official organs and statistical bureaux care more to learn how many hogs and sheep, oxen and calves, are consumed per head, than how much solid intellectual nourishment the whole people or individuals consume."—P. 553.

Educators complain that the students do not come to them with an impulse to learn. Indeed, we are told that they do not go to school on their own impulse, but because *sent*. But why is there this lamentable indifference to real education on the part of the young? They but reflect their environment, whose spirit they have imbibed. What a revelation of the intellectual character and inspiration of the families, churches, and communities from which these pupils come!

391. The chief thing, therefore, is that society itself turn its face, instead of its back, to progress. Hegel says that it was in Greece that man first stood on his head; that is, there he made thinking the basis of life and walked by thought. Every substitution of things for men is fatal from the ethical point of view, which is the value-standpoint. The world can mould the mind, making it simply the mirror of its things and vanities; or the mind can mould the world, stamping on things its ideas and making them the mirror of mind. Hence our emphasis on the change of the social spirit, the means of radically altering the relation of society to the conditions through which it acts. Social study is leading from abstractions to reality, from myths to realism and actuality, thus furnishing a genuine basis for social culture. The investigation which leads into the real enegries of society shows that much which pretends to peculiar social exaltation floats like a cloud over society without affecting its movements—whims, empty notions, vain visions. This is called an age of science; but where are the truly scientific societies? It is called an age of culture; but where is society more than superficially touched by literature and

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 275

art? How to change what is now an abstraction, a mere phrase, an empty notion, a symbol, into an earnest personal and social reality, is a mighty problem. How can, where leisure abounds, the cultural energies receive some of the attention now absorbed by the economic, the appetitive, and the recreative forces?

392. So far as social conditions are concerned, progress is largely a process of capitalisation; that is, it produces more than it consumes and makes its overproduction a possession of the future, in which it becomes a producing factor. Production always involves consumption to produce strength; but consumption does not always involve production. There is productive consumption and non-productive consumption. Production differs in kind, as in economics, art, intellect; it differs also in amount. Some ages live on the past; others transmit capital to the future, differing in kind and amount. So every age has consuming and non-productive classes, while others are both consumers and producers. Here we have a key to determine the place of classes and entire ages in the work of social progress.

Capitalisation which produces an abiding social result is of special value. It is impossible to tell what any of the hundreds of millions who have wrought to produce our age contributed; but it is certain that those wrought most effectively who produced permanent effects. The persons from whom these emanate can seldom be traced, and therefore the energies can be called "anonymous forces." But some prominent effects can be traced to their sources. Certain schools of thought have been like great States whose dominion was long and mighty. Systems of thought, like dynasties, have ruled nations and ages; and particular ideas were like individual monarchs of commanding influence in the dynasties. These producers of great ideas and systems are leading names in cultural history and pertain to all departments of thought and art.

Among these permanent contributions are words which crystallise the culmination of a process of thinking; thoughts that continue to live; proverbs which pass from people to people and from age to age; abiding literary productions; songs, models of beauty and power, forms, manners, and customs, which enter and continue to influence society; lasting organisations and institutions; everything, in fact, that obtains and retains social currency. Contributions like these are the most effective, because they have a continuous moulding influence on society; and those who originate and institute them are the chief agents in social progress.

Culture-products appeal to and stimulate culture. Hence, one of the chief factors in social progress consists in the appropriation and conservation by society of the cultural creations of individuals. Scholars think and work, speak and write, for society. This social impulse gives their life much of its highest value and most fruitful inspiration. The works of an author, for instance, are read, their thoughts appropriated and made a public possession, and thus they become an energy and permanent factor in social evolution. The social effect of the individual author is heightened by preserving his works for future generations to read; but even without that his influence may be great and lasting. The individual's thought is wrought into the social tissue. We cannot estimate the influence of creations which attain an existence independent of their author, in the form of books, or works of art, or inventions. The social contents of the ages consist largely of past individual and social products; they are inheritances to which the heirs perhaps add little. Whole schools, churches, and ages are characterised as reproductive rather than productive. Whoever in any way adds to the permanent social content becomes an enduring social energy. Long after the solitary thinker and toiler for humanity has been forgotten

society continues to walk in the light he gives. Therefore social action is not confined to what is done by society itself; it also includes all that individuals do for human welfare. Who can tell what the first thinkers, statesmen, poets, and artists have been to society? Not only what they themselves did, but also what they impelled others to do, must be taken into account. As culture develops and embraces the whole world in its sphere, there will be a still greater influence of intellectual creations. Already the world-thoughts are celebrating their advent.

Permanent social agencies are such factors as truly express human nature and are adapted to its needs, whether or not the agencies are embodied in institutions. No other agencies, however embodied in organisations and institutions, can endure. Evolution is a process for the manifestation of human nature amid the various conditions to which it is subjected; and the social perfection at which the social ideal aims consists of the full manifestation of associated human nature amid the best conditions. Whatever is manufactured, artificial, imposed from without, or is in any way contrary to nature, can have only a temporary influence. It may last for a while because it meets certain demands, and may even become historical; but the historical is final only so far as it meets the final requirements of humanity. Who would think of returning to the feudal system? The individual possesses an advantage over society in that he has a realm of freedom of investigation besides his sociality, while society has only the force of its sociality with its fixed forms, its traditional customs, and its hereditary contents. Its hope of progress is that individuals will break through this crust and make their personal progressive elements social.

In the Library of the British Museum, where the above paragraph was written, the multiplicity of subjects, the number

of authors, and the enormous stacks of books are bewildering. Even those volumes which surround the reader under the great dome, eighty thousand in number, have an overwhelming effect. Yet the vast collection deposited in this library is but a fraction of what the past has produced. It is impossible to form an adequate conception of all that has been wrought out in a single department even, and has somehow affected society. Only a part of past productions has come down to us. All the works, whether preserved or lost, are individual in their creation, but their authors were under the influence of society. The thousands of earnest workers in the library labour for society. Society takes what is offered and transmits to coming generations these vast treasures.

The history of any permanent organisation illustrates the power of enduring institutions. They establish the course which men continue to take, the method they pursue, perhaps the very thoughts and aims which inspire them. A monarchy, a republic, a church are illustrations of abiding power. The councils of the early Christians testify to the influence of associate action when made permanent and yet living. The decrees of the councils established the orthodox doctrines for countless millions and for many ages.

393. Social progress has been vague because the factors involved in it were not understood. Individual progress was clear; but how it became social was not apprehended. Every deeper view has proved that society cannot be developed as a totality, like an animal. Insuperable difficulties were also involved in the notion that society is literally a union of individuals. All history testifies that individual culture need not become social culture. It was urged that individuals think, feel, and labour for society. But how? If society cannot be cultivated as an organism, and if individual culture is not necessarily social culture, the way to the progress of society seemed barred or at least beyond the reach of rational purpose. The difficulty is overcome by the true

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 279

conception, which shows that society is the product of the interrelation and interaction of individuals, who make it without losing their personal identity, and who, in turn, are moulded by it while it remains distinct from them. It is concentrated energy, a real unity, the bond of union consisting of the forces actually working and passing between individuals. Society, constituted by the social forces, it being what and as they are, undergoes the same changes as these forces. Social culture is individual culture, but the culture of the social energies of individuals. Social culture is a process of developing and socialising personal intellect, æsthetics, ethics, and religion. Persons are no more to be trained for society than for themselves; they are to be trained for both, each receiving its due.

Force or the law can only in part determine the places of individuals; often the most important function belongs to education, ethical training, and social experience. The pre-eminence naturally belongs to the strong, and, so far as ethical, this pre-eminence is a demand of society. The forcible subjection of the weak is, of course, out of the question; but they sink of themselves below the strong. Sociologically the leadership belongs to the strength given by education, wisdom, and ethics. The social forces cannot be organised toward perfection by subordinating the wise and good to the foolish and wicked.

394. The elevation of a strong man above a low level is easy; but does it not become difficult when culture is general and a high degree of scholarship common? The impression that society is so far advanced as to be beyond the dominating influence of personalities is a mistake. Even among the cultured the grades are very marked. Any academy of science, any university will furnish the proof. The nineteenth century had controlling minds in philosophy, science, literature, politics, and war, just as

previous centuries. The distance between the common level and the summits is not as great as formerly, but it has not been wholly removed. From the sea-level to the summit ten thousand feet high it is farther than from the Engadine Valley, which is six thousand feet above the sea. Indeed, what would be a mountain from the sea is a plain in the Engadine. But, while recognising this difference, there is no question that abundant room is left for strong personalities, eminent leaders, and heroes. As in the past, so in the future their place will be that of epoch-makers. Their power is only liable to be overestimated when they are abstracted from the social influences which have helped to mould them, and when the force they exert is abstracted from the society which responds to it and makes it socially effective.

No doubt, in the future, as in the past, to know these men will be to know the most essential factors of history. Frequently as specialists they work out the solution of problems which then becomes a possession of the public. They rise above the masses as men of genius, originators of ideas and revealers of human power, authors of reformations and revolutions, founders of dynasties and empires, and expanders of kingdoms both in the intellectual and physical domains. When we speak of social progress we think first of all of strong individuality and marked personality, of men who dare to think and act for themselves,—creators, discoverers, investigators, who break through tradition and lead where others follow, or ought to follow. With a keen sense of needs; with insight and foresight; with an omnipotent faith and a resolute will, they are the prime movers in the march of humanity. Makers of the progressive ages, the ages without them are apt to be unprogressive. In describing them we but indicate leading conditions of future progress.

Now, as always, the epoch-makers appeal to the few. The voices on the summit are not heard in the valleys.

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 281

Culture has as intense and impregnable prejudices as ignorance. It is especially important that the deepest and most advanced movements win the thinkers and authors, teachers, professional men, editors, officials, leaders generally. Even needed organisations may arise slowly. The silent, unobserved forces are often deepest and have the promise of the future.

The psychology of a new movement is a fruitful theme—a single seed often unobserved; imperceptible growth; the rich harvest. Perhaps even the consciousness of the need to be met has yet to be created. Natural inertia, tyranny of tradition, the iron law of custom, must be overcome by something new, foreign, not understood. The natural difficulties in the way of progress seem almost insuperable; but the initiative of strong ethical personalities is underestimated by men who emphasise the power of economics and hold that conditions are stronger than men, and that in the most essential points the individual is dependent on society. That depends on the individual.

395. It is only necessary to recall the chapter on the relation of the individual to society to indicate what errors are overcome by rightly relating personalities to social progress. The most serious social losses result from a communism which depreciates individuality, from a socialism which ignores personal freedom and self-interest, and from the failure to develop the personal powers to the utmost. It is absurd to speak of society as taking care of itself, no matter what individuals may do. Action in social evolution does not cease to be personal because neither purposed nor even conscious. No definite limit can be set to personal initiative. This magnifying of individual power in social progress will seem strange to such only as fail to understand society and social progress. Since individuals are the possessors of all the reality that constitutes the social actuality, it is clear that through their agency all social progress must come.

Another point in the relation of the individual to society is important. It has become a proverb that corporations have no souls. But whence the saying? Men who have conscience when acting alone seem to lose it in corporate action. The responsibility being shared by a number seems to lessen that of each. What a hundred do collectively no one in particular seems to do. But in reality the responsibility of each is heightened by the fact that the action is social. What the person does by and for himself may be of little moment; but what he does in connection with others may direct their action, or it at least sanctions and furthers that action. The very weight of the social action increases his responsibility. Official duty in an organisation, in a church, a city, a State, is thus immeasurably more important than that which deals solely with private interests. This same weakening of responsibility is seen in lax governments and culpable army organisations, where the gravest abuses occur from which multitudes, and even the entire nation, suffer, and yet each official shirks the responsibility of neglect and fraud till it becomes almost impossible to locate it. An empty, irresponsible abstraction takes the place of personal reality.

The personal factor and the responsibility it involves are lost in proportion as associations, governments, and institutions become machines. It is one of the many cases in which society itself is lost amid the conditions of its existence. In a representative government, where the authority of the people is delegated to officials, the dangers with respect to the lack of responsibility are peculiarly great. The seat of responsibility rests ultimately with the people. But this responsibility is shared by millions and so seems diffused indefinitely. Whose business is it to watch the representatives? Often a party loses its personality and becomes a machine to which persons are subordinated.

396. Nothing more need be said of the relation of society to its conditions or of the reciprocal influence between the psychical state and its environment. So long as the adaptation between the two is not complete the social mind may dominate the environment or the environment the social mind. In the higher stages of culture complete adaptation need not, as in the lower, limit social progress. The energised mind can continue to develop on the basis of the environment, making the universe of thought and culture its sphere. The best society always masters its conditions and adapts them to its intellect, feeling, and purpose. In proportion to the development of the social mind and self-consciousness will society seek to objectify itself in its external conditions so as to make them its body, an outer expression of its inner self. To develop the social mind so as to be most worthy of being objectified, and then to make it body itself forth in the most perfect manner, involve the essentials of social progress. Self-culture and self-expression, co-ordinated and co-operative, are the two forms of the task. They are, in fact, so vitally connected that they constitute but one process fully carried out. It is the condition in which mind completely subjects matter and form to its purposes. This means that the environment ministers to the aim of society; that the forms used become a real embodiment of the social substance; and that society itself is revealed by the body in which it moves. A tyrannical government, for instance, is possible only so long as it keeps the people ignorant or weak. Either a form is imposed on, and seeks to mould, society, or else society as the substance, determines its own form and adapts it to itself. Here every species of organisation finds its law.

There is now a strong trend toward social autonomy, society as the soul seeking to mould its own body. Some of the social conditions are so clearly marked out that

the best way of appropriating them is the only problem. Nature is given, its forces are fixed, society depends on nature for existence; and the question is how the materials can be secured for human purposes with least effort and to the attainment of the greatest results. Science is largely involved; modern discoveries and inventions, and the vast realm of political economy, are included. To make the most of nature and, at the same time, to get leisure for the highest interests is the chief aim here. We have seen that society is not truly free so long as subject to natural processes or entangled in the very mechanism which is valuable as a means of making society supreme. The value of social conditions consists in the fact that they either emancipate and develop society itself, or embody, in an objective form, the mind of society.

We have seen how dependent society on a low plane of culture is on external influence for impulses to progress. Adaptation to the environment is apt to be followed by stagnation. But with a developed content and with energetic inherent forces a society may become self-impulsive.

397. The second era of social evolution has made it evident that much of the welfare and progress of society depends on the character and management of the State. Among the most important factors in human evolution are those which tend to make the State *right backed by might*. The State as a truly ethical institution impresses its principles on its citizens and also on other States. In its relation to individuals, to organisations, and to international affairs it makes questions of right supreme. The law then becomes an ethical standard, both as a coercive and an educational power. It is true that history shows that "interests are, in general, mightier than ideas"; but this is not necessarily the case in the higher stages of evolution. The conflicting interests within and without the

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 285

State are to be harmonised according to the impartial principles of right. The categorical imperative must be applied as rigorously to States as to other associations and individuals; that is, the principle of action must be such that it can be made a general law applicable to all similar cases. It is not evident why the Golden Rule should be applicable to individuals and not to States and all associations. The fact is, that the ethical demands on an association increase with its size and the interests involved.

The subject of political ethics is in a crude condition. How far a State is to be judged by the same moral principles as the individual is in dispute. When called a personality, the State seems liable to the same law as the individual. Treitschke, *Politik*, vol. i., p. 105, however, holds, "that the moral standard for judging a state must be taken from the nature and the aims of the State, not from the moral standard of an individual." But if the State can ignore evident ethical laws, how can it enforce them on others? The nature of the State must, of course, determine its ethics; but its standard ought certainly not to be lower than that of the individual.

With the ethical development of the State we look also for that of all institutions within its bounds, such as the Church, schools, benevolent establishments, and organisations.

398. There are ethical requirements respecting which the individual feels himself painfully inadequate. His powers, his time, his opportunities, are severely limited. A harmonious development of all the human powers has become immeasurably more difficult in our day, with the richness, comprehensiveness, and complexity of modern thought and life, than in ancient Greece. So great are the diversities amid which the human being is now thrust that it is impossible for the largest mind with the longest life and the utmost diligence to reach the summits attained in each of the various specialties. Even if each

specialist were to represent his department to perfection, no individual mind can form a synthesis of all the excellences developed. With the advance of knowledge the division of labour increases and specialties are multiplied. Every now and then persons may co-operate to produce a synthesis, but it usually becomes the occasion for new specialisations. This process can be observed in philosophy, in the departments of physical science, in the human sciences, in art, and even in practical life.

What is impossible for isolated individuals may, however, be accomplished by society. Each association must indeed limit itself in order to attain a high degree of excellence, a kind of specialisation similar to that required of individuals; but these societies can recognise each other, can be correlated and federated, and thus form a totality in which all their excellences are embraced. In this is seen a social perfection distinct from individual perfection, and far surpassing the latter in a synthesis of excellences, possessing a many-sidedness and completeness which can never be found in an individual. In order that such a social synthesis may be possible, a unity of societies is required, which is far more perfect than any yet attained.

Societies one in the aim of social perfection may specialise on all departments of human interests, and thus, in their specific tendencies, present the greatest variety. The organisation of society on an ethical basis does not, therefore, imply monotony or general uniformity even, but only agreement respecting the moral character and the ultimate aim. The theory that men are united in proportion as they are alike does not hold good in all cases. The stress is rather to be laid on their agreement in the fundamentals or the supreme interests. An academy of sciences may leave room for the most diverse departments of scholarship, the scientific aim and pursuit being the bond of union. The same is true of ethical, religious, and economic societies. Diversity may, in fact, add to the value

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 287

of an association and increase the real unity, while monotony makes the combination a mere repetition of the same factors and therefore mechanical. The ethical organisation need not involve a tendency to uniformity, but may be promotive of the infinite variety of real life. The principles of unity, in order to be truly ethical, must themselves be kept living so as to prevent their degeneration into a shallow and formal legalism.

399. From the very nature of the case no finality can be claimed for the discussion of sociological ethics. Every science, especially every human science, bears the stamp of the limitations existing when it appears. We cannot project ourselves into the future or create the science of the future. But with the postulate that the ethical organisation of society is supreme, that economics, politics, and the other social forces and interests be permeated by ethics, we can test the existing society, can fathom the meaning of social needs, and determine certain conditions of progress; but, at best, we move tentatively, recognising new needs as they arise, and meeting each demand as it appears. Thus, while there are general principles, it is equally true that each age and each society has its specific duties, must do its own thinking and its own work.

Just now the appreciation of ethics and the establishment of its right to rule are the most urgent demands. Much of the needed work will depend on small and local, but advanced, societies, the circle of influence ever widening until it reaches social groups, larger organisations, States, and humanity. The basis for future progress will be laid if sociological ethics creates an impulse toward the ethical organisation of society, which is the first and most fundamental condition for taking the long step from what is to what ought to be.

We cannot foretell how far the ethical societies already established will meet the requirements made by sociological ethics. What is needed, however, is not merely

societies with an ethical aim, but the organisation of all societies on an ethical basis, with the purpose of making the ethical factor supreme in every aim. An ethical condition, to be shared by all, ought to be promoted by all.

When it is said: "Law is stable; society is progressive," I prefer to say that a progressive law is also possible and can be embodied in the constitution of a progressive society. The survival of the fittest applies to society, but it means the ethically fittest. Ethical fitness may change with the social conditions. Social adherence to the effete is an admission that the progress made cannot realise itself in society. The living have the right of way; the dead have no right of way, and the dead hand can govern the living hand only so far as this is itself dead. Ethics has no respect for the strange notion respecting unconditional reverence for ancestors, a theory worthy of the primitive savages whom it dominates. Their devotion to the memory of the forefathers requires a slavish adherence to their views and practices. It is the worst abuse of ancestors to turn into a dead possession or a petrification what they left as an inheritance for life and development. If the ancestors themselves believed that the best use to be made of cereals is to bury them with mummies, is it a crime to correct the error and put the seed where it will yield an hundredfold? An institution which lives on its past record has ceased to live its own life and has become unethical. It is like a family whose boast is an empty name, but whose glory and mission are where it should likewise be,—under ground.

Much that has a bearing on social progress is here omitted, because already stated explicitly or implied, such as the natural environment and geographical situation, the division of labour, a favourable economic condition, the increase of population and the growth of cities, migration and intercourse with foreigners, and all proper means for increasing the stimuli of society and the responses to the same.

400. Many problems arise from the conditions and tendencies of modern life which ought to be discussed if details could at all be entered. As it is, it must be left for each investigator to apply to them the principles enunciated. Among the burning questions which deeply concern progress are those which have their basis in the social order, the industrial situation, and the relation of the classes. With the modern ideas of freedom and equality, the economic and social distinctions present problems of the gravest moment. Some theories of human betterment seem to threaten the continuance of the conditions and means of progress handed down from the past. To the relation of capital and labour, of rich and poor, of idlers and workers, must be added another: that of the educated and the ignorant. Perhaps the last is one of the most difficult problems. All who work, whether with the intellect or muscle, have in the fact of work a bond of union, and everything points to unity and co-operation as the result which evolution must eventually produce. How this is to be brought about is, however, still doubtful. Not in lowering economic efficiency is there promise of relief—production ought to be stimulated to the utmost, so far as proper. But the hope is in permeating economics, which is fundamental for every human being, with ethical principles as the supreme directive. With normal production in a favourably situated land, all the worthy inhabitants ought to be provided for, though absolute economic equality seems impossible.

Men, however, do not need wealth in order to be happy; but in exact proportion as intellect advances and affects all classes will the demand for culture increase. Specialisation is required for eminence in a particular department; but how many are, by their very situation and labour, debarred from such specialisation? With present circumstances, even a liberal education is within the reach of but a limited number. It is a serious question, how far the

most advanced nation, with the large majority excluded from the higher education, can be called "enlightened." This, then, is the problem: Will the vast majority always be doomed to comparative ignorance, shut out from the higher culture, and therefore from many of its advantages? This single question, when its full meaning is grasped and when the agitations to which it is likely to give rise in the future are considered, affords some idea how enormous the task involved in the problem of social ethics. And yet the present teems with similar questions, and more are likely to arise with the progress of evolution. This much, at least, is now certain: social peace and welfare can be expected only if those who possess advantages, whether of wealth or culture, use them altruistically, especially for such as constitute the toiling millions and labour in material things for the better-situated classes. The growth of social solidarity will tend to make men share more and more the common lot, that is, to share their joys and sorrows and their temporal conditions in general.

401. In every investigation an important point is gained whenever a definite problem is presented clearly to the mind and made the object of specific effort for solution. That this is done by sociological ethics is a very modest claim respecting its real merits. It accomplishes much more. This third division presents perfection as the social ideal; considers the actuality which is to be transformed; and suggests principles for the transformation of the actuality into the ideal. The very nature of the case required that much of the discussion be tentative. But even this may be of great value in considering a subject whose development belongs almost wholly to the future. The harvest must not be expected at seedtime. A great result will be gained if ethics can be embodied henceforth as an integral part of sociology, and if its momentous problems receive the attention they deserve from stu-

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 291

dents of society. With ethics embodied, we may expect sociology to take its place as truly a human science and the true science of human society.

CONCLUSION

402. The preceding pages have been largely devoted to the constituent forces and factors of society which are apt to be overlooked and yet are essential for social interpretation. Nowhere is it implied that a human individual can be literally separated into these forces as a chemical compound into its elements. But a study of these forces, of their correlation, of their social action, throws the needed light on the nature of society, on social evolution, and on sociological ethics. Society, as a product of the relation of individuals, of the interaction, concentration, co-operation, and conflict of their forces, presents that social realism which has throughout been the object of our search. Society is a real energy of incalculable power, but an energy which does not inhere in a literal organism. Social energy is a union or organisation of forces which emanate from individuals. All persons are in some degree involved in this organisation who psychically receive from or give to others, that which they take or give constituting the social essence. Whatever any one possesses aside from this is private, not social. In this relation between the individual and society both retain their distinctness and reality, while the most intimate relation is established between them.

A synthesis might be asked for after this analysis. But just as after psychical analysis the psychologist can point to the mind itself and its operations as the synthesis, so the sociologist can point to society for a synthesis of the social forces. With this synthesis of the forces, as seen in social action, constantly before us, we come to associations and social groups with the query, What constituent

elements enter into the society and interpret its action? The value of sociology consists largely in the fact that it furnishes the principles and methods by means of which all association can be interpreted by discovering its elements.

Our purpose throughout has been to make the interpretation scientific, systematic. Three fundamental and comprehensive problems we found to be involved in this purpose: the inherent nature of society; the manifestation of this nature in the process of development; and what, taking all the social data into account, society ought to become. By omitting either the Nature of Society, Social Evolution, or Sociological Ethics, numerous weighty questions remain unanswered; but in these three divisions, of which each occupies a realm peculiar to itself, a place is found for every legitimate inquiry respecting the science of society. It is no disparagement to sociological investigation that it necessarily deals with large generalisations, concentrating attention on principles, great ideas, laws; on what is characteristic, typical, meaningful. These are so rich because they involve the whole universe of social fact and detail.

Amid the difference in the matter, the scope, the relations, the division, and the method of sociology, it became necessary, first of all, to secure a firm basis and a valid and comprehensive scheme for the construction of the science of society. Since this difference is characteristic of the works of able sociologists, there was hope of attaining the required basis only by going to society itself, past and present, the aim being to interpret the social reality with the aid of the light of former investigators. That amid the babel of voices the new definitions, division, method, and construction will meet with dissent is to be expected. It will, in fact, be welcomed if it leads to something better. No sociological work can, for a long time, hope for finality; its value must be estimated by its help along the

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 293

way toward finality. Even at the risk of the charge of presumption, the results which have been attained by investigators of the new science ought to be systematised. This will afford a basis for criticism, and may prepare the way for progress, however much of what has been put into a system may, through later researches, be modified or rejected. Permanent and continuous progress in sociology cannot be expected until the fundamental questions of definition, scope, and general outlines are agreed upon.

As in the case of every science, especially a human science so rich and complex as sociology, a long time will be required before the science of society is clearly apprehended by the mass of social students, is sharply separated from allied subjects, and can carry to satisfactory completion the constructive work required. Sociology being still in its tentative stage, the preceding pages naturally bear the marks of this stage. Every sociologist must regard himself as involved in the process of evolution, as a child of his age, and dependent on what has gone before. But, as we have seen, evolution also has processes of organisation. Not everything remains forever in a fluid, flowing, or even plastic stage. Abiding types, permanent institutions, final methods are obtainable. Reason and conscience are likewise organised during the process, and fixed norms or laws are established. This gives hope of solid and lasting results to every earnest and profound investigator. The basis thus gained is not the end of evolution, but an abiding foundation for future development. Every science passes through such a tentative stage, usually with much uncertainty, confusion, and doubtful experiment, toward a stage of definiteness, of completed culminations, of valid conclusions, and fixed rules, which henceforth, as standards of deduction, become the guide and limit of its inquiries and constructions. Even with such a solid basis and with the general principles settled, the vast work of sociology has only begun.

New problems emerge with solutions; the depths fathomed invite to still lower depths; and the insight gained solicits still keener and sharper and more penetrating vision. Some of the many problems suggested afford to the best thinkers opportunities for a life of specialisation. New questions also will arise with an increase of knowledge. Besides, the correlations and adjustments of the social energies and their products will never end. New occasions for this task will be offered by the infinity of social factors and relations, of which more and more are revealed and seized as society develops. There is no apprehensible limit to the social material, and the complete mastery of its details lies beyond the limits of the human mind. Thus, even with the fundamentals settled, it is the sociologist's calling to labour in an inexhaustible mine. All the rich material offered pertains to humanity in the most important relations, and therefore this sociological material is the most valuable for the investigation and use of the human family.

That we are only on the shore, with the great ocean of truth beyond, can be regarded as an objection to the study by such only as are solely intent on taking what others have elaborated. But, instead of being an objection, it means opportunity for all who want to investigate and think, who are ready to do original work, to become pioneers, and to guide others in their investigations. It is hard to tell whether the inquiring or creative mind is more needed, since the work of the investigator but prepares the material for construction. In the importance of the subject itself as it now dawns on students, in the vastness of its resources, in the magnitude of its problems, and in the fact that the state of society and social knowledge proves that the time for sociology has fully come, we find the greatest encouragement for persistent and absorbing sociological inquiry. Recent evolution shows that on the basis laid by the study of nature rises the

Changing the Actuality into the Ideal 295

study of man; and the study of man in his earthly relations culminates in the study of his sociality. Much of the thought, research, and scholarship of the future will, no doubt, pertain to the depth and breadth of social relation and action.

So far as the preceding pages are tentative; so far as they present problems rather than solutions and directions how to solve them; and so far as they are suggestive instead of dogmatic, they aim to awaken a consciousness of the social reality and need and possibility, and to induce others to enter upon their investigation.

We have epics of particular peoples and ages; but the great epic of humanity remains unwritten. It is a drama which no author can compress into a drama. Sociology attempts to fathom the meaning of social humanity, but presents the results in such general outlines and comprehensive principles as to deprive the epic of that concrete reality which is so essential in the drama of life. The view, at best, is that of a large landscape from a high summit, from which the forms of valleys and mountains are seen, but the details remain invisible. It is with the full consciousness of this limitation that the sociologist ventures on his task. But this task is not in vain if he draws his conclusions correctly. The outlines which he gives the reader can himself fill with substance and clothe with life. He can descend from the summit of principles and laws, and explain with their help the society of the past and the present, following associations and nations in their rise, progress, and decay, interpreting societies and ages by their dominant energies and the forces correlated with them, tracing the steps through which mankind has passed in its arduous upward struggle into civilisation, and estimating the value of the agencies to be used for promoting the future development of society.

APPENDIX

A. (Vol. I., p. 17)—The charge so often made that Carl Marx ignores all but the economic factor in human society is not true, though many of his statements seem to imply it. His friend Engels shows that the charge is unjust; see *Archiv für sociale Gesetzgebung*, 1899, p. 795. But there is no question that he and other socialistic writers unduly emphasise economics in social life and evolution.

Professor Lamprecht, of Leipzig, is the leader of the so-called materialistic school of history. This school does not ignore other historical factors, but they are greatly subordinated to the economic.

H. C. Carey's *Principles of Social Science* is a treatise on political economy and an enlargement of his work with the original title, *Principles of Political Economy*. He says, vol. i., p. 63: "Social science treats of man in his efforts for the maintenance and improvement of his condition, and may now be defined to be *the science of the laws which govern man in his efforts to secure for himself the highest individuality and the greatest power of associating with his fellow-men.*" It is significant that this social science, which is political economy, does not at all make society its subject-matter, but treats only of the efforts of the individual to attain the highest individuality and the greatest power of association.

L. Cossa, *Introduction to the Study of Political Economy*, p. 51, states that, besides Carey, Clement and others think the economic can be called social science.

L. Gumplowicz, *Grundriss der Sociologie*, p. 44, affirms that the three eminent writers on political economy, Mohl, Stein, and Gneisenau, viewed "society chiefly as an economic concept." He states that it became common to regard political economy as the essence of social science. This is true of

Baerenbach, Menger, and many others who have made a specialty of economic studies.

Some writers absorb economics in sociology. Maurice Block, in the article on "Social Science" in *Lalor's Cyclopadia*: "There is a science which concerns itself with the means of satisfying our material wants; there is another which has to do with our moral wants; the one is political economy, the other moral science; it is, therefore, the union of the two which constitutes *social science*." Here human wants are the subject-matter; these wants, however, are individual as well as social, and why their discussion should produce social science is not evident.

The failure to discover the distinct sphere of sociology when compared with economics is quite common. At the British Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1880, Mr. W. Westgarth said: "It is by man acting on man that we have a science. This association of man gives us the science of society, and the association of his labour gives us economic science. . . . Sociology as the science of society has to do with associated man in all his many diversified interests, economic and moral, physical and psychical. Economic science is that section of sociology which has to do only with the association of men in labour and in industrial exertion."

B. (Vol. I., p. 29)—Lecturers on social conditions and their improvement are popularly classed as sociologists. The same is true of experts in social statistics or in some department of social pathology. Books devoted to social themes, whether dealing with fact or fiction, with no trace of science, are dubbed sociological. "Sociological" is thus made synonymous with "social," and the reason for its existence ceases. Even where scholarly classification is expected, sociology is often used to cover every species of social thought and work. This is common in the catalogues of libraries, and with the present vagueness of the term seems hardly avoidable. Under the head of "Sociology," the catalogue of the Boston Public Library puts scientific and philosophical social discussions, likewise books on social pathology and reform and on practical movements.

In the Royal Library of Berlin, the large volume of the catalogue with the title *Sociologie* includes every species of social investigation and discussion, whether speculative, scientific, or practical. The same is true of other libraries. In this indefinite and often contradictory heterogeneity we have a picture of what sociology stands for in the minds of most men.

Order does not emerge from the chaos when we inquire what the schools teach under the head of sociology. The views of a number of educators respecting the meaning of the term are found in the *Report of the U. S. Commissioner of Education*, 1894-95, vol. ii., p. 1213. As the result of an elaborate inquiry it is found that one instructor thinks that "under ethics and economics most of the substance of sociology" is taught. President Finley defines it as "the science of man in society." Professor Peabody, Harvard, regards it as "the philosophy of social evolution." Professor Henderson, Chicago: "The study which seeks to co-ordinate the processes and the results of the special social sciences. It aims to consider society as an organic unity; to study its movement as a whole, its purpose, the conditions of progress." Professor Giddings, Columbia: "Sociology is not an inclusive, it is the fundamental social science. It studies the elements that make up society." The *Report* says: "The most agree in calling it 'a comprehensive science, including politics, economics, etc.' Others call it 'a science of sciences'; 'the study of the social nexus that underlies the various phenomena that are included in the various departments of social science'; 'it is the philosophy of all'; 'it treats of the evolution of science in its broadest sense.'" The report is an eloquent argument in favour of the need of a thorough revision of the definition and scope of sociology, in order to secure a firm basis for future co-operation and progress. The *Century Dictionary* thus defines sociology: "The science of social phenomena; the science which investigates the laws regulating human society; the science which treats of the general structure of society, the laws of its development, the progress of civilisation, and all that relates to society." Other dictionaries leave the subject equally vague. Often the central thought, the germ and nucleus of

all the other thoughts involved, namely, society as the subject-matter, is lacking. It is made clear that sociology somehow deals with society, with social phenomena, social institutions, evolution, civilisation, organisations; but *how* is not apparent. There is an agglomeration of social themes rather than a comprehension of all involved in society as the great object of interpretation.

W. G. Sumner, *J. c.*: "It is a fact of familiar observation that all popular discussions of social questions seize directly upon points of social disease and social remedies. The diagnosis of some asserted social ill and the prescription of the remedy are undertaken offhand by the first comer, and without reflecting that the diagnosis of a social disease is many times harder than that of a disease in an individual, and that to prescribe for a society is to prescribe for an organism which is immortal."

A condensed summary of the views held respecting sociology is found in Palgrave's *Dictionary of Political Economy*, under the headings "Social Science" and "Sociology."

C. (Vol. I., p. 47)—*Method of Sociology*. The method is embodied in the work and may be inferred from that. At the same time it is so fundamental and so much in dispute in sociological investigations that it is advisable to state explicitly some of the leading principles. E. V. Zenker is right when he says in *Natürliche Entwicklungsgeschichte der Gesellschaft*: "The methodological conflict which at present rages between the advocates of our science indicates that the structure has not yet passed beyond the foundation stones, and that for a long time there can be no hope of putting a roof on the building."

The first chapter has made evident one of the most important principles, namely, that for a knowledge of society we are obliged to institute a thorough investigation of society itself. In order to come to this study without prejudice we must not bring any presuppositions which will take the place of facts. That matter is the interpreter of mind, physiology of psychology, the lower animal creation of humanity, can be accepted

by the scientific investigator only after the proof has been furnished. There is therefore good ground for rejecting the method of such sociologists as introduce physical terms for the interpretation of psychical phenomena.

For sociology, a human science, we cannot in every respect obtain the exactness of a natural science.

On the proper limits of scientific interpretation there are two valuable addresses by Du Bois-Reymond: *Limits of the Science of Nature*, and *The Seven Riddles of the World*. In the *Deutsche Rundschau*, December, 1901, an article by J. Reinke also discusses the limits of natural science. Whatever the belief or theory of scientists may be, it is shown that we have no scientific data to prove the genesis of the organic from the inorganic, or the origin of mind from matter. It is also shown that mechanical processes cannot possibly, by any known methods, account for psychical phenomena. For consciousness and its contents physical laws are, consequently, inadequate.

In view of the development of science since the middle of the nineteenth century there is no hope of reducing sociology to "social physics," as Comte attempted to do, or to regard it with Lilienfeld as "social physiology," or to treat it, as some other sociological writers have done, as a department of biology.

Dr. N. Reichesberg, *Die Statistik und die Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, p. 241, thinks the fruitlessness in sociological investigation largely due to the fact that natural law has been taken as the interpreter of society and that the attempt is made to reduce sociology to a natural science. He states that Comte, living at the time when French materialism flourished, sought in society the same laws which prevail in inanimate nature, the laws of a blind mechanism. Carey also sought these laws, but he believed that the substance of society is somewhat differently formed than the combinations in nature. Spencer, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, and many others are declared not to have accomplished more by means of their application of the principles of natural science to human society than to set up a few unmeaning analogies. "They have hardly been able to prove

a single positive statement for the elucidation of human phenomena. Their comparisons, such as that of parliament with the brain and the telegraphic wires with the nerves, may be ingenious, but science has nothing to do with such phrases." By the use of the biological method they have failed to find the laws of human association, and their failure has occasioned questioning as to the possibility of discovering them.

So long as sociology is in an inchoate state its very comprehensiveness makes it liable to be used for ventilating all kinds of metaphysical theories and introducing analogies from other spheres, whether really explanatory or not. "Sociology is particularly open to such inroads of foreign ideas and terms. To some it is a physical science, and these describe human history as a mode of dissipating social energy. . . . To those who hold that society is an organism it is a biologic science, and they try to describe it in terms of cells, nerves, and ganglia."—S. N. Patten, *The Relation of Sociology to Psychology*.

Huxley says: "In the strict sense of the word 'nature,' it denotes the sum of the phenomenal world, of that which has been, and is, and will be; and society, like art, is therefore a part of nature, but it is convenient to distinguish those parts of nature in which man plays the part of immediate cause, as something apart; and, therefore, society, like art, is usefully to be considered as distinct from nature. It is the more desirable, and even necessary, to make this distinction, since society differs from nature in having a definite moral object." —*Evolution and Ethics and other Essays*, p. 202.

Huxley also says of modern science: "It admits that there are two worlds to be considered, the one physical and the other psychical, and that though there is a most intimate relation and interconnection between the two, the bridge from one to the other has yet to be found; that their phenomena run, not in one series, but along two parallel lines."—*The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1887.

So soon as personality is introduced as a factor in the investigation, natural science is transcended. "In no investigation according to the method of natural science is there a

place for the personalities of history."—H. Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, vol. i., p. 295. On the preceding page he says that he has no objection to sociology according to the method of natural science, but that it cannot claim to be the only science of society. Least of all can such a sociology claim to give a science of the history of man. That history has factors which the ordinary principles of science do not recognise. A sociology which seeks only general laws, like natural science, falsifies society; it cannot bring personality under its laws, and therefore eliminates the personality.

Georg Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, also shows that in human affairs the method of natural science is limited. The same is true of Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 2nd ed., p. 88 *et seq.*

Windelband speaks of the "positivistic stagnation," in *Fahresbericht der Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1894, iv., p. 106. He shows that historians are trying to throw off the shackles of a positivistic philosophy. Other thinkers also emphasise the distinction between the natural and the human sciences, showing that the method of the former is only in part applicable to the latter.

C. Menger, *Ueber die Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften*, p. 149, makes a statement respecting political economy which is applicable to all the social sciences. "To transfer the results of physiology and anatomy, by means of analogy, into political economy is such nonsense that no scholar who has been trained in method will think it worth while to refute the process." But it may be worth while to do it for the sake of those not thoroughly trained in method.

The sociologist must guard against a tendency which, as Huxley says, men of science share with all other sorts of men, namely, "to be impatient of that most wholesome state of mind—suspended judgment."

Sociology may be greatly aided by statistics, especially in determining the movements of large masses. Hence wherever available the statistical method should be adopted, as in respect to population, occupations, wealth, wages, exports and imports,

births and deaths, insanity, suicides, diseases, and similar facts. But motives and psychological causes in general are not measurable as objective phenomena are. Qualitative is different from quantitative determination. The limitation of statistics is evident from the very definition. Lavasseur: "Statistic is the numerical study of social facts." Lexis: "Statistic is the numerical investigation of man as social."

In natural science measurement may deal with causes, as when in chemistry it is determined in what proportion elements combine. Lord Kelvin said: "Nearly all the grandest discoveries of science have been but the rewards of accurate measurement and patient, long-continued labour in the sifting of numerical results." In the social sciences, the statistical method is, however, of more limited application. It can never interpret the essence of society. Good suggestions on the value of moral facts in history as compared with statistics are found in A. D. White's address on *Studies in General History and the History of Civilisation*.

We must distinguish between the enumeration of facts and their causes. When in 1880 one hundred American families numbered, on an average, 555 persons, and in 1890 only 493, the numbers themselves do not explain the decrease. The mere fact that insanity and suicide increase from decade to decade reveals nothing respecting the cause, the very thing which concerns us most. A large number of persons of the age of sixty may annually be admitted to the poorhouse on the plea of poverty due to infirmity. But whether the infirmity is due to heredity, overwork, unsanitary conditions, intemperance, sickness, accident, is not shown. More criminals may be sentenced now than ten years ago and yet crimes have decreased. Perhaps the law includes crimes formerly omitted; the police may be more vigilant and the courts more strict.

Social analysis, comparison, synthesis, classification, the search for causes, principles, laws, the unification of the results so as to obtain a system, are constant processes. But great caution is necessary. The sociologist on his voyage of discovery may not be able to discover laws at once. "We do not imagine that we must immediately have laws at any cost,

nor do we think that they can be picked like blackberries, because we make valid knowledge, that is, necessary and universal judgments, our chief aim; and where the laws still fail we are content with the complete observation of the reality, with the classification of the material thus furnished, and with the investigation of what the facts discovered involve."—G. Schmoller, *Handbuch*, p. 980.

Valuable data may be found from which inferences respecting the future can be drawn, without any claim to prevision. J. MacClelland, *Social Science and Social Schemes*, p. 7, says: "Absolute prevision being beyond the claim made for the laws of any science by the true scientist, it is difficult to understand upon what rational basis a place in science can be denied to those conditional laws of society which are formulated from the data collected regarding the history of man—his physical, psychological, and sociological development."

How liable to error men are in predicting even the near future from the causes at work is made evident from the beginning of C. H. Pearson's book on *National Life and Character*.

Anthropology and ethnology are of great service to sociology, but neither covers the whole social life of humanity. Anthropology is chiefly concerned with the physical condition of man as the basis of his activities, while ethnology considers more his psychological factors. Both have paid special attention to the early stages of man. Ethnology covers much the same ground as sociology, particularly in regard to early social conditions. Unfortunately, much confusion still prevails respecting the spheres of anthropology, ethnology, and ethnography, and, as a consequence, it frequently happens that, instead of division of labour, what is discussed in one is discussed by all. Human antiquity or archæology also includes many of their contents.

To define anthropology as the science of man or the natural history of man is too vague, not indicating sufficiently what is included or excluded. According to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the subject includes man's place in nature; the origin of man; races of mankind; antiquity of man; language; and

the development of civilisation. This makes anthropology so inclusive as to leave but little for the other human sciences to do. What, for instance, cannot be included under the development of civilisation?

Sometimes anthropology is limited to the "different races of man, their elements, modifications, and possible origin."

The same encyclopædia says: "Ethnography embraces the descriptive details, and ethnology the rational exposition, of the human aggregates and organisations known as hordes, clans, tribes, and nations, especially in the earlier, the savage and barbarous, stages of their progress. Both belong to the general science of anthropology or the natural history of mankind, being related to it as parts to the whole." Ethnography, so far as differentiated from ethnology, deals with facts, while ethnology deals with theories and principles, aiming at a rational system. The relation is much the same as that of Spencer's "descriptive sociology" to sociology.

An effort is also made to give demography a specific place as a social science, treating "of the statistics of health and disease, of the physical, intellectual, and economical aspects of births, marriages, and mortality."

For definitions of anthropology, ethnography, and ethnology, see *Anthropology*, by Dr. P. Topinard, Introduction: "Anthropology is the branch of natural history which treats of man and of the races of man."

The two books of Paul Topinard and E. B. Tylor on *Anthropology*, published about the same time, are illustrations of the marked differences in the apprehension of the subject.

A. Bastian treats anthropology and ethnology as sister sciences, both making man the object of investigation; but anthropology views man as a psycho-physical individual, ethnology in his tribal or national relations.—*Die Aufgaben der Ethnologie*.

The scientific method of sociology necessarily omits certain religious factors from its investigations. Sociology does not propose to take the place of religion or theology.

The total personality, the character, the heart, the will, are involved in religion; therefore it cannot possibly be exhausted

by any scientific investigation. Science leaves abundant room for faith and may aid faith in gaining a firm basis. When, in 1878, Romanes published *A Candid Examination of Theism*, believing that science alone was sufficient for man and that faith can be eliminated, he was sure that the result he had attained would not be changed and that religion was finally dismissed. But later he found his science not final, and "could reproach himself only for what he called sins of the intellect, mental arrogance, undue regard for intellectual supremacy."—*Life and Letters*, p. 352. In the same, pp. 85-86, Darwin mentions certain presuppositions on which the theologian may base his theory of the universe, and adds: "I could not answer him." Darwin, who adheres so faithfully to the scientific method, is a model of frankness in admitting its limitations.

Sometimes sociology is said to follow the psychological method. But prominent as psychology is in society, it does not furnish the method for sociology. It would be more correct to say that the method is obtained from logic or the theory of knowledge. Society as *sui generis* must take its method from itself. Professor Patten concludes his *Relation of Sociology to Psychology*: "There is, therefore, no good reason for calling sociology a psychological science. It is much better to assert its independence and to develop its terms and ideas out of its own material. In this way progress may be slower, but it will be surer, and in the end will give sociology a place in the hierarchy of the sciences equal in rank with physics, chemistry, or any other independent science."

Taking into account all its factors, it is clear that sociology must have its own method. As it alone makes society its subject-matter it can draw its method from no other department, but must go to its subject-matter for this method. I call this the *sociological* method, meaning that the nature of the pursuit in the study is determined entirely by the nature of society. As we proceed with the study of society we shall find that the sociological method becomes clearer and is fully evolved.

D. (Vol. I., p. 66)—"It is unnecessary to state that the phenomenon of heredity has not yet been explained. Different

theories exist: Darwin's theory of pangenesis and another by Haeckel; that of parigenesis, also Weismann's of 'germinating plasma'; Spencer's of polarigenesis, and many others."—Fiamingo, *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung*, vol. v., p. 321. See also *The Present Evolution of Man*, by G. A. Reid, second chapter.

On the tendency of investigators to emphasise either the influence of heredity or else that of environment, see W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, pp. 7-14; and, on the actual influence of each of these factors, chapters xix. and xx.

A hen which hatches a brood of ducks finds that, in spite of her protests, the ducklings rush into the first available stream or pond. That is heredity. On the other hand, the influence of environment is strikingly illustrated in the case of children carried off and reared by wolves. Some of the cases reported may be fictitious, but others are unquestionably trustworthy. Persons isolated from human society, whether in prison or in forests, also reveal the influence of environment.

Professor Rauber, of Leipzig, published a small volume in 1885, entitled *Homo sapiens ferus oder die Zustände der Verwilderten*, in which he gives a number of instances of persons who had for some time lived outside of human society.

In India, many children are carried off by wolves. Most of them are devoured, but some are kept alive and reared by the wolves. The evidence has been carefully considered and its sources are here given. The importance of the matter for determining the power of heredity and of environment is very great.

A Journey through the Kingdom of Oude, in 1849-1850, by Major-General Sir W. H. Sleeman, K.C.B., Resident at the Court of Lucknow. London, Richard Bentley, 1858, vol. i., pp. 208-222.

Fungle Life in India, by V. Bell, M.A. The accounts are found under the head of "Geological Survey of India," pp. 454-466. The letters of Rev. Mr. Erhardt and the personal investigations of Mr. Bell leave no doubt respecting the cases which came under their personal observation. The volume also contains Max Müller's views on the subject.

Chambers's Journal, July 17, 1852, and September 16, 1882; and *Fraser's Magazine*, May, 1854.

In no instance had there been a development of language or, so far as could be seen, of reason, in the children. The animal propensities had been exercised and developed, but the intellect seemed stunted. Those who had lived with wolves were wolfish, preferring the company and food and life of wolves. Their ethics, if the name can be properly applied in such a case, was that of brutes. Of inherited ideas there was not a trace, not even of human impulses. The stimuli which had come to them had developed only the sensuous life. They were what they had been made by their surroundings and the effort to secure a livelihood.

It has been regarded as significant that in every case speech was absent. Language is evidently a product of social intercourse, not innate. The sounds they uttered were not those of articulate language, but ejaculations which were more animal than human. Professor Rauber says of the cases he considers, that they did not speak a word, but only gave forth animal sounds. Not a syllable gave evidence of an innate idea.

Some of the results of removal from human society given above are confirmed by the effects produced by a life of solitude on Alexander Selkirk. They are found in the account of his life as given by himself.

E. (Vol. I., p. 75)—“The psychical development of men and nations finds its chief explanation less in natural surroundings, the climate, soil, and water-currents, as is taught by some philosophers, than in their relations and connections with each other, their friendships, federations, and enmities, their intercourse in commerce, love, and war.”—D. G. Brinton, *Races and Peoples*, p. 52.

That men were made essentially different by nature and that this difference has crystallised in the various races of mankind is an unproved theory. No one can tell what could be made of the lowest peoples by putting them in more favourable situations for thousands of years. The recent investigations

of savage peoples have not confirmed the theory. There seems to be no valid foundation for the views of writers like Nott and Gliddon, who held that an impassable gulf exists between the inherent qualities of the different races, some being made higher by nature, others lower, the latter possessing only animal instincts and incapable of a high degree of culture. Research has shown that the ancestors of the most advanced peoples were probably once savages and not always in the van, and that a striking likeness exists between peoples of different races when in the same stage of culture. So remarkably alike are the mental operations amid similar conditions that the essential likeness of all men is a natural inference.

A. Forel, of Switzerland, also emphasises the lines of demarkation drawn in the human family by means of race. He speaks of some of the lower races as presenting insuperable barriers in the way of a high degree of development.

A valuable discussion of race and heredity by R. Virchow is found in *Festschrift für Adolph Bastian*, first essay, "Rassenbildung und Erblichkeit." The conception of race he pronounces indefinite, because we know no people which has not been mixed with other peoples, so that to our knowledge no pure race exists. He also states that heredity is a very uncertain factor. The children of parents who belong to different races often differ in general characteristics and likewise in special features. Sometimes the child is like the father, sometimes like the mother, at others it partakes of the characteristics of each. In the same family decided differences exist respecting the colour of the hair, skin, and eyes, in the features of the face, and the form of the head.

So far as race is concerned, there is no valid criterion in colour, form of skull, language, or any other test known at present. This result attained by Virchow is confirmed by the essay of H. Steinthal which follows his.

At the close of his essay, Virchow states that, so far as scientific inquiry is concerned, the problem of the origin of the human races remains unsolved. From a theoretical standpoint, he thinks that the races are due to variations which have become hereditary. He does not attribute the racial

peculiarities to original differences in the human family, but to variations from the original type.

There is much difference of opinion respecting the number and classification of the races. A convenient arrangement is that adopted in the Kensington Museum, London, which is the Natural History Department of the British Museum, where this statement occurs: "All the different races of mankind are commonly regarded as belonging to a single species (*Homo sapiens*). Numerous classifications of these races have been proposed, but it seems best to recognise three distinct types into which primitive man (wherever he may first have made his appearance on the globe) diverged. These are respectively typified by (1) the Caucasian, or white races of Europe, (2) the Mongolian, or yellow races of Asia, and (3) the Negro, or black races of Africa. Around these three types, or somewhere between them, may be arranged all existing individuals of the species. Many races appear to be descendants of direct crosses between well-established extreme forms; while others may have been derived from the primitive stock before its triple division. But all the groups have so much in common that it is difficult to find characters by which they can be exactly distinguished."

J. Lippert, *l. c.*, vol. i., p. 168 *et seq.*, shows how difficult it is to classify men according to races. It has been claimed that the human race is one, that humanity consists of two races, of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, eleven, twelve, fifteen, sixteen, twenty-two, sixty, and even sixty-three. Lippert gives the names of those who adopted these different numbers.

F. (Vol. I., p. 115)—We do not profess to have the secret of being or the ability to interpret its metaphysical essence or substance; but, for our *conception* of being, the ultimate analysis always reveals it as power and nothing but power. We can conceive of the universe and deal with it only as a universe of energy. If there is still a residue after we have resolved all into energy, it does not exist for human knowledge. For our thinking this is final; and, by thus resolving all the objects of

the universe into power, we have that conception which gives the mind the unity it craves and makes the concrete objects, their forms and relations, manifestations of power. We cannot conceive a thing as existing which is not power and has not the power of manifesting itself. How can we know anything that has not the power of making itself known? Our perception of an object is simply a result of the power it exerts on us. We cannot stop to prove that every conception of being is a conception of power, but each one can test the matter for himself. We think, too, in terms of power; an idea that cannot impress us cannot be conceived. To us, then, the universe is a universe of power, and the philosophy of the universe is the Philosophy of Power.

Power exerted is but another name for force; and in the reduction of society to force we have the key to its science. The problem of the different sciences is the problem of the different kinds of forces, of their combinations or interactions, and of the method of their working. Sociology finds its peculiar sphere in the *social* forces, being intent on discovering their nature, their interrelation of co-operation or antagonism, and their operations.

G. (Vol. I., p. 237)—The ethnological collections of London, Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Washington, and other cities, as well as researches among existing savages, prove that this force early became influential among nature-peoples. The implements which have come down to us from the stone-period were difficult for primitive man to decorate, yet they are not without ornamentation. The garments and trinkets of the same period, of course, could not be so generally preserved; but such as are found among cannibals of our own day reveal the lively exercise of the æsthetic faculty. The gorgeous colouring of articles of dress among American, African, Australian, and other tribes, is familiar. Th. Acheilis, *Moderne Völkerkunde*, p. 345, regards it as one of the earliest desires of man to surpass his fellow-men in respect to adornment, the æsthetic impulse thus ministering to vanity and ambition.

Lumholtz, *l. c.*, p. 135, says of the Australians: "The natives are as fond of decorating their bodies as a sailor is." Their figures of human beings are not without symmetry. Even in their children the artistic impulse is active. "The children play all day long, build mounds, draw figures in the sand, throw boomerangs, etc." (p. 193). The men plait baskets, "and they are proud of exhibiting the most beautiful specimens of their handiwork" (p. 193). Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. i., p. 71, says that the traces of men in the Dordogne caves of France point to a time when the reindeer and the mammoth inhabited that region, and that there are proofs that then "men drew to themselves admiring glances by colours and ornaments."

E. Grosse, in *The Beginnings of Art*, has entered on a new and valuable undertaking, which throws much light on the æsthetic faculty and its manifestations among primitive people. He shows that, so far as we can learn, the æsthetic taste dates back to the earliest time and exerted a powerful social influence; and many of its productions among savages far surpass the crude notions usually entertained on the subject. Some of them reveal a conception and a skill which it is hard to believe possible to a savage people. Primitive representative art "succeeds in giving its rude figures a truthfulness to life which is missed in the carefully elaborated designs of many higher peoples" (p. 193). All the arts, with the exception of architecture, are familiar to primitive peoples, and in their essential forms they are like those of the higher stages of culture. "The agreement between the artistic works of the rudest and of the most cultivated peoples is one not only in breadth but also in depth. Strange and inartistic as the primitive forms of art sometimes appear at the first sight, as soon as we examine them more closely we find that they are formed according to the same laws as govern the highest creations of art. And not only are the great fundamental principles of eurythm, symmetry, contrast, climax, and harmony practised by the Australian and the Esquimo as they were by the Athenians and the Florentines, but we have repeatedly determined—especially in regard to adornment of the body—that even those

details which are commonly considered sports of arbitrary caprice belong to the common æsthetic stock of the peoples most remote from civilisation. This fact is certainly not without significance in æsthetics. Our investigation has proved what æsthetics has hitherto only asserted: that there are, for the human race at least, generally effective conditions for æsthetic pleasure, and consequently generally valid laws of artistic creation. As against this fundamental agreement, the differences between primitive and higher art-forms appear to be more of a quantitative than a qualitative sort. The emotions represented in primitive art are narrow and rude, its materials are scanty, its forms are poor and coarse, but in its essential motives, means, and aims the art of the earliest times is at one with the art of all times" (p. 307). The conclusions reached by the author confirm the view that the æsthetic force should be placed immediately after the organic forces.

"Æsthetics," the eighth chapter in my *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy*, discusses more fully some phases of the subject. R. Woermann, in a large and valuable volume, *Geschichte der Kunst aller Zeiten und Völker*, gives the history of ancient art. The second and third volumes are to bring the history of art down to our times.

H. (Vol. II., p. 23)—For the primitive family the works of Lewis Henry Morgan, especially *Ancient Society*, are of great value; likewise, J. F. McLennan, *Primitive Marriage*; Starcke, *The Primitive Family*; and C. S. Wake, *The Development of Marriage and Kinship*. Many other writers discuss the subject; but the above give a full view of the matter and mention the authorities. The work of J. J. Bachofen, *Mutterrecht*, is that of a pioneer and very important; but later researches have modified some of the principal conclusions. Evidently the evolution of the family has not been along a single line, but often in diverse directions, leading to very different results.

C. N. Starcke, p. 91, says of the Fiji Islanders: "The chief's practice of extensive polygamy makes it desirable to establish the child's rank by a reference to its mother."

Even if descent was traced through the mother, not through the father, because the maternity was always certain while that of the paternity was not, this would not establish promiscuity as the rule. It might be simply for the sake of leaving no doubt in any case. But, as intimated, besides the uncertainty of the paternity there were valid reasons for tracing the descent through the mother. The claim of the woman as property by her clan has already been mentioned. In polygamy the children of the same father naturally lived with their mother and were regarded as peculiarly hers, in distinction from the children of other mothers. In polyandry, the children had, of course, to be reckoned to the mother, because the paternity was uncertain. But in all cases the close relation of the child to the mother was apparent. On the mother the nursing, the training, and the home of the child depended. With all that is loose in savage life, much with respect to the marriage relation is settled with great rigidity.

Against promiscuity among relatives is the fact that "the powerful objection to the marriage of near kinsfolk" is said to be universal among savages.—Wake, p. 103. The repugnance to it is at least absent only in rare instances. The same writer, p. 71, says: "The abhorrence of consanguineous marriages can be shown to be general among primitive peoples, however uncultured these may be, and exogamy can be most rationally explained as marriage out of the gens, clan, or group of kinship, arising from that feeling of abhorrence rather than from the practice of wife-capture or forcible marriage."

There were often peculiar ways of determining the relationship. Hearn, *The Aryan Household*, p. 147: "Agnation, as distinguished from cognation, means relationship through the male line only. It traces through the father alone; and it traces through his sons, not through his daughters. A man's brother's son, for example, is his agnate; his sister's son, or his mother's brother, is his cognate. In an agnatic system, therefore, the descendants—male or female—of a sister were not related to a brother or his descendants. In like manner, two half-brothers by the same father were as fully agnates to each other as if they were of the whole blood; but two

half-brothers by the same mother were not related to each other at all." *Vice versa* if the relationship was only reckoned through the mother.

Ammon, *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen*, p. 29, thinks that a state of promiscuity probably never existed in humanity. He holds that its existence has been disproved by Westermarck, *Geschichte der menschlichen Ehen*, H. E. Ziegler, *Die Naturwissenschaft und die socialen Theorien*, and other investigators.

I. (Vol. II., p. 144) — Much in modern diplomacy is as pathetic as it is tragic: the best men are hampered, and circumstances force them to ignore their holiest altruistic convictions. Not that all are, by any means, like prize-fighters, which enter the ring to knock down their opponents; they may resort to persuasion to attain their ends. But to be "diplomatic" has come to stand for cunning and shrewdness and even hypocrisy, in order to gain a point. Perhaps Metternich was hardly less unscrupulous regarding his means than Talleyrand; yet he saw clearly that the state as ultimate has had its day and that the era of internationalism has dawned. Even since his day, however, great progress in this respect has been made. In his *Memoirs*, vol. i., pp. 36-37, he says:

"Politics is the science of the vital interests of states. Since, however, an isolated state no longer exists, and is found only in the annals of the heathen world, or in the abstractions of so-called philosophers, we must always view the society of nations as the essential condition of the present world. Thus, then, each state, besides its separate interests, has also those which are common to it with other states. The great axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge of the true political interests of all states. In these general interests lies the guarantee of their existence, while individual interests to which the transitory political movements of the day assign a great importance, and the care of which constitutes political wisdom in the eyes of a restless and short-sighted policy, possess only a relative and secondary value. History teaches us that whenever the separate come into con-

flit with the general interests of a state, and the latter are neglected or mistaken in the zealous and extensive prosecution of the former, this is to be regarded as an exceptional or unhealthy condition, whose development or speedy amendment ultimately decides the destiny of the state, that is, its impending decline or its recuperative prosperity. That which characterises the modern world, and essentially distinguishes it from the ancient, is the tendency of nations to draw near to each other, and in some fashion to enter into a social league, which rests on the same basis with the great human society developed in the bosom of Christianity. This foundation consists of the precept of the Book of books, 'Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you.' This fundamental rule of every human fraternity, applied to the state, means in the political world reciprocity, and its effect is what in the language of diplomacy is called '*bons procédés*' in other words, mutual consideration and honourable conduct. . . . The establishment of international relations upon the basis of reciprocity, under the guarantee of respect for acquired rights, constitutes, at the present day, the essence of politics, of which diplomacy is only the daily application. . . . Just as men daily transgress the laws of civil society, nations only too often act in opposition to the eternal precepts which govern their alliance."

K. (Vol. II., p. 171)—Mr. Holls shows, p. 211, how great an emphasis was placed on the sovereignty of states. "In all discussions of questions touching the sovereignty, honour, and essential interests of an independent state, too much stress cannot be laid upon the memorable dictum of Cesare Balbo, that 'unimpaired sovereignty is to a nation what her character is to a woman.'" P. 356, he says, that some persons had suggested the establishment "of an international army, to act as an executive force of the proposed international court, compelling obedience to its mandates. This would, of course, mean a vital impairment of the sovereignty of all states agreeing to such a plan, and it would lead directly to a cosmopolitanism, than which nothing could have been farther from

the ideas of the framers of The Hague Treaty. They were careful to leave the sovereignty of each state absolutely unimpaired, and trusted exclusively to the force of public opinion and the public conscience for a sanction to enforce the mandates of the newly established court."

In his address at the close of the Conference M. de Staal, the President, spoke of the work accomplished as trying "to consolidate, while safeguarding both, the two principles which are the foundation of international law,—the principle of sovereignty of individual states, and the principle of a just international comity." Mr. Holls, on pp. 333-334, adds new emphasis to the principle of sovereignty upheld at The Hague. "The point of view maintained by the United States was that of strict legal propriety, and of an absolute recognition of the great principle of complete sovereignty of all independent states. This involves the almost self-evident truth that no obligation, however slight or insignificant, can ever be put upon a sovereign state against its own consent, except by the impairment of its sovereignty. The right to recognise other Powers, or to withhold such recognition at will, is one of the fundamental attributes of sovereignty, and it is not impaired but only exercised when a state deliberately enters into a limited federation or union with other states for a particular purpose; for such adhesion implies a mutual recognition on the part of all members of such federation or union. . . . The veto of one must be as effective as that of a majority, without regard to size or power, otherwise there would have been an abdication of an essential part of sovereignty."

Every recognition of a collective sovereignty is an admission of the limit of state sovereignty. The diplomatic relations of states imply a mutuality of rights and duties. Neither the advantages nor the obligations of a stranger within the borders of a state are equal to those of the citizens. The state is not sovereign over the foreigner as over its citizens, for it is obliged to consider his relations to his own state. W. E. Hall, *International Law*, p. 43: "Until a foreigner has made himself by his own act a subject of the state into which he has come, he has politically neither the privileges nor the responsibilities of

a subject. His allegiance to his own state is recognised as being intact, and he cannot be obliged either to do anything inconsistent with it, or to render active service to the state under the control of which he momentarily is." But this limitation of authority within its own territory is slight compared with that outside of its boundaries.

The treaties into which states enter contain many evidences that they themselves admit a limit to their sovereignty. A striking instance in recent times is furnished by the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, in respect to the conflict between Russia and Turkey. T. E. Holland, *Studies in International Law*, p. 227, says that "the question for decision was whether she (Russia) was to deal according to her good will and pleasure with the Ottoman Empire, or whether the fate of that Empire was a matter which concerned the European Powers in common." The question was whether the sovereignty, in this matter, pertained to Russia or to the European Powers. Russia entered into a treaty at San Stefano with Turkey without regard to the other nations. England in particular objected to this treaty. The Congress of Berlin set aside the treaty and put a new one in its place. "The (new) treaty was intended, in the first place, as a re-assertion of the claim of the Powers collectively, as against Russia, to take cognisance of the Eastern question."—P. 228. "At the opening of the Congress, Prince Bismarck explained that the Treaty of San Stefano must be revised, because it affected 'European conventions'; and the Russian delegates were now prepared to admit that it had never been intended as anything more than a rough draft, to be settled by the collective wisdom of the Great Powers. The Treaty of Berlin was accordingly so drawn as to supersede those parts of the Treaty of San Stefano which were held to be of European concern."—P. 229.

Instances like this can leave no doubt as to the limit of a state in respect to external matters; and the virtual admission of this in so many acts of nations should lead to an explicit recognition of the truth. At the head of its articles on arbitration The Hague Congress gives the names of all the rulers

represented, and these rulers are announced as "recognising the solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilised nations."—Holls, pp. 174 and 381. But is this "solidarity" conceivable if each of the twenty-six states has a sovereignty independent of the others?

L. (Vol. II., p. 186)—After the paragraph had been written a petition for a "World-Legislature" was presented to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, in January, 1902, which confirms many points stated above. It was signed by a number of prominent men and reads as follows:

"To the General Court of Massachusetts:

"The undersigned, citizens of Massachusetts, respectfully petition you to adopt resolutions asking the Congress of the United States to empower and request the President of the United States to invite the nations of the world to send each a representative to a meeting for the purpose of establishing and setting in motion, as far as practicable, a world-legislature. We present this petition for the following reasons:

"We hold that mankind is, in reality, one organic body; that all the parts of that body are actually in vital relations to each other by force of laws not enacted by men, but inherent in the nature of the organism; that the operation of these beneficent laws will be facilitated by recognising and obeying them as far as is in human power, that thus far in the history of mankind the operation of these laws has been imperfect, and that to-day it is impeded by the separation of mankind into many political bodies, each of which claims absolute sovereignty over its internal affairs and its external relations.

"Thus far the relations of nations with each other have been regulated by treaties. We believe that the time is ripe for a farther advance. Since mankind is organically one, it is reasonable that it should have a means whereby it can express its judgment and its will; in other words, that there should be a legislative body to serve all mankind as the several nations are now served by the legislative branches of their governments, where such branches exist.

"We look forward to the development of the organic politi-

cal unity of mankind until each nation shall be represented in the world-legislature, when the concerns of all mankind will be acted upon by the representatives of all mankind, for the peace and welfare of all.

"We regard the union of the sovereign States of the United States of America as a fitting illustration of the possible union of the sovereign nations into the recognised body politic of mankind. As the several sovereign States voluntarily relinquished certain of their claims of sovereignty and thus realised a higher political unity, so a grander union of mankind than is possible by international treaties will be realised when the nations, surrendering their claims of sovereignty in such respects as shall be found necessary and practicable, come formally into the unity in which they already exist by the very laws of their being.

"We believe that the establishment of this proposed world-legislature will promote in a high degree peace on earth and good will toward men, and that the formal recognition of the unity of the race by means of a suitable organ for its activity will greatly hasten the advance of the race in securing all the good things of earth."

VOL. II.—22.



INDEX

A

- Abstraction, i, 9-11
 Academy of Sciences, Berlin, i, 13
 Achelis, Th., on Condition of Primitive Peoples, i, 198; on Primitive
 Aesthetics, ii, 312
 Action, Social, at the same Time
 Individual, i, 164-174; of Individuals and Societies, i, 117-119; what it involves, i, 119-121
 Acton, Lord, Ideas Living Forces in History, ii, 201
 Actuality, its Value in Social Reform, ii, 249, 250; Social, its Problems, ii, 289-290
 Aesthetic Force, Culture of, i, 311-312; Power of, i, 233-237, 254
 Aesthetics, among Nature-Peoples, i, 235, 236; ii, 312-314; Influence on other Forces, i, 236-237; in Literature, i, 234; and Physical Means, i, 254
 Affectional Force, i, 224-228
 Affinities of Social Energies, i, 201-202
 Age, the, a Study of, ii, 244
 Ages transmit according to Appreciation, i, 373
 Aggregation, i, 91
 Alexander the Great, Power of, i, 165; Retrogression through his Death, i, 297; and the Limit of National Life, ii, 124
 Alexander, S., on Perfection, ii, 222; on Moral Progress, ii, 261
 Altruism, i, 241; ii, 257, 258
 Ammon, summary of Darwin's Views, i, 51, 52; on early Promiscuity, ii, 316
 Analysis, Social, i, 187, 188; Ultimate Factor in, i, 91
 Anarchism, i, 345, 372; ii, 92, 108; International, ii, 127, 128, 141-144, 150
 Ancestors, Bond of Union, ii, 30, 32, 34
 Angelo, Michael, his Work and that of Society, i, 153
 Animal Societies, i, 2, 3, 42; and Human Remains, i, 339
 Animalism in the First Era, ii, 50
 Anthropology, ii, 305, 306
 Apjohn, L., on Gladstone, ii, 147
 Appetitive Force, i, 223, 224
 Aquinas, Representative and Moulder of his Age, i, 280
 Arbitration Court established at The Hague, ii, 167-169
 Archæology, i, 24
 Aristotle, Man a Political Being, i, 4, 82; Politics of, i, 20; and Political History, ii, 190, 191; Founder of a School, i, 181; Superior Knowledge of, i, 185; Intellectual Power of, i, 251; Influence of, i, 289; ii, 129; his System made a Hindrance to Progress, i, 342; made an Epoch in Thought, i, 359; left no Intellectual Successor, i, 394; on the Ideal of an Object, ii, 205, 206; Conception of Society, ii, 209; modifies Philosophy, ii, 264
 Army and Navy, i, 217
 Army, Standing, ii, 95
 — the, as a Society, i, 90
 Art, Means of Communication, i, 234, 311, 325, 326; among Primitive Peoples, i, 235, 236; and the State, i, 234; ii, 110, 111
 Artaxerxes and the Zendavesta, i, 171
 Association, i, 13, 80; Reason for, i, 81, 82; Innate Conditions of, i, 82, 83; Basis of, i, 83, 84; Interpreted by its Action, i, 106; Characteristics of, i, 121, 122; Formal, an Organisation of Wills, i, 122-123; Simple and Compound, i,

Association—Continued

- 132-134; Governed by its Forces, i, 142; Animal and Human, i, 144; Unitive and Divisive, i, 195; Power, of, i, 226, 227; Formed by the Recreative Force, i, 229, 230; Primitive, i, 312
 Athaulf and the Goths, ii, 106
 Attention, Social, Concentration of, i, 374-377
 ——— and Social Movement, i, 374-

377

Attraction of Likeness and Unlikeness, i, 86

Augustine on Society, ii, 209

Augustus, his Age, i, 394

Authority and Progress, i, 342, 343

B

Bachofen, J. J., on the Right of Mothers, ii, 314

Bagehot, W., Biological Laws of History, i, 61; Progress Rare, i, 292; on Military Progress, ii, 94-96; Change of Nations, ii, 122

Balance of Power, the, ii, 179

Baldwin, J. M., Psychology of Social Action, i, 188; Social Evolution, i, 267, 268

Barth, Paul, Philosophy of History as Sociology, i, 23; the Aim of Politics, i, 176

Bastian, A., on Anthropology and Ethnology, ii, 306

Beaconsfield, on Diplomacy, ii, 148

Beaurin-Gressier, L., on Social Action, i, 190, 191

Beethoven, Creative, i, 74; Individuality in his Music, i, 171

Bell, V., on Children reared by Wolves, ii, 308

Benedetti, Count V., Origin of the Franco-German War, ii, 145

Bentham's Individualism, ii, 209

Berkeley, Bishop, Idealism of, i, 59

Bernard, Montagu, the Sovereign State, ii, 126

Bernheim, E., the Masses falsely emphasised, i, 150

Bethuel, ii, 22; on Method of Sociology, ii, 303

Bible, the, on the First Society, ii, 17

Biological and Social Relations, i, 54, 56

Birthright of the First-Born Son, ii, 32

Bismarck, Autonomy of the State, ii, 130, 131; Effect of his Withdrawal from Society, i, 297; Influence on German Industries, ii, 100; Limited by State Policy, ii, 144; Origin of the Franco-German War, ii, 145; Private and Social Force, i, 118; ii, 145; Policy of Blood and Iron, ii, 146, 147; Power of, i, 179; on the Treaty of San Stefano, ii, 319

Block, M., on Social Science, ii, 297, 298

Bluntschli, on Sovereignty, ii, 126; on the Holy Alliance, ii, 184

Bodnar, S., the Trend to Idealism, ii, 199

Bossuet, on Society, ii, 209

Brinton, D. G., Causality in Ideal Aims, ii, 200, 201; Influence of Natural and Social Environment, ii, 309

Browning, his *Æsthetics Peculiar*, i, 192

Browning Club, its Social Forces, i, 132

Bruder, A., Humanity and Society, i, 126

Buckle, Influence of Nature on Society, i, 58; Dominion of Mind, i, 65

Buddhism, i, 59

Burgess, J. W., on the Social Contract, ii, 67; the State an Organised Unit, ii, 79; Relation of Religion to the State, ii, 116; on Sovereignty, ii, 126

C

Cadmus, ii, 68

Capitalisation, Social, ii, 275

Carey, H. C., on Social Science, ii, 297, 301

Carlyle, Thought and its Manifestation, i, 54

Cassell's *Dictionary* on Sociology, i, 27

Categorical Imperative in Politics, ii, 285

Changes in Social Tendencies, i, 372

Chiefs, ii, 30; how chosen, ii, 32, 33; their Power varied, ii, 34

Christian Nations, their Dominion, ii, 180, 181
 Cicero, Social Influence of, i, 118
 Cities as Centres of Empire, ii, 69
 Citizens the Essence of the State, ii, 74-76
 Civilisation, Centres of, ii, 69
 Clan, the, ii, 39, 42, 54, 55, 59, 72, 73, 84, 85
 Class War, ii, 231, 232
 Classification of Society, i, 134, 135
 Collective Thinking Figurative, i, 167-171
 Colonisation, ii, 175
 Columbus, i, 77, 349
 Communication, Causes which evolve its Means, i, 320
 Communism, i, 149, 150
 Community of Interests between the Individual and Society, i, 175, 176
 Comparative Sociology, i, 83, 84
 Comte, Definition of Sociology, i, 1, 42; ii, 301; Intent on fathoming History, i, 22; Social Evolution since, i, 26; Need of Criticising Sociological Works since, i, 30; Social Statics and Dynamics, i, 43; Analysis of Society, i, 77; Humanity a Society, i, 126; Altruism, i, 185; Inadequacy of his Positive Philosophy, i, 274; Relation to his Age, i, 280; and Sociological Ethics, ii, 197
 Concert of European Powers, ii, 162
 Condorcet ignores Individuals in Masses, i, 150
 Confederacy of Tribes, ii, 33
 Conformity, Social, i, 222
 Confucius, his Religion Ethical, i, 243
 Congress of Nations, Permanent, ii, 181, 182
 Consanguine Organisation, how disintegrated, ii, 36, 37, 40-42, 56-61
 Consanguinity and Sociality, ii, 12, 13; Evolution in, ii, 13, 19, 20, 25, 26; Effect of its Evolution, ii, 25, 26; how differentiated, ii, 27-29
 Conscience, how evolved, ii, 204
 Conservatism and Radicalism, i, 389, 390
 Constitutional Forces not distinct-

ively Human, i, 231; in the State, ii, 106
 Content of Social Groups, i, 326
 Content, Social, Causes which evolve it, i, 326-332; varies with Social Groups, i, 329; how changed, i, 329, 330; how made Permanent, i, 332-343; much of it Lost, i, 334, 335; last not always Best, i, 335; and Social Action, ii, 227-229; how studied, ii, 228, 229
 Cope, E. D., Congenital and Acquired Characteristics, i, 198
 Cossa, L., Economic and Social Science, ii, 297
 Courtney, W. L., on Morality as Natural, ii, 216
 Crabbe's Synonyms, on Society, i, 126
 Creative Energy, i, 150-153; in Primitive Times, ii, 52
 Crises, their Causes, ii, 248, 249
 Culture, i, 199; History and Sociology, i, 20, 21; and Civilisation, i, 352-354; ii, 93, 94
 Cultural Forces, their Development, i, 310-318; in the First Era, ii, 51, 52; in the State, ii, 108-110
 — Interests, how ascertained, ii, 273, 274
 Cumulative Evolution, i, 234
 Curtius, E., Physical Influences, i, 62; Ancient Philosophers and Sophists, i, 140; Leisure a Test of Culture, i, 231; ii, 254; on Transition Eras, ii, 68; on the Dardanides, ii, 69; on the Origin of Greek States, ii, 71

D

Dante, Private Knowledge, i, 185; his Aesthetics Peculiar, i, 192
 Darwin, C. R., Theories of, i, 51, 52, ii, 308; Source of his Views, i, 68; Social Influence, i, 101; Sharing his Thoughts with others, i, 170; Private Thoughts of, i, 185; and Biological Evolution, i, 261; on Tendency to Perfectibility, i, 293, 294; how he changed the Social Content, i, 328, 329; and Darwinism, i, 379; the Struggle for Existence, ii, 199; and the Theologian, ii, 307

Degeneracy, Social, ii, 14, 15;
 Causes of, i, 296
 Delbert, Ph., Heredity and Environment, i, 67
 Democritus, Realisation of his Nature, ii, 206
 Demosthenes, Social Influence of, i, 118
 Descartes and his Age, i, 280
 Descent, Theory of, i, 52
 Descriptive Sociology, i, 12, 42
 Development, through Exercise, i, 300, 306, 307
 Devolution, i, 264
 Dialects, ii, 27
 Dietzel, Limitless Need of Man, i, 202
 Difficulties of Primitive Peoples, i, 295, 296
 Dilthey, W., on Psychology, i, 203;
 on Lubbock and Spencer's Theories of Primitive Religion, i, 249;
 Three Departments of Science, ii, 201; on History, ii, 211
 Diogenes, ii, 272
 Diplomats, their Limitations, ii, 153, 154
 Distinction between Biological and Social Factors, i, 54-56
 Division, of Labour and Evolution, i, 368; of Sociology, i, 42, 47
 Dominance, Relative, of Intellect, Feeling, and Will, i, 251-253
 Dove, A., on Tribal Chiefs, ii, 106
 Draper, J. W., History as Part of Physiology, i, 61
 Du Bois-Reymond, on Limits of Science, ii, 301
 Dwight, T. W., on the Patriarchate, ii, 34

E

Economic Force, i, 208-212, 275, 276
 Economics, and Sociology, i, 16, 17;
 Social, i, 210-212; and the State, ii, 96, 97
 Education, its Aim, ii, 272, 273
 — in Internationalism, ii, 183, 192
 Egotic Force, i, 219-223; may be Altruistic, i, 221; in the Evolution of Language, i, 323
 Egotism and Altruism, ii, 266

Elders, ii, 35, 70; in Primitive Society, i, 310
 Elizabeth, Literature in her Era, i, 281, 394
 Emotions, whether they decrease, i, 362-365
 Energies vested, i, 370, 371
 Epochs, i, 378, 379
 Equality, Social, ii, 231, 232
 Equilibrium of States, ii, 177
 Era, Differences between the First and Second, ii, 118, 119; Magnitude of Problems in the First, ii, 53, 54, 60
 Erhardt, Rev., on Children reared by Wolves, ii, 308
 Espinas, A. I., Society not an Organism, i, 163
 Ethical, Adaptation, ii, 246, 247;
 Basis of Society, ii, 287, 288; Co-ordination of Societies, ii, 225, 226, 229; and Cosmical Law, ii, 247, 248; Force, i, 237-244, 254, 255, how developed, i, 312, 313; Leadership, ii, 230; Problems in Society, ii, 200; Progress, ii, 260
 Ethics, i, 47; and Aesthetics, i, 241, 242; and Custom, i, 243, 244; how Evolved, i, 239, 240; how far Innate, i, 238, 239; and Physical Means, i, 254; and Religion, i, 242, 243; and Science, ii, 207, 208, 210; Social, difficulties of, ii, 41, 42; and Society, ii, 199, 200; and the State, ii, 112-114; and Traditionalism, ii, 288; the Will in, i, 242; Sociological, Based on the Nature and Evolution of Society, ii, 205-207, 209, 210; Involves what, ii, 206, 207, 212, 213; Justified, ii, 197-201; Limitation of, ii, 287, 289; why Neglected, ii, 197, 198; and Progress, ii, 212-214; its Sphere, ii, 203, 204
 Ethnography, ii, 306
 Ethnology, ii, 306
 Ethology, ii, 261
 Evolution, explained, i, 261-265;
 Time and Space in, i, 286; Social, i, 265, 266
 — Social, Begins at the Bottom, i, 302, 305; ii, 13-15; New Beginnings in, i, 396, 397; differs from Biological, i, 272, 274; Causes of, i, 297-299; Change

Evolution, Social—*Continued*
 in the Forces, i, 276, 277, 288, 289; Change in the Interaction of the Forces, i, 277-279; Change in the Permanent Deposits, i, 280, 281; Change in the Social Content, i, 279, 280; Change in the Social Structure, i, 281-283, 343-347; Chief Characteristics of each Era, ii, 4; and Fixed Culminations, i, 385-387, 391, 392; its Effects on Customs, Laws, and Principles, i, 384-387; and Environment, i, 287, 288, 301; its Three Great Eras, ii, 3; False Views of, i, 267-269, Epitome of its General Features, i, 405-408; all the Forces involved in, i, 275, 276, 283-285, 288; develops Heterogeneity and Homogeneity, i, 269-273; its Logic, ii, 189; Man and Environment in, i, 265, 266; Motive in, i, 289, 290; involves all Kinds of Movements, i, 298; Obstacles to, i, 355; illustrated by an Orchestra, i, 269; its Six Fundamental Processes, i, 357-360; its Products, i, 353; essentially Psychical, i, 353, 354; and Retrogressive Factors, i, 296-299; and the Sexual Relation, i, 305, 306; Structural Basis of its Eras, ii, 4, 5; and War, i, 396, 397
 Eyre, Affection among the Australians, i, 227

F

Family, the, a Society, i, 135;
 Primitive, ii, 17, 23, 24, 37;
 Primitive, what it includes, ii, 18, 19; Primitive, Solidarity and Distinctions in, ii, 18; Primitive, its Supremacy, ii, 19, 20; in the State, ii, 91, 92
 Fanaticism, i, 247, 248
 Father, the, Head of the Family, ii, 32
 Featherman, A., Origin of Language, i, 278, 279
 Federation of States, ii, 181-183
 Feeling, its Education, ii, 256;
 Transmission of, i, 361, 362
 Fiamingo, Professor, Union of Social and Biological Factors, i, 139, 140; on Heredity, ii, 308
 Fichte, Idealism of, i, 58; ii, 264
 Finley, President, on Sociology, ii, 299
 Fiske, John, on Sociology, i, 178
 Fison, Rev. Mr., Group Marriages, ii, 45
 Flint, R., On Materialism, i, 61;
 Idea of Progress, i, 292
 Forces, Private and Social, i, 107, 117
 ——— Social, Æsthetic, i, 23-27, 254, Appendix G; Affectional, i, 224, 228; Affectional differ from the Appetitive, i, 225; Affectional include Malevolent Affections, i, 226; Affinities of, i, 201, 202; Appetitive, including Hunger, Thirst, and Sexual passion, i, 223, 224; Atoms of Society, i, 191, 192; Blended, i, 200, 201, 255, 256; Constitute Society, i, 100-102, 189; Constitutional, i, 218, 219, 231, 254; Culture of, i, 195-198; Defined, i, 98, 99; depend on Individuals, i, 191, 192, 379; Division of, i, 206, 207; Economic, i, 208-212, 275, 276; Egotic, i, 219-223; Ethical, i, 237-244, 254, 255; in the Family, i, 306; Fundamental, i, 208-218; Intellectual, i, 250, 251, 255; Interaction of, i, 119-121; Kinds sought, i, 202, 203; Limit of, ii, 229; Martial, i, 216-218; Organising Power of, i, 257, 258; Political, i, 212-218; ii, 76; Psychical, i, 285; Psychical Factors involved, i, 252, 253; and Physical Means, i, 253-255; Recreative, i, 228-231; Relative Dominance of, ii, 246; Religious, i, 244-249, 255; Scientific Basis of Society, i, 109, 114; Variation of, i, 195, 196
 Forel, A., on Race, ii, 310
 Frazer, J. G., the Blood-feud, ii, 19; Totemism, ii, 44
 Frazer, R. W., the Economic Factor in Primitive Marriage, ii, 22
 Frederick II., and the Academy of Sciences, Berlin, i, 13; and the German People, i, 152; his Power, i, 165; and Voltaire, i, 268

Frederick, William III., on Education, ii, 100
 Freedom in Savage and Civilised Life, i, 390, 391
 Freeman, E. A., on Politics, i, 20
 Fustel de Coulanges, the Family the First Society, ii, 17; the Gens and the Phratry, ii, 26, 27; Ancient Religions, ii, 39

G

Garofalo, R., Society not an Organism, i, 163
 Generalisation, i, 396, 397; Process of, i, 9-11; Social, i, 380, 384-391; Individual, i, 381-384
 Gens, ii, 33, 43
 Geography and Society, i, 70-72
 — of Society, ii, 230, 231
 Gibbon, on the Council of the Magi, i, 171; on Writing and Culture, ii, 109, 110
 Giddings, F. H., Sociologist, i, 77; Individuals as Social units, i, 92; Society Conscious, i, 131; on Sociology, ii, 299
 Gierke, O. F., on Guilds, i, 129; Influence of Society on Individuals, i, 174; on Germanic Divisions, ii, 60
 Gladstone, Principles and Limitations of, ii, 147, 148
 Gliddon, on Race, ii, 310
 Goethe, and Self-culture, i, 145; and the German People, i, 152; as a Private Force, i, 185; and Schiller, i, 190; Quotations from, i, 392
 Government, Origin of, i, 308-310; the Executive Will of the State, i, 214; its Evolution, ii, 29-34, 52; Variations in Primitive Society, ii, 34; and the State, ii, 88, 89
 Gray, Th., Reticence of, i, 159
 Greef, G. de, Sociologist, i, 77
 Grosse, E., on the Beginning of Art, ii, 313, 314
 Grote, G., on Physical Influences, i, 62; Greeks on Influence of Locality, i, 72; Greek Faith, ii, 40
 Grotius, Historian of International Relations, ii, 149, 156

Group Marriages, ii, 24, 45, 46
 Groups, Primitive, how held together, ii, 26
 — Social, i, 123, 124, 130
 Gumpłowicz, L., on Sociology and Political Science, i, 19; on Sociology, i, 150; on Economic and Social Science, ii, 297
 Gustavus Adolphus, Personal Sovereignty, ii, 89
 Gutenberg, Inventor of Printing, i, 181
 Guyan, M. J., Sociology and Art, i, 312

H

Haddon, A. C., Conservatism of Isolated Peoples, i, 295
 Haeckel, on Heredity, ii, 308
 Hague, The, Peace Congress, ii, 163-172; its Aims, ii, 165; Agreements, Declarations, and Wishes, ii, 165-167; the States Represented in, ii, 166
 Hall, W. E., International Treaties, ii, 162; Limit of the State, ii, 318, 319
 Happiness, Individual, not the Social Ideal, ii, 217-220
 Hartmann, E. von, on the Unconscious, i, 132
 Hauser, Caspar, Inseparable from his Family, i, 55
 Hearn, W. E., Aryan Antiquity, i, 303; on Primitive Peoples, ii, 12, Establishment of Political Society, ii, 84; Religion among the Aryans, ii, 39; Religion and Kinship, ii, 40; Clans selecting an Ancestor, ii, 42; on Agnation and Cognation, ii, 315
 Hegel, and Philosophy, i, 15; Philosophy of History, i, 23; Idealism of, i, 58; Intellect of, i, 251; and Evolution, i, 263; on Greek Culture, ii, 274; and his Age, i, 280; Era from Kant to, i, 281; Philosophical Influence of, i, 329; had no Successor, i, 394; Claim of his Disciples, i, 395
 Hegelianism, ii, 264; taken for Philosophy, i, 15; and the State, i, 18; and Evolution, i, 263

Helmholtz, H. L. F. von, Peculiarity of his Intellectual Force, i, 192; Limit to Scientific Growth, i, 396
 Henderson, C. R., on Sociology, ii, 299
 Herbart, on Apperception, i, 171
 Herder, Philosophy of History, i, 22; Apostle of Humanity, i, 170; on Biological Unity, i, 370
 Heredity, i, 51, 52, 65, 66; Appendix D, ii, 29
 Herodotus, on the Race of Troglodytes, i, 293
 Herzen, Alex., the Relation of the Individual to Society, i, 141
 History, i, 338-340; Creation of the Individual and Society, i, 154, 177-179
 Holland, T. E., Russia and Turkey, ii, 319
 Holls, F. W., Peace Conference at The Hague, ii, 154, 166; Sovereignty at The Hague Conference, 317, 318
 Holy Alliance, the, ii, 183, 184
 Homer, Beginning of Greek History, i, 397; belongs to Humanity, ii, 129
 Humanity, a Society, i, 124-126; Division of, i, 196, 197; its Epic, ii, 295
 Humboldt, W. von, the Duty of the Historian, ii, 200
 Hume, Influence of Nature on Society, i, 58, 59
 Huxley, on Generalisation, i, 11; Limits of History and Archaeology, i, 24; and Agnosticism, i, 185; Ethical and Cosmical Processes, ii, 247, 248; on Evolution, i, 275, 369; on Nature and Society, ii, 302; on Suspended Judgment, ii, 303

I

Ideas in History, i, 188, 189
 Ideal, the, Creative, ii, 215, 216; Social Growth of, ii, 216, 217; and its Realisation, ii, 220, 235, 236; its Sublimity, ii, 236, 237; its Value, ii, 238-241
 Ideals, Causative, ii, 200, 201, 208

Ihering, R. von, Society and Morality, ii, 214
 Imitation not Applicable to Mental Processes, i, 203-206
 Individual, belongs to Himself and Society, i, 100, 101; Relation to Society, i, 109-115; an Organism, i, 142, 144, 164; his Ordinary Social Relations, i, 143; and Society Co-operative, i, 153-156; Result of Maturing Slowly, i, 182, 183
 Individual and Social Control, i, 147, 148; Community of Interests, i, 175-177
 Individualisation and Progress beyond Consanguine Limits, ii, 44-46
 ——— and Socialisation, i, 369; in the State, ii, 83-85
 Individualism, i, 147-149
 Individuality, i, 157, 367, 368; and Society, i, 156-158; and Evolution, i, 367-369
 Individuals, their Private and Social Forces, i, 107, 108; how Estimated by Society, i, 179; as Representatives, i, 180, 181
 Induction Culminating in Deduction, i, 382, 383
 Industrialism, ii, 96-98
 Influence of Nature, on Imagination and Feeling, i, 68, 69
 ——— of Society, on Individuals, i, 174
 ——— of Men, and their Conditions, i, 179-181
 Inheritance, Social, i, 365-367
 Initiative in Movements, i, 181, 182
 Innate Conditions of Sociality, i, 82
 Instinctive Action, ii, 52, 53
 Institutions, their Growth and Decay, i, 341; as Social Deposits, i, 340-342; Test of, ii, 57
 Intellect, slowly developed in the First Era, ii, 52; and the State, ii, 116-118; transmission of, i, 360-362
 Intellectual Force, i, 250, 251, 255; Culture of, i, 316, 317; Last to develop, i, 316
 Intellectualism, i, 250, 251
 Interaction of the Social Forces, how evolved, i, 320-326
 Internal and External Forces in Evolution, i, 264, 265

International, Agreements Violated, ii, 161, 162; Conduct, Rules for, ii, 158-160; Congresses, ii, 160, 161, 164; Education of the People, ii, 154-156; Institute of Sociology on Society as an Organism, i, 163; Law, Ignorance of, ii, 155, 156; Law, its Codification, ii, 192, 193; Law, its Nature, ii, 156, 157; Law, Practical, ii, 157, 158; Relations, ii, 137, 138; Organisation, its Demands, ii, 190, 191; Spheres of Interest, ii, 178, 179

Internationalism, and Realism, ii, 139, 140, 150; what it involves, ii, 140, 141; Difficulty of, ii, 144, 190, Appendix I; involved in the State, ii, 148, 149; Demand for, ii, 151-153; its Sphere, ii, 158; and Economics, ii, 174, 175; and Race, ii, 174; is it Ultimate, ii, 186-188; its Leaders, ii, 191, 192; does not interfere with National Functions and Characteristics, i, 193, 194

Israelites, illustrating the Differentiation and Union of the Consanguinity, ii, 31, 32

J

Jacobinism, i, 97

Jacobins, their Theory of Society, ii, 209

Jacob's Service for Rachel and Leah, ii, 22

Janet, G. J. R., Affection among Savages, i, 228; on Perfection, ii, 221; on Moral Progress, ii, 260

Jones, Henry, on the Social Organism, i, 164

Jowett, B., Translation of Aristotle, ii, 206

K

Kant, his Critical Philosophy, i, 15, 250; ii, 251; not Historian of Philosophy, i, 26; his Relation to Nature, i, 62; his place in Culture, i, 74; a Solitary Thinker, i, 101; and the German People, i, 152;

Private Intellectual Force, i, 185; on the Good Will, i, 243; and the Philosophical Era, i, 251, 281; and Criticism, i, 359; on Beauty, ii, 265

Kant-Laplace Theory, i, 264

Kareiev, Society not an Organism, i, 163

Kasson, John, Treatment of Native Tribes, ii, 188, 189

Kelvin, Lord, on Progress in Science, ii, 304

Kobong, ii, 42, 43

Kranz, C. de, Society not an Organism, i, 163

L

Laban and Rebekah, ii, 22

Lamarck, National Influence on, i, 168

Lamprecht, Prof., Materialistic School of History, ii, 297

Language, Individual and Social, i, 183-185; its Permanent Symbols, i, 280; illustrative of Social Action, i, 183-185; how developed, i, 323-326; created by Individuals, i, 325, 326

Large Bodies Unwieldy, i, 171

Law, ii, 107, 113, 114

Le Bon, G., on the Crowd, i, 178, 179

Ledlie, J. C., on Roman Law, i, 95

Leibnitz, founded Academy of Sciences in Berlin, i, 13; sharing Thoughts with others, i, 170; on Inherent Energy of the Mind, ii, 9

Letourneau, C., on Animal Societies, i, 3

Lexis, W., Society not an Organism, i, 167

Lillienfeld, Paul von, Sociologist, i, 77; Individualisation, i, 158; Society an Organism, i, 163; on Vanished Peoples, i, 298, 299; on Sociology, ii, 301

Lilly, W. S., The Life of a Nation, i, 160

Limousin, Society not an Organism, i, 163

Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, i, 117, 153, 351

Lindner, G. A., *Humanity as a Society*, i, 126; *The Relation of Individuals*, i, 190
 Linguistic Roots, formed in the Pre-historic Era, ii, 28, 29
 Lippert, J., on Buddhism, i, 59; *Development of Men's Physical Forces*, i, 64; *Nature's Influence on Primitive Man*, i, 69; on *Primitive Peoples*, ii, 12; *Origin of the State*, ii, 61; on *Classification of the Races*, ii, 311
 Livingston, D., i, 228
 Locality and Social Content, i, 327
 Locke, on the *Mind as a Blank Sheet of Paper*, ii, 9; and *Innate Ideas*, ii, 204
 Lotze's Relation to Herder, i, 22
 Louis XIV. declared Himself the State, ii, 85; his Age, ii, 232, 233, 255
 Louis XV. and Social Depravity, ii, 94
 Lubbock, John, *Affection among Australians*, i, 227; on *Primitive Peoples*, ii, 12; on *Marriage in Sumatra*, ii, 22
 Lumholtz, C., *Affection among Australians*, i, 227, 228; *Æsthetics among Australians*, ii, 313
 Luther, Religious Influence of, i, 329
 Lycurgus, Greek Organisation in his Day, ii, 59

M

MacClelland, J., *Individuals as Social Units*, i, 192; on *Rights Limited to the Kinship*, ii, 50; on *Social Prevision*, ii, 305
 Machiavelli, makes the State Might, ii, 89
 Mackenzie, J. S., *Society an Organism*, i, 163; on *Social Philosophy*, ii, 214
 Mackinnon, J., *Corruption under Louis XV.*, ii, 94
 McLennan, J. F., on *Primitive Marriage*, ii, 314
 Maier, H., the *Duty of Science*, ii, 201
 Maine, H. S., ii, 34; on *Movement from Status to Contract*, ii, 57;

on *Sovereignty of the State*, ii, 126
 Majorities usually Conservative, i, 372
 Man and Environment in Social Evolution, i, 265, 266; the *Standard in Evolution*, i, 317, 318; the *Measure of Things*, i, 402
 Man's Response to Stimuli, i, 304, 305
 Map of Europe, ii, 179, 180
 Marriage, in *Primitive Times*, ii, 21, 22; and *Economics*, ii, 21, 22, 25
 Martial Force, i, 216-218
 Marx, Carl, on *Economics*, i, 16; ii, 297; on *Conflict and Progress*, i, 86; and *Socialistic Economics*, i, 210; his *Socialism*, i, 243; ii, 248; his *Theories made Popular*, i, 253; *Influence of his Socialism*, i, 330; ii, 269; demands *Structural Change of Society*, i, 346; *Social Democracy and the State*, ii, 145
 Mason, O. T., on *Primitive Travel*, i, 73; *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, ii, 47
 Mass Movements, i, 350, 351, 375, 376
 Materialism, i, 57, 59-61; ii, 198, 199
 Materialistic School of History, i, 17; Appendix A.
 Matthew, J., on *Community Government in Australia*, ii, 35
 Matriarchate among Primitive Peoples, ii, 35
 Meade, Gen., *Orders at Gettysburg*, i, 137
 Means becoming Ends, i, 355-357
 Menger, C., on *Method in Economics*, ii, 303
 Mental, Action always Individual, i, 164-169; *Evolution*, i, 198, 199
 Method of Sociology, Appendix C.
 Metternich, as a *Social Force*, i, 158, 159; how limited, ii, 144; on the *Relation of States*, ii, 316, 317
 Might Uncontradicted, i, 403
 Migration, *Influence of*, ii, 57, 58
 Militarism, i, 217; ii, 95, 96
 Mill, J. Stuart, on *Ethology*, ii, 261, 262
 Mimicry, i, 321, 322

Mind Advancing on Nature, i, 61-65, 390; in Social Changes, i, 347-349; governed by its Inherent Laws, ii, 9, 10
 Minos, First King of Crete, ii, 71
 Mobs, Power of, i, 375, 376
 Mohl, R. von, on Sovereignty, ii, 126
 Moltke, Private and Social Force, i, 117; his Power, i, 165
 Monogamy, ii, 24, 25
 Monroe Doctrine, ii, 126, 127
 Montaigne, i, 68
 Montesquieu, i, 68
 Moral Crisis, i, 371
 Morality, its Growth, ii, 239, 240
 Morgan, L. H., Institutions and Human Needs, ii, 8; on Primitive Peoples, ii, 12; Government among American Indians, ii, 33; Intercourse between Indian Tribes, ii, 33; Individualisation of Indian Tribes, ii, 37; on Mothers Selecting Clans for their Children, ii, 42; on Consanguine and Political Organisations, ii, 58-60; on the State as Based on Property and Territory, ii, 75, 76; on the Primitive Family, ii, 314
 Morley, H., on Abuse of Aristotle's Authority, i, 342
 Mother, Descent through the, ii, 32
 Mound-Builders, i, 298
 Mouravieff, Count, on the Meaning of "Political," ii, 149, 150
 Movement of Large Bodies, i, 350, 351
 Movements, Social, Extremes in, ii, 265
 Mozart and the German People, i, 152
 Müller, Max, on Children reared by Wolves, ii, 308

N

Nachtigal, the Tebus, i, 293
 Napoleon, his Force as General and Lawgiver, i, 100; his Force determines his Historic Place, i, 115; changes France, i, 162; his Power, i, 165, 329; Effect of his Removal, i, 297; his Humiliation of Germany, ii, 100; Lives Sacrificed, ii, 143

Napoleon III., Motives, ii, 147; and the Crimean war, ii, 162
 Nationalism and Internationalism, ii, 123, 124
 Nations, Affinities, of, ii, 156; Misrepresentations of, ii, 173; weaker, Influence of, ii., 176, 177
 Natural Conditions Favourable to Social Evolution, i, 287, 288
 Natural Selection, i, 52
 Nature, and Social Laws, i, 45; and Society, i, 56-62, 66-69; its Influence on Men, i, 56, 57; and Division of Labor, i, 73; Humanised, i, 75, 76; and Culture-Peoples, i, 195-198
 Nature-Peoples above Animals, i, 198
 Nature changes with Society, i, 349
 Navies, Development of, ii, 176
 Necessity before Choice, i, 208
 New Testament, i, 219
 Newton, Sharing Thoughts with Others, i, 170; Private and Social Force, i, 185; Peculiar Intellectual Force, i, 192; Aryan Descent of, i, 303
 Niebuhr, B. G., The Aim of History, i, 251
 Nihilism, ii, 105
 Nott on Race, ii, 310
 Nott, Chief Justice, Formation of the United States, ii, 185
 Novicow, J., Society an Organism, i, 163

O

Oettingen, on Cultural Statistics, ii, 273, 274
 Opinion, Power of, i, 372-374; and Reality, i, 378
 Optimism, ii, 272; and Pessimism, i, 399-401
 Organisation, Power of, i, 282-284
 Organisations, needed, ii, 234; Process of, ii, 233, 234
 Organising Power of Social Forces, i, 257, 258
 Originality, i, 150-153, 394-396; prevented by Reproductive Education, i, 395
 Osborn, H. F., Aristotle on a Perfecting Tendency, i, 293

P

- Palmerston, Lord, Treatment of weaker Nations, ii, 147
- Park, Mungo, i, 228
- Part taken for the Whole, i, 13-15
- Party and Social Politics, ii, 100, 101
- Party Dominion, i, 372
- Past, the, its Merits, i, 181, 182
- Paternalism, i, 97
- Patten, S. N., on Sociology, ii, 302, 307
- Paul, H., The New Psychology, i, 132; Language created by Individuals, i, 168, 169; Mental Factor in Linguistic Changes, i, 348, 349
- Peabody, F. G., on Sociology, ii, 299
- Pearson, C. H., on Social Prevision, ii, 305
- People, Responsibility of, in a Republic, ii, 101
- Perfectibility, Tendency toward, i, 293, 294
- Perfection, Unattainable, i, 404, 405; Social, the Social Ideal, ii, 220-222, 234; Social, Two Kinds of, ii, 222; Social, Conditions of, ii, 222-224; Social, and Organisation, ii, 224; Social, and that of the Individual, ii, 285-287
- Pericles, Age of, i, 394; ii, 236
- Personal Culture and Sociality, i, 145, 146
- Personalities in Advanced Culture, ii, 279-281
- Personality, its Culture, ii, 271, 272
- Persons Federated, i, 87
- Pessimism, i, 399-401
- Peter the Great, Testament of, ii, 179
- Petrie, W. M. Flinders, Growth of the Brain, i, 64; on Art, ii, 111, 112
- Philosophy, of History as Sociology, i, 22-24; after Plato and Aristotle, i, 289
- Phratry, ii, 33
- Physical Conditions most Favourable, i, 66, 67
- Pierce, H. H. D., Training of Diplomats, ii, 154
- Plato, and Culture, i, 74; his Relation to Society, i, 102; his Conception of Society, ii, 209; How Others think his Thoughts, i, 171; his Philosophy changed, i, 289; Idealist, ii, 205, 264, 265
- "Political," limited to the State, ii, 149, 150; Changes, ii, 89, 90; Functions, ii, 80-82, 91; and Consanguine Ties, ii, 106
- Political Science and Sociology, i, 17-20
- Politics, ii, 77, 89-91
- Polyandry, ii, 24
- Polygamy, ii, 23-25
- Popular and Historical Estimates, i, 373, 374
- Power, Philosophy of, ii, 311, 312
- Pratt, Hodgson, on War and the Press, ii, 173, 174
- Prehistoric Era, Difficulties of, ii, 7
- Press, the, and War, ii, 172-174
- Primitive Man and Animals, ii, 10, 14; Man, his Task, ii, 15, 16; Men, not necessarily Warlike, i, 308; Peoples, ii, 4; Peoples, and Experience, ii, 8, 9; Peoples, their Emotional State, ii, 10-12
- Productive and Consumptive Forces, ii, 254
- Products of Organised and Unorganised Societies, i, 129, 130
- Progress, Social, no Native Impulse to, i, 290-294; Causes of, i, 294, 295; Conditions of, i, 259; ii, 50-52, 254, 255, 264, 265, 267; Difficult for Primitive Man, i, 295, 296; by Applying what has been Established, i, 396; in the First Era, ii, 48-53; within Political Institutions, ii, 94; what it Involves, ii, 240, 241; begins with the Actuality, ii, 242, 243; its Problems, ii, 250, 251, 289, 290; Positive, ii, 251; its Difficulties, ii, 259, 260; Value of Feeling in, ii, 255-257, 266-268; Permanent Social Factors in, ii, 275-278; Individual Contributions to, ii, 276-278; and the State, ii, 284, 285
- Progressive and Stationary Peoples, i, 274, 294
- Promiscuity, Doubtful in Early Times, ii, 23; Appendix H.
- Property, Origin of, ii, 49, 50
- Proudhon, P. J., i, 68

Psychology, of Peoples, i, 21; Social, i, 173, 174; in Language, i, 324, 325; its Gain on Biology, ii, 13
Public, and Private Interests, i, 155;
Control, ii, 102

R

Race, Probable Origin of, i, 74, 75;
Appendix E; in Evolution, i, 299-301
Races, Classification of, ii, 311;
Mixture of, i, 328
Randolph, E., on State Sovereignty, ii, 184
Rank, Origin of, ii, 20; in a State, ii, 120, 121; Social, ii, 230, 231
Ranke, L. von, Aim of History, i, 251
Raphael, Influence in Art, i, 153, 329
Ratzel, F., Influence of Geography on Society, i, 71; on Nature-Peoples, i, 196; ii, 12; on Stationary Peoples, i, 293; Stagnation of Primitive Peoples, i, 391; on Purchase of the Wife, ii, 22; on Dominion in Hordes, ii, 33; on Family States, ii, 79
Rauber, Prof., on Individuals Isolated from Society, ii, 308, 309
Realism, Social, ii, 291
Reason, its Growth, ii, 201, 202; and Language develop together, i, 322, 323; and Purpose, ii, 215
Reclus, Émile, on Primitive Peoples, ii, 12; on Primitive Man Learning from Animals, ii, 15; on Symbols of Tribes, ii, 43; on Collectivism, ii, 45; on Ancestral Ordinances, ii, 46; on Woman's Part in Civilisation, ii, 47, 48; on Food and Civilisation, ii, 50
Recreative Force, i, 228-231; Large Sphere of Influence, i, 229-231
Reichsberg, N., on Method of Sociology, ii, 301, 302
Reid, J., on Heredity, ii, 308
Reinke, J., on Limits of Science, ii, 301
Relation of Organised and Unorganised Societies, i, 126-128; of the Individual and Society, i, 142-144

Religion, Innate Conditions of, i, 245, 246; Influence of, i, 246; Origin of, beyond Scientific Demonstration, i, 246, 247; Individual and Social, i, 247, 248; and Physical Means, i, 255; Power of Primitive, ii, 39, 40; in the State, ii, 114-116; and Ethics, ii, 115, 116; and Sociology, ii, 306, 307
Religious and Consanguine Bonds, ii, 37-40
—— Force, i, 244-249, 255; how evolved, i, 313-316
Repetition, Effect of, i, 377, 378
Reproduction, Mental, i, 204-206
Republics, Reaction against, ii, 102, 103
Responsibility, Personal, in Social Action, ii, 282
Ribot, J. A., on Generalisation, i, 11
Richthofen, Baron von, on Chinese Institutions, i, 343
Rickert, H., on Psychical and Physical Processes, ii, 198, 199, 302, 303
Ripley, W. Z., Influence of the City on Society, i, 71, 72
Ritter, C., Influence of Geography on Men, i, 71
Romanes on Religion, ii, 307
Rousseau, on Nature-Peoples, ii, 94
Rousseau's Social Influence, i, 114
Rümelin, G., on Individual Initiative, i, 152; on Social and Ethical Laws, ii, 211, 212; Feeling in Social Progress, ii, 257

S

Salvianus, the Union of Barbarians, ii, 106
Samuel, Kingship in Israel, ii, 69, 70
Sanders, T. C., *Jus Gentium*, i, 45
Saul, chosen King, ii, 70, 72
Savages, Passionate Outbreaks of, ii, 107; their Rights, ii, 188, 189
Say, J. B., recommends Social Economics, i, 212
Schaefer, D., Moral Forces in History, ii, 201

- Schaeffle, A. E. F., Sociologist, i, 77; on the Social Organism, i, 163; ii, 301; on Teleology in Social Science, ii, 214
- Schelling, his Idealistic Philosophy, i, 58; ii, 264; on Individualisation, i, 158
- Schiller, his Relation to Goethe, i, 190
- Schleicher, Prof., on Language, ii, 199
- Schleiermacher, on Education, ii, 251
- Schmidt-Warneck, Prof., on Sociology and the State, i, 19, 20
- Schmoller, G., Injustice of Institutions, i, 343; Class War, ii, 223; Social Laws, ii, 304, 305
- Schubert-Solden, R. von, Society formed by Psychic Interaction, i, 81
- Schurtz, H., Development of Culture, i, 353, 354; Feeling in the Masses, i, 365; Primitive Man, ii, 12; Political Organisation, ii, 67; Conservatism of the People, ii, 68; Mania of Savages, ii, 107
- Science, how used, i, 3, 8, 12; Social, and Experience, i, 186
- Scientific, Method, i, 4; Social Interpretation, i, 8, 30; Basis of Society, i, 109, 114
- Self-Culture and Sociality, i, 145, 146
- Self-Interest and what Interests, ii, 262-265
- Self-Manifestation, i, 192, 193
- Selfishness, ii, 257
- Selkirk, A., Effects of Isolation from Society, ii, 309
- Serfs of Russia, i, 351
- Sex, it Separates and Unites, ii, 16, 17
- Sexual Passion in Primitive Man, ii, 23, 24
- Sexual Relation, Organising Power of, ii, 16, 17; how settled, ii, 20, 24, 25
- Shakespeare, and Culture, i, 74; Club, i, 132, 142; his Individuality, i, 171; his Vocabulary, i, 185; Aryan Descent of, i, 303; Quotations from, i, 392
- Sidgwick, H., Functions of the State, ii, 78; on the Actual and the Ideal, ii, 244, 245
- Sigel, Feodor, Evolution, from Heterogeneity to Homogeneity, i, 273; of Law from Custom, ii, 110
- Sigwart, C., Mental Content always Individual, i, 167; on Social Action, i, 189; on Social Prevision, ii, 208; on Ethics and Scientific Investigation, ii, 217; on the Ethical Purpose, ii, 241
- Simmel, G., on what Constitutes Society, i, 99; on the Victory of the Truth, i, 404; on Method in Sociology, ii, 303
- Slavery, Primitive, ii, 22
- Sleeman, W. H., on Children reared by Wolves, ii, 308
- Smith, Adam, Economic Inquiries and Sociology, i, 38; Popular Influence of, i, 253
- Smith, Goldwin, early English Kings, ii, 82
- Sociability, not Innate, i, 301
- "Social," Meaning of the Term, i, 119; ii, 235
- Social Action, Individual and Associated, i, 117-119
- and Individual Thought, i, 170
- Culture, ii, 278, 279
- Education of the Individual, i, 172
- Evolution, *see* Evolution, Social.
- Forces, *see* Forces, Social.
- Groups, i, 34-37, 123, 124, 127-130; Structure of, i, 346
- Inheritance and Culture, i, 365-367
- Interaction, how it takes place, i, 86, 87, 109-111
- Products abstracted from Society, i, 174, 175
- Statics and Dynamics, i, 42-44, 46
- Structure, how evolved, i, 343-347; affected by Social Content, i, 344, 345; and new Social Demands, i, 346, 347
- Training, i, 146-148
- Socialism, i, 14, 15; ii, 44
- Sociality, Evolution of, i, 285, 286
- Society, Subject-Matter of Sociology, i, 1; how viewed by Sociology, i, 1-9, 29-31; in the Societies, i, 8; Genus and Species, i, 9-12;

Society—Continued

its Nature, i, 30, 31, 44; its Physical Basis, i, 51; its Psychical Essence, i, 52-54; its Soul and Body, i, 52-56; and Physiological Psychology, i, 50-58; and its Conditions, i, 54-56; ii, 268-270; growing in Dominance over Nature, i, 62-65, 72, 73; a Compound, i, 77; Etymology of the Word, i, 77, 78; how used, i, 79; regarded as a Union of Individuals, i, 79, 91, 92; not a Sum of Individuals, i, 80; and Association, i, 80; formed by Individual Action and Reaction, i, 80, 81, 84-86; Common Basis of, i, 83, 84; a Concept, not a Percept, i, 87-90; not composed of Individuals, i, 91-98; does not absorb the Individual, i, 96; Product of the Interaction of Social Forces, i, 101, 102; an Energy compounded of Energies, i, 103, 169; Correct View of, a Test of Errors, i, 103-105; as its Social Forces, i, 103-107; like its Units, i, 105; what Persons contribute to it, i, 105, 106; Dynamic Conception of, i, 108, 109; Fruitfulness of the Dynamic Conception, i, 111-114; what Included, i, 116; a Combination of Wills, i, 121-123; not fully conscious of itself, i, 130; Simple and Compound, i, 132-134; Continuous, i, 136; its Source in Individuals, i, 159, 160; not an Entity, i, 159, 160; not an Organism, i, 161-164; has a Mind, Consciousness, Thought, and Feeling, only figuratively, i, 164-169; its Influence on Individuals, i, 173; and Nature, Reciprocal Influence of, i, 349, 350; its Settled and Unsettled Factors, i, 387, 388; studied in Fixed Types and Unsettled Questions, i, 398, 399; enslaved by the Conditions it creates, ii, 270, 271; Master of its Conditions, ii, 271, 272, 274, 283, 284; of Nations, ii, 136, 137, 171

Socii, i, 78

Sociological Era, ii, 153

Sociology, Defined, i, 1; Origin of the Term, i, 1; its Aim, i, 2, 7;

a Human Science, i, 2, 3; interprets Society in Time and Space, i, 6, 7; interprets Humanity, i, 7; and the other Social Sciences co-operative, i, 7; Confusion in, i, 11-15; ii, 298, 299; treats of the Genus Society, i, 12-14; its Relation to the Special Social Sciences, i, 15, 16, 34-42; and Economics, i, 16, 17; and Political Science, i, 17-20; and the State, i, 19, 20; and the History of Culture, i, 20-22; and the Philosophy of History, i, 22-24; and Evolution, i, 24-27; as Social Pathology and Hygiene, i, 27-29; Appendix B; Popular Conception of, i, 28, 29; how to overcome Confusion in, i, 29-32; and Human Biology, i, 32, 33; not a Mosaic of Social Sciences, i, 39; its Functions respecting the Special Social Sciences, i, 39-42; Division of, i, 42-47; Descriptive, i, 42; Comparative, i, 42; its Scientific Basis, i, 114, 115; deals with Social Energies, i, 138, 139; Tentative, ii, 292, 293; Inexhaustible, ii, 294

Socrates, Subjection to the State, i, 18; and the thought of Athens, i, 171; on Morality, i, 250, 401; and the Public, ii, 229; on Principles, ii, 239

Sohm, R., on Roman Law, i, 95; on the Frank Constitution, ii, 73, 74

Soldiers moving in a Mass, i, 376

Solon, Greek Organisation at his time, ii, 59; the Property Classes, ii, 75

Sombart, W., the Social Ideal, ii, 222

Sovereignty of the State, ii, 85-87, 124-127, 177; divided between the Ruler and the People, ii, 85; Origin of, ii, 170; at The Hague, ii, 169-171, Appendix K; and the United States, ii, 184, 185

Specialisation, Narrow, i, 370

Species, their Variability, i, 52, 381

Spencer, H., Descriptive Sociology, i, 11, 12, 42; ii, 306; and Evolution, i, 26; on Instinct and Reason, ii, 53; on Social Statistics, i,

Spencer—Continued

- 43, 44; the Nature of Society, i, 45, 46; ii, 301; on Environment, i, 51, 68; and Sociological Ethics, ii, 197; on Heredity, i, 68; ii, 308; on Primitive Man, ii, 12, 313; Sociologist, i, 77; Views Society as composed of Individuals, i, 94, 95; on Social Aggregation, i, 160; on Biological Evolution, i, 261; on Matter, Force, and Motion, i, 267; on Happiness as the Ethical Aim, ii, 219, 220; on Perfection, ii, 221; Synthetic Philosophy, of, i, 274
- Spinoza, Intellectual Possessions of, i, 185
- Spiritualism, i, 57-59
- Squillace, Fausto, The Sociological Aspect of Art, i, 311
- Staal, M. de, Organism of States, ii, 165; on Sovereignty, ii, 318
- Stagnation, Social, its Causes, ii, 28
- Starcke, C. N., Society not an Organism, i, 163; the Family, the Primitive Social Type, ii, 17; the Selection of Chiefs, ii, 33; on Clan Customs, ii, 42; Clan Divisions in the Family, ii, 45; on the Primitive Family, ii, 314
- State, the, its Genesis, ii, 65, 66; Definition of, ii, 76; as a Society, i, 19, 55, 135, 136; in what Sense Natural, ii, 60, 206; its Authority, ii, 77, 78, 81, 82; Contract Theory of, ii, 66, 67; its Nature, i, 213-216; and Government, ii, 67; Age of, ii, 71; its Sovereignty, i, 214-216; ii, 124-127, 142, 143; and Civilisation, ii, 71; Evolution of, ii, 41; Sociological View of, ii, 65, 148, 149, 151-153; and Family, ii, 79; and other Societies, ii, 78, 80, 81, 91, 92, 104, 105; the Functions of, ii, 83; its Constitution, ii, 89, 90; its Laws, ii, 89, 90; its Politics, ii, 89, 90; the Cultural, ii, 98-100; its Power over Associations, ii, 105; Opportunity it affords Culture, ii, 119, 120; need not grow Old, ii, 121, 122; and larger Relationship of Modern Times, ii, 122, 123, 128-131
- States, and Foreign Influence, ii, 125, 126; their Aid in settling Disputes, ii, 171, 172; Dominant Ones, ii, 175, 176; Basis of their Union, ii, 177
- Statesmen, their Failures, ii, 146-148
- Statistics in Sociology, ii, 303, 304
- Stein, Lorenz von, on Sociology, i, 31; International Inquiries, ii, 141, 142
- Stein, Ludwig, on Sociology, i, 32; Society not an Organism, i, 163
- Steinmetz, S. R., Society not an Organism, i, 163; on Economic Evolution, i, 276
- Steinthal, H., on Race, ii, 310
- Stephen, Leslie, the Race a Social Organism, i, 126
- Struggle for Existence, i, 52
- Subconscious Activity, ii, 266-268
- Sully, James, on Social Feelings, i, 206; Philosophical Evolution, i, 275
- Sulzer, G., on Human Biology, i, 33; recognises Unorganised Societies, i, 130
- Sumner, W. G., on Sociology, i, 27, 28; on Social Disease and the Remedy, ii, 300
- Supernationalism, ii, 187, 188
- Sybel, H. von, What made History, i, 281
- Synthesis, Social, ii, 291

T

- Talleyrand, as a Representative, i, 162; ii, 144; his Character, ii, 148
- Tarde, G., Sociologist, i, 77; Society not an Organism, i, 163; on Social Interpretation, i, 203; on Imitation, i, 206
- Tendencies, Changes in, i, 371, 372; their Study, ii, 261, 262
- Territory and the State, ii, 71, 74-76
- Theocracy, ii, 69, 70
- Theodoric the Great, on Barbarians, ii, 106
- Thought and its Symbols, i, 347-349
- Topinard, Paul, on Animal Sociology, i, 3; on Anthropology, ii, 306

- Totem, Clan Designation and Religious Symbol, ii, 42-44
 Totemism, its Origin, ii, 43
 Transition Eras, ii, 107
 Transmission, of Intellectual Factors, i, 360-362; of Emotional Factors, i, 361, 362
 Travithick, R., ran the First Locomotive, i, 398
 Treitschke, H. von, Hegel's View of the State, i, 18; Conception of the State, i, 20; Individual not absorbed by Society, i, 96; the First State, ii, 73; State Sovereignty, ii, 89; the State and History, ii, 130; International Relation of States, ii, 154; Political Ethics, ii, 285
 Truth and Right, Triumph of, i, 399-404
 Truth includes Goodness and Beauty, ii, 207
 Turkey and the European Problem, ii, 179
 Twiss, Travers, Society of Nations, ii, 185
 Tylor, E. B., on the Savage, i, 197; ii, 12; Social Degeneration, ii, 14; on Anthropology, ii, 306

U

- Unconscious Evolution, i, 302
 Unity of States, ii, 135, 136
 Unorganised Society, i, 123-125
 Utilitarianism, its Overthrow, ii, 263

V

- Vanni, I., on Sociology, i, 23, 24
 Vico and History, i, 22
 Vierkandt, A., on Affection of Nature-Peoples, i, 228; on the Ethical and Scientific Aspect, ii, 207, 208; on the Social Ideal, ii, 216, 217; on Psychological Factors in Civilisation, ii, 267
 Virchow, R., on Race and Heredity, ii, 310
 Voltaire and Frederick II., i, 268

W

- Wagner, A., Social Economics, i, 210; Economic Discussions of, i, 212
 Waitz, E. T., Primitive Peoples, ii, 12
 Waitz, G., Origin of the Frank State, ii, 73
 Wake, C. S., on the Kobong and Totem, ii, 43; on Fijian Symbols, ii, 44; on Group Marriages, ii, 46; on Primitive Marriage, ii, 314, 315
 Wallace, A. R., and Darwin, i, 170; Biological Evolution, i, 261
 Walthew, G. W., the Communal and National Soul, i, 166, 167
 War, ii, 186; Appendix L; as Social, i, 136-138; Horrors of, ii, 145; and the People, ii, 172
 Ward, James, Social Interaction, i, 101
 Ward, Lester F., Sociologist, i, 77
 Watt, James, Private and Social Force, i, 152, 153
 Weismann, Aug., Developmental Force, i, 293; Innate Factor in Evolution, i, 342; on Heredity, ii, 308
 Westermarck, on early Promiscuity, ii, 316
 Westgarth, W., on Sociology, ii, 298
 White, A. D., on History and Statistics, ii, 304
 Wilson, D., Primitive Peoples, ii, 12
 Wilson, Woodrow, the Family a State, ii, 79; on Sovereignty, ii, 126
 Winchester, C. T., on the Ideal, ii, 207
 Windelband, W., on Sociological Method, ii, 303
 Wives, how obtained in Primitive Times, ii, 21
 Woermann, R., History of Art, ii, 314
 Wolf-Children, ii, 308, 309
 Woman, her Place in the first Era, ii, 46, 47; Promoter of Culture, ii, 46, 47
 Word, a, and its Content, i, 4, 5
 World-Legislature, Petition for a, ii, 320, 321

Worms, René, Society not an Organism, i, 163

Wright, Carroll D., Individuals as Social Units, i, 93; Recognises Unorganised Society, i, 130

Writing, its Influence, i, 338-340; in the State, ii, 109, 110

Wundt, W., on the Will, i, 123; on Social Transformation, ii, 68

Z

Zeitgeist, how learned, ii, 243, 244

Zenker, E. V., on Sociological Method, ii, 300

Ziegler, H. E., on Primitive Promiscuity, ii, 316

Zoroaster and the Zendavesta, i, 171



Sociology.

Social Facts and Forces.

**The Factory—The Labor Union—The Corporation—
The Railway—The City—The Church.** By WASH-
INGTON GLADDEN, author of "Applied Christianity,"
"Tools and the Man," etc. 12°, \$1.25.

"The book is full of invigorating thought, and is to be recommended to every one who feels the growing importance of public duties."—*The Outlook*.

Socialism and the Social Movement in the Nineteenth Century.

By WERNER SOMBART, University of Breslau, Germany.
Translated by ANSON P. ATTERBURY. With Intro-
duction by JOHN B. CLARK, Professor of Political
Economy in Columbia University. 12°, \$1.25.

"Sombart's treatise on socialism impresses me as admirable; and the translation is certainly an excellent piece of work."—J. B. CLARK, Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University.

The Sphere of the State,

or, The People as a Body Politic. By FRANK S. HOFF-
MAN, A.M., Professor of Philosophy, Union College.
Second edition. 12°, \$1.50.

"Professor Hoffman has done an excellent piece of work. He has furnished the student with a capital text-book and the general reader, who is interested in political science, with much that is suggestive, much that is worthy of his careful attention."

Anarchism.

A Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory. By
E. V. ZENKER. 12°, \$1.50.

"The fullest and best account of anarchism ever published. . . . A most powerful and trenchant criticism."—*London Book Gazette*.

Suggestions Toward an Applied Science of Sociology.

By EDWARD P. PAYSON, 12°. \$1.25.

"Mr. Payson has given us a valuable little volume on a very large and most important subject."—*Portland (Me.) Press*.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York & London.

By B. W. Conn, Ph.D.

Instructor of Biology in the Wesleyan University

THE METHOD OF EVOLUTION

Illustrated, Octavo

Prof. Conn, who in a previous work summarized for the popular reader the evidence for and against the general theory of organic evolution, has now brought the subject up to date by reviewing the present attitude of science toward the various evolutionary theories. The work gives an especially full account of the theories of heredity inaugurated by Weismann, and of the very great change that they have produced in the view which biologists take to-day in regard to all phenomena connected with evolution and development. This work is designed for all intelligent readers who are desirous of keeping abreast of the times and does not involve a technical knowledge of biological data for its comprehension . . . \$2.00

EVOLUTION OF TO-DAY

A summary of the theory of evolution as held by modern scientists, and an account of the progress made through the investigations and discussions of a quarter of a century. Octavo, cloth . . . \$1.75

CONTENTS.—Introduction—What is Evolution?—Are Species Mutable?—Classification of the Organic World—Life during the Geological Ages—Embryology—Geographical Distribution—Darwin's Explanation of Evolution—More recent Attempts to Explain Evolution—The Evolution of Man.

"A volume which is at once learned, scientific, ardent, independent, and devout."—*Journal of Education*, Boston.

"A complete success on the line marked out for it—that of judicial exposition."—*Boston Literary World*.

"This book becomes a sort of dictionary of evolution, and will be a necessity for any one who would understand the evolution of to-day."—*Omaha Republican*.

THE LIVING WORLD

Whence it Came and Whither it is Drifting. A review of the speculations concerning the origin and significance of life and of the facts known in regard to its development, with suggestions as to the direction in which the development is now tending. Illustrated. Octavo, cloth, \$1.25

"The lucid style, clear descriptions, and logical reasoning make his chapters highly satisfactory reading to the student who desires to learn the latest results of scientific research in this direction."—*The Critic*.

"The book is very readable, dignified in tone and reverent in spirit."—*The Churchman*.

New York—G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS—London

UNIVERSITY

**THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW**

**AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS
WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN
THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY
WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH
DAY AND TO \$1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY
OVERDUE.**

MAR 27 1933

MAR 28 1933

MAR 29 1933

MAY 12 1936

LD 21-50m-1,'81

YC 06875



78 78

